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“The Case Against Western Military Assistance to Ukraine”
A superb essay (link below) that constitutes a valuable contribution to this matter. The author painstakingly (and, in my view, compellingly) lays his out arguments for the following propositions:
- It’s extremely unlikely that, had the West not helped Ukraine, Russia would have attacked a NATO member next
- Western military assistance to Ukraine makes proliferation more, not less, likely
- Providing military assistance to Ukraine is not cheap once you take into account the indirect costs
- The argument that committing to Ukraine’s defense was necessary to deter wars of aggression is flawed
- The argument from credibility is a self-fulfilling prophecy and a recipe for the sunk cost fallacy
Link:
https://philippelemoine.substack.com/p/the-case-against-western-military
Published in General
I can try to explain. I think that there’s more about this in the Old Testament than in the New.
Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s. Jesus did say this. He must have meant something by this. Figuring out what He meant is a bit difficult.
In the Old Testament, we find examples of a great many wars, including what we would not call wars of “aggression” and even “genocide.” These are approved in many instances, and sometimes even commanded by God. It seems quite clear, by implication, that killing in war does not violate the commandment against murder. There are even examples of the execution of prisoners, including women and children.
Then there are the promises of God in Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 28, which do promise blessings to the Israelites for obedience, but also promise curses and catastrophes for disobedience, including war. In Ezekiel, it is made very clear that God was using Nebuchadnezzar as His instrument of judgment. Nebuchadnezzar engaged in what we would call a war of “aggression” and “genocide” against the southern kingdom of Judah.
This seems at odds with the modern view, which makes moral judgments about matters of war.
Can you point me to any place in the Bible that teaches something like “just war” theory?
My impression is that this “just war” idea comes from the Greeks and the Romans, there’s a bit of it in Augustine, and the main advocate of this idea is Thomas Aquinas. So it’s not clear to me that it’s Christian. If it were a true Biblical teaching, I would think that this would be made more clear.
I have one more thought as a follow-up to #61, Steven, and ran out of space.
In foreign affairs and matters of war, what if it’s not a matter of right and wrong, but a matter of wrong and wrong? In other words, if we’re going to make moral judgments, then we should recognize that both sides are bad. It’s not good guys vs. bad guys. It’s bad guys vs. bad guys.
You do realize that every country in the world knows that NATO is dominated by the United States, don’t you?
A great point. We’re seeing what happened with battleships vs. carriers as the focus of the fleet happening to air power.
I see this as the most likely outcome. Unfortunately it will only come after more bloodshed.
NATO countries have done this in the recent past (in our lifetimes). I get that Russia wants a security buffer, but in the era of hypersonic missiles and satellite surveillance, nobody is going to be surprised by a tank invasion. Tanks are not a first strike weapon. The security buffer should be measured in 10s of feet.
google tells me this:
Christian application of just war theory stems from several scriptural principles: human beings have intrinsic value (Genesis 1:27) but are also inherently sinful (Romans 3:10). God instituted human government specifically to maintain order and justice (Romans 13:1–5; 1 Peter 2:14). Mankind in general, and Christians in particular, are morally obligated to pursue a more just world (Proverbs 21:3; Micah 6:8; Matthew 5:13–16). This obligation does not, however, imply any use of violence to “advance” the faith (John 18:36). Further, God’s prohibition on killing applies to murder (Exodus 20:13), not to capital punishment (Genesis 9:6) or justified warfare (Psalm 18:34) or legitimate self-defense (Luke 22:36). At the same time, cruelty, revenge, and hatred are condemned by the Bible (Romans 12:19; Proverbs 20:22; Galatians 5:19–24).
Indeed. Our stockpiles were already “pre-depleted for your convenience” (i.e., never actually built up) long before sending anything to Ukraine. And I think this is a better way of having that driven home, than finding out after actually being attacked ourselves. Or an actual NATO country or something.
Nobody’s going to attack you. Mr Nuclear Option.
