Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Real Terrorist Threat
David Judson, who recently resigned from his position as editor-in-chief of Turkey's English-language Hürriyet Daily News, is now reporting for the paper from India. (He is much missed by readers of Hürriyet, by the way: Since his departure, the paper has become noticeably less interesting.)
... if the news [of bin Laden's death] was cathartic in the city where bin Laden’s hijacked planes wrought such hellish devastation and death nearly a decade ago, here where another terrorist attack killed 164 people in 2008, the conclusion is far different. For Americans, and not just the young people who famously danced for joy in front of the White House, the mood is about an ending. “Closure” on the events of 9/11 is an often-encountered phrase. Here, where the iconic date is “26/11,” for Nov. 26, 2008 when the Mumbai attacks occurred, there is no celebration. Virtually everyone I have spoken with sees no end to jihad terror. Most, in fact, see the danger and threat increasing.
“LeT,” is the local abbreviation for “Lashkar-e-Taiba,” the organization blamed for the Mumbai attacks. Unlike al-Qaeda, it is hardly a household word in the west. While its priority has long been the disputed region of Kashmir between India and Pakistan, its ultimate aim of Shariah rule throughout much of the world is squarely in line with that of al-Qaeda.
That’s not to say Lashkar has been entirely ignored. There is plenty of research available online and a detailed analysis on this ascendant terror group was carried just last month by the Associated Press. None of this is difficult to find and I urge its reading. But what reporting exists is largely out of sight. The AP agency report, for example, actually appeared in very few newspapers. ...
Lashkar, however, is unlikely to remain so invisible for long, predicted Sundeep Waslekar, founder of India’s global think tank, the Strategic Foresight Group. Rather than a case of CIA daring-do, he told me, bin Laden’s killing is more akin to the corporate takeover of a weak brand. Al-Qaeda is a spent force, its recruitment long ago collapsed, its fighters number at best in the hundreds if not the tens. The forces that cashed bin Laden into the CIA have now placed their bets on a much more formidable organization whose claims include a vow to “raise the green flag over the White House.” Waslekar’s estimate of Lashkar’s fighting force is around 200,000. It also enjoys a quasi-legal fundraising/charity arm in Pakistan that make it a force to be reckoned with.
“Comparing the strength of al-Qaeda and LeT (Lashkar) is like comparing the militaries of the United States and Belgium,” Waslekar said.
From this city, the chaos of terrorism seems hardly to have been defeated. Something similar might be said of the chaotic way the news media perceives, assesses and reflects continuing terrorist threats and danger.
He is surely right.
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Jun '10
Re: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Real Terrorist Threat
You don't have to be very smart to be an effective terrorist, as the Mumbai attackers proved. And to be an effective cruise missile--the vest-wearing type--you just have to look halfway normal until the appointed time. Sheer numbers can change the whole game. And the worst thing they do, if effective enough, is turn the target countries into police states.
Edited on May 13, 2011 at 7:25pmAug '10
Re: Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Real Terrorist Threat
Somebody tell me why we even let Pakistanis into the U.S. Or let anyone who has a Pakistani stamp in his passport into the U.S. Suppose we slammed the door. If there were diplomatic retaliation, who would even notice? If you couldn't go to Pakistan, would you be heartbroken?
Diplomatic isolation: I suppose the idea is a non-starter. It's complicated in execution, and its optimum result is wholly sterile. But somehow I keep thinking...more Cubas, not fewer...¡sí, podemos!