Ricochet is the best place on the internet to discuss the issues of the day, either through commenting on posts or writing your own for our active and dynamic community in a fully moderated environment. In addition, the Ricochet Audio Network offers over 50 original podcasts with new episodes released every day.
Why Does the Ukraine Matter?
The question is posed by my old friend Eric Edelman on The Weekly Standard website. Eric and I overlapped at Cornell and later in graduate school at Yale. After getting a Ph.D. in diplomatic history with a dissertation on Turkey’s entrance into NATO, he joined the Foreign Service. In time, he served as ambassador to Turkey (a job I crave myself), and he was last visible as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, a post he held from 2005 to 2009.
Here is the answer he gives:
First, [the Ukraine] matters because—despite Putin’s risible claims of anti-Russian violence in Crimea and eastern Ukraine (even Angela Merkel reportedly told President Obama that she thinks Putin is “in another world”)—this is military aggression against a neighboring independent state in the heart of Europe that violates the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Moreover, the pretext upon which it is based, protection of Russian national minorities in Ukraine, could also be used against NATO member states like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and under Article 5 of the NATO treaty, “an armed attack against one [member state] . . . shall be considered an attack against them all.” The future viability of the alliance is at stake here.
Second, if Putin can pull off a smash and grab operation against Crimea without being made to pay a serious and significant price, others will draw their own conclusions. Would the “international community” exact a price subsequently if China seized the Senkaku Islands or even Taiwan? Would Pyongyang or Tehran conclude that it might have more leeway for aggressive moves against its neighbors?
Third, there is a huge nonproliferation issue (allegedly the president’s highest national security priority) at stake. Ukraine, as one of the successor states to the former Soviet Union, found itself in 1991 with nuclear weapons on its territory to which it laid claim. It was one of the Clinton administration’s signal diplomatic achievements to have gotten Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to agree to return the nuclear weapons on their respective territory to Russia, leaving one nuclear weapons state on the territory of the former USSR rather than four. In return, the United States, United Kingdom, and Russia all signed, along with Ukraine, the Budapest Memorandum, which accompanied Ukraine’s adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Inter alia, that document committed Russia to “respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and imposed on Russia an “obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” If left standing, Russian aggression will establish that security assurances offered by the nuclear weapons states to states that willingly give up their nuclear weapons or weapons programs mean precisely nothing.
Eric also has some things to say about what can be done to bring Vladimir Putin to heel, and they deserve heeding — especially because he knows whereof he speaks when he talks about military matters in particular.
I would merely add that it would not take much effort on our part to bring down the Russian economy. The place is a banana republic, or — to be more precise — a petrodollar paradise. Call the Russian bluff. Batten down the hatches and bring oil and gas to Europe from other sources this Spring, and the ruble will crash and Russia fall apart. Seventy-five percent of its exports have to do with energy.
Polls show that seventy percent of the citizens of Russia oppose Putin’s intervention in the Crimea now. If the Russians do not export their oil and gas, they will have next to nothing to eat — and that will not sit well with the Russian people.
Moreover, the place is a kleptocracy: run by and for a handful of oligarchs who profit from exploiting for their own benefit the resources that rightly belong to their fellow citizens, and they stash their loot abroad. Freeze all assets owned abroad by Russian nationals, and his fellow oligarchs will be calling for Putin’s scalp.
Let me add that Putin himself has billions and billions stashed abroad. I am told by a Russian expert here at Stanford that he may be the world’s wealthiest man, and we know under whose name his stolen riches are hidden. Remember: we read their mail.
The coup that Putin is trying to pull off is predicated on the presumption that we and our allies in Europe are so weak-kneed that we will acquiesce. There is one thing that you can be certain of. If we do acquiesce, this will not be Vladimir Putin’s “last territorial demand in Europe.”
There is this to be said in defense of Neville Chamberlain. Hitler made such a promise at the time he signed the Munich Agreement, and Chamberlain believed it. Putin has said nothing of the kind.
To acquiesce is to risk losing everything that we gained in World War II and the Cold War. Ron Paul, Rand Paul (I suspect), and the Cato Institute notwithstanding, our long-term well-being depends upon there being a tolerably reliable international order relatively free from thuggery and open to trade. This does not mean that we have to be deeply concerned with every bit of foolishness that goes on. It does not mean that we have to be the world’s policeman. But when a power possessing nuclear arms runs amok and begins seizing territory from its neighbors, we have to act.
