I am an Israeli Jew. In case you haven't heard, we're engaged in a significant war on multiple fronts. We have also been subject to a wide range of criticism from a wide range of sources. The UN accuses us of war crimes and genocide. Twitter accounts accuse us of mass rape, of routine lying, of targeting children and engaging in a mass of collective punishment. For many, there is a need to engage with these criticisms for the purposes of rebuttal. Over the course of the war, I’ve realized that these sorts of arguments are pointless. The US was involved with and supporting the Saudi war in Yemen (150,000 suffering violent deaths). There were no mass protests and there is no ICJ warrant out for the arrest of Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud. I understand that people are focused on Israel’s war for reasons that have a great deal to do with Jew-obsession and hatred and very little to do with the scope, reasoning or nature of the actions my country has undertaken.

That all said, I can’t simply ignore the criticisms. I have to take them into consideration. This isn’t to justify my people before international courts, international governments or the social media commentariat. It isn’t to satisfy the indictments laid at our feet by the Norwegians, Irish, Greeks or Turks. No, I have to take these criticisms into consideration because I must lead my own life in a way that I can justify before my Creator and my ultimate Judge. Even in this case, the purpose isn’t to avoid any punishment or reward. My interpretation of Jewish Hell is just this: all your rational gymnastics are stripped away, and you become completely aware of the immoral decisions you’ve made and your guilt in making them. This concept of Hell is so powerful that the Jewish faith believes that nobody is ‘there’ for more than a single year.

The question then isn’t: Can I justify our actions and my own part in those actions? Instead, the question is: What is right in our current situation and what can I do to improve the morality of our actions?

This sort of review is particularly important in our High Holiday season, which is specifically in place for the purposes of introspection and moral improvement.

Accusations that Count

In this assessment, I can safely ignore the wild-eyed ridiculousness of some claims. I’m thinking of those Internet commentators who write things like “Israel dropped a NUKE on Lebanon!” or completely misquote – or misunderstand the context of – passages in the Talmud. Organ harvesting, attacks on fertility (boy, those didn’t work) and Zionist Death Sharks all fit into this category. These critics simply don’t know what they’re talking about. Likewise, I can ignore those who accuse our people of almost comical mischaracterizations (think of the little girl being comforted by a soldier and the commentators explaining that he was grooming her for rape). I know soldiers, many of them. I understand the moral logic of our people. While there are certainly subsegments of our population who are out of control for a variety of reasons which we’ll get to, the rape of children and captives isn’t on the table.

These criticisms simply aren’t relevant because they aren’t based in any sort of truth.

What is relevant are accusations around collective punishment, excessive force, arbitrary violence, assassination, destruction of property, use of Palestinian shields, displacement of populations, seizure of land, lack of rights and mistreatment of prisoners.

As an Israeli Jew – a taxpayer, a member of society, a man whose children will join the army – I have an obligation to understand these sorts of criticisms and, when appropriate, do whatever I can to change behaviors.

Caveats

There are a few core caveats to this analysis.

First, I cannot suggest that Israel not defend herself. The Arab and Muslim world has engaged in a multi-decade effort first to cleanse itself of its Jewish population (99.8% Jewish population decline in Arab countries since 1948) and to eliminate the only Jewish State (wars of elimination in 1948, 1967 and 1973, as well as a change in tactics post-73 towards major terrorism and the building of terrorist capability and WMDs explicitly for the purpose of erasing the State of Israel).

I will not apologize for my people existing and I won’t bow before those who want to destroy us. The way in which we conduct war and peace must be appropriate, but that does not mean we do not have a right to defend ourselves.

Second, my moral analysis will have little to do with Western standards of war or the criteria established under international law.

In the case of Western standards, they were developed in the context of protecting civilian populations during the wars of Lords and Kings. They best apply to wars between governments, but not wars between peoples. The reality of the Middle East is that conflicts are not national, they are sectarian. For the Palestinian enemies of Israel, every Jewish child is an appropriate target. They are engaged in a War Between Peoples. In line with my principles (covered in the next section) I believe a War Between Peoples is a terrible thing. But the proper response to it is not the Western laws of war. Those laws don’t deal with the challenges created by total ethnic conflict.

In the case of International Law, such law is obviously extremely flexible in its interpretation, depending on what your desired outcome is. For example, the West Bank is commonly referred to as ‘Occupied Territory’ when it can’t be occupied territory because there was no prior state it is occupied from; Jordan’s control of the West Bank was never recognized internationally. It is instead ‘Disputed Territory.’ Nonetheless, the legal treatment of occupation is imposed by international authorities because they prefer those outcomes. Likewise, Mohammed bin Salman faces no indictment despite Saudi actions in Yemen.

Instead of Western or International standards, my criterium is my understanding of what it means to act in the image of my Creator.

Third, I am not a professional in this area. I am not a legal scholar, and I am not privy to any secrets. I’m not in the army, I’m not in politics and I’m not in intelligence. I have never worked for the government and aside from conversations with those who serve, I have no special access to information (and they can’t share secrets). I am a consultant who works on Quality Assurance and financial and strategic analysis. I am also a writer.

Principles

Given all the above, my basic moral tenants in a war like that faced by Israel are:

1. You don’t need to die to save your enemies lives, property or rights. Your own life takes precedence. This is in line with standard Jewish practice, including the much-debated Talmud discussion about two people with not enough water in the desert.
2. You should not engage in unnecessary destruction.
3. Criminals must be punished in order to limit the spread of criminality.
4. Your ultimate goal should be to raise the potential of both your people and other peoples – even enemy peoples.
5. Those enemies who cannot be raised up should be neutralized, within the confines of limiting destruction.

Within the above, there are some important wrinkles. For example, early-stage destructive intervention (say, limiting Hamas) could prevent a need for a far greater and more destructive late-stage intervention. Thus, under the second and fourth principle, it would have been a morally superior choice to have engaged in the Gaza War prior to Hamas’ extensive build-up even though the casus belli was not yet as clear. Hamas itself could not be raised up and so should have been neutralized. Like any law, decisions about emphasis have a major impact on interpretation. That is fundamentally why, despite the fact that I am sharing this piece publicly, this analysis is ultimately very personal.