This is what baffles me. We here on R> go on and on about how corrupt our government and media are, but when it comes to Ukraine and Russia, we believe everything we’re told? And then trust in these same people to conduct a proxy war with Russia (and China) while maintaining America’s interests?? Incredible.
And, btw, I see Russia’s aggression as precipitated by American/NATO meddling in the region, and Putin’s desire to serve the interests of Russia and Russians. I’m also flummoxed that many people ostensibly on my side of the political spectrum don’t seem to believe in national self-interest when it comes to Russia. Nationalism for me, but not for thee?
And one more thing! As far as I’m aware, no one has addressed my suspicion that the Biden administration is all-in on handing cash and armaments to Ukraine as a payoff for keeping quiet about Biden family corruption. It’s extortion. Hunter wasn’t paid by Burisma for his energy expertise. Change my mind.
No, I haven’t read the article. I’m working to send my tax money to Ukraine and don’t have the time.
I’ve never been able to get past that, either.
I don’t believe anything I am told and only half of what I say!
I think a lot of that has to do with ideological inertia, whereby Cold War attitudes toward the Soviet “Evil Empire” Union simply got transferred onto modern Russia, without regard to their validity.
Agreed. It’s a Cold War mentality after the world has moved on. The energy wasted on Russia when China looms and Israel faces a nuclear threat from Iran. . . I just want to throw my hands up and take up drinking.
Yes. It readily brings to mind one of my all-time favorite quotes, from one of my favorite American thinkers/intellectuals/philosophers, Eric Hoffer (bolding mine):
“In a time of drastic change it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned usually find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists.” — Reflections on the Human Condition, 1973
The inability of our diplomatic/military/intelligence apparatus to get past its Cold War mentality paradigm vis-a-vis Russia is partly responsible for the mess we find ourselves in now as a proxy participant in the war in Ukraine.
Ugh.
No nationalism for us either. Only for Ukraine. Ukraine is the only nation where nationalism is good. For everyone else it’s evil.
But a lot of people seem to have the attitude that if we’re not going to have secure borders for our own country, we shouldn’t help Ukraine have secure borders either. Rather than, not only should Ukraine have secure borders, but so should we!
A lot of people?
I agree. We’re debating aid to Ukraine, not “why aren’t we spending it on X”. It’s not a very strong argument because it’s always true. Fifty years ago, there were black congressmen who wouldn’t vote for funds for NASA on the grounds of “I don’t know if there’s life on Mars, but I do know there are rats in Harlem tenements.”
I’ve seen it occasionally on Ricochet too. Might be part of the @gleneisenhardt attitude, even if it sometimes takes the form of “we shouldn’t help (spend money etc) anyone secure their border until ours is fully secured first.” To which a common response is something like “we can walk and chew gum at the same time” (usually without evidence presented of a capability to do either, at least under the latest Dimocrat administration).
Meanwhile, the rats would seem to be a city/state problem, not a federal one.
Nope. American political leaders should serve American interests, just like Ukrainian political leaders should serve Ukrainian interests. If it is in our interests to help Ukraine (and the only thing I’d like us to help them to do is come to a settlement with Russia, likely giving up Crimea forever and parts of Ukraine as well), then we should do it. That’s still a big “if” in my book using the means our corrupt government is currently using.
The Biden administration doesn’t know how anything works, except conducting war? Sell me another bridge.
In this specific example, sure, but I think the comparison is valid: “I don’t care about the issue you do. I want you to care about the issue I care about.”
So Putin started to lie immediately….. “free and democratic state”????? After that how can you bother to listen….
So why are the Balts & the Finns leading-while as usual Biden is leading from behind…..
Those of us who are fortunate enough to have developed the attention span necessary to read and absorb the meaning of the contents of an entire sentence as opposed to just a snippet of it, meanwhile, have no trouble noticing the aspirational element in said sentence. Here it is, in full, with said aspirational element bolded this time:
“I consider the development of Russia as a free and democratic state to be our main political and ideological goal.”
This, it must be noted, is from 2005, when Russia was just beginning to try to climb out of the deep socio-economic devastation that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent 8 year long Yeltsin Era had wreaked upon it.
