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Why Does the Ukraine Matter?
The question is posed by my old friend Eric Edelman on The Weekly Standard website. Eric and I overlapped at Cornell and later in graduate school at Yale. After getting a Ph.D. in diplomatic history with a dissertation on Turkey’s entrance into NATO, he joined the Foreign Service. In time, he served as ambassador to Turkey (a job I crave myself), and he was last visible as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, a post he held from 2005 to 2009.
Here is the answer he gives:
First, [the Ukraine] matters because—despite Putin’s risible claims of anti-Russian violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (even Angela Merkel reportedly told President Obama that she thinks Putin is “in another world”)—this is military aggression against a neighboring independent state in the heart of Europe that violates the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the pretext upon which it is based, protection of Russian national minorities in Ukraine, could also be used against NATO member states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and under Article 5 of the NATO treaty, “an armed attack against one [member state] . . . shall be considered an attack against them all.” The future viability of the alliance is at stake here.
Second, if Putin can pull off a smash and grab operation against Crimea without being made to pay a serious and significant price, others will draw their own conclusions. Would the “international community” exact a price subsequently if China seized the Senkaku Islands or even Taiwan? Would Pyongyang or Tehran conclude that it might have more leeway for aggressive moves against its neighbors?
Third, there is a huge nonproliferation issue (allegedly the president’s highest national security priority) at stake. Ukraine, as one of the successor states to the former Soviet Union, found itself in 1991 with nuclear weapons on its territory to which it laid claim. It was one of the Clinton administration’s signal diplomatic achievements to have gotten Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to agree to return the nuclear weapons on their respective territory to Russia, leaving one nuclear weapons state on the territory of the former USSR rather than four. In return, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia all signed, along with Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum, which accompanied Ukraine’s adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Inter alia, that document committed Russia to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and imposed on Russia an “obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” If left standing, Russian aggression will establish that security assurances offered by the nuclear weapons states to states that willingly give up their nuclear weapons or weapons programs mean precisely nothing.
Eric also has some things to say about what can be done to bring Vladimir Putin to heel, and they deserve heeding — especially because he knows whereof he speaks when he talks about military matters in particular.
I would merely add that it would not take much effort on our part to bring down the Russian economy. The place is a banana republic, or — to be more precise — a petrodollar paradise. Call the Russian bluff. Batten down the hatches and bring oil and gas to Europe from other sources this Spring, and the ruble will crash and Russia fall apart. Seventy-five percent of its exports have to do with energy.
Polls show that seventy percent of the citizens of Russia oppose Putin’s intervention in the Crimea now. If the Russians do not export their oil and gas, they will have next to nothing to eat — and that will not sit well with the Russian people.
Moreover, the place is a kleptocracy: run by and for a handful of oligarchs who profit from exploiting for their own benefit the resources that rightly belong to their fellow citizens, and they stash their loot abroad. Freeze all assets owned abroad by Russian nationals, and his fellow oligarchs will be calling for Putin’s scalp.
Let me add that Putin himself has billions and billions stashed abroad. I am told by a Russian expert here at Stanford that he may be the world’s wealthiest man, and we know under whose name his stolen riches are hidden. Remember: we read their mail.
The coup that Putin is trying to pull off is predicated on the presumption that we and our allies in Europe are so weak-kneed that we will acquiesce. There is one thing that you can be certain of. If we do acquiesce, this will not be Vladimir Putin’s “last territorial demand in Europe.”
There is this to be said in defense of Neville Chamberlain. Hitler made such a promise at the time he signed the Munich Agreement, and Chamberlain believed it. Putin has said nothing of the kind.
To acquiesce is to risk losing everything that we gained in World War II and the Cold War. Ron Paul, Rand Paul (I suspect), and the Cato Institute notwithstanding, our long-term well-being depends upon there being a tolerably reliable international order relatively free from thuggery and open to trade. This does not mean that we have to be deeply concerned with every bit of foolishness that goes on. It does not mean that we have to be the world’s policeman. But when a power possessing nuclear arms runs amok and begins seizing territory from its neighbors, we have to act.
