Dien Bien Phu, February 1954 - Prelude to Disaster

The battle of Dien Bien Phu was the climactic end of France’s time in Indochina. It marked the first time that a non-European colonial independence movement had evolved through all the stages from guerrilla bands to a conventionally organized, equipped army able to defeat a modern Western power in pitched battle. The final vindication of that army was the destruction at Dien Bien Phu in spring 1954 of a US-equipped French force — eventually 15,000 strong, including artillery, tanks, two crack parachute brigades and Foreign Legion infantry, with tactical air support. France’s defeat shocked the Western world.

But that is to get ahead of ourselves. The original plan was for France to provoke the Viet Minh into a set-piece pitched battle where the superior French forces could destroy the Viet.

So wrote the French overall commander in Indochina: "Dien Bien Phu is a very good defensive position... I have assembled there a strong force of infantry and artillery, equivalent to a heavy division. I have given command to a senior officer of whose energy I am certain... Battle has been accepted on terrain of our choosing and under the best conditions."

The French had reason for confidence. There was a recent precedent. In the fall of 1952, the French had dealt a major defeat to the Viet Minh in similar circumstances at a place called Na San.

In 1952, the Viet Minh commander, General Võ Nguyên Giáp, loosed three divisions of regulars to drive the French out of the Tai region of northwest Indochina. Na San sat astride a northeast-southwest trail used by the Viet Minh to move supplies, and was of critical importance to Giáp, who needed unhindered access to the trail to support his troops. He believed Na San was defended by no more than five understrength French battalions of about 2,000 men.

The base at Na San was nestled in a valley enclosed by a 3-mile-wide ring of hills. The heart of the fortress lay in the valley bottom, buttressed by encirclements of barbed wire and minefields blocking all potential avenues of approach. There was an inner ring of 12 fortified strongpoints. They protected the main base’s artillery and mortar emplacements, airstrip, headquarters, aid station and storage depot. There were 16 additional strongpoints on the outer ring of hills, manned by companies of about 100 men each. These were arranged to deliver a grid of supportive machine gun and mortar fire. The troops were from 12 infantry battalions, including crack paratroop and Foreign Legion battalions. It proved too tough a nut to crack. From November 23 to December 3, Giáp lost as many as 7,000 killed and wounded. It was a devastating defeat.

Dien Bien Phu was supposed to be Na San on a grand scale. But there was a crucial difference. The French underestimated the abilities of slave laborers in vast numbers. Giáp employed perhaps 300,000 “volunteer” porters who moved the materiel and weapons of three regular infantry divisions, one division of heavy artillery and an anti-aircraft regiment over hundreds of miles from their marshaling locations in China to Dien Bien Phu. These porters kept 50,000 combat personnel and over 200 artillery pieces supplied throughout the battle.

Conventional wisdom has it that the French were shocked that the Viets were well-supplied with modern weapons. The conventional wisdom is wrong. By mid-February 1954, it was abundantly clear what was happening. As early as the end of December 1953, the French C-in-C wrote:

“Two weeks ago I would have put the chances of victory at 100 per cent…against an enemy of whose resources we were aware up to about 15 December. But during the past two weeks serious intelligence informs us of the arrival of new resources (37mm AA guns, perhaps heavy artillery and motorized equipment); and if these really exist, and the enemy succeeds in getting them into action, then I can no longer guarantee success.”

French sorties from Dien Bien Phu met with increasing resistance. In the early days, the typical firefights had been patrol clashes with enemy units who had sprung opportunist ambushes. Now, French troops were running into solidly dug-in opponents in carefully camouflaged trenches, supported by machine guns, recoilless rifles and mortars, emplaced, protected and concealed for the long term. Between 20 November and 15 February, French casualties totalled 32 officers, 96 NCOs and 836 corporals and privates. This represented something like 10 per cent of the Dien Bien Phu garrison. By February, the French could not venture 1,500 meters outside their strongpoints without needing artillery support and airstrikes to extricate themselves. On 17 February, orders were given that further sorties be limited to light reconnaissance patrols to reduce casualties.

The C-in-C wrote, “One must face the fact that the battle may not go in our favour... either if the defences are dislocated by very powerful attacks mounted with modern resources employed for the first time; or if Dien Bien Phu is smothered, the enemy succeeding in preventing our use of the airstrip either by artillery or AA guns.”

The staff looked at two options in case the coming battle went against them. They concluded it was an invitation to disaster. Any breakout would require the sacrifice of the best units to cut a way free for the worst.

A staffer wrote, “In any case, it will have to be the Commander-in-Chief’s battle. Presumably he must have foreseen the necessary requirements before getting himself into this kind of hornet’s nest.”

So although the first shots of “The Battle of Dien Bien Phu” weren’t fired until March 13, by February the die had been cast.