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Since the end of the War of 1812, the United States Army has fought using a unified theory of how to conduct and win wars. For over 120 years, from 1814 to 1941, its theory of victory came from French doctrine, used by Napoleon in his campaigns.
Under the Shadow of Napoleon: The US Army's Doctrine, Education, and Theory of Victory from 1814 to 1941. Second Edition, by Michael A Bonura, explores the period when the US Army drew upon a doctrine distilled during the wars of the French Revolution and perfected and practiced by Napoleon Bonaparte.
Bonura opens by introducing the French Theory of Victory. Developed during the revolution, it prioritized the offensive, recognizing that victory was achieved by attacking. A purely defensive war was doomed to either defeat or stalemate. It emphasized nonspecialized infantry as the offensive spearhead, supported by artillery and cavalry.
This doctrine was brought to America by Winfield Scott, who first used it during the War of 1812, winning battles with it. There were several reasons it succeeded and endured. It allowed the development of a heterogeneous army. Soldiers were expected to master a variety of skills, not to narrowly specialize. It fostered aggressive tactics. Both characteristics fit the armies of the US.
Bonura also shows how, once installed, it remained the dominant doctrine until replaced by a newer combined arms doctrine in 1941. Bonura shows that the new doctrine maintained the offensive spirit of the older doctrine even then. Both approaches avoided dogmatism, encouraging initiative by low-level officers and battlefield innovation.
This is the second edition of this book. The first appeared fourteen years ago. This is a major revision, incorporating a number of new primary sources. Bonura also changed the book’s focus. In the first edition he looked at what he called the US Army’s Way of Warfare. In this edition, he changed the focus to the Theory of Victory. He did this to emphasize that Army theory was concerned with winning wars, not simply conducting them.
Under the Shadow of Napoleon is a specialized book, an intellectual history of the US Army. It will interest those concerned with grand strategy. While it is aimed at military professionals, military historians and those interested in the “how” of military planning, readers do not need to be military experts to read and understand it. It is clearly written, its concepts accessible to anyone with an interest in the topic.
“Under the Shadow of Napoleon: The US Army’s Doctrine, Education, and Theory of Victory from 1814 to 1941. Second Edition,” by Michael A Bonura, University of North Texas Press, April 2026, 448 pages, $34.95 (Hardcover), $27.96 (E-book)
This review was written by Mark Lardas, who writes at Ricochet as Seawriter. Mark Lardas, an engineer, freelance writer, historian, and model-maker, lives in League City, TX. His website is marklardas.com.
Discussion (4)
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Is Bonura saying that the US abandoned this theory of victory in 1941, and if so, what did they replace it with?
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A combined arms doctrine based around battle group with increased unit specialization. The old doctrine was infantry-heavy, with non-specialized infantry.
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Which proved faulty in WW1. And Pershing proved to be less than amenable to learning from the costly tuition paid by France and Britain.
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Bondurant argues convincingly Pershing successfully used the existing theory of victory in WWI. German infiltration tactics were consistent with unspecialized infantry units. You simply added infiltration tactics to all units, not just an elite few.
French and British doctrine in WWI stressed the defensive over the offense by the time the US joined the war.
Motorization required a change of theories due to the need for specialization.