Isolationism made sense in the 19th century when we could rely on the British to support such an order. It made no sense in the 1920s and the 1930s as we learned the hard way in 1941, and it makes no sense now.
I am not suggesting that there is any need for histrionics. Nor do I think that we need to put boots on the ground. We simply need to use the economic levers at our disposal. In situations like this one, the less that statesmen posture the better. Talk softly, and wield a big stick with vigor and cunning. That should be our policy.
Published in General
Germany is the key to everything in Europe right now. I hope that Merkel, who knows something about what it is like to be under the Russian thumb, has the courage to work the levers that Europe and America have. Economically, Russia is weak.
During Pax Americana we fought on China’s doorstep – when it was pretty weak – in Korea and Vietnam, but never on Russia’s doorstep really (though a sliver of that country abuts up with N. Korea). Has the world changed so much that we would contemplate altering that show of restraint?
Why don’t we see what instruments we have at hand for penalizing the Russians, short of force?
America did not fight the USSR on its doorstep after Korea, but it did show that it was willing to do so by putting American troops in friendly states on the border with either the Soviets or with their client states.
I’m not recommending that we invade Russia today. I’m not even recommending that we put troops in Ukraine today, merely attempting to rebut an argument that we avoid it.
I agree with Prof. Rahe’s personal sanctions suggestion, and a slightly different gas response (Keystone and Alaskan go-aheads). I’d also supply arms to the Free Syrian Army, and take a more aggressive stance on Iran.
Here is an extremely interesting and useful article about the demographics of eastern Ukraine. Eastern Ukraine has always had a Ukrainian majority, regardless of what language they speak. The growing proportion of non-Ukrainians have been caused by the devistaing famine of the 1930s, and by industralization. It’s been pointed out elsewhere that while the big industrial cities are heavily ethnic Russian, the rural countryside remains very much ethnically Ukrainian.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/07/why-eastern-ukraine-is-an-integral-part-of-ukraine/
Again, the “threat” of Ukrainian nationalism against the Russian population is a Big Lie, a Казкa (fairy tale).
In contrast, supposed Ukrainian national rights in the Russian Federation hovers near zero.
Putin has manufactured this threat, whole cloth. It is in character with being a KGB punk, along with the ever-tighter group of advisors around him. You can take the boy out of the KGB, but you can’t take the KGB out of the boy.
If Manfred Cane is me, Manfred Arcane, then let me respond that I fail to see that the word ‘accommodation’ applies very accurately to my position. I am for hurting Putin, as I have mentioned numerous time above, including the economic measures galore that you favor. But at issue here seems to be the ultimate outcome of your plan. For example, when you “cut Putin off at the knees”, does that mean expelling the Russians from their naval base in the Crimea? Inquiring minds want to know.
Or, do you believe strongly enough in Ukraine’s complete autonomy to want to go and risk a fight? Not_for_me, or_my_sons.
…
Amen. If we cut Putin off at the knees now, we will not have trouble later. If we try to appease him, God help us all. Manfred Cane is dreaming. The “accommodation” with Russia that he has in mind is not on_offer.
Again, the “threat” of Ukrainian nationalism against the Russian population is a Big Lie, aКазкa (fairy tale).
In contrast, supposed Ukrainian national rights in the Russian Federation hovers near zero.
How very true and on-point.
Drawing clear moral distinctions vis-à-vis tyrants, Reagan & Thatcher taught us in the 1980s (if we had not learned it previously), is like Holy Water sprinkled on the devil. Unfortunately, it’s precisely what Leftists like Obama are incapable of doing.
My argument has to do with the fact that this analogue, “Merkel sent the Wehrmacht into Kaliningrad”, has as much likelihood of happening as you waking up tomorrow and finding yourself Czar of all Russia.
