The DOJ’s Uvalde Report: Part 2

You can read Part-1 by clicking on the link.

The DOJ report is about 600 pages long. I'm not going to write a 600-page essay. I will provide quotes from the post. I have provided the link to the report so you can read as much of the report or as little as you like.

There is no doubt that the law enforcement response to the Robb Elementary School shooter was a failure, and some have called it a cascade of failures. I don't disagree with that description. If I was asked who should see the report first my answer would be the families that lost their children or a teacher on that horrible day. The rest of us whether it be the media, law enforcement officers, and the public would be next in line after the families had a chance to read the report.

Here is a list of some the recommendations of the report:

Chapter 2. Tactics and Equipment

Observation 1: The first officers on scene immediately moved toward the sound of gunfire and into the
West Building of Robb Elementary to stop the shooter, which was in adherence to active shooter
response generally accepted practices. Once inside the building, five of the first officers on scene
continued to press down the hallway and toward a barrage of gunfire erupting inside of rooms 111/112.

Observation 2: Officer movements down the hallway were uncoordinated and not tactically sound,
creating potential crossfire between officers entering on the south side and north side of the hallway.

Recommendation 2.1: Officers responding to an active shooter and other dynamic scenes should
maintain cognizance of potential crossfire upon their initial approach and make tactical adjustments
as soon as feasible.

Recommendation 2.2: Law enforcement agencies should ensure officers are trained on one-, two-,
three-, and four-person team formations that are taught in active shooter training courses. These
formations are designed to allow the greatest opportunity for success for officers in locating and
addressing the threat with whatever weapon system they have on their person.

Observation 3: After officers suffered graze wounds from shrapnel, the first officers on scene did not
penetrate the doors to rooms 111/112 and repositioned to a barricaded subject situation. This mindset
permeated throughout much of the incident response, even impacting many of the later responding
officers. Despite their training and despite multiple events indicating the subject continued to pose an
active threat to students and staff in the building, including the likelihood and then confirmation of
victims inside the room, officers on scene did not attempt to enter the room and stop the shooter until
for over an hour after they entered the building. The shooter was not killed until approximately 77
minutes after law enforcement first arrived.

Recommendation 3.1: Officers responding to an active shooter incident must continually seek to
eliminate the threat and enable victim response. The shooter’s immediate past actions and likely
future actions serve as “triggering points” that indicate the appropriate response should be in line
with active shooter response protocols. An active shooter with access to victims should never be
considered and treated as a barricaded subject.

Recommendation 3.2: Officers responding to an active shooter incident or dynamic scenes with
evolving threats should continually assess their surroundings and stimuli and seek to obtain an
accurate picture of the incident to inform their decision-making and tactical approach.

Recommendation 3.3: Law enforcement training academies and providers should ensure that
active shooter training modules include the factors in determining active shooter versus
barricaded subject situations.