Tactical Issues

Some criticisms are tactical. In other words, they criticize the specific types of actions carried out. Key areas of tactical criticism include:

• Destruction of property
• Mistreatment of prisoners
• Assassination
• Use of Palestinian shields
• Excessive and arbitrary force

Destruction of Property

The war in Gaza and the West Bank, and now the war in Lebanon, have involved extensive destruction of property. Large areas of Gaza have been largely destroyed. In Lebanon, there has been extensive violence and more than a few bombings. In the West Bank, roads have been torn up and buildings bulldozed or destroyed in offensive operations. The facts behind this destruction are generally clear and well-agreed upon. The question for me is: are those activities not just justifiable, but right?

From the perspective of the Israeli government and IDF, there have been clear cases of excessive destruction. The demolition of an empty university facility from which terrorists were not operating was one of these. From the perspective of outsiders, almost every building destroyed has been unjustifiable.

The questions I would use for determining whether Israel’s actions have been appropriate are:

• Do the structures involved pose a real risk to Israeli soldiers or civilians (e.g. is Hamas using them as firing platforms)?
• Is there a less destructive means of neutralizing them?

From soldiers I’ve talked to (and heard from second-hand), every building they’ve encountered in Gaza has had pre-positioned arms in it. The idea is that Hamas fighters dressed as civilians and unarmed can go into structures, pick up weapons and attack Israeli forces. Even if the buildings don’t have these arms, enemy fighters can emerge from tunnels beneath the buildings – fully armed – and use the buildings as firing platforms. Given this, the destruction of buildings is the right decision where the buildings pose a risk to the lives of soldiers. However, this is only true so long as there is no less destructive means of neutralizing them. For example, several months into the war, Israeli soldiers transitioned from the demolition of these homes/firing positions to demolition of internal staircases. No stairs means no elevated firing position. In addition, as the war progressed, Israel became more effective, not only at eliminating arms caches but at entering the tunnels themselves. This means fighters have much less opportunity to pop up and fire from buildings, and reduces the need to demolish them.

I haven’t done a data analysis (I’m not even sure what sources I could use), but anecdotally, and based on the simple sound of fighter aircraft outside my apartment, Israel has significantly cut back both demolitions on the ground and aerial bombing activity. As less destructive means have emerged, they have been largely embraced. This tunnel warfare has also reduced the need to conduct major ordinance bombings against mid-level targets, which can have unexpected impacts in areas with large underground excavations. At this point, this sort of bunker-busting activity appears to be limited to top-level targets like Mohammed Deif (or Sinwar, if he is found).

For this reason, I believe Israeli destruction of property in Gaza has been largely justified. The same applies to the new policy of digging up roads (after a massive IED killed a number of soldiers) or destroying houses in Lebanon that hold missiles. This is certainly not true in all cases, though. The commander who destroyed the university facility was censored for that activity. Every army faces, amid the heat of battle, soldiers who step out of line in the interests of hate, revenge or blood lust.

As with any question of this nature, there must be policies in place for determining in advance what actions are right, for punishing intentional crimes after the fact and for altering procedures to reduce the possibility of poor choices. The Israeli army – like the American army – is lawyered up and is actively engaging in setting criteria and judging soldiers’ activities.

Israel does engage in after-action judgements for both legal and tactical purposes – much like hospitals do following treatment failures. Israel has a General Staff Fact-Finding Assessment Mechanism (FFA) and as per best practices, it is staffed by those outside the normal chain of command. However, this mechanism is challenged by the nature of the conflict. It can be impossible to ascertain that a criminal action took place due to the complexity of circumstances and difficulty collecting evidence (autopsies of Palestinians can be hard to conduct) and witness statements. Thus, criminal charges and convictions are not secured at a high rate.

I see two ways to improve on the FFA mechanism.

First, there should be more regular non-criminal penalties (these do exist and are occasionally applied). Where there is uncertainty, but a decent likelihood that inappropriate actions were carried out, there should be a means of punishment. The gray zone of the field of combat necessarily means that civilian law is hard to apply.

Second, the FFA is currently triggered by the surfacing of allegations or the raising of suspicions around particular operations/events. I believe it would be more effective to extend the investigative mandate by using AI to listen/watch footage and records of events in order to flag them for possible human review. This would enable a reduction in events where there is no ‘gotcha’ film and thus far more thoroughly improve combat performance and behavior.

Mistreatment of Prisoners

The mistreatment of security prisoners is a very different issue, one in which Israel’s performance has not been good. As I see it, there are three major issues in security prisoner management.

1. Correctly filtering who should be punished. I know Israel has done a poor job of filtering cases correctly. This has been exacerbated by the mass of prisoners added to the system during this war.
2. Correctly determining the appropriate punishment. In many cases (and I know this will be unpopular), the punishments have not been severe enough for those correctly filtered.
3. Correctly delivering appropriate punishment. This has been a severe failure, with a lack of professionalism and inconsistency resulting in punishments that are too light, too heavy or just too random for the situation.

Filtering

If I were on the Hamas side of the equation, this would be simple. Any Jew is an enemy, so sectarian filtering is all that is needed. However, they even get that wrong sometimes. Famously, Hamas killed a comatose 17-year-old Druze in his hospital bed because they thought he was Jewish. This is the War Between Peoples model. The problem with this model is that it is inherently incapable of raising others up and it tends towards unnecessary destruction. While it might be appropriate in extreme situations, it should only be a very last resort – and we aren’t there and hopefully never will be.

So, what is the purpose of filtering? In line with my principles, the goals are to:

• Limit criminality by punishing criminals (in this case, terrorists)
• Neutralize those who cannot be reformed
• Raise up others, including those who are not prisoners

Filtering plays an absolutely critical role in all three areas.

• You want to punish criminals, but you have to identify them. If you randomly punish others, you become the criminal.
• You have to be able to identify the unredeemable.
• The enemy population has to realize that you are honestly trying to limit the scope of your actions in order to know that there is a positive outcome waiting should they cease fighting.

Israel’s filtering mechanisms have not been good. On a very basic level, this comes down to a simple reality that the treatment of unlawful combatants is an inherently difficult proposition. All the uncertainty of peacetime prosecutions is multiplied by the necessary secrecy of military and intelligence operations. This means that those defending prisoners are either people who are part of the security establishment (which will universally lead to biased trials) or others who can’t access all the information that would normally be a part of a strong defense. I have a friend who was a military prosecutor in a security prison (i.e. one for Palestinian terrorists) in Israel. There is a legal framework in place. But the defense often can’t know who the witnesses are or what the evidence is against those they are representing. A mechanism of dealing with this is closed hearings where civilian judges (including the Israeli Supreme Court who is no friend of the government and not a pro-prosecution entity) can hear the available evidence. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ensure a fair "trial," and it is close to impossible to broadcast the fairness of the trial by making the evidence public.