Isolationism made sense in the 19th century when we could rely on the British to support such an order. It made no sense in the 1920s and the 1930s as we learned the hard way in 1941, and it makes no sense now.
I am not suggesting that there is any need for histrionics. Nor do I think that we need to put boots on the ground. We simply need to use the economic levers at our disposal. In situations like this one, the less that statesmen posture the better. Talk softly, and wield a big stick with vigor and cunning. That should be our policy.
Published in General
The US will do nothing because those in power think the conservatives, Republicans, Tea Party and other local internal political opponents are more of a threat than Russia.
I’m not so sure you could supplant Russian exports to Europe on such a short term basis. Even if the Western Hemisphere had the capacity to replace Russian supply, you would need to build LNG and petroleum terminals to handle the imports and pipelines to distribute them in Europe. Certainly possible, but within a few months?
That is the beauty of futures markets. Announce that there will be competition, and “hey presto” there is competition. Producers start to feel the effects of that very quickly. If futures prices start to drop, real prices follow.
Against a country in as bad a shape as Russia is, a little backbone would go a long ways.
Alas, we are not in such good shape ourselves. Do you suppose Putin has an unspoken (perhaps more persuasive than posturing) red line, which – should we cross it – would cause Russia to dump its holdings of Treasuries? The result for us would be staggering. This is a stunning answer to those who assert that “debt doesn’t matter.” It is a weapon we have handed out to our most powerful adversaries. It would be a “reset” button all right. It would reset the value of the dollar – much lower.
Alas, we are not in such good shape ourselves. Do you suppose Putin has an unspoken (perhaps more persuasive than posturing) red line, which – should we cross it – would cause Russia to dump its holdings of Treasuries? The result for us would be staggering. This is a stunning answer to those who assert that “debt doesn’t matter.” It is a weapon we have handed out to our most powerful adversaries. It would be a “reset” button all right. It would reset the value of the dollar – much lower.
I’m a rabid anti-debt guy, but still a question about this scenario: it hurts Russia as much or more to damage the value of its US securities then it does us, no? And China has no interest in seeing its massive collection of Treasury Notes suddenly undermined, does it? Hopefully someone more sophisticated then I (doesn’t take much!) about the nexus of currency exchange rates/debt/interest rates can clarify how this weaponization of US Treasury bonds would work.
I am listening to the Ricochet Podcast discussing the idea that Ukraine is probably better off with dismemberment.
No one seems to recall that Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons. Is that what the West had in mind in 1994? Can we get whoever was POTUS then to tell us what his administration had in mind?
And then can we get back to the question of trusting the US in the eyes of the Polish, the Israelis and others?
RE#35 I think the first one out fares best. The scramble that follows will be ugly as prices drop. Selling new bonds will require much higher interest rates. Very bad news for the US deficit.
Nothing in my postings ‘justifies’ this warped interpretation: “However, they in no way justify the armed annexation of sovereign territory from a neighboring state. Is that difficult to agree with?”.
On the contrary, I have made it clear that not only are the Russians wrong but I have lobbied ad nauseum about how specifically to punish them.
And your last bit about the “why Ukraine needs Russian permission to decide what’s in its best interests vis-à-vis NATO” is just so backwards it isn’t funny. I am saying thatUkraine needs US permission to join NATO – and that we should be very, very wary about granting said membership, unless we first address the interests of the Russophiles in that country.
Are you saying that the sentiment in Crimea, and perhaps other parts of the Ukraine, for some affiliation with Russia is immaterial in this affair?
…
…However, they in no way justify the armed annexation of sovereign territory from a neighboring state. Is that difficult to agree with? …
.. please explain why Ukraine_needs_Russian_permission_to_decide what’s in_its_best_interests_vis-à-vis_NATO? You appear to have decided Russia gets to exercise a veto over Ukrainian decisions since they happen to be neighbors…
Removed: Wrong thread.
And there are lots of Canadians EVERYWHERE.
Under that pretense, couldn’t Vlad the Annexer drop some Russian troops and tanks in to protect the huge populations of ethnic Russians in, say, Brighton Beach (a.k.a., Little Odessa) or West Hollywood? Yes, West Hollywood: The same city that prides itself on being the most gay-friendly city in America also happens to have the largest concentration of Russian immigrants in the U.S. outside New York City. If it’s his duty to protect Russians from the menace of gay propaganda, can we expect to see the T-90s rolling up Santa Monica Boulevard soon? ·18 hours ago
The market perceptions that matter, though, are educated market perceptions. It’s something that people occasionally used to talk to us about when I worked as a fund manager mostly dealing with sovereign debt and particularly US treasuries (even more particularly, TIPS) and it’s highly overrated. Keystone would permanently lower the real value of gas (by increasing supply). The redistribution of US treasuries outside Russia would be a one off thing, a moment’s blip. Think along the lines of Friedman’s permanent income theory.
