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The Invasion of the Soviet Union Was the Key Turning Point of WW2
Operation Barbarossa was the name given to Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 22, 1941. The battle aims of the German forces under the command of Adolf Hitler were the following: the complete annihilation of the Soviet Union’s armed forces, the collapse of communism, and primarily the conquest of lebensraum (living space) for the Third Reich and its people.
To achieve such aims the Germans created one of the largest and least well known coalitions in history, assembling an army of 4 million men (3 million being German) and hundreds of thousands of cars, trucks, planes, and horses. They came from Finland in the far north to Romania in the far south and invaded the USSR on a 2,000 mile frontier. At approximately 3:00 in the morning on Monday 74 years ago began what many historians believe was the decisive event of the Second World War. I would concur with such a view and here is why.
First, the decision by Hitler to attack the Soviet Union in 1941 opened up an Eastern Front in the war in Europe and thus created a two-front war. This was the mistake many German generals believed had cost Germany the First World War; the surviving generals’ assessment blamed the Nazis’ decisions here for Germany losing the Second.
By May 1941 Hitler was master of continental Europe. Had Hitler decided to go with the smart options, he would have concentrated on bringing Britain to peace terms and thus ending any possible American entry into the European war. Yet he did not, thank God. As Andrew Roberts points out in his brilliant book The Storm of War, blinded by Nazi ideology (i.e., lebensraum), Hitler chose to follow the goals of the party, rather than what was “rational.” In doing so he signed his death warrant. The German Empire simply could not sustain a war in the long run on two fronts once the allied powers mobilized their full economic, political, and military resources.
Second was the sheer savagery and cost of the new front on Nazi forces. Most importantly, the operation opened up the Eastern Front, to which more forces were committed than in any other theater of war in world history. The Eastern Front became the site of some of the largest battles, most horrific atrocities, and highest casualties for Soviets and Germans alike.
The numbers that fought on the Soviet soil were daunting but the amount that died there was even more horrifying. Nearly 25 million people (and this is a conservative figure) died on this front in a four-year period. Not just soldiers but millions of civilians as well. Hitler did not call it a war of annihilation for nothing.
Fortunately for the Russian people and the world, his war had a downside for Nazi ambitions. For you see, out of every four German soldiers killed in the entire war, three died on the Eastern Front. Since German armed forces lost close to 3 million men, that is a startling figure but a telling one. In this figure, one can see how the Second World war came to be lost for Germany.
The other allied nations did not inflict such casualty rates on Germans until late 1944 when Germany was already fatally weakened. It was the ordinary Russians — ill-equipped, terrified, and fused with both hatred and patriotism — who won against their invaders at a terrifying cost. Statistically speaking, it took three to four Russian soldiers to die in order to inflict same result on one German soldier. Now you can imagine why so many Russians died and why their deaths were so crucial to the end victory.
Third, and this is crucial, was the make up of the Russian government. The USSR was a totalitarian communist state which since 1927 had been led by a genocidal communist lunatic. Joseph Stalin had wiped away several millions of his own people and others he controlled during the years leading up to WW2. He ruled with an iron fist and a vicious communist police state which had just finished purging its imagined enemies and rivals in the military and the party.
However, going up against the equally frightening totalitarian regime of Nazi Germany, perhaps it was better that Russia had such a cruel but tight, centralized police state. For no democratic government, not even the U.S., could have sustained and kept fighting against Hitler while losing the millions the Russian people did. If you doubt me, keep in mind the growing disquiet in current generation of American public when Iraq war dead of U.S. soldiers rose to 4,000.
Modern democracies and the ones in the 1940s could not have sustained the casualty rates that Russia endured then and still remained free societies or combatants. They would have sued for peace or stayed out of confrontation. While I personally believe the U.S. and U.K. could have defeated the Nazis without Soviet Union, millions more of their men would have paid with their lives and the war would not have ended in 1945 (or without a mushroom cloud in Europe).
