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A Tale of Two Visits to the DMZ
Consider two images of two United States presidents at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in Korea. The two images convey very different messages, very different possibilities. Which do you prefer?
The first image is of President Obama peering through military binoculars into North Korea. He is shielded behind bulletproof glass and a sandbagged observation post. South Korean (ROK) and American soldiers flank him. This image reflects the state of US-Korean policy for the past half-century.
The second image has more in it, and not in it, than a casual observer would see. The concrete curb, over which President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un are stepping, marks the dividing line between the two Koreas, defined in the armistice a half-century ago. The blue buildings are half on the north and half on the south. The southern half is controlled by the United Nations Command, while the northern is controlled by North Korean forces. For half a century, guard forces have faced off in ritualized vigilance.
With that context, consider what happened on the last weekend of June 2019. Notice that there are no military uniforms in sight. The two nation’s elite protective services, guarding the President of the United States and the hereditary leader of North Korea, took over the space for the hours needed to ensure their principals would be secure. The uniforms were dark suits instead of business-equivalent uniforms. The focus was protection rather than confrontation. This was a masterful employment of information as a tool of national policy, an informally choreographed act of public diplomacy.
President Trump set this moment in motion by Twitter, his go-to channel for information operations on multiple levels. It reminded me of an informal mentorship moment I had with a commanding general some years ago. This general would send out an e-mail calendar invitation to his staff when he was flying into his headquarters. Everyone in this lean staff was invited to join him for a morning “run, walk, or skate.” He always ran at a pace anyone in reasonable shape could match, and staff members would slide up alongside, exchange a few words, then fall back or move forward along the route. What was this accomplishing?
“I use these runs like other generals use golf,” my commander taught me. “When you are out playing golf, people talk. If the boss likes an idea, you get approval or an invitation to present it at the office. If not, you are just playing golf, so no one loses status.”
A tweet cuts out all the formal diplomatic structures and all the reputations at risk along the way. Because it is just a tweet, and not formal policy, there is no requirement to respond. If Kim had decided he just wasn’t going to be available, it would be a missed opportunity but not a failed formal initiative.
Kim accepted and the two nation’s security and diplomatic teams scrabbled to catch up with their principals’ intent. The militaries stepped back, and the personal protective forces stepped in, establishing coordinated security for the hours around the two leaders’ visit. The North Korean security team was sufficiently disciplined and professional to block the western press mob while recognizing the authority of President Trump’s new press secretary. Between the braying press pack and the large young men in dark suits, Stephanie Grisham got a bit bruised, but created the space for a couple of western reporters to get through and take the photographs to tell the story.
Grisham’s first days on the new job bode well, as she displayed toughness and poise under pressure. That is her setting the pick to roll a couple of reporters by the much bigger North Korean security man. Understand, everyone in the frame is doing their job. No one is being undisciplined on either government’s side. The big young man is doing his job, as instructed, and so is the tough lady who has her act together, focused on her boss’s need and intent in this moment.
Credit to Mike Gallagher for verbally painting the pictures at the top on his show. I went looking for the best images of each event and pulled them together into the top graphic and this story.
Published in Foreign Policy
I don’t have strong opinions on Trump’s “strategy” with regards to Kim, but I can’t shake this gnawing feeling that if the people in the pictures were flipped that the interpretation would be vastly different.
If I didn’t know better, I’d swear the bulletproof glass was between Obama and our troops . . .
Does anyone remember the time when a photo of a President was published where he was looking through the wrong end of a set of binoculars? I remember it as Clinton on the DMZ, but I could be wrong.
Snopes. FWIW.
Putin, backward.
But why? Reputation. Credibility. Policy.
Earned or not, liberal Democrats have a reputation for being weak on defense. It wasn’t a Republican candidate who created the phrase “global test”.
I object to the idea that we should have sacrificial soldiers at the DMZ as some sort of trip wire.
I also don’t think South Korea could manage a full out attack by North Korea without resorting to nuclear weapons. Nor should they.
He was using them in Macro mode.
I agree, but that’s because Obama was an appeaser, which Donald Trump most definitely is not.
I certainly hope it doesn’t come to a test of arms. But the correlation of forces skews heavily in favor of South Korea. The only advantage accruing to the North is choosing the timing of an attack.
You left out fanaticism.
I have no idea whether President Trump will have any success in his diplomatic efforts toward North Korea. Past policies have been an abject failure, so it seems appropriate for him to try something different.
The President often uses a tactic toward our opposition and allies that reverses the general use of the “good-cop/bad-cop” employed by prior Presidents. With our opponents, like North Korea or Russia or China, he acts friendly personally, playing the “good cop,” and letting his principal advisers take the “bad cop” role (Pompeo, Bolton, previously Mattis). With our allies, the President plays “bad cop,” and lets his advisers take the “good cop” role (seeking concessions in exchange for convincing the President to back down).
I’m also not sure if this will be successful, but it seems to have worked on some issues (particularly Mexico and some other allies), and it seems worth trying.