I wish I could snap my fingers and come up with a solution to these problems, but I can’t. Israel is not the first country to face these issues with the challenges of military tribunals going back centuries.

That said, a significant alteration could be made that would better serve my principles. Instead of a simple ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty,’ sentencing could be based on a combination of severity of crimes and certainty that they were committed. A Nukhba terrorist caught on film shooting Israeli civilians on October 7^th would be subject to the full weight of punishment (and could indeed face a civilian trial). However, a man caught on the Israeli side of the fence with a gun that may have been used to kill civilians, and whom Palestinian informants identify as a Nukhba terrorist, wouldn’t be released — but shouldn’t face the maximal punishment.

With this principle in mind, punishments can be public, and where possible, the logic behind them should be revealed as well. This already applies to Israeli citizens. Unfortunately, longer-term administrative detention is applied to non-Israeli Palestinians (Israelis can be administratively detained for short periods). It serves as a sort of parallel and poorly-disclosed form of imprisonment. While these detentions are routinely reviewed by judges, they are inherently challenging.

Addressing these issues might be as simple as a change in emphasis. The goal is to restrict active terrorists while broadcasting to the rest of the population that the detentions are not arbitrary. With this in mind the prosecution, judge and defense should all understand that the defendant’s friends and family almost certainly know the truth. In other words, the goal isn’t prosecution per se, but messaging. Don’t ever seek to detain those who aren’t highly likely to have engaged in acts of terrorism. By demonstrating selectivity, even with the fog of war and the non-disclosure of sources, you can demonstrate a desire to conduct warfare only against those who are already engaged in it.

There is strong evidence that this filtering was particularly weak in the immediate aftermath of October 7^th. There was evidence of this on the Twittersphere as well. People were arrested and detained for at least a few weeks on scant evidence while the filtering was taking place. Again, as the pace of the war has become more deliberate, I believe this has improved.

Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that it still isn’t strong. In a case of pre-detention action, a first responder who killed a terrorist attacking a bus stop was himself shot down, despite disposing of his weapon and raising his hands. Another tragic and more famous example was the three hostages who were killed because they were suspected of being terrorists. This is poor filtering, and one has to assume it is still occurring in the heat and the aftermath of battle.

What is my personal obligation, before my Creator? I would love to say I acted by "donating to B’tselem or Breaking the Silence!" However, their broader actions and approach are deeply antithetical to my other principles. They don’t recognize aspects of the war that demand behavior outside the Western box. Following their principles and goals would lead to an existential threat to Israel and her people – violating the first principle.

As with the destruction of property, an extension of the FFA review process to a proactive review, even in the absence of allegations or explicit suspicions, could be helpful. This review could look not only for criminality on the part of jailors but for the opportunity to improve effectiveness. Fundamentally, people want to do a good and moral job. Helping them do that without reflexively accusing them of immorality could be quite positive. As one Quality Assurance (QA) manager on a U.S. aircraft carrier once told me: “Once QA is seen as a tool that helps you achieve your objectives, rather than a roadblock, then it will be embraced by those it is helping.”

That same concept can apply to the parallel prosecution system through which Israel engages with many suspected terrorists.

Determining

In determining punishment, Israel is constrained in quite a different way. The State has no death penalty. In addition, it can and does release security prisoners in exchange for hostages. Cases of those released prisoners going on to commit violent acts are legion. As just one prominent example, Sinwar himself (and 1,026 others) was released in the exchange for Gilad Shalit.

The likelihood that the terrorist you just stopped in the street will be out again and fighting is a major incentive for individuals to take the law into their own hands. This results in tragic mistakes like the man gunned down at the bus stop after stopping a terrorist and the Eritrean migrant beaten to death as a suspected terrorist. It also results in egregious acts of extrajudicial murder. In the most shocking case (for me) a young girl who had attempted a stabbing attack in Jerusalem was shot to death as she lay on the sidewalk, already disabled after having been shot moments before.

In the cases of the innocent (or even heroic) bystanders, the problem is one of filtering, and then determination. In the case of the Palestinian girl, it was purely one of determination. She was already clearly identified as a terrorist. However, a proper and controlled punishment process was not followed. Part of the reason was almost certainly a feeling that proper punishment would never be delivered.

Due to Supreme Court rulings, Israel’s prison service provides convicted terrorists not only the basics like food, but amenities like university educations and medical intervention. Mohammed Sinwar was rescued from an ischemic cerebrovascular accident caused by a brain tumor. This is all standard in the West. It goes further, though. In order to keep prisoners calm and under control, wardens have permitted them to rape conscript soldiers. In other words, Israeli 18- and 19-year-old conscript girls have been raped by convicted terrorist murderers in order to make those terrorists easier to manage.

This reveals deep levels of professional mismanagement and mistreatment (in this case, positive treatment from the terrorist’s perspective). The State Comptroller’s Office is investigating, but the clear concept is that prisoners are being confined — and that is it. For terrorist murderers, many Israelis feel that approach — combined with routine mass releases — is deeply insufficient.

The State needs a death penalty as well as a sentence of life incarceration without possibility of exchange. It also needs to have levels of incarceration that prevent the unreformable from spreading their influence and power. This can mean solitary isolation, but it can also mean severe conditions in which prisoners can’t talk to others (a lack of communication can and has been enforced even in a room full of people). This wouldn’t be appropriate for most prisoners, but it may well be appropriate for some. By limiting their influence and by undermining their capabilities (including through psychological means) you can reduce the destruction that is ultimately necessary, and give others a path up and out of the conflict.

As an individual, I have and will continue to advocate for far firmer punishment – in some cases – to restrict the influence and impact of select security prisoners. I believe that this will contribute to a reduction in vigilantism both outside and within the prison service.

Delivering

Even when a terrorist is correctly filtered with an appropriately determined punishment or restriction there can and have been severe problems in delivery. In the aftermath of the accusation of rape at Sde Teiman, a politician argued in the Knesset that this was permissible because the prisoner was a Nukhba terrorist. Even if we assume some court were to somehow find that this terrible Nukhba terrorist should have been punished by rape, the politician was suggesting something else entirely. He was suggesting that delivery should effectively be ‘anything goes.’

In other words, there should be no controls, no professionalism and no standards. Whatever the guard felt like would be deemed appropriate.