I plan on address the points one at a time. It may take more then one comment since I am constrained on space but first I wanted to reiterate that while I broadly disagree with many of the points in the article it is well written and worth one’s time to engage with. Ultimately this is the discussion that I want to have which is about the prudence of US involvement rather than its morality. I am not convinced it would sway anyone who is broadly in favor of the intervention and it doesn’t really address my principle areas of concern but it does a fair job of framing arguments.
Here I broadly agree with the Author. The most likely next target of Russian aggression would be Moldavia using the situation in Transnistria as the pretext for Russian intervention. His larger point at this part of the column however deserves some attention and commentary. His assertion is that Russia would have major issues in Ukraine, whether or not the West had intervened. Essentially what the west did was prolong the kinetic, or conventional stage of the conflict. Russia would still have had to occupy a hostile Ukrainian state and would have had to commit a great deal of effort to fight an unconventional force in Ukrainian. I find this argument persuasive. He goes on to point out that this frozen conflict would likely accomplish the Wests strategic goals of tying down Russia’s forces in Ukraine and limiting their scope of movement in the future. I think this may be a compelling argument; however, I am not as certain about that as the author. It is certainly possible that Russia would be tied down in Ukraine. It is also likely that may hamper Russian aggression. This having been said an insurgence would not lead to the direct degradation of front line Russian military formations that the current Ukrainian conflict has. It also would not lead to the current level of understanding about the relative weakness and capabilities of the Russian military. I am not completely convinced that Russia tied down in a frozen Ukrainian conflict has the same level of benefit to the west that having the Russian military bleed in a conventional conflict, but it may be correct that the frozen conflict would have accomplished enough of the West’s objectives, while avoiding the escalations that would make such a conflict worthwhile. This is an intriguing if academic argument at this point. I wish we had explored this more fully before getting involved.
As to his principle assertion that Ukraine is not the Baltics and that NATO is unlikely to be on the menu for Russian aggression. I am not sure I agree with that at all. I agree with him that NATO was unlikely to be proximately next on the list. I think Moldavia is an easier target with a ready made pretext. I do however think that Russia has a long term strategic objective of ending the NATO alliance. While I don’t think they believe they can do it militarily, at least not anymore. I do think it is in Russia’s calculations. I am not sure if in response to a lackluster and disunited response from the west, Putin would not have decided to push his luck. I think the plan has always been for Russia to exploit differences between the Eastern and Western members of NATO to unravel the alliance. I easily envision a point where Russia decides to try its luck with that kind of strategy. I am not sure it would have happened in this particular case that is unknowable. It is not however difficult to see Eastern Members of NATO supporting a strong response and Germany and Western NATO members proposing a tepid response and the US dithering enough to make Russia contemplate something rash with respect to the Baltics. That didn’t happen and to a certain extent the US has been appeasing the Eastern NATO members while possible reigning them in a bit. I don’t necessarily think this is great strategy but if I give the Biden administration some grace, which I am loathed to do, I can see where it may have been necessary. All of this having been said it is equally likely that a Ukrainian fall would have had more benefit to the US’s objectives for NATO. Shortly after the invasion many NATO countries that had been shirking their defense obligations made major announcements that they would be rearming. I think that we are seeing a lot of backsliding on that since Ukraine has continued to hold out, so put that as perhaps one more item on the scale in favor of a non intervention in Ukraine.
I agree with him here that anything here is on the margins at best. I am on the whole lukewarm about proliferation, so this set of arguments didn’t resonate we me. I don’t think I can do them complete justice. I agree that in the real world Russia needs to be a partner, as does China, in preventing proliferation. I would just contend they aren’t a very good partner. I don’t think they did much to prevent North Korea, Pakistan, or Iran from developing Nuclear weapons programs, two of which have achieved breakout and have nuclear weapons. They may have helped keep former Soviet Republics and Satellites from keeping Nuclear weapons in the 90s, but that was very much a case of self interest. I don’t think they much cared before Ukraine if Iran becomes a nuclear state. I think China and Russia are eager to see US allies remain non nuclear, but I really don’t find that compelling. I would not be that worried at all if Norway, Sweden, Germany, Poland, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan all announced tomorrow they were nuclear powers. It would be a tremendous proliferation event, but I don’t think it makes the world less safe in an objective sense. It would curb the ambitions of Russia and China. It also may be a complete headache for the US. In the end however it is unlikely to be tremendously destabilizing to the world.