Fourth, the resources that Russia had at its disposal proved crucial to victory. The Russians’ sheer territory meant that it was impossible for the Germans to fully conquer and police it effectively. As the initial fighting ended, the USSR armed forces learned to retreat in an orderly fashion dragging the Germans deeper and deeper into Russia and playing havoc with their very thin supply lines. This would prove crucial as the war went on and the Germans became too few on the ground.
The mineral and productivity resources of the Stalinist regime were left intact behind the Ural Mountains, easily out of reach of Stuka bombers. The Soviet war capacity could be kept alive and allowed to grow, turning out new and ever more effective tanks, armaments, and rockets. However, the biggest resource that ensured Russia’s survival was it vast population. The Russians had a population then of over 100 million people and could put millions to arms, something the Germans found out later. For all the thousands the Nazis killed, more kept coming. This sapped German morale and allowed the Russians to regroup and plan strategies and attacks with more men. This was crucial to winning the war in the East.
I probably have more reasons why Soviet entry into the war changed the course of history but, alas, as of right now I cannot think of them. But as you can see, it was necessary that they did. The outcome of the war in Europe was decided not on the beaches of Normandy but in the steppes, forests, and hill country of the Eastern Front. The greatest and cruelest conflict in history had its worst and most awful confrontations here and the results changed the history of the globe.
Hope you read it and like or comment below. I am not working for RT by the way. As of yet anyway.
Published in History, Military
In addressing the issue of the German navy, it was as schizophrenic as the Luftwaffe. The programs to build the Bismark and the Tirpitz were slow, and the actual use of Bismark was a waste, as had been the sacrifices of Graf Spee and others. There was no real concept of concentrated fleet action, nor any preparation for squadron operations. Sure there were carriers under construction, but the losses to the Luftwaffe over Britain doomed the carrier program as Germany could not spare any pilots even if the carriers were ever completed.
Put simply, Hitler, in 1940, was not prepared to actually go to war with Britain. His own staff, prior to the war, had wanted to postpone any naval confrontations with Britain until at least 1943 / 44, when they figured they would have enough of a navy to actually have a squadron.
The 1939-41 sacrifice of the surface fleet was a tremendous waste of equipment and men that could have been put toward other things.
Gents, I want to thank you. I have hitherto somehow lived with the impression that Hitler’s Germany was a mortal threat to Britain & that Hitler, had he concentrated such forces as he had at the time, could have destroyed Britain utterly. I am very happy to learn that, whatever one hears from the likes of Churchill, Hitler in fact had no chance–shy of some devilish miracle–of prevailing upon Britain. I, of course, regret only that Britain had to go through all those baseless fears & the shocking change of government that created an unelected PM in the person of Churchill. Can you imagine how embarrassed they all must have been, in Britain & Germany alike, some fearing & the others hoping that the might of the Reich might vanquish the island race. To say nothing of poor Roosevelt, who was anyway ill & busy managing the Depression–he had to worry so much about helping Britain when in fact there was no mortal threat, no moment of truth or finest hour or so much owed by so many for so little. What a silly misunderstanding–or was it some kind of terrible lie on the part of Churchill–you remember the famous line about fighting on the beaches &c.–there was no chance at all of an invasion, I have now learned. I am telling you, it puts all that pretense of courage in face of ultimate risk in an entirely new light!
You are again putting words in my mouth.
None of what I have said would have been apparent to anyone at the time. Would the RAF have known the real state of the Luftwaffe? No. Would the Royal Navy have known or appreciated the idiocy of the Kriegsmarine’s tactics? No. They were losing ships to the Germans. Just after the Bismarck was stalled and overwhelmed (after knocking out the Hood and disabling the hapless and cursed Prince of Wales), the Ark Royal carrier (whose planes had disabled Bismarck) was sunk by a sub attack.
If you read General Allenbrook’s memoirs (their CnC, Montgomery’s boss, and the man who successfully evacuated Dunkirk), you can see just how thinly the Brits were stretched. They were expecting some sort of knock out blow at every moment, and were consistently surprised how how the Nazis kept thinning out their own forces and widening their theater of operations.