I can’t imagine a situation in which rape would be an appropriate judicial punishment. But even if it were, the prison guards themselves can’t be the ones determining when to apply it on an ad-hoc basis.

This is the essence of delivery. The punishment delivered has to be in line with the prior filtering and determination steps. Even if the situation is one of interrogation, there has to be an oversight process to limit what occurs.

All that said, it isn’t clear what happened at Sde Teiman. The prisoner was placed behind shields that prevented the cameras from capturing what occurred. The doctor who reported the possibility of a crime did say that the damage he saw was inconsistent with rape and more likely due to consensual or self-administered sexual activity.

Interestingly, Sde Teiman actually demonstrated that at least one part of the control system was working correctly. A doctor reported a possible crime against prisoners, possible perpetrators were arrested (with some remaining in custody) and this occurred prior to any footage being released. There were controls and they were swiftly reacted to. The protests against enforcement of these controls are more than egregious – but again these were driven by a significant belief that the system was and is not appropriately determining punishment and delivering it.

At the same time, other parts of the service, such as those responsible for monitoring the cameras which are there, in part, to prevent abuses, did not report on regular concealment of activity from the cameras. The guards involved claimed they were concealing activity from other prisoners and forming a literal shield to protect themselves in the midst of a significant number of extremely violent prisoners. However, the cameras should be set up to allow monitoring of these ‘behind the curtain’ activities while permitting such movements to occur. This would help ensure appropriate delivery of determined punishments to prisoners who have been properly filtered.

Prisoners Overview

In thinking about the prisoner’s issues, I am reminded of the evolution of policing in the US. In the popular mind at least, it went from far less professional, almost vigilante, 1970s-style policing with very limited incarceration policies to the far more professional (and more likely to incarcerate) policies of the early 2000s. The combination of professionalism and the delivery of justice contributed to a massive decrease in crime and street violence. With this model in mind, I can and do speak in favor of better targeting, better punishment and better delivery leading to better outcomes.

In my assessment before the Almighty, I know I have clearly expressed my opposition to the Sde Teiman protestors’ actions (as well as the words of the idiot politician in the Knesset). That all said, I don’t have tremendous knowledge or reach in this area and so I choose to concentrate on other issues.

Assassination

Israel has long been associated with a policy of assassination. In reality, this policy has ebbed and flowed. For years, Israel removed the heads of terrorist organizations (including Hezbollah in 1992). Then when it was determined that the policy was ineffective, it basically stopped until the recent war.

Assassination would appear to be an ideal policy that is almost perfectly in line with my principles. You are protecting yourself, you are limiting damage, you are punishing criminals, you are potentially freeing your enemy to find a new path and you are neutralizing unredeemable threats. Win, win, win.

The challenge is that assassination is probably only effective in very particular circumstances. For example, the US assassinated many Al Qaeda and Taliban commanders. The US didn’t win or even really slow down those organizations. Israel killed Nasrallah’s predecessor and various Hamas leaders without much effect. Assassination, apparently a laudable approach, didn’t work.

Assassination only seems to work when:

• The enemy has a large bureaucratic organization that requires expertise to run.
• The enemy has limited means of identifying and replenishing those expert leaders.

With the above in mind, assassinating political leaders is unlikely to be effective. They’ll simply be replaced because political leaders are rarely great experts (and dead leaders can make great martyrs and effectively lead from beyond the grave). Likewise, assassinating operations leaders of more ad-hoc terrorist organizations will also be ineffective – they aren’t large bureaucracies.

Assassinations didn’t really slow down Al Qaeda. However, ISIS, with its more formal structure, faced real issues under a policy of assassination. They have since morphed their organization into less of a "state" and more of an ad hoc terrorist club. This has made them more resilient in the face of assassination but also less threatening in terms of establishing a functioning and powerful terrorist state.

In the case of Hamas, earlier assassinations were less than effective. As Hamas adopted the structure of a state with a bureaucracy and payroll, eliminating professional administrators became more valuable. Nonetheless, their main effect is to demoralize the enemy. However, in Hezbollah’s case, assassinations won’t have a massive short-term effect. The organization’s fighters are trained to act as independent cells. However, the impact can be significant in the long term and while under continual stress. Hezbollah runs a $1 billion budget and has 100,000 paid employees (akin to Sony, Renault or Proctor & Gamble). Eliminating the entire management team (who had been running things for as long as 40 years) while taking out a large number of middle managers (who still require a slice of the budget) while also eliminating their corporate communications tools has had a brutal impact on their ability to sustain operations. Nasrallah, the political leader, can be left in place — he can’t administer the organization in isolation.

Given all the above, I think Israel’s assassination policy is reasonable. However, collateral damage remains a critical consideration. A bombing of a tunnel early in the war killed dozens or more for a mid-level commander underground. In retrospect, this wasn’t the right call (it was hard to know the neighborhood would collapse). Learning from that error, this approach hasn’t been repeated – we now go into the tunnels to get mid-level commanders. On the other hand, the removal of Deif was appropriate, even though there were probably significant surrounding casualties (keeping in mind that he was most likely surrounded by his own men).

When judged against my principles, Israel’s recent assassination policy has been both appropriate and effective.

Use of Palestinian Shields

This is one of the most controversial areas. Recent film showed a Palestinian tied to the hood of a Humvee while the vehicle drove through a neighborhood. Somewhat unbelievably, the soldiers claimed the man was injured and couldn’t walk and they were just transporting him as they lacked space within the vehicle. It is far more likely he was a shield.

Under the Western laws of war, this is a clear violation. Whether the man was a civilian or an injured unlawful combatant, it was inappropriate to use him as a human shield. However, from Hamas’ perspective, human shields are entirely appropriate. They routinely use Palestinians (including children) as shields, although, of course, they prefer to use Israeli hostages for this purpose. Hamas doesn’t see it as a violation of the laws of war because theirs is a War Between Peoples. If the human shields prevent Israel from firing, then they’ve been protected without actually leading to any loss of life on the shields’ part. Theirs is a cynical but accurate assessment that Israel is reluctant to fire on women and children. Of course, decades of this policy have forced Israel to increasingly ignore the presence of human shields because it would be impossible to stop Hamas from killing Israelis otherwise. Even so, everything Hamas has is shielded by civilians, either underground, in schools, in hospitals, in ambulances etc...