This is strangely for me simultaneously his most and least compelling section. He does a good job of laying out the fact that this is extremely costly to the US. In the first place it is more costly than the raw numbers would seem to indicate coming in at just under 1/5 of the procurement budget of the US. Secondly it depletes our capabilities because it will take multiple years to restock the expended arsenal. Thirdly it crowds out weapons that could be used for a pivot to Asia. I find all of these points compelling and all of them represent issues that need to be addressed. These echo most of my reservations about the cost of a Ukrainian intervention. I find myself agreeing with all the above points yet coming away unconvinced. I do believe we are spending more than is advertised in supporting Ukraine, that is pretty clear all government spending is wasteful. Military spending is prone to waste. Military spending during a conflict is worst of all. Yet, and this is a big yet where our disagreements about points 1, 4, and 5 become something of a rorschach test, If you believe a future conflict between NATO and Russia was somewhat likely this all becomes money extremely well spent. I would much rather spend treasure than blood to accomplish a US military aim. The author believes conflict between Russia and NATO is highly unlikely at any point. I believe conflict between Russia and NATO to be highly likely at some point. This is strictly a prudential judgement, which people of good faith and good will can disagree on. It is going to be difficult for us to convince each other differently but the Author comes close and has me reexamining my priors. As for depleting our stockpiles, this concerns me in the short term; however, I look at this knowledge as a blessing in the medium to long term. We need to get a handle on this situation now. I doubt the current administration is up to that task, but the next one is going to have to make rebuilding our arsenal and our stockpiles a priority. If we had stayed out of this in the beginning, which may have been the most prudent choice as pointed out in the first point, then we wouldn’t be in this position; however, we also may not have appreciated the situation adequately. Assuming we have a medium term we now know that this is a challenge that needs to be solved. Also I don’t think this is an unsolvable issue. I think we can ramp up production/ find alternative sources of production if we start looking for them. The time to do this would be now, but we have short sighted people in charge so we are going to have to muddle through for at least the next two years to begin addressing this issue. Finally we have the issue about opportunity costs between this and a pivot to Asia. I think these are largely immaterial. The weaponry needed to protect Taiwan from a Chinese amphibious invasion and the weaponry needed to stop a Russian land invasion are I think dissimilar. Up until very recently there hasn’t been much real overlap. It does probably hamper US training and readiness, that is something we need to consider, but is not insurmountable. As we move into the next phase and more sophisticate systems are being provided with more overlap this may be an issue.
On a broader point. In general the US and NATO, with some notable exceptions, have been giving older hardware. I don’t think broadly speaking this initially caused much of a loss of capabilities. Poland and the Czech republic trading their older Warsaw Pact equipment for more modern NATO equivalents probably made a certain sort of sense without really jeopardizing much on capabilities. Most of the Infantry fighting vehicles sent to Ukraine were older models that were primarily used for training and would not have been frontline units. While depleting training stocks is an issue. It does provide an ability to modernize which is probably appropriate. The real issue is in ammunition and ordnance. That is stockpiles that the US and NATO need for training and contingencies, using it up in Ukraine presents a short term challenge. If we do the smart thing a restock and look at expanding our capabilities this is not a long term issue. It also allows the west to surface and think about a challenge before, hopefully it becomes critical to the West’s survival. Additionally we are seeing how the shape of warfare is changing. Artillery still has a big role, but airpower seems diminished. Drones are a new factor. Naval power is showing to be more vulnerable than previously suspected. Hopefully the US is taking notes on these lessons. They will be very valuable in shaping force decisions in the future.
