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The Deeper Meaning of McChrystal
Just ran an op-ed today in the Wall Street Journal trying to plumb the more important meaning behind the firing of General McChrystal (I can’t let Robinson hog all the space in the nation’s papers). One issue is that civilian-military relations have been very poor, perhaps even in a crisis (though the media overuse that word these days), since the end of the Cold War. This began with Colin Powell’s time as chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Bill Clinton’s hostile relationship with the military. McChrystal’s alleged misdeeds are nothing compared to Powell’s publishing a New York Times op-ed opposing intervention in Bosnia while the administration was considering it or the open resistance to gays in the military. Clinton’s troubles continued throughout his administration, but I really lay the blame for the poor state of things at the feet of the congressional Democrats, who encouraged the revolt of the generals and other military resistance to the Bush administration’s strategies in Iraq and the war on terrorism. It was predictable that a similar, maybe even worse outbreak, would occur once a Democrat again was President.
There are other important issues worth exploring, such as whether this really compares with MacArthur or McClellan, what this means for the Afghanistan war, how independent we want the military to be in its judgments, whether the military should want generals with political saavy, and so on. It seems to me that Petraeus may be an excellent political general, but do we really want our warfighters to worry about these qualities at the expense of the sheer expertise at killing the enemy brought to the table by a McChrystal?
Published in General
While admitting that I’m not fully educated on either man’s profile, was not Petraeus the architect of the surge strategy in Iraq? Also, I thought I understood McChrystal to be a protege of Petraeus? Again, without knowing the man or his full profile, is it possible Petraeus is both politically and operationally savvy? Not to overstate his value, necessarily, but I don’t see the warfighters being concerned about Petraeus’ bona fides in that department.
While this is well outside my area of expertise, it seems that the questions John raises have been points of discussion for millennial; did not the Roman Senate have some “issues” with political generals?
“…whether this really compares with MacArthur or McClellan”
Outside of the odd similarity of names, McChrystal does not seem to rise to that level. He hasn’t got the political muscle that those other two did, nor is the military impact likely to be as significant.
“whether the military should want generals with political savvy”
Again, a very old question. There are two kinds of “political savvy”, at least as relates to the military. There is the savvy to engage in politics and play it with skill, which is a scary thing in a general, and the savvy to stay out of it and keep one’s mouth shut, especially when short of significant military success. That’s much to be desired.
John, excellent piece. In it, you describe the “revolt of the generals” as involving retired officers. Are there examples of congressional Democrats trying to stir up dissent among active-duty officers during the Bush years?
Jim and Dean: Good points. Under the circumstances, Petraeus is a politically savvy choice — he is the least likely to lose time in executing the war plan, while he has demonstrated political skills. Nonetheless, a few points: a) time will be lost, even if Petraeus is familiar with with the plans; b) Afghanistan is a harder problem than Iraq; c) the message sent to the officers is that aggressiveness of the McChrystal sort will be punished. I am not confident that the political skill set and the skills to effectively kill the enemy are compatible. I quite agree that generals who stay out of politics and focus on the enemy are the kind that we want. These are not new questions, but are inherent in the civilian-military relationship — they do go back to Rome, if not before. Rome, it should be noted, did not satisfactorily solve the problem.
Adam: I think one starting example was the encouragement by members of Congress to military lawyers — the judge advocate generals — to take a different position than the civilian leadership of the Bush administration on the application of the Geneva Conventions to the war on terror and military commissions. If I recall correctly, Congress had the military lawyers testify at odds with the views of the civilian Justice Department lawyers in charge of setting for the executive branch’s settled interpretation of federal and international law. It seems to me that if the President decides that the Geneva Conventions, international law that is not self-executing within our system, does not apply to the war on terror, that his decision is final for the executive branch and for the military as Commander-in-Chief. Congress’s effort to create division was a clear threat not just to the President’s sole constitutional responsibility to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, but it undermined the chain of command from the President to his military.
With regards to the political question, politics takes place on the battle field as much as it does in Washington. Commanders from the lowest levels on up practice local politics at an ever increasing degree of magnitude as you reach higher levels of command. It’s not unlike your local mayor, state governor, etc. The choices are obviously of a different nature as are the consequences. But in today’s combat environment in Iraq and Afghanistan, commanders of all levels must be proficient in both killing and politicking. So, it seems to me that political skill is as much necessary for a general as it is a politician.
As for Petraeus, having spent many months serving under him in Iraq, I never once heard anyone intimate that he is “soft.” Having escorted him through my area of operation on one occasion, I could discern nothing in him that suggested he was political at the expense of also being an effective and violent, when necessary, commander. This is colloquial evidence and not hard proof. However, it seems to me that Petraeus is our best choice, combining the tactical command sense necessary with a political savvy that seems lost on McChrystal.