The very reality that Israel is increasingly unwilling to allow Hamas fighters to be protected by human shields is the very same reality that suggests tying either civilians or combatants to the roof of your Humvee isn’t a good policy. If Hamas remains willing to use human shields (including their own wives and children) despite their reduced effectiveness, then they are not likely to care about the guy tied to your roof who is effectively obstructing your view.

Thus, this action is ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. It puts somebody at unnecessary risk for no effective gain. It is thus, under my principles, wrong. Not gravely wrong, considering the context of the fight, but wrong nonetheless.

The same principle goes for tossing bodies off of roofs. There’s no respect due to an enemy who would kidnap a comatose 17-year-old in his hospital bed just because they suspect he’s a Jew. On the other hand, unless you think the enemy is wired up to blow (which is possible), this sort of action doesn’t serve any purpose.

On the broader scale, these sorts of actions can reduce the possibility of longer-term more positive outcomes. They increase animosity and hatred for very limited or non-existent tactical gains.

Excessive and Arbitrary Force

There have obviously been many cases of excessive and arbitrary force. They fail every one of my principles. They are unnecessarily destructive, costing people’s welfare or lives for basically no purpose. They are criminal, which means that they undermine your own society. And they create deep and unrelenting animosity which prevents the elevation of the enemy.

In many ways, this category of accusation falls into the mistreatment of prisoners; although the targets in question often never get a chance to be prisoners. These represent failures of filtering targets, of appropriately determining punishments and of professionally delivering those punishments.

Israel rarely engages in excessive and arbitrary force in their large-scale actions. For example, there are multiple layers of fire control and review before missiles or drones are deployed. The right decisions aren’t always made, and mistakes happen, but there is an extensive process of review within the confines of a high-paced combat environment.

The real challenges here are in the day-to-day. Things like traffic stops, checkpoints, arrests – borderline policing activities and actual policing activities. This is a problem not only with the Palestinians but domestically. I hope I don’t piss off the wrong people, but the police aren’t very professional or competent. Excessive violence in the day-to-day happens and it is ignored too often.

Go back to the case of the hostages accidentally shot down. There was no indication of a threat, but the automatic judgment was to apply more violence more arbitrarily rather than less arbitrarily. This was, as I recall, even though an officer gave an order not to shoot in at least one case. If this occurs in the case of hostages, it is reasonable to assume that it occurs in other cases as well. Fighting-age males who are uninvolved have almost certainly been killed through the arbitrary application of force.

Combat has stress and it has fog. There is a role for leniency when incorrect or self-protective decisions are made. For this reason, I am in favor of the investigations the FFA already engages in. The first goal of these investigations is not prosecution of punishment, it is process improvement. Only if malicious intent is discovered is there punishment. The goal then is to improve the performance and reduce arbitrary violence caused by both malicious intent and simple errors. The problem, as in other areas, is that the triggers to FFA involvement are too limited. In aerospace, for example, close calls are routinely reported or captured by automated systems. Questionable applications of force should be treated the same way. As covered before, broad-based AI review of all actions should be applied to suggest situations that require human review and intervention.

I do recognize that conscript soldiers are inherently difficult to apply quality principles to. They aren’t in the service long enough to be totally integrated into a core quality culture. Nonetheless, the army does take steps to train proper combat behavior. Notably, it excludes soldiers who would be expected not to serve honorably. For example, current Minister Ben Gvir was excluded from military service due to his extremism.

Given all of this, I do believe improvements can and should be made with consistent messaging that the purpose of the more intensive reviews is not only to prevent criminal actions but also to improve the effectiveness of the overall war effort.

Tactical Conclusions

Tactical issues really aren’t an area in which I have relevant expertise. I have no special legal knowledge and no military background. I recognize my limitations. That said, I am happy to write and speak and try to contribute to what I believe are good-faith efforts to improve the morality of tactical actions. I don’t know that my core recommendations (broader criteria for initiation of investigations, broader ranges of punishment for terrorists, and professionalization of law-enforcement-adjacent areas) are actually appropriate but I’m still happy to propose them.

In my judgement before my Creator, as a supporter of the IDF, I’m not going to be overwhelmed with self-doubt and guilt over my actions in this area. It isn’t an area I understand well enough to be out screaming for change. However, I also won’t condemn those who are screaming for change. While those filming the IDF and triggering FFA reviews are generally seeking the destruction of the State of Israel, they are sometimes capturing and reporting immoral actions that should be curtailed. Unfortunately, their bias can pollute what they record and the context they share. It would be more effective, and far less antagonistic, if the IDF conducted initial reviews automatically and in the context of increasing effectiveness.

Strategic Issues

Unlike the tactical issues, which benefit significantly from more technical knowledge, the broader strategic questions can and should be a subject of fundamentally qualified review and criticism by all citizens.

There are broad camps in Israeli society when it comes to strategic issues. Traditionally the ‘peace’ camp was stronger. However, the failures of the withdrawals from Lebanon (2000) and Gaza (2005) have greatly weakened that movement. The other major camp, which calls for a robust and involved defense, has grown in popularity and political strength. This camp has a major level of distrust in the possibility of peace with the Palestinians. You could summarize their position as: "It has been tried, their culture doesn’t want it, and it will thus never work."

Within this broad group, there are multiple resultant policies. At the extreme right, you have those who favor displacement and a "Greater Israel" concept. At the more moderate end, you have those who were, until recently, in favor of the absolutely minimal intervention necessary to preserve the status quo. Judging by the actions of the State, that moderate "no peace is possible wing" was the dominant philosophy for at least a decade.

In the aftermath of October 7^th, a new movement has begun to strengthen. This one wants to see Israeli victory and then a path toward peace. Broadly speaking, I fit into this category. It fits with my principles of protecting my people but also trying to lift up others — including those who are my enemies today. Due to significant concerns of impracticability, many proposals from this camp are vague in nature. Many like to play up a sort of Palestinian Marshall Plan. But this deemed viable without recognizing that massive aid, when delivered to a corrupt society, actually undermines the maturation of that society (the southern Italian Mafia was greatly strengthened by the Marshall Plan). This is why I created the North Gaza Project (northgaza.org). I wanted something tangible, defensible and reasonable.

With all that in mind, let’s review ongoing strategies and where improvement is possible, at least in my opinion.

Displacement of Populations

Israel has not had a policy of displacement since 1948 (a discussion of the scope of that displacement is beyond the scope of this piece). The lack of displacement is one reason why the Arab and Palestinian population from the ‘River to the Sea’ has grown from 1.3 million prior to the State of Israel to 7.6 million today.