I find this one of the Author’s less compelling points. He seems to me to be simultaneously arguing that there isn’t a lot the US can do to discourage wars of aggression and that the US need not be concerned about wars of aggression because of its status as global hegemon. I think he is correct in his assessment that there need not have been, in isolation at least, a defense of Ukraine. I think this misses the overall trend prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The US pull out of Afghanistan was a terribly mismanaged affair. Biden’s almost groveling attempts at restarting the JCPOA also projected weakness. Biden’s mixed signals prior to Russia’s invasion all painted a picture of American decline and fecklessness that surely indicated an opportunity to both Russia and China. Putin being the more impulsive of the two went first. At this point Biden would likely have still preferred not to get involved. Keep in mind the US’s first inclination was to follow I think path one and evacuate Zelensky and allow the Russians to achieve something in Ukraine. Zelensky did not oblige and the weight of public opinion in the west forced Biden to react. I think this was fortuitous because it reversed the image of fecklessness enough to deter further bad actors from acting. Essentially I am arguing that Biden’s actions prior to Ukraine had lost deterrence and that the forceful actions in Ukraine may have restored a measure of it. This being said, Biden and the US have largely been reactionary in their approach to Ukraine. The only foreign policy decisions they have been proscriptive on the Iran deal and the Afghanistan withdrawal have been disasters of the first order. I am not convinced the Ukrainian adventure is any better thought out, it has just so far worked out better for Biden and the West. I can certainly believe that will not continue to be the case given who is in charge at the moment.
I pretty much completely disagree with this point. Although it is argued fairly well and I am willing to admit this is likely because of my priors rather then necessarily a defect in the author’s arguments. I believe that it may have been a valid move to not engage in the beginning, but once committed a withdrawal of support does cost the US credibility it can ill afford to lose at the moment. Once again this need not necessarily be the case; however, post Afghanistan it certainly lends a credence to the argument that America is an exhausted power that is unwilling to engage in the world. This will have catastrophic consequences in both NATO and the Pacific. Once again absence facts on the ground from other foreign policy missteps by the current administration I might agree in broad parts with the author, but now the US has to either demonstrate a certain set of resolve or retreat entirely behind the two oceans and hope that is enough to protect it. If after wagering its credibility as an ally and yet again turning its back when the going gets tough, which hasn’t even happened yet, what country will want to put itself where its defense guarantees rely on the US. I think a withdrawal of support now would certainly lead to a geostrategic victory for China and also probably for Russia as well. Would that not likely lead to a fracture in NATO? wouldn’t the eastern NATO powers have to adopt an accommodationist attitude with an newly triumphant Russia? Wouldn’t our Pacific partners need to determine safeguards and recalibrate to be more accommodating to China? If you think both of these outcomes are good in the long run for the US and the world I guess that is a viable strategy. I don’t. I think a resurgent Russia and an emboldened China are really catastrophic for the world. The author definitely disagrees on this point. He seems to believe that the strength of the US on paper, in addition to the fact that neither Russia or China is actually a good partner will tend to allow US hegemony to basically continue. I just don’t see this as the case.
I do believe the US is rapidly approaching a point were we need to force our Ukrainian friends to accept a bitter pill and discuss a negotiated settlement. Ultimately Biden needs to do this, because Zelensky can’t politically. I think in general the US’s goals of weakening Russia have been achieved. I understand that most likely there needs to be another successful Ukrainian counter attack, if possible, to allow situations on the ground to be favorable enough for the best possible terms for the Ukrainians, but in the end Russia is going to get something out of this and Ukraine is going to lose something. It isn’t necessarily a just or satisfying solution; however, it is the most likely solution. Dragging this out into a frozen conflict ultimately benefits Russia and China more than the west.
To be fair the argument is about proportionality. Biden is spending $200B on Ukraine and $0 on US borders. If it was split even, then the argument would be diminished.
Well, no, not really. As long as the Border Patrol etc exists, we’re not spending $0.
I don’t think the Ukraine spending has reached $200 Billion, either.