My point still stands regarding the Luftwaffe, though, I don’t think they could have successfully knocked out Britain at that time, and the Luftwaffe clearly came to the same conclusion then too. They were running out of aircraft and pilots.
After rereading this part, wasn’t this the case in most of the buildup to the war? The main one is if Britain and France went to war over the Sudeten, before Germany had a chance to integrate the Germans there and having the Czech armed forces on their side, but it could come at any of the other points as well.
Skip, you’re too nice a guy. Really, there is no getting around this: All sides in the conflict were wrong about the most important things!
Yes, Hitler was a gambler and impatient. He bluffed his way through the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and the Sudetenland. Hitler was further surprised when France didn’t invade from the west in 1939, as France had more and better tanks and aircraft than the Nazis.
Heck, even the invasion of France could have gone the other way if Belgium hadn’t dithered so long and let the Allies dig in along its German frontier. Allenbrook described how the BEF had started to entrench itself along the Franco-Belgium border after the Belgians refused to let them enter. Then, before the Brits had a chance to finish that work the Belgians, finally realizing that Hitler was going to invade no matter what, begged the Allies to reinforce. So the BEF stopped its fortification work and started moving forward. Before the BEF could even get to work in Belgium, Germany attacked and caught them flat footed.
Eh? This is usually the case in wars – especially at the outset. As the adage goes, no plan survives the first five minutes of a conflict. Hitler gained an early massive (and unexpected, even to themselves) tactical advantage in the war, then utterly squandered it through foolish and mercurial strategy. The Brits and French made massive early mistakes, costing France entirely and pushing Britain to the brink.
Are you sure you believe this, that the parties in most wars mistook the fundamental facts when going to war
It usually seems to be the case. What seems “fundamentally” important at the beginning of a conflict may well not turn out to be decisive in achieving victory.
Example: the importance attached to battleships by all sides at the start of WWII.
Example: the correct application of airpower (Germany invested heavily in dive bombers and medium bombers, but didn’t consider the importance of bomber escorts and heavy bombers).
Example: Vietnam – yes we could win any actual military encounter, but the home front collapsed.
Example: The 2nd Punic War – Rome utterly misunderstood Hannibal’s tactics, while Hannibal utterly misunderstood Roman resolve and depth of resources.
Example: WWI – no one was prepared for what actually happened.
Example: Iraq – quick military victory, but no planning for what followed (and continues).
Skip, maybe this is another discussion. I dislike the way you put together many things that are not alike & I do not see how you have picked your examples.
Consider a few things: Hannibal really was better than those who opposed him, but Rome was under no illusion that he was an existential threat. Had he turned out to be a blunderer–then that would have been a good example. Just because he was better than they were makes no difference as to the fundamental necessities of the war.
As to Vietnam & Iraq: Your politicians did not decided what they wanted & how to get it. Ends & means were badly out of alignment. That this should happen is not such a shock. Many go to war who should better not, but they are not clear-eyed. But of course the mistakes did not go so far as to prevent Americans from defeating their enemies; nor were they wrong about who was really the enemy. The ignorance of necessity was only partial. As for the homefront trouble–that does not seem to me obviously relevant to what we are discussing here.
Now, as to WWII–the battleship mistake is not important.
& as to WWI–everybody had prepared to do exactly what they did. They did not expect a stalemate, but that is a different matter. This is a strange case, at any rate–who went to war with whom & why is almost uniquely difficult of understanding in that case. (Completely unlike WWII…)
So your examples do not persuade me that the rule is fundamental misunderstanding. I’d say the Great War really did show a great misunderstanding. But not the other cases. It strikes me, however, that the discussion would really have to take into account regime & the capabilities of the man who wages war.
But if we were to put it in crass terms–though not misleadingly crass–the question is about who is stronger & who is weaker. Would you say parties to war are usually mistaken about this basic issue? I would say, no.