Note that this policy is quite different from those applied within the Arab world. The Jewish population within the Arab world has dropped by 99.5% since 1948. This policy, in which there are almost no Jews in any Arab country from Iraq to Algeria, is one of the major drivers for Israeli mistrust of Arab intentions.

That all said, there are three broad categories of ongoing displacement with fundamentally different moral implications.

1. The temporary displacement of populations in Gaza.
2. The "soft displacement" of the failure to legalize new minority settlements and buildings.
3. The occasional demolition of primarily Bedouin villages in both Israel and the Disputed Territories.

Gaza Displacement

The Gaza displacements are short-term in nature. It is a very unusual war in that the local population has not been allowed to flee to neighboring countries (e.g. Egypt). I can’t think of another modern conflict in which almost no civilians have been able to exit the conflict zone. What has happened instead has been continual internal displacement. The population is being moved around to reduce their exposure to military operations. This has undeniably been extremely difficult and destructive. That said, it has been better than the alternatives of either far greater exposure to combat or an allowance for Hamas to continue attacking Israel unimpeded, which violates my first principle.

Despite the Gaza displacements being justifiable, they aren’t desirable – certainly not on an ongoing basis. If there is a better option that reduces this destructive activity while still providing security, then it is morally necessary to pursue it. This is one driver for the North Gaza Project.

I believe it is highly desirable to provide an out for those people who want to leave the conflict and who aren’t connected to terror organizations. That out can be applied in the very near future. This general concept has been growing within the government of Israel, with some calling for removal of the North Gaza population and then a reintroduction of those who have been vetted for the purposes of permanent settlement.

On a personal moral level, I feel this shift is critically important. I regularly advocate for it, and I make every effort to put it in front of decision-makers. Although nobody calls me up and asks me about my policies, I am seeing them being adopted in fits and starts by the Israeli government.

That said, I don’t think the continued vagueness of Israeli government policy is justified. I know decisions are made through a sort of gradual shifting of consensus process, but I nonetheless think it would be more moral to move more directly towards a defined outcome that can reduce destruction and enable people to escape the conflict and be lifted up as a result.

Standing before my Creator I know I will hope I could do more in this area, but I also know I am taking every opportunity to push this forward.

Soft Displacement

Israel has a less than explicit policy of not legalizing new Arab settlements (and then bulldozing those that are illegal). This has been extended even to the Druze. Despite a massive increase in the Druze population, the first new Druze settlement or legal extension of an existing settlement was only approved in the last decade. Thankfully, this was followed up by significant additional permits late last year.

This sort of nudge-nudge-wink-wink sectarian preference for Jewish settlement is understandable from a War Between Peoples perspective, but it is fundamentally bothersome in an environment where alternatives are available. Are new construction permits really going to threaten Jewish lives? In some cases, say those where the population is virulently anti-Israel and the building would provide a firing platform onto nearby highways or towns, then the answer is yes. But in many other cases, the Druze being an extremely clear one, the answer is no.

As with many other areas that have nothing to do with the conflict, I am in favor of clearer legal standards. There should be an explicit policy by which building permits are granted or denied in a timely manner. That policy should explicitly take security issues into account. For example, a town that has a history of launching attacks on passing motorists should not be granted permission to extend housing closer to a major highway. By making the criteria explicit and giving a way out of those restrictions (e.g. no attacks for a period of time) you enable the possibility of growing long-term peace.

These sorts of nudge-nudge-wink-wink games are extended to the Jewish population as well. Approvals for new buildings require a byzantine process and a great deal of political gamesmanship. There are also inter-Jewish games being played, like trying to discourage Haredi housing in areas of the country. Instead of these ad-hoc decisions, processes should be increasingly standardized and increasingly explicit – with a commensurate drop in political and behind-the-scenes favor-trading.

As with many strategic areas, my personal obligation as a citizen is focused on how I vote. For me, this particular issue is a bellwether of appropriate inter-ethnic respect and respect for the rule of law. When possible, those who propose more explicit rules and more even application of those rules will earn my vote. This is one reason I was very supportive of the broad coalition government of Naftali Bennett.

As relatively small as this issue seems, it is a major indicator of a leader’s underlying intent.

Bedouin Villages

Despite appearing similar to the soft displacement challenge, the Bedouin village challenge is fundamentally different and more complex. Many Bedouin in Israel remain somewhat nomadic. It is not uncommon for a family to have several different ad-hoc residences that are moved between on a seasonal basis. As wealth has increased, this sort of extensive ramshackle settlement has been significantly extended, in part as an effort to change the facts on the ground and constrain fixed settlement activities.

What results is a classic conflict between nomadic and settled people.

Outsiders will often see a nationalistic conflict, but the same Bedouins who support nomadic sprawl will often serve in the IDF and vote for parties that want to work with the State of Israel. The issues here have a great deal more in common with issues faced in other conflict zones between nomadic and settled populations. Historically, these challenges have appeared all over the world from the Roman frontier to the American West. Currently, Nigeria is a hotbed of conflict between settled and nomadic populations. While a lot of this has been cast under a religious framework (the Christian population tends to be more settled, the Muslim more nomadic) the underpinnings are even more basic than religious conflict.

In these cases, determining who is "right" is difficult. Settled vs. nomadic value systems and relationships to land are fundamentally different and have very different moral underpinnings and assumptions. The very concepts of land ownership are irreconcilable under these systems. Although the implementation certainly left a lot to be desired, the skeleton of an appropriate approach was established during the conflict between the United States and the Indian nations.

The idea is simple: carve out zones in which nomadic rules apply and will continue to apply. For example, today Nunavut is an autonomous Inuit region of Northern Canada, with its own legal system with its own rules of land ownership. In the Nunavut capital of Iqaluit, there are under 10 properties whose land is owned by the residents or the organizations that use the buildings built there. In line with Inuit values, everybody else holds only a lease.

This is not a bellwether issue for me, in part due to its fundamental complexity and my willingness to accept the difficulty in finding resolutions in this sort of cultural conflict. Despite that, it is my obligation as a voter to support those looking for pathways out of conflict that don’t require the erasure of one or the other culture.

Control of Land

While displacement of populations requires the actual movement of people, control of land is a somewhat different challenge. Control of land is also one of the most controversial areas of the conflict. For many, those who accept that Israel should be allowed to exist, there is a broad call for a return to the 1967 "borders." The 1967 borders were really an armistice line with Jordanian or Egyptian occupation on the other side of the line. In the case of the Golan Heights, Syria had sovereignty over the territory prior to 1967. Interestingly, the only border Israel had in 1967 was with Lebanon – where a border was defined and accepted by both sides.