Yes, the Russians are [REDACTED]s (I think the CoC folks will let that pass this one time), and everyone knows it. But do you want to fight for the Ukrainians’ freedom, there on the doorstep of Russia, which Ukraine membership in NATO may very well entail – when we could follow H. Kissinger and try and find an accommodation that lets Russia keep their naval bases, allows them some influence over Crimea – at least to the degree that is tolerable to non-Russians there, but lets West Ukraine integrate more fully with the West? And all the while enjoying the considerable gratification of sticking it to the Russians while we make this happen?
Or, do you believe strongly enough in Ukraine’s complete autonomy to want to go and risk a fight? Not_for_me, or_my_sons.
There isn’t because Russia/Soviet Union did an excellent job of ethnic cleansing, just like Crimea and the Tatars. Is that the take away lesson? Do a good job, and no one will bother you later?
At this point I would like to declare a free and independent Republic of Tatarstan. Not the Crimean Tatars, but the one in south central Russia. It’s a country almost twice the size of Crimea, and unlike Crimea (which has not much besides nice coastline and a harbor) Tatarstan is highly industralized and rich in oil, so they are economically viable. Ethnic Tatars make up an absolute majority of the population. Their 1992 constitution already asserts that Tatarstan is a soverign state, and it should be easy to repeal parts of that document that ties it to the Russian Federation.
We’ll leave the Chechens and Dagestanis until next week.
The rhetoric coming from Moscow regarding Ukraine is just another edition of The Big Lie (the concept of “Bolshevik” itself was a lie, they were never a majority). Everything that comes out of Lavrov’s mouth is a lie. Where they have been able to, like in Crimea, any media not parroting Moscow’s line is cut off.
Throughout the Maidan, I have been extremely impressed by the diversity of the demonstrators. They’ve come from all parts of Ukraine, just as many Russian as Ukrainian speakers. The young people are to be expected to support the Maidan; they have their futures to fight for. But the older men who were actually fighting — they remember what it was like living under Soviet control — they don’t want to go back, and they were willing to put their lives on the line. Even given the role of the radical right in the demos, calling Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian patriots fascists, anti-Semites (look who’s talking!) and neonazis is the filthiest slander of all.
The brains of people in Ukraine who still identify themselves as “Soviet” refuse to believe anything contrary to their worldview and are unable to absorb the truth.
Very cool. You might get HVTs’ vote for its membership in NATO.
I personally long ago concluded that we should exclude Russia from membership in any Western organization, G-8, you name it, until its conduct liberalized. Same with China.
Western interaction with these two was supposed to cause them to ultimately liberalize. Well any trend in that direction has long since tapered off. Time to rethink our policies towards them. I don’t know why we don’t charge a “tyranny_tax” on all goods imported from either one of those two countries now.
We’ll leave the Chechens_and_Dagestanis until next week.
Or, do you believe strongly enough in Ukraine’s complete autonomy to want to go and risk a fight? Not_for_me, or_my_sons.
America’s willingness to fight created the Pax Americana, a historically uniquely peaceful period in which America does not have to fight much. Giuliani’s increase in the inclination of NYPD to engage in confrontation resulted in reduced confrontation for the NYPD.
Cravenness only looks like it results in a reduction in people’s kids dying.
Loss of the Russian military base in Crimea was never on the table, as far as I know. We have never had a problem with it, and neither have most Ukrainians. The Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia in 1994, guaranteed Ukraine’s sovereignty. It is that declaration that is being violated today.
The idea of anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine is just another fable dreamed up by Moscow. Even in Lviv there was a “let’s talk Russian day” last week.
And the Russian occupation of the Baltics in 1940 was completely illegal (accompanied by another lie), and something never recognized by most Western countries. The Russian population in the inter-war Baltics was not significant. Soviet occupation brought about significant demographic change (a nice word for killing). Discrimination against ethnic Russians in the Baltics today — another lie.
So what do you want to do – concretely? I can’t read your intentions from your nebulous prose.
During Pax Americana we fought on China’s doorstep – when it was pretty weak – in Korea and Vietnam, but never on Russia’s doorstep really (though a sliver of that country abuts up with N. Korea). Has the world changed so much that we would contemplate altering that show of restraint?