I would agree on that point – where mistakes are often made, though, is in understanding where, how, and to what extent the parties are weak or strong. You just cannot fully know until you put things to the test.
It cost Britain dearly when they lost Singapore and Force Z. A competent carrier force in that area might have changed the Japanese strategy (not that Britain had any to spare at that point, but really Force Z was sent on a suicide mission).
It cost Germany through the building and then the loss of their surface fleet too – a tremendous waste of resources and time. After the lessons of WWI and the successes of the primitive subs of that time, why in heck did they first try to build a fleet of surface raiders? Lunacy. A larger U-boat fleet earlier in the war could have been decisive against Britain.
I think there’s a difference between knowledge & what you call putting it to the test or the old adage about contact with the enemy–at the very least, chance has to be taken into account, which knowledge cannot fully overcome. But the question is, is it all up to chance, or the decisive things–you seemed to me to suggest, it really is up to chance ultimately. Whatever people could know, whatever they can do–it does not add up–chance is still more important.
I suppose that’s not what you really believe. If you think about what the political art can do, what things are by necessity or naturally, & what part chance plays in events–would you still say, mostly, wars are started by parties who misunderstand the fundamental things?
That would be conflating two different ideas to say it that way. It’s much broader in scope than what I’m trying to say. It’s more along the lines of this: Every nation that goes to war does so with initial strategies and goals, and often these are deeply flawed and filled with misconceptions – either starting wars that they cannot (or are unprepared to) practically win, or in investing in the wrong strategy or technology. WWI is practically a case study, but so is WWII.
Hitler was surprised that Britain and France actually went to war over Poland, but was not prepared to actually fight them in 1939. He had been assuming a later war against them, and even though the 1940 collapse of France came unexpectedly rapidly, he was still not really prepared for a longer war, nor prepared to actually knock out Britain – the naval and air unpreparedness and dithering demonstrate this. He then stupidly compounded those problems by expanding the war in every other direction. His early successes make one wonder what he could have wrought had he just been more patient, and had his armaments engineers been a little more focussed. Imagine if he had waited till 1941, he may well have been able to knock out Britain and still have enough strength to pivot to Russia.
I’m not so sure Germany could have even managed to build a larger U-Boat fleet. Germany had a profound shortage of steel, despite being (I think) the second largest producer of steel. These difficulties go back to the 1930’s, when Germany had to contend with harsh American sanctions, including sanctions that were enacted after Kristallnacht.
The steel problem was so acute that the Luftwaffe had steel allocated specially for them separate from the rest of the German armed forces, partly thanks to the influence of Goering. I don’t think Germany could have built that much more U-Boats while trying to build up the Luftwaffe and the Wehrmacht.
True, but they were getting it from somewhere, and likely they would have had more in 1941 (absent a war) than they did in 1939. Their tank forces in 1939/40 were still mostly older obsolete models, and they could have recalled, scrapped, and replaced those, had they given themselves enough time. And the steel allocated to projects like Bismarck, or their abortive carriers, was largely wasted. 1 Bismarck = lots of u-boats.
As to the general matter, sure, there are all sorts of mistakes made in war. There is a question as to its basic rationality. Do rulers really know what they’re doing starting wars. War separates winners & losers; & takes its toll on all; so it really matters whether the difference between winners & losers has much to do with the political art; otherwise, it is chance. Your statements are rather non-committal. How often is often? How full of miconceptions? How deeply flawed? It sounds like you’re saying, it’s insanity & of course they don’t know they’re insane! But you do not come out & say it. I do not know therefore your opinion on this matter so I do not know whether I agree or not–are the flaws & misconceptions the fundamental thing or are they not?
As to the specific points, it seems reasonable not to expect war over powerless, defenseless Poland when there had been no war over the far more redoubtable Czechoslovakia. I think Hitler misunderstood decent people–like Chamberlain–which he was bound to do. I think his successes make sense & could have been augmented much better, but his limits as a politician were very serious.