If Israel’s neighbors had been peaceful, the 1967 ‘borders’ would have been largely acceptable. While I certainly embrace the concept of Jerusalem as the Jewish capital, it is a religious capital. If Jews could have been permitted to visit and to live within that capital without political control, then that may well have been acceptable. Under Jordanian control, however, all Jews were expelled, and Jewish sites were routinely damaged and destroyed. Shooting at Jews who lived in the western part of the city was routine. The territories were cleansed of Jews, including places that had had continual Jewish presence for thousands of years (like Jerusalem and Hebron). This was followed by the use of the territories to harass and ultimately destroy the rest of Jewish life in the land. The policy of using these territories as the first step in cleansing the land of Jews was best illustrated by the wars in 1948 and 1967. When the country had no strategic depth (it was only 9 miles wide in its center), these territories were used to launch wars intended to drive the Jews into the sea. Given the history in Gaza and Lebanon, it isn’t hard to imagine that ceding these territories to the Palestinians outright would result in continual and massive rocket and artillery fire into the underlying cities on the plains.

For this reason, control of the land is entirely justifiable. I don’t lose any sleep over the fact that Israel hasn’t ‘returned’ strategic critical land to the Palestinian Authority or Hamas.

Non-Citizen Rights

The rights of non-citizens governed by Israel is more complex. While Arab citizens of Israel legally have the same rights as any other citizen (although, as with building permits, implementation can be uneven), the same does not apply to Palestinians beyond the 1967 lines.

The result is different rights for different people within territory controlled by Israel. It isn’t apartheid because it isn’t ethnically determined; over two million people who identify as Palestinian Arabs have full legal rights in Israel.

The challenge here is basic: if these populations had full rights as Israeli citizens, then, given their history of terrorism, Israel would be overrun. Furthermore, if this territory wasn’t controlled by Israel, then Israel would be under constant and massive attack. At the same time, it is morally reprehensible to govern people in this way.

(Note that, although I don’t know the details of Palestinian governance, the descendants of refugees from the 1948 war have a separate legal and diminished status within Palestinian-governed areas. It isn’t only Israel that has separate and unequal laws.)

As intractable as the problem may seem, there are approaches to moderating it. They aren’t one-step solutions, but processes that lead towards a continually improving reality. The North Gaza Project, with its clear path toward increasing self-governance, is one such approach. It is not the only approach; it isn’t even my only approach. In my proposed Constitution for the State of Israel, I include on-ramp and off-ramp procedures for individual towns and cities to join or leave a modified multi-national Israeli state. Onboarding procedures are based on popular support and local performance as they relate to incitement and terrorism. I apply these procedures equally to both Jewish and Palestinian settlements. One could easily imagine a third path, where individual Palestinian cantons are recognized by Israel and granted self-rule and granted essentially open visas and access to civilian law in exchange for demonstrated performance on security issues.

Whatever path is chosen, I feel there is a moral need for a more explicit policy that offers a way out of the current status quo. Whether or not any part of the Palestinian population actually avails themselves of a process that offers full rights or full self-rule in return for security performance — the existence of the option to do so is morally critical. Unfortunately, most organizations that support greater autonomy and self-rule don’t sufficiently take security issues into account and they don’t offer a gated roadmap towards these greater rights. They are thus adopting some version of the ‘it is wrong to occupy, so let’s withdraw’ approach that has cost Israel so dearly in Gaza and Lebanon. Because these approaches have a demonstrated track record of terrible failure, they have no traction within the Israeli population and are in opposition to my first moral rule: You don’t need to die to save your enemies' lives, property or rights.

As an individual, my obligation is to think seriously about these challenges and do my best to propose ways to improve the situation. This isn’t the West, there are no simple solutions. There are powerful Palestinian and Arab cultural forces that, through violent means, will suppress any attempt at normalization. Thus, while I can propose an onramp for Palestinian-governed towns, I do recognize it is unlikely to be frequently used. Nonetheless, as stated before, the option has to be there. In contrast, the North Gaza Project doesn’t require organized Palestinian support and so can be implemented (and provide a path towards greater rights) unilaterally.

Collective punishment/siege tactics

The Palestinian militant groups are engaged in a very popular War Between Peoples. Even those who no longer support Hamas would support another anti-Israel force so long as it was more effective than Hamas. It is thus justifiable to engage in a mirror War Between Peoples conflict. However, I don’t think it right to do so.

The first reason it isn’t right to do so is because the Palestinians themselves don’t deserve it. From a Jewish perspective, they do pose a serious threat. However, their issues with Israel are not without justification. They also have a claim to this land. My first principle of protecting my people does not mean that any means or any treatment of others is acceptable.

I am far from alone in the perspective that a mirror conflict would be unjustifiable. Israel has dropped enough ordinance on Gaza to have eliminated the entire population many times over. The fact that even Hamas reports 40,000 dead, and not 2 million, reflects the targeting that has been done. Given this, it is clear Israel is not engaged in a War Between Peoples.

I also see a Jewish version of the Palestinian War Between Peoples as morally unacceptable because it violates two of my principles.

First, the destruction would not be effective – it would thus be unnecessarily destructive and ultimately criminal. Islamic history shows it wouldn’t achieve much in terms of security. The Moors were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula, but it didn’t bring security to the Spanish and Portuguese. Arab raiders took as many as a million Christian slaves from the Iberian Peninsula after they were expelled. In another famous case, Baghdad remains a Muslim city despite the Mongol genocide of its entire Muslim population.

Second, a Jewish mirror of the War Between Peoples would preclude any opportunity to raise the potential of the Palestinians.

However, while a full War Between Peoples would be unacceptable, the nature of Palestinian society does suggest that collective tactics have their place. Arab society is far less individualistic than Western society. People have their place and violations of the accepted moral code are culturally suppressed (think of honor killings). The idea of Israel as the enemy is not just adopted by individuals, it is adopted by the society with severe consequences for those who step out of line. In Lebanon, this is explicitly codified. Talking to an Israeli or having any interaction with an Israeli can be punishable with anything from a few months in prison to death. With information censored and interaction verboten, there is no simple way for Lebanese to understand Israel’s position, much less break the cycle of conflict. As a result, Israel’s enemy is less the individual and more the collective. Again, I recognize how alien this is to Western eyes.

