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Organizational Culture, Improvisation, Success, and Failure
Maggie’s Farm reminds us that October 21 was the 210th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar, which — in turn — reminds me of a thoughtful document written in 1797 by a Spanish naval official, Don Domingo Perez de Grandallana, on the subject of “why do we keep losing to the British, and what can we do about it?” His thoughts were inspired by his observations of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent, a significant defeat for Spain, and addressed a question very relevant to us today. Specifically: What attributes of an organization make it possible for that organization to accomplish its mission in an environment of uncertainty, rapid change, and high stress? Here are his key findings, quoted from Adam Nicholson’s Seize the Fire:
An Englishman enters a naval action with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by the sacred and priceless principle of mutual support. Accordingly, both he and his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgement upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, and goes into battle with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief’s signals for such and such manoeures…
De Grandallana continues:
Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by the strict rule to keep station which is enforced upon then in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst of all they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.
The various kinds of organizational behavior that de Grandallana identifies are still very much with us. In some organizations, people are “preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief’s signals.” In others, they “fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment upon the spur of the moment.” And in a few organizations, they act with the aforesaid zeal and judgment while also knowing that they will be supported by colleagues who are “bound by the sacred and priceless principle of mutual support.”
One could simply say “for best results, combine individual entrepreneurship with a high degree of teamwork,” but I think de Grandallana says it much better.
By the time of the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), de Grandallana had become head of Spain’s naval secretariat. Imagine his feelings when reading the reports of that battle’s catastrophic results for the combined Spanish and French fleets. He had accurately diagnosed the key problems of his side, but had been unable to bring about the sweeping changes necessary to address them. Cassandra, in real life.
Shortly after hurricances Katrina and Rita, The Washington Post featured an article on the increasing propensity of Americans to be driven by rules and procedures, rather than doing what makes sense. There are certainly trends in our society which, if not reversed, will make us increasingly similar to the Spanish situation in 1805, rather than that Nelson’s victorious fleet. And in case it’s not obvious, I’m not talking about just the military, but all aspects of our society, including education, business, government, and nonprofits.
For another example of this malign trend, see my post about bureaucratic obstacles to fighting a wildfire on my own blog. I think Don Domingo Perez de Grandallana would feel a sad sense of recognition.
Published in Culture, History
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THIS. Needs to be on the flagship podcast.
Victor Davis Hanson wrote about this sort of thing in his book, Carnage and Culture, in which he “argued that the military dominance of Western Civilization, beginning with the ancient Greeks, is the result of certain fundamental aspects of Western culture, such as consensual government and individualism.”
Norvell De Atkine describes different military cultures (encouragement or discouragement of personal initiative) in his article, “Why Arabs Lose Wars.”
Bureaucracy and its inefficiency and waste is the main reason we need to give more responsibility back to the states and maybe even local governments. The bigger the entity directing something (education, business, health care and the like) the more money it will waste, the less ability it will have to react quickly and the less accountability it will have to the people.
A 4-10 10-4 battle will be determined by culture, or common understanding of what is expected. If the four delay by sheer determination and bloody the enemy in spite of the odds, and the other four don’t and put up a token defence then flee, the 10 will join the four fresh and unbloodied to help their four take on the 10, and legends will be made of everyone.
There were no easy victories in that type of war. It often came down to getting a last volley off while blood was running over the deck. Firing when the gunnery officer was dead, and regrouping as casualties required it. Training and discipline helped, but on the fly decisions by everyone from the seamen to the officers made for success.
Interestingly the current situation has shown that an enemy only needs to confuse and force a quick decision by the President to gain an enormous advantage in spite of the overwhelming advantage.
Titus,
Your comments here makes me think your objection is over the use of the word culture to describe values and behavior within a group. Culture is not just a thing for nation states. Even groups as small as families, offices, businesses, or sports teams have their own culture.
What is your objection to the use of the word culture?
See also Rose Wilder Lane’s comparison of the French/Spanish colonial styles vs that of the British:
The Governments gave them (in the case of the French and Spanish colonies–ed) carefully detailed instructions for clearing and fencing the land, caring for the fence and the gate, and plowing and planting, cultivating, harvesting, and dividing the crops…The English Kings were never so efficient. They gave the land to traders. A few gentlemen, who had political pull enough to get a grant, organized a trading company; their agents collected a ship-load or two of settlers and made an agreement with them which was usually broken on both sides…To the scandalized French, the people in the English colonies seemed like undisciplined children, wild, rude, wretched subjects of bad rulers.
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Exactly, and who won in the end?
To cut through all the chaff and pseudo pop organizational behavior, Act and those around you will also.
BRAVO! Well done Mr. Foster. Thank you!
Rule Britannia!
In my earlier comment about the culture changes engendered by the French Revolution, it highlights another factor. England had been unified for hundreds of years and had had a major change at the heart of its legal system after the unification. The union of England and Scotland had been accomplished relatively recently and took care of some of the administrative headaches of dealing with them as two separate kingdoms. So, while George III did have several domains: the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Kingdom of Ireland, the Electorate of Brunswick-Lüneburg, the Duchy of Insular Normandy, and the Lordship of Man, they were run separately.
In both France and Spain, they had been several independent kingdoms, counties, duchies, seigneuries, etc. that had been brought together under one administration, but there had not been a new and unified legal code imposed since the Roman Law. Each domain had developed independently, but they were trying to run them as if they were one kingdom. The problem was that each had dozens of sets of laws, contradicted in the next territory. It would be as if instead of a President, we had one person who would be governor of all fifty states and had to deal with all fifty state legislatures. These were not nations as we think of them today. This fact may have led to the culture of prescription. “Don’t think about it, just do it this way here and that way there. Using common sense will cause trouble.”
I am unsure of the point Titus is trying to make, but in the end, the British had a superior naval doctrine to the French.
This meant that even when the French had a great admiral such as Suffren the British were still competitive and often beat him.
One great or superior Admiral could not over the long haul win out against the superior naval doctrine and culture of the English.
I could write huge posts on this if people really want.
So let it be written; so let it be done.
That’s alright, I have abused the privilege enough for both of us. ;^D