Recent events have me thinking about military strategy, and the importance of morale. I found myself mulling over the famous Doolittle raid during World War II.

For those who might not recall the details, this was an air raid on Tokyo in April 1942 by a handful of American bombers, B-25 Mitchells, which were land-based bombers but were, in this instance, launched off the carrier Hornet. The damage to Tokyo was minimal, but the propaganda victory was significant, after a series of catastrophic American and allied losses in the first months of the war.

I’ll present a case that the Doolittle raid diverted critical naval resources from important operations, with real military and naval significance, in the south Pacific region.  You all can then critique my evaluation, and also decide for yourselves whether the morale boost from the Doolittle raid was worth the cost in other locations.

I’ll provide a few links at the end, for anyone wishing to double-check my account or read more, mostly from the official Navy historical site (the Naval Historical and Heritage Command, history.navy.mil).

I. Background

As I’m sure you all know, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, devastated the US Pacific Fleet.  The Japanese had 6 fleet carriers at the time, all used in the Pearl Harbor attack — Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku.

The silver lining for the US Navy was that none of our carriers were at Pearl.  At the time, we had either 5 or 7 fleet carriers, depending on how you count them.  Saratoga, Lexington, Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet were solid fleet carriers, though Hornet was brand new and still working up.  We also had Ranger and Wasp, often counted as fleet carriers, though they were smaller and poorly protected, and we tried to avoid using them in the Pacific (they did perform good service in the Atlantic).

So at the start of 1942, the Japanese had a 6-5 advantage in fleet carriers in the Pacific.  This increased to a 6-4 advantage when Saratoga was torpedoed in January 1942 and knocked out of action until shortly after the Battle of Midway in early June.

This was the naval situation in the Pacific at the start of the Doolittle raid.

II.  The Doolittle Raid

On April 1, 1942, Hornet took aboard 16 stripped-down B-25 Mitchells in San Francisco Bay.  The B-25 was a medium bomber, with two engines, a maximum bomb load of 3,200 pounds, and a crew of five.  Hornet could not carry its normal air complement along with the B-25s, so she rendezvoused with Enterprise en route, on April 13, and both carriers proceeded toward Japan.

Lt. Col. Jimmy Doolittle, commanding the B-25 squadron, took off for the Tokyo raid on April 18, 1942.  The attack was launched earlier than planned, from a distance of 650 miles rather than 500, because the task force might have been spotted by a Japanese ship.  During the launch, an unfortunate sailor slipped on the windswept and wet flight deck, losing an arm to the propeller blades of the last of Doolittle’s planes to take off.

The 16 B-25s successfully bombed targets in Tokyo and the surrounding area, and one damaged the Japanese light carrier Ryujo.  The official naval history concedes that “the material damage inflicted by Doolittle’s raiders proved small.”

All 16 of Doolittle’s planes were lost, with 15 crashing in occupied China or off its coast, and one making it to Soviet territory, where the crew was interned.  Ultimately, 69 of the 80 airmen safely returned to the US fairly promptly, including Doolittle, who received the Medal of Honor.  Three Americans died in the raid itself, four died in Japanese captivity, four survived being held as POWs by the Japanese.  Of the 69 who returned, the 5 who landed in the Soviet Union were technically required, under international law, to be interned by the Soviets until the end of the war, but were allowed to “escape” within a year.  (Remember that the Japanese and the Soviets had a non-aggression pact until the very end of the war.)

As a bean-counting accountant, in terms of material damage, the Doolittle raid was probably a failure.  The damages were minimal, and we lost 11 highly trained, heroic airmen — 7 killed and 4 captured by the Japanese — plus 16 valuable bombers.  But war is not just about dollars and cents.

Evaluated in itself, I think that the Doolittle raid was a great success.  No one thought that a mere 16 medium bombers were going to cause significant damage to a nation of 80 million.  But it showed that we could strike back, and the message to the Japanese was quite ferocious.  It was something like: How do you like this?  This is just the first tiny drop from the bitter cup that you are going to drink, to the dregs.  We’re going to send your Navy to the depths, slaughter your soldiers, burn your cities to the ground.

It is a good historical lesson.  Thus far, in all of human history, it seems to me that the single most foolish thing that the leaders of any country can do is to get the Americans really, really mad.  Bad idea, Tojo.

III.  The Problem in the Coral Sea

My critique of the Doolittle raid relates to naval events elsewhere.  Remember that, at the time, we had only 4 fleet carriers in the Pacific.  Hornet and Enterprise were carrying out the Doolittle raid.  That left Lexington and Yorktown to hold off Japan’s 6 fleet carriers elsewhere.  Saratoga was still being repaired in Puget Sound.

The stage was set for the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first carrier-against-carrier battle in history.

Admiral Nimitz, commanding the US Pacific Fleet, had intelligence that the Japanese intended to make a seaborne attack on Port Moresby, on the southern coast of New Guinea.  He dispatched Lexington and Yorktown to counter this threat, and the two carriers rendezvoused on May 1, 1942, in the vicinity of the Coral Sea.  The intelligence was accurate.  The two newest and best carriers in the Japanese fleet, Shokaku and Zuikaku, were there to cover the invasion, along with the (smaller) light carrier Shoho.

But as a result of the Doolittle raid, Enterprise and Hornet couldn’t get there in time.

Enterprise and Hornet returned to Pearl Harbor on April 25, and departed for the South Pacific five days later, on April 30.  However, they could not reach the Coral Sea until the battle, fought between May 4 and May 7, was over.