If there were a German minority in Kaliningrad clamoring for affiliation with Germany, then we would have something to talk about and your analogy might make sense.
But then this fact would be front and center in the West’s dispute with Russia, … and it isn’t.
Secondly, statements like this, “Merkel sent the Wehrmacht into Kaliningrad” are just so completely unhinged from reality and relevance to these discussion that one does not know where to begin addressing them. The ‘similarities’ between such a fanciful event and the Crimean incursion are so strained as to make mention of them an exercise in sophistry.
Uhh . . . surely, in a discussion centered upon the armed annexation by one European state of another state’s sovereign territory, you see the relevance of an analogy with Germany doing a similar thing based upon a similar rationale. …Using words like sophistry and phrases like “unhinged from reality” simply because an analogy is foreign to you does not strengthen_your_argument ….
Against a country in as bad a shape as Russia is, a little backbone would go a long ways.
Alas, we are not in such good shape ourselves. Do you suppose Putin has an unspoken (perhaps more persuasive than posturing) red line, which – should we cross it – would cause Russia to dump its holdings of Treasuries? The result for us would be staggering. This is a stunning answer to those who assert that “debt doesn’t matter.” It is a weapon we have handed out to our most powerful adversaries. It would be a “reset” button all right. It would reset the value of the dollar – much lower. ·
Russia holds about 2.4% of Federal debt. Selling that would be a problem for America, but not a terrible problem (it would be unsurprising if it were the second or third worst problem in a particular week). It would be a much bigger problem for Russia. The classic fear is of Russia redeeming its debt, but American debt is too temporally diversified for that.
I was thinking about that yesterday and looked up holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by country.
Russia comes in 11th in the December 2013 ranking (using the odd aggregation categories of the Treasury), with holdings of US$ 138.6 billion, ranking between Hong Kong and Luxembourg. By comparison, China has holdings of US$ 1268.9 billion.
Were Russia to dump its Treasuries, it would certainly perturb the market, but their total holdings are about equal to what the Federal Reserve is purchasing every two months in “quantitative easing”. I can see the Fed just stepping up and buying the Treasuries to stabilise the market. It would be just a blip on their US$ 4 trillion balance sheet. ·10 minutes ago
I gotta be faster if I’m gonna beat anonymous to this stuff.
I am listening to the Ricochet Podcast discussing the idea that Ukraine is probably better off with dismemberment.
No one seems to recall that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. Is that what the West had in mind in 1994? Can we get whoever was POTUS then to tell us what his administration had in mind?
And then can we get back to the question of trusting the US in the eyes of the Polish, the Israelis and others? ·45 minutes ago
Sigh.
“It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”
Henry Kissinger
There isn’t because Russia/Soviet Union did an excellent job of ethnic cleansing, just like Crimea and the Tatars. Is that the take away lesson? Do a good job, and no one will bother you later?
RE: #40 This is true, quantitatively. Perceptions in the market, however, could amplify the effect, especially given mounting uncertainties as to the dollar. Combine a big dump by Russia with incremental moves away from the dollar as the reserve currency – i.e. more countries settling international transactions in other currencies, and who knows what panic selling might ensue. By way of comparison, I believe approval of the Keystone pipeline would promptly lower gas prices, although there would be no immediate increase in crude supply (far from it).
Speaking of long-term, some experts are not optimistic about Russian energy. For one thing, they will always be a high-cost producer. If we can push down gas prices, that would impact their margins and their income.
There are also possible unintended consequences. Despite Russia being energy-rich and China being energy-poor, there have been few energy exports from Russia to China. Cutting off the European market might cause the Russians to pivot toward the east, creating an entente the West may ultimately regret. ·19 hours ago
Another reason the US needs to err on the side against military aggressiveness: The EU – in this case France – isn’t really serious about aiding Ukraine’s independence from Russia:
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/France_says_warship_deal_with_Russia_still_alive_999.html