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NATO in the 21st Century
When I was a senior in college, I was enrolled in two different seminar classes taught by the same professor. He was a very wise and experienced man who fought with MacArthur in the Philippines before receiving his doctorate in history. He is the preeminent NATO historian as well as a distinguished early American history scholar. The two classes were called “NATO: A Modern History” and “Jeffersonian America,” and both of those courses have been on my mind recently.
The Jeffersonian America class began with Washington’s Farewell Address from in 1796. Washington used the address to discuss what he believed should guide American foreign policy. He expressed a desire to uphold current alliances, but also cautioned against creating more alliances, “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements.” Washington feared a United States being pulled into the conflict because of rivalries that have defined much of European history. “Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe,” he asked “entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”
Now let us fast forward to April 4th 1949 and the founding of NATO by twelve nations. The alliance was formed less than four years after the surrender of Germany and four months before the first successful Soviet nuclear weapons test. The free world was threatened by the Soviet Union’s expansionist foreign policy in Eastern Europe and the hardcore communist philosophy that underpinned it. My thoughts on communism are pretty much in line with those of Brigadier General Jack Ripper. The Soviet Union represented a real and present danger to the entire world because of its communist philosophy. NATO was formed to protect the United States and the other member nations from Soviet aggression and was central to the eventual collapse of the USSR.
However, it has been 67 years since NATO’s founding and I think it would be prudent to discuss the current merits of the alliance. The collapse of the Soviet Union has made NATO’s mission a little more muddled. Is the threat from Russia the same as the threat from the USSR? Soviet philosophy called for a global Marxist revolution, but what is the philosophy of the Russian Federation? Is Putin more of a Tsar than a General Secretary of the Central Committee? I have a sense that the current political climate in Europe is more like 1914 than 1949. The old rivalries are stirring and threatening the cooperation that defined the second half of the 20th century.
The most important question is does the NATO alliance still serve a purpose? If the Russians invade one of the Baltic nations what will happen? I believe that the US will dutifully try to defend the tiny nations, but I am not convinced that any of the other nations will heed the call. But what about Article 5, you ask?
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. [emphasis added]
I’ll never forget my professor trying to dissuade the class of the conventional understanding of Article 5 (it’s hard to disagree with a person who was there when the treaty was being signed and ratified). Article 5 does not require the use of armed force, it only includes armed force as one of the responses. The “deems necessary” line is never mentioned, but would most assuredly be used by other NATO allies to preclude sending military aid to a vulnerable Baltic nation. Will the French commit a significant portion of their over-stretched military? Will the Belgians and their unionized army get there on time? Will the Dutch respond to an attack on Estonia with force even though they barely protested the killing of 193 Dutch citizens on MH 17 by Russian-backed separatists? The Turks? The Greeks? Italians and Spaniards fighting in Latvia?
If it’s as easy as I think to picture NATO allies weaseling out of defending another member state, then I have to ask whether NATO serves an American interest or are we now entangled in the toils of European ambition as Washington warned? I have not come to a conclusion on this matter and I am no fan of Putin or a new Imperial Russia. I just happen to believe it’s important to discuss what has become an almost unquestionable belief that NATO in its current configuration is necessary for American foreign policy.
Published in Foreign Policy
Preservation of the current world order, which is generally in the interest of both the US and Europe. We had a number of nations helping in Iraq and Afghanistan, such as Poland, with little or nothing “in it for them” except commitment to our alliance.
A major confrontation with China would also tend to spread. I would expect it to trigger major problems in the Middle East. Even if our NATO allies didn’t directly help with China, they could help with other problems that would free up US forces.
You can have use of overseas military bases without entering into defensive alliance organizations like NATO. We have bases in Saudi, for example. And in Cuba.
Operations involving our NATO allies are made mostly for purposes of political cover, so we can say we are acting together with the “world community” or whatever. Their military contributions are negligible (with the possible exception of the Brits) and tend to be far more trouble than they are worth operationally because of various interoperability and command and control problems.