The Battle of the Coral Sea is generally considered a tactical draw, or perhaps a narrow tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic victory for the US.  In the event, we lost Lexington and Yorktown was significantly damaged (though she would be repaired with extraordinary speed at Pearl).  The Japanese lost the light carrier Shoho, but more importantly, their best two fleet carriers were put out of action.  Shokaku was seriously damaged and had to return to Japan, while the undamaged Zuikaku lost so much of her air wing that she, too, was out of action for a while.

Less than a month later, on June 4, our 3 surviving Pacific fleet carriers — Yorktown, Enterprise, and Hornet — would meet the other 4 Japanese fleet carriers — Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu — near a tiny island called Midway.  We would lose Yorktown.  The Japanese would lose all four.

My critique of the Doolittle raid involves the answer to this question: What would have happened if Enterprise and Hornet had been at the Coral Sea?

IV.  Hypothetical Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway

So what would have happened, but for the Doolittle raid?  We can never know.  We can only make an educated guess.  Here is my educated guess.

In this hypothetical, we would have had a 4-2 advantage in fleet carriers at the Coral Sea.  A month later, at a 4-3 disadvantage,  we would sink all 4 Japanese carriers, losing only 1.  So my educated guess is that we would have sunk both Shokaku and Zuikaku at the Coral Sea, with either zero or 1 carriers lost on our side.

The Japanese probably would have launched the Midway attack anyway, as they did so without their two carriers that were at the Coral Sea.  The outcome of Midway would have been the same for us, or perhaps better, if all 4 American carriers had survived the hypothetical battle of the Coral Sea.  We lost 1 carrier at Midway (Yorktown), and I think that we would have lose either zero or 1 in my hypothetical.

I think that the most likely outcome is that, but for the Doolittle raid, we would have lost a total of 1 fleet carrier in the combined, hypothetical battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.  In the aftermath of Midway, we would have had 3 fleet carriers remaining in the Pacific — plus Saratoga, which had completed repairs before the battle and was en route, but didn’t arrive in time to fight at Midway.  The Japanese would have lost all 6 of their fleet carriers.

Heading into the battles off Guadalcanal, we had a fleet carrier advantage, in the real world, of 3:2 — Saratoga, Enterprise, and Hornet vs. Shokaku and Zuikaku.  In my hypothetical, we would have had an advantage of 4:0.

Note that this does not count one borderline carrier on our side, Wasp, and two borderline carriers on the Japanese side that were completed in mid-1942, Hiyo and Junyo.  The latter two were converted passenger liners, on the weak side and with a limited air arm, though sometimes classified as fleet carriers.

Shokaku and Zuikaku were back in action within about 2 months, in a series of naval battles around Guadalcanal, which our Marines invaded on August 7.

V.  Playing Out the Hypothetical

Enterprise was heavily damaged by Shokaku and Zuikaku at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on August 24, 1942, being knocked out of action until October.  We did sink the Japanese light carrier Ryujo in this battle — the same one that was damaged in the Doolittle raid.  Hornet had not arrived for this battle, though Saratoga was there along with the borderline Wasp (meaning borderline between a light carrier and a fleet carrier).

Saratoga was badly damaged by a submarine attack a week later, on August 31, and knocked out of action until November. Wasp was sunk by a Japanese submarine attack on September 15, 1942.  For the next month or so, Hornet was our only active carrier in the Pacific.  Enterprise returned to action on October 24, just in time.

Well, just in time to watch Hornet go down, and to be badly damaged again.  In the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands on October 25-27, 1942, Enterprise and Hornet faced heavy odds: fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, again, plus the borderline Junyo and another light carrier, Zuiho.  Fortunately, Hiyo had turned back due to an engine room fire.

The Santa Cruz Islands was a victory for the Japanese, as Hornet was sunk and Enterprise damaged.  Shokaku and Zuiho were heavily damaged on the Japanese side.

At this point, the damaged Enterprise was our sole carrier in the Pacific.  Arguably because of the unintended consequence of the Doolittle raid, we had lost Lexington, and Yorktown, and Wasp, and Hornet — and Saratoga, while not sunk, was damaged and out of action.  The Japanese still had Zuikaku, and the borderline Hiyo, with Shokaku and Junyo under repair.

It’s not clear whether any of this would have happened in my hypothetical.  Would have the Japanese have risked the Guadalcanal operation, with no fleet carriers at all?  They would have had the borderline, converted liners Hiyo and Junyo, plus the light carriers Ryujo and Zuiho, to take on (probably) 4 American fleet carriers plus the borderline Wasp.  They were desperate, but perhaps not that desperate.

In the event, the present looked bleak at the end of 1942, though the future was bright.  In December, the mighty Essex was commissioned, namesake of a new class of over two dozen American fleet carriers, the best carriers of the war by a wide margin, none of which would be lost.  But at the time, we had only the damaged Enterprise in operation for a brief period, and the Saratoga returning from repairs in November.

We were so desperate, in mid-1943, that we went into action with the so-called “USS Robin,” an apparently new fleet carrier.  It’s a great story.  The Robin was actually the HMS Victorious, borrowed from the British and modified to handle American aircraft.  It operated with the Saratoga briefly, covering a couple of amphibious invasions.  You can read more about it here.

In the long run, of course, any negative consequences of the Doolittle raid would have made little difference.  By mid-1944, American naval and air power were overwhelming in the Pacific, and the Japanese were doomed.

VI.  Sources

If you’re interested in reading more, you can check out the following from the official US naval history website.

Battles: Doolittle Raid, Coral Sea, Midway.

Carrier service histories: Lexington (CV-2), Saratoga, Yorktown (CV-5), Enterprise, Wasp (CV-7), Hornet (CV-8).

Saratoga and Enterprise survived through the war.  I’ve included the ship numbers for Lexington, Yorktown, Wasp, and Hornet, because all of these names were used again for Essex-class carriers.