What do you make of the BEF in Normandy? Could Hitler have exterminated it had he wanted to do it? Do you think he wanted to do it? Are you persuaded he focused on destroying Britain, gave it his best shot, & was defeated?
I’m not sure they could have scrapped the tanks. Hitler did not have much freedom to choose 1941 as a date to invade the Soviet Union. The Soviets were the dominant partner in the short German-Soviet alliance. The Soviet Union dominated the relationship economically, since they supplied Germany with critical materials that lessened the impact the British blockade of the continent, including (and most importantly) oil and grain. Germany was getting oil from Romania, but not enough. The Soviets were aware of their dominance, and they put the screws to Germany. I can’t remember the exact date, but Soviet diplomats demanded that Germany build some heavy industrial plant in the Soviet Union while also surrendering the blueprints. They basically wanted Germany to give away technology for grain and, to a lesser extent, oil. The Germans balked, and realized that the alliance couldn’t last much longer.
You think the USSR was the big partner? Stalin supplied Hitler with enormous quantities of oil & kerosene! As for the German-Soviet heavy industry partnership–it long precedes the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, so far as I know. As a rule, I do not think the partner that supplies enormous resources is the tough one-
I think he dithered on Dunkirk and lost a chance to knock out the BEF. However, even if he had done so he still would have had to either bomb Britain into submission or invade, and I don’t think he could have done either, even with a full mustering of resources available at that time. The BEF, remember, lost pretty well all of its equipment in its evacuation, so if Hitler could have landed he would have outmatched them anyway.
But Hitler would still have had to cross the channel first, and Britain still had the RAF and the Navy. Hitler was unable to knock out the former, and lacked the strength to confront the latter. Sure he had successfully invaded Norway, but that was a different proposition than invading Britain, so that meant bombing Britain into peace. And for reasons previously discussed, he was unable to do that.
The fact that the Soviets could make such demands shows how powerful they were in the relationship.
There was German-Soviet industry cooperation, going back to (I think) the 1920’s. This was cooperation, not demands being made due to economic leverage.
Not to mention military cooperation. Germany handily got around Versailles (pre Hitler) by training officers and men in the USSR. This way they kept their “official” army under the treaty, all the while making the real one larger and better trained. The USSR also made a handy place to stash equipment “off site”.
Well, then, you have also proven that Hitler dominated the relationship because he could demand everything he got in the R-M pact-
What do you mean? Hitler couldn’t demand anything.
And that was due to Walter Rathenau (under the Treaty of Rapallo), a Jew in the Weimar government.
I don’t think we’re understanding each other. To my knowledge, Hitler got enormous quantities of oil & kerosene & whatever else through the R-M pact. Whatever you think about what he could demand, we agree he got those things? Does not that, by your criteria, make him the big partner?
No. He got that only because he agreed to cede Eastern Poland and agreed on with the Russians on what constituted their sphere of influence. The Soviet Union was getting permanent increases in their territory. Germany was merely getting raw materials (true, that was a separate economic treaty, but it followed from M-R). Germany was relying upon the Soviets for the war in the west. The Soviets really didn’t need Germany once they got their territories.
I’m not sure what you mean by “the big partner” but Hitler had to give up a lot for the pact. He was the one who came to Stalin in August 1939. He gave up large parts of Poland and gave Stalin a free hand in the Baltics. It also freed up Stalin to launch his attack on Finland in November 1939 and allowed him to seize land from Romania.
1. Hitler got most of Poland. That again should mean he’s a bigger boy than Stalin1
2. If he’s getting paid to give Stalin less than he’s taking for himself, he’s even bigger!
3. If the payments continue for more throughout the 39-41 period, stopped by Hitler’s attack, it starts looking like the weaker paying the stronger!
4. What does ‘relying upon the Soviets’ mean? Relying on them to make payments? Or what? If Stalin felt like he did not need Hitler, why keep paying him?