South Korea has much more to lose in every way. Seoul is right across the border. They have a huge economy, NK has almost no economy, assets or infrastructure. Those factors are crucial in this scenario.
And what? That because they have the most to lose, the wisest course of action for the ROK is surrender?
The end result of an attack by the KPA is a lot of death and damage in the south culminating in the total destruction of the Kim regime.
And what then? South Korea wins? They bomb NK back into the Stone Age, no electricity, no infrastructure, no food. Just like now.
The destruction of Seoul and millions of deaths in the south versus what? What gain?
Make no mistake, the Moon ‘regime’ will be gone as well. No one’s surrendering.
It’s just useful to recognize all the imbalances and how they naturally affect how to best proceed.
A couple of years ago, it was reported that the North Koreans had infiltrated part of the South Korean secret computer network and potentially obtained the war plans for defending South Korea. It would be interesting to know how, if true, this affected North Korean planning. Had they been underestimating South Korea and the US? Would an attack demonstrably be a losing afffair?
What should be the end goal for the Korean Penisula? Does defeat of North Korea and reunification make sense for South Korea? West Germany absorbed a huge economic burden with East Germany and I think the difference between North and South are even greater.
Does one hope for some regime change in North Korea that provides a freer North that can rebuild itself and maybe one day willingly reunite the Penisula? Of course, what does China want and how do they affect things?
An attack on North Korea by the ROK is not their policy.
Sez you. How does North Korea know that? They are a Paranoid State. Just because they are probably wrong doesn’t matter.
Maybe we are talking past each other, but it seems to me that you are pretty casual about what would be tantamount to a huge loss of life for little or no gain. I can’t quite get a ‘win’ out of it, and very little satisfaction from the other guy losing.
Not casual at all. My views are simple. The south is more than ready to defend itself. The north is weak and Kim’s influence is largely due to his nuclear program. The only sure way to guarantee his fall is if he attacks the south. Not my desired outcome.
Some situations really are lose:lose. That is how the situation has been for nigh on seventy years. Trump might change the dynamic. He also might not be able to.
I don’t want to overload the quoting mechanism:
“Not casual at all. My views are simple. The south is more than ready to defend itself. The north is weak and Kim’s influence is largely due to his nuclear program. The only sure way to guarantee his fall is if he attacks the south. Not my desired outcome.”
I’m not sure we want Kim to fall, either. In fact it would probably be a bad thing.
I can’t understand people’s belief that things are so starkly top-down. Even dictators have obstacles. The people directly under the totalitarian dictator- the guys who carry out the orders – are likely pretty influential and important to keep happy. These men are military badasses. They aren’t peaceniks and they don’t want to be seen as week. If Kim moves to fast he can easily wake up dead.
It’s not like North Korea is going to have some kind of popular democratic revolution and all will be well. That’s not even possible at this point.
I think he’s a kid who inherited a failed state and is in a horrible box. Maybe not. Maybe he’s a ruthless killer who wants to taunt and embarrass the USA and reunite Korea by force.
I’m closer to the former supposition.
Just highlight the part you want to argue with, and hit “Reply.” It will only quote the highlighted part.
Doesn’t work for me using my phone, but thanks!
Very true. He’s sitting on a time bomb his father and grandfather created.
Embrace the power of “and.” Remember the murder of his brother.
I think I see your problem. 😜
Michael Malice claims Kim is the hereditary ruler, chief warlord of a group of warlords who call themselves “general.” The turf is apparently divided among several of them, just like the old days when they would be Lord So-and-So. So feudal with strong king, perhaps.
Again, he may have been forced to do so or make enemies of influential generals. He was charged with treason, right? Kinda like George Bush and Scooter Libby. Thrown to the wolves.
We act like everyone has complete freedom and agency to always do the right thing, and if they don’t ( and we have scant information) they are some kind of evil personified.
And the journalists who want Trump to scold Kim about human rights violations. The answer is. It’s been done. We need to move the entire thing in another direction.
Opening up Korea will accomplish great things and reform, saving and liberating the ones in the little concentration camps around the country and the big one that is the entire country. Scolding and shaming doesn’t do anything real, and is obviously counterproductive.
It makes the politician look good and we Americans can feel nicely superior, but nothing changes for the North Korean people.
Agreed. But I suspect that Kim is not exactly a squish. Yes, he probably has to act a part, but that’s not saying that it isn’t true to himself.
I believe we’ve actually pulled back the battalion that used to be right up on the DMZ. Troops further back, along side all the local ROK units with their pre-planned, dug in positions, are a good deal more than a trip wire. And it ain’t 1950. Our equipment and training, and the ROKs, are far beyond the North Koreans’ equipment and training.
Austin Bay, on a recent R> hosted Power Line podcast, claims otherwise. He asserts the ROK has worked out the “kill chain” necessary to overwhelm the DPRK strategic forces and leadership.
See also an article on Korea at The National Interest:
Maybe yes, maybe no. If yes, then the ROK is following the US play versus the USSR. We took it out of the all or nothing nukes or don’t fight position and into the “if you roll across the inter-German border, we’ll defeat you without firing a single nuke.”