Why don’t we see what instruments we have at hand for penalizing the Russians, short of force?
Or, do you believe strongly enough in Ukraine’s complete autonomy to want to go and risk a fight? Not_for_me, or_my_sons.
America’s willingness to fight created the Pax Americana, a historically uniquely peaceful period in which America does not have to fight much. Giuliani’s increase in the inclination of NYPD to engage in confrontation resulted in reduced confrontation for the NYPD.
Cravenness only looks like it results in a reduction in people’s kids dying.
If there were a German minority in Kaliningrad clamoring for affiliation with Germany, then we would have something to talk about and your analogy might make sense.
I see. So then we would need what exactly? A couple of web sites? A few press releases from previously unknown groups demanding “reunification”? Presumably you can imagine how easy it would be to generate such nonsense . . . the KGB/FSB does this stuff routinely, as do other security services . . . yes, including ours and those of our allies.
Moreover, who says it has to be requested by locals? Why can’t Germans in present-day Germany just decide it’s time to reestablish the Germany that once was? Is there some previously unknown Manfred Principle that only recognizes irredentist claims if Manfred decides it’s ‘home grown’?
You advanced this “analogy” remember. Only, to quote that wonderful line from “Princess Bride”: “I don’t think that word means what you think it does.”
Those two cases are not nearly ‘analogous’ because one event (‘Merkel sends the Wehrmacht into Kaliningrad’) is not anywhere near being in prospect, whereas the other has happened.
(“Manfred Principle”? I do like the sound of that. Thanks!)
If there were a German minority in Kaliningrad clamoring for affiliation with Germany, then we would have something to talk about and your analogy might make sense.
I see. So then we would need what exactly? A couple of web sites? A few press releases from previously unknown groups demanding “reunification”? Presumably you can imagine how easy it would be to generate such nonsense . . . the KGB/FSB does this stuff routinely, as do other security services . . . yes, including ours and those of our allies.
Moreover, who says it has to be requested by locals? Why can’t Germans in present-day Germany just decide it’s time to reestablish the Germany that once was? Is there some previously unknown Manfred Principle that only recognizes irredentist claims if Manfred decides it’s ‘home grown’?
Those two cases are not nearly ‘analogous’ because one event (‘Merkel sends the Wehrmacht into Kaliningrad’) is not anywhere near being in prospect, whereas the other has happened.
Got it. Two different events can’t be analogous unless both have actually occurred or ‘nearly’ occurred. That does shed light upon your flexible interpretation of sovereignty, wherein the proximity of an adversary defines how much of it you can legitimately exercise. I daresay these Manfred Principles should have been shared with the poor Ukrainians before they went around acting all autonomous and stuff. Nevertheless, ignorance is no defense! Let’s all welcome Russia’s newest province – Crimea! Hail Vladimirimus Putinarimus – Definer of Sovereignty and Master of the Protocols of Analogous Matters. :-)
We may agree more than we disagree, except your remark: “I’m not recommending that we invade Russia today. I’m not even recommending that we put troops in Ukraine today, merely attempting to rebut an argument that we avoid it”, really scares me.
If the EU wants to put troops in Ukraine, I think they would be crazy, but that’s their decision (not going to happen with their 1.6% of GDP military spending anyway). Just don’t come to the US to use our sons to fight their wars, ala WWI. Our job, as I see it, is to find other ways to motivate Russia to letWestern Ukraine go.
…
….
I’m not recommending that we invade_Russia today. I’m not even recommending that we put troops in_Ukraine today, merely attempting to rebut an argument that we avoid it.
I agree with Prof. Rahe’s personal sanctions suggestion, and a slightly different gas response (Keystone_and_Alaskan_go-aheads). I’d also supply arms to the Free Syrian Army, and take a more aggressive stance on_Iran. ·..
Yes, 40% of the population of the Crimea. My blunder. My apologies.
Are you saying that the sentiment in Crimea, and perhaps other parts of the Ukraine, for some affiliation with Russia is immaterial in this affair?
It’s rather stunning you are making the irredentist argument, but I’ll play along.
In the 1930s, some Austrians wanted “affiliation” with Nazi Germany. Some ethnically German Poles wanted “affiliation” with Nazi Germany. Some ethnically German Czechs wanted “affiliation” with Nazi Germany. Your point, especially given modern European history, is staggeringly short sighted.