The Europeans had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the Balkans to take care of trouble in their own neighborhood. I see no possibility that they would go to bat for us in the Pacific, where they have zero military reach, and where their involvement would antagonize China, an important trading partner that does not threaten them.
China’s goal is to push the U.S. out beyond the “second island chain”, as they call it, so that China can dominate its neighborhood the same way that the United States dominates its neighborhood. The Europeans simply have no dog in this fight.
Do you have any experience serving in a NATO command, or another military command dealing with NATO-specific issues? I couldn’t see anything about this in your profile.
Hercules,
Concerns about standing alliances are understandable. However, they offer a way for the U.S. to lead by shaping the current and future political environment, as well as pushing for action when necessary. (I’m consciously using the word shape, not control.) We did this following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and 9/11. Although we didn’t get all the support we desired, NATO gave us an expeditious political means to develop options and identify what each partner could provide. Without a standing alliance, it would take significantly more time to create one and get all the supporting countries coordinated. It would also take longer to coordinate military operations, since they wouldn’t have standing operational procedures to use. I’ve been involved in several multi-national military operations, and cannot stress enough the importance of these.
It’s a good idea to consider Washington’s comment in context. The situation then was completely different from what we have today. While we think that things change quickly now, back then no other country was a democracy. Countries changed policies when the ruler died or just changed his mind, and went to war much more often. Overall, the social and political situation in Europe, particularly NATO countries, has been fairly stable for decades, a very long period of peace as compared to previous centuries.
There may be good reasons to tweak NATO. However, I see no reason for us to leave.
No, none whatsoever. But there is a large literature out there about coalition warfare, including in the NATO context.
Roger that. While on active duty in the Navy, I was tangentially involved with one NATO operation. However, I have extensive experience in the Far East with navies from several countries, including Japan, the ROK, Australia, Singapore and India. You’d be surprised how much we depend upon these allies. Due to the shrinking number of ships in our navy, we depend upon them to provide ships, submarines and aircraft to help us accomplish missions that the allies are willing to conduct. This happens more than you realize, during exercises and normal operations. The more we work with them, the more they learn and get used to using our standing operating procedures (SOP). NATO has a leg up on our allies in the Far East, since they have SOPs which help them all operate together. If we weren’t in NATO, it’d be nigh impossible to develop and employ SOPs.
Also, although the distance is great, the U.K. and France are still interested in what happens in the Western Pacific. They send ships out here periodically, to reinforce their national interests.
I hope this helps you understand that, even though it’s difficult to operate with foreign militaries and looks ineffective, it supports U.S. national interests.
Tedley, thanks for that comment.
There’s no question that, as we disarm more and more, we have to rely on allies to do things that we no longer have the capacity to do. But this is not an ideal situation. I think that the rising threat of China will quite soon force us to reverse our disarmament policy, particularly our naval disarmament.
I also think that burden sharing against China will be quite different than in Europe because of the different nature of the battlefield. In Europe the planning was always for large-scale ground operations by armored forces. To the extent that the security problems in Asia are more air/maritime in nature than land, it might actually provide smaller allies more meaningful roles to play especially to the extent that investments in air/maritime capabilities enhance their own national sovereignty, and not just collective security. The notion of air/sea battle and the integration of the battlespace through sensors, UAVs, interlinked jet fighters (F35’s) suggests increasing opportunities for allies to plug and play into US-led coalitions. On the whole, I would imgaine with the great distances/spaces involved, the size of the key players, plus the evolving nature of military tech, burden sharing would be less of a challenge in Asia than in Europe.
But having said all that, I still think Europe will have little or no interest in helping us with China. Most of the burden sharing (and attendant free rider problems) will be with our Pacific allies.
I think your points are well thought out, and I definitely agree that the U.S. shouldn’t let its military shrink as far as it has.