Get the Ricochet app
Ricochet will work fine in a browser on your mobile devices, but for the best experience please download our app.

The Ricochet Podcast
3 Whisky Happy Hour
Beyond the Polls
GLoP Culture
Heritage Explains
Chicks on The Right
3 Martini Lunch
Call Me Back - with Dan Senor
The American Idea
Federalist Radio Hour
The Erick Erickson Show
The Radio Free Hillsdale Hour
Daily Signal
Hillsdale Dialogues
Madison’s Notes
Mom Wars
What the Hell Is Going On
Parsing Immigration Policy
Freedom to Learn
Conservative Crossroads with Henry Olsen
The Learning Curve
The Conservative Woman’s Guide
Law Talk with Epstein, Yoo & Cooke
Not Dead Yet
Giving Ventures
Who Funds that?
The Back of the Book
The Kevin Roberts Show with Larry O’Connor
Gray Matters
The Report Card with Nat Malkus
The Glenn Show
The Libertarian
Martini Shot
The Dave Carter Show
The Powerline Show
In Dissent
Heard at Heritage
Smart Girl Politics
James Lileks’ The Diner
Case in Point: The Legal Show on the Hottest Legal Cases in Politics and Culture
JobMakers
One on One with Robert DoarRicochet will work fine in a browser on your mobile devices, but for the best experience please download our app.
Was taking Vicksburg really necessary?
I don't really have much to say about the Revolutionary War, but I have had some thoughts about The Late Unpleasantness. Figure I might as well shoehorn it in among the America250 stuff. And I figured this was as good a place as any to inquire of opinionated boffins.
Taking Vicksburg meant that the South couldn't easily access the Trans-Mississippi region, and that they couldn't easily receive supplies from that area. It allowed the Union easy access up and down the Mississippi, communicating with the garrison at New Orleans, and burning Jackson a time or two. Theoretically it allowed the upper Midwest greater access to the outside world once again.
On the other hand, taking Vicksburg meant keeping the army of the West out in the West, digging canals and investing in a fortress for long months while fighting happened in the East. Suppose instead of unvexing the river, Grant left Sherman half his forces to keep Vicksburg occupied. That won't be enough to take the place, but it will be enough to pin the Confederate Western army there on defense. Meanwhile, Grant takes the other half and strikes elsewhere.
Perhaps that's easy to say with hindsight. On the gripping hand, look at that list of benefits again. Meaning no umbrage to the great state of Texas, the place wasn't populated at the time. An occasional cattle drive would relieve the South's gnawing hunger somewhat, but there's not much else they can do. Smuggle in foreign powder? You've got a long and weary road to get it shipped to Texas and then walked to Virginia. Even if the Union benefited from logistics on the Father of Waters, the superior east-west lines of communication in the North, and the control of the seas, muted the importance of those riverboats.
Was taking Vicksburg necessary?
Recommended by MembersThis post was promoted to the Main Feed at the recommendation of Ricochet's members.
Discussion (32)
CHARTER MEMBER
To read this bio, please join Ricochet.
But that is exactly what Grant did. He left troops to keep Pemberton entertained at Vicksburg while he landed 22,000 troops at Bruinsburg. Then he drove east as far as Jackson, destroying railroads and other infrastructure along the way. He defeated Johnston's army around Jackson preventing its further interference, then fell upon Vicksburg from the south and east.
Sherman was taking notes. He would recreate the Vicksburg campaign in a larger scale with his March to the Sea.
To read this bio, please join Ricochet.
What Percival said.
CONTRIBUTOR
To read this bio, please join Ricochet.
Did, after roughly a year of cutting canals and trying to attack from other angles, angles that wouldn't outdistance his supply line. I figure if he hadn't made a serious attempt to actually conquer Vicksburg, if he had left enough men to keep 'em pinned there he would have had plenty enough men to accomplish something else. A year is an awful long time to stay idle in war.
But okay, even at that point, why turn Sherman back after Jackson? Keep pushing right into Alabama? Maybe cut down to Mobile and relieve the Confederacy of one of it's remaining significant cities.
Perhaps it's the benefit of historical hindsight talking here; knowing that the Confederacy didn't have the resources the Union did. On the other hand the Union should have known it had the advantage even if it didn't know how much.
CHARTER MEMBER
To read this bio, please join Ricochet.
Grant effectively did outrun his supply line on his way to Jackson. His connection to the river was tenuous at best. When Sherman jumped off a year and a half later, he was planning on being out of communication until he came out the other side. As it was, Sherman on his own would have run low on ammunition.
To read this bio, please join Ricochet.
The psychological impact mattered. If the South continued to hold some key points despite the invasion of a larger union army, the peace party (e.g., McClellan in 1864) would have a much stronger hand in bringing the war to an end on terms far more favorable to the South. Vicksburg then Atlanta one year later told a story of inexorable Union advance and victory.
You're seeing five of 32 comments. Sign in, or join for just $5 per month, to read them all and add your own.