There are two approaches towards a collective enemy. One is collective punishment. The other is to try to disrupt the collective itself.

My arguments in favor of processes for the extension of rights to Palestinian cities are about the inverse of collective punishment: collective reward. If a city wants to join Israel and minimize terrorist activity then it can be rewarded with open borders, free trade and ascension to full citizenship. The inverse is the sustainment of a state of war, which is itself a collective punishment.

In contrast, the North Gaza Project is about disrupting the collective. By separating a self-selecting subsegment of the population, you are cherry-picking those who declare they no longer want to be involved in a collective war.

These approaches offer an alternative to collective punishment. This is needed, in part, because collective punishment hasn’t proven to be effective. The very existence of the current wars with Gaza and Hezbollah reinforces its ineffectiveness.

While collective punishment per se may not be effective, incidental collective suffering may nonetheless be appropriate. For example, it is better to displace the population while trying to get access to Hamas fighters than it is to ignore the Hamas fighters and allow them carte blanche to simply attack you.

In summary, I believe alternatives to collective punishment should be pursued wherever possible. This is true for Israel, but it is also true beyond Israel. Some estimates suggest that routine Western sanctions regimes have killed millions while others suggest a strong connection to chronic illness and other forms of collective suffering. Despite this, these sanctions regimes rarely bring down the governments or individuals they target.

While it may or may not be justified, a short, sharp and targeted conflict is often more justifiable than drawn-out sanctions.

As an individual, I am constantly proposing ideas that sidestep collective approaches. That said, my approaches are unusual, so I understand why they are not seen as part of the anti-terror toolkit. I don’t condemn Israel for not explicitly applying them, but I would like to see a shift in policy. I am thus doing what I can to support exactly that.

Goals

Perhaps the most important of Israel’s failures is a failure of goals. Put simply, there is a de facto reality that Israel is engaged in a long-term and extremely muddled conflict. There is no clear government policy on what a desired outcome is and how to get there.

In very broad strokes, from the 1940s to the 60s, the policy was survival. In the 1970s and 80s, the policy was strong Israeli control with no plan for complete resolution (interestingly, Israel built Al Shifa hospital in this period). In the 1990s, the goal was a land-for-peace deal with the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In the early 2000s, policy shifted to disengagement and peace through walls. Now, the policy is broadly the suppression of major terrorist organizations without any clear next steps.

The reason there are no clear next steps is because the obvious choices have been tried and have failed.

This isn’t an indictment of Israel. Despite the costs, I’m proud that we gave negotiated peace a chance and that we gave unilateral peace a chance. The problem I have is that, beyond pushing terrorists back and undermining their capabilities we don’t have a vision for how to make things better in the future. We seem to be sleepwalking back to unending suppression.

Setting aside methods, the lack of goals is deeply problematic. You want to explain to your own people, and to your enemies, what you actually want to achieve.

In the case of Hezbollah and Lebanon, goals can be more easily defined. Nonetheless, our expression of goals has been quite limited. We have said we want Hezbollah to withdraw. It has been made clear that we don’t want to occupy Lebanon. And it has been stated that we’d really like not to be shooting at anybody north of the border. But why not take the next step? Why not paint a picture of the future in which there is trade, tourism and cultural exchange across the border? Despite the laws against normalization, it is 100% clear that Lebanon is not a monolith. With the possibility of collective reward, non-Hezbollah populations may well embrace a relationship with Israel and assist in bringing the conflict to an end.

In the case of the Palestinians, long-term goals outside of a broad longing for expulsion (on the far right) to kumbaya peace (on the far left) aren’t being stated. They aren’t even clear.

Israel, at this point, has the power to create unilateral road maps. Not roadmaps negotiated with terrorist entities, but roadmaps proposed to populations. The North Gaza Project is a unilateral roadmap to create personal investments in a functioning Palestinian-governed society at peace with Israel and rewarding to its own people. My proposed Constitution contains another roadmap for other populations. These roadmaps are far from guaranteed, but they come with clear milestones and targets to unlock greater levels of self-rule and personal rights. By simply making a detailed plan a clear policy goal you provide an off-ramp and create a detailed vision for the future. You telegraph possibilities.

Outside of the context of war, I believe that the existence of law creates holiness. Holiness is the ability to reach beyond the present and touch some aspect of forever. Holiness can be as simple as providing people their next meal so they can begin to embrace broader goals. Holiness can also be as complex as building cathedrals (not a Jewish thing) that create a sense of aspiration towards G-d.

Law is a baseline for the establishment of stability. This idea of holiness, of creating rules that are sustained and reach beyond the immediate reality, is why I believe that Jews put such emphasis on law as a part of our religion. A law can be stronger and more inherently impactful than any structure.

A unilateral roadmap, a clear plan that is closely adhered to, is a law. If the opportunity exists, it is a chance to bring something positive to the conflict and to give people a sense that their existence isn’t simply arbitrary. A roadmap can be holy.

The lack of a roadmap, while understandable, is our greatest failing. For this reason, I believe it is incumbent on me to promote positive roadmaps that have the potential to raise people’s potential. I believe it is incumbent on me to listen to criticisms and have conversations that can not only strengthen that roadmap through greater learning, but also integrate that roadmap into official State policy.

I am just a citizen. I am not in politics or the military. I have never worked for the State.

Nonetheless, I believe I have a moral obligation to my Creator to do what I can to create a better reality.

Conclusion

Tactically, there should be:

• More automated and broader review of military and police actions
• A broader range of legal punishments for terrorists including sliding scales given uncertainty.
• Greater professionalization of law-enforcement-adjacent areas.

Strategically, there should be:

• Openness to nomadic-controlled territory.
• Clarity on building permits and new settlement rules with provisions for terrorist histories.
• Continued strategic control of the land.
• Ways for Palestinians to exit the conflict and gain either full Israeli citizenship or autonomous political rights.
• Limits on collective punishment through the undermining of collectives.
• Clarity on goals in the form of roadmaps.

As an individual standing before my Creator on this coming Rosh Hashana, I recognize my obligation to improve the world without sacrificing myself or my people. I believe I’m doing what I can and what is appropriate. I won’t watch the Twittersphere or the UN or the Irish and feel guilt over my actions. Nonetheless, in the year to come, I know I am obligated to embrace opportunities to do more and to continually try to improve the reality we have inherited.