No, I don’t say those (or ethnic Russian) longings for affiliation are “immaterial.” (Nice straw man, however). However, they in no way justify the armed annexation of sovereign territory from a neighboring state. Is that difficult to agree with? Furthermore, once such annexation is permitted it becomes more difficult to stop subsequent territorial demands.
The rest of your post(s) re: NATO membership for Ukraine are rather baffling: please explain why Ukraine needs Russian permission to decide what’s in its best interests vis-à-vis NATO? You appear to have decided Russia gets to exercise a veto over Ukrainian decisions since they happen to be neighbors. That’s an interesting view of sovereignty. ·9 hours ago
Amen.
Do you suppose Putin has an unspoken (perhaps more persuasive than posturing) red line, which – should we cross it – would cause Russia to dump its holdings of Treasuries? The result for us would be staggering. . . .
I was thinking about that yesterday and looked up holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by country.
Russia comes in 11th in the December 2013 ranking (using the odd aggregation categories of the Treasury), with holdings of US$ 138.6 billion, ranking between Hong Kong and Luxembourg. By comparison, China has holdings of US$ 1268.9 billion.
Were Russia to dump its Treasuries, it would certainly perturb the market, but their total holdings are about equal to what the Federal Reserve is purchasing every two months in “quantitative easing”. I can see the Fed just stepping up and buying the Treasuries to stabilise the market. It would be just a blip on their US$ 4 trillion balance sheet. ·6 hours ago
Thank you for this. It sounded wrong to me, but I did not know the details.
Then, too, the Poles and the Czechs felt badly burned by the administration’s canceling of missile defense plans early in its term. It is unlikely that they would put themselves in that kind of Lucy and the football situation with the United States again.
Elsewhere (http://bit.ly/1fb4Ovh), I recently wrote about a dispiriting conversation on Ukraine with a group of European officials. If those officials are typical, Paul’s proposals are non-starters.
. . . The result has been a better price for Russian energy exports to Europe. Immediately and unmistakably embracing our energy potential may be our the most effective answer to the Russian move that we have available. ·10 hours ago
Edited 6 hours ago
Clark, I hope that you are wrong about the Europeans but I fear that you are right.
I was thinking about that yesterday and looked up holdings of U.S. Treasury securities by country.
Russia comes in 11th in the December 2013 ranking (using the odd aggregation categories of the Treasury), with holdings of US$ 138.6 billion, ranking between Hong Kong and Luxembourg. By comparison, China has holdings of US$ 1268.9 billion.
Were Russia to dump its Treasuries, it would certainly perturb the market, but their total holdings are about equal to what the Federal Reserve is purchasing every two months in “quantitative easing”. I can see the Fed just stepping up and buying the Treasuries to stabilise the market. It would be just a blip on their US$ 4 trillion balance sheet. ·10 minutes ago
I gotta be faster if I’m gonna beat anonymous to this stuff. ·7 hours ago
You both got a jump on me.
Edited 6 hours ago
This would last about twenty-four hours. Fundamentals count more than panic.
Or, do you believe strongly enough in Ukraine’s complete autonomy to want to go and risk a fight? Not_for_me, or_my_sons.
America’s willingness to fight created the Pax Americana, a historically uniquely peaceful period in which America does not have to fight much. Giuliani’s increase in the inclination of NYPD to engage in confrontation resulted in reduced confrontation for the NYPD.
Cravenness only looks like it results in a reduction in people’s kids dying. ·6 hours ago
Amen. If we cut Putin off at the knees now, we will not have trouble later. If we try to appease him, God help us all. Manfred Cane is dreaming. The “accommodation” with Russia that he has in mind is not on offer.
During Pax Americana we fought on China’s doorstep – when it was pretty weak – in Korea and Vietnam, but never on Russia’s doorstep really (though a sliver of that country abuts up with N. Korea). Has the world changed so much that we would contemplate altering that show of restraint?
Why don’t we see what instruments we have at hand for penalizing the Russians, short of force?
America’s willingness to fight created the Pax Americana, a historically uniquely peaceful period in which America does not have to fight much. Giuliani’s increase in the inclination of NYPD to engage in confrontation resulted in reduced confrontation for the NYPD.
Cravenness only looks like it results in a reduction in people’s kids dying.
In my original post, I suggested the instruments available. All short of force.
It’s being reported in Kiev that the EU is fast-tracking free trade status for Ukraine, with Merkel as a driving force. The same agreement went to the signing stage a few months ago but the pro-Russian president of Ukraine refused to sign it.