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The Battle of Ramadi, Continued
I’ve been meaning to write about the recapture of Ramadi, which is assuredly a modestly hopeful development. Along with the recapture of Tishrin Dam, it’s the biggest gain against ISIS this year — although it’s offset by ISIS’s gains in Aleppo, which is the direct consequence of Russia’s pounding of anti-ISIS rebels.
Speaking of which, the interview below, direct from Aleppo with Rami Jarrah, is really worth watching. He’s one of the only journalists now in Aleppo, where rebel-held areas are attacked daily by Russian planes and the Assad regime:
But the recapture of Ramadi is definitely a blow, for now at least, to the ISIS narrative of invincibility.
Let’s hope they don’t screw it up. Despite defeats in Tikrit, the Beiji refinery complex, the transit route connecting Mosul to the city of Raqqa, and now Ramadi, ISIS is far from being destroyed — and Ramadi is far from being held. It’s a lot easier to conquer territory than it is to hold it.
So we should wait another six months, at least, before celebrating. We’ll see whether the ISF is not only capable of holding it, but turning it over to the Sunni tribes — and keeping out the Shia militias, who are waiting just outside the city and eager to start a sectarian bloodbath.
Abadi and his rivals (the pro-Iranian Hashd) were deeply divided when the offensive to retake Ramadi began. US accounts claim that we stepped up our support to make sure the Shia militia would be sidelined: US advisers in Anbar helped plan the operation; Americans trained the units fighting for the city; the US assembled and trained a new force of Sunni tribal fighters from scratch. Washington, reportedly, insisted the Hashd be kept out of Ramadi proper to ensure it appeared to be a genuine ISF victory. (Rumors are floating around that the US cut a deal with the Abadi government and the Hashd to ensure their withdrawal from the operation. If so, this obviously happened behind the scenes, but the Iraqi press has been full of stories about the role of US special forces and US air power — and so has ours. So our presence was, at least, obvious to the Shia militias.)
But ISIS elements remain; some reports suggest that they’re still present in a quarter of the city. Assuming they will be driven out entirely, the biggest problem won’t be military, but political: Who’s going to run the city? Who will ensure there are no reprisals and vengeance killings? Who will ensure the city doesn’t descend into lawless chaos? The government claims to be trying to create a new Sunni police force to ensure this, but it’s far from clear that they exist in the numbers required. Both the Sunni tribes and the Shia militias are apt to exact revenge upon ISIS collaborators. This, obviously, wouldn’t stabilize anything, and if the Shia exterminate Sunni civilians, as is their habit, we’re back to the very problem from which ISIS emerged in the first place.
Initial reports suggest that 80 percent of the city’s been reduced to rubble. It could take about ten years to rebuild it. Meaningful stability won’t return until it’s rebuilt to the point, at least, that IDPs can return and security and services can be restored.
If it’s true, as Baghdad claims, that this was entirely a victory for the ISF and that no Shia militias took part in it, it would be quite unlike the clashes in Tikrit and Beiji, where the militias played the largest role. The US supports Baghdad in this claim, but it doesn’t seem to be true: Photos have emerged from the battle showing Iraqi fighters with Shia militia patches on their uniforms. This would stand to reason; the army purged its Sunni officers after 2011, so it’s hard to imagine where a competent Sunni fighting force could have come from, otherwise. (And in fact, by this point the ISF and the Shia militias are pretty close to being one the same thing.)
Perhaps the US’ claims to have trained a Sunni tribal force on the double-quick-time are correct. If true, it would be a huge achievement. But if Abadi now fails to allow Sunnis a significant measure of authority and autonomy to govern the recaptured regions — not to mention a share of the oil revenues — it will probably be a short-lived victory.
It’s also possible that the US has decided to pretend it doesn’t notice the presence of the Shia militias. This would feed directly into the ISIS narrative, perhaps to the point of offsetting the psychological blow of the lost territory.
“[T]he victory,” declares The New York Times, “is the clearest sign yet that the Islamic State, after laying claim to huge parts of Iraq and Syria in 2014, is losing momentum and in retreat.”
Too soon. It may be. We can hope. But there’s no reason for premature jubilation. Nor is there reason for despair. We just don’t know yet.
If you have the time, here’s an excellent discussion of the larger context of all of this. I posted this video in response to a thread on the Member Feed, but you may have missed it. It’s particularly worth paying attention to Michael Pregent, whose personal knowledge of the Shia militias is extensive. I share his concerns about how this is apt to play out.
But it’s just too soon to say, so I’ll be glad that at least, for now, ISIS has been dealt, at least, a propaganda blow.
Published in General
No. But that doesn’t mean they’ll become liberal democrats.
See I was just trying to differentiate between a jihadist and a rebel. You can join a rebellion without becoming a jihadist. You can fight tyranny also. You used the word radicalized when I think you really meant becoming an insurgent or freedom fighter, etc.
Back to my point – Russia learned about Muslim antibodies against external interference from the Mujahedin in Afghanistan. I was surprised that, so soon, they put their paw back into the honey hive for another go at the bees’ ‘stingers’ (<– yes, a deliberate pun). Maybe Syrians are not Afghans. Maybe we won’t give the rebels Stinger missiles. Maybe we will. Wouldn’t that be something.
I suppose I meant “a monster.”
Claire,
I am sorry to sound like a broken record but I must take us back to Jihad. Yes, without a doubt, brutality can create monsters. Assad is a monster as the article you have linked conclusively proves. However, we are so divorced from the absolutism of Jihad in the West that we continue to be unable to recognize it for what it is. This absolutist religious doctrine justifies the most monstrous of behavior to all non-Jihadists (Muslim & non-Muslims). This doctrine is coupled to the idea of Dhimmitude, in the case of women Domestic Dhimmitude, and a hideous misogynistic culture is produced. This culture has nothing to do with past experiences but is a self-actualizing monstrosity. Once this culture becomes dominant it is totally aggressive, destructive, and merciless. Unleashed upon a civilian population it will rack up atrocities without regard to threat or retribution but upon ideology alone.
Over 1,000 years ago Judaism & Christianity accepted Heterosexual Monogamy as the only moral paradigm for sexuality. We have forgotten about this. If you think about it, nothing could be more important for securing women’s rights and the rights of humanity in general than this new code. Islam failed to make the change and to this day codifies polygamy in Sharia Law. When we see videos of young Jihadist warriors salivating at the thought of participating in the Slave auction of Yazidi women, women who have been captured while their husbands and fathers were murdered, we see the face of total tyranny. The women risk all to escape. Some commit suicide.
Should Assad be deposed? The obvious answer is yes. Would Syria in Jihadist hands be an improvement? The obvious answer is no. Sometimes reality is really nauseating.
Regards,
Jim
Do you really think that what the Syrian people–what any people ruled by a despot–have to say, beyond the temporary immediacy of a civil war, matters to the despot?
Eric Hines
Yeah, I think it matters a lot to any despot, even Stalin, Hitler, et al. It keeps them from sleeping easily at night. That’s why these people take despotic measures to protect their own powers.