Amateurs Talk Tactics. Pros Talk Logistics. Henry Knox and the guns of Ticonderoga.

An America at 250 repost ... When George Washington took over the troops of the Continental Army outside Boston in the Summer of 1775, he found three lies in one…

• While there was manpower aplenty, they were raw militia, not troops, not soldiers.
• Except for one Pennsylvania regiment and himself, there wasn’t much “Continental” about this aggregation of men. Most by far were from Massachusetts, with a few from nearby Connecticut, Rhode Island, or New Hampshire.
• They certainly weren’t an Army. There was no discipline, little chain of command, and worse … few military stores. There was precious little powder and no artillery to speak of.

On the British side, however, the blood spilled on the road back from Concord and at Bunker/Breed's Hill had dramatically changed British opinions about the Americans. Wrote General Gage: “The rebels are not the despicable rabble too many have supposed them to be…. In all their wars against the French, they never showed such conduct, attention, and perseverance as they do now.”

For now, the British seemed content to cool their heels in Boston and await developments. They abandoned Charlestown and the Breed's/Bunker Hill positions and concentrated on building the defenses of Boston itself. They constructed a defense in depth on the Roxbury Neck that sealed off land access to Boston. In practice, over time, they allowed considerable traffic in both directions as long as no weapons were in evidence. But the Continentals couldn’t burst in, and the British couldn’t break out by land. They still had freedom of the sea, however. And while they feared the Americans somehow mounting artillery on the hills overlooking the harbor and channel, they assumed they’d have plenty of warning. First, even if supplied with artillery, it would take days for the Rebels to mount those guns and dig them in on the heights. And even that was a moot point. The Americans had no artillery sufficient for the task.

But that was about to change.

On the New York shores of Lake Champlain, guarding the short portage route between the southern end of Champlain and the northern end of Lake George, sits the impressive Fort Ticonderoga. It’s a star-shaped fortress with earthworks and ditches backed by thick stone walls and lots of fine artillery. Ticonderoga was built by the French during the French & Indian War. After that war, its strategic position became much devalued, and the British allowed it to fall into disrepair. It did, however, remain an important supply and communication point. It housed powder and heavy artillery. In 1775, it was manned by a token force of 50 or so British troops.

In May, at the urging of Benedict Arnold and others, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress authorized Arnold to raise a force and capture Ticonderoga. On the way, Arnold’s force was joined by Ethan Allen and a Connecticut militia company who had also hit on the idea of taking Ticonderoga. The force under the combined leadership of Arnold and Allen overwhelmed the fort’s unsuspecting defenders. Emboldened, detachments also raided Fort Crown Point and Fort St. Jean, capturing additional guns, powder, and provisions. It was a great success!

Possession may be 9/10ths of the law, but possessing a thing and having the ability to use it when needed are two very different things. Canon and powder on the wrong shore of Lake Champlain, 200 miles of trackless wilderness away from Boston, might as well have been on the moon.

It’s not known when or by whom the audacious plan was proposed to Washington, but in November 1775, Washington selected Henry Knox (a former bookseller) to lead an expedition to retrieve that priceless equipment from Ticonderoga and deliver it to Boston. “No trouble or expense must be spared to obtain them.” The princely sum of 1,000 pounds was allocated to Knox for the expedition. He departed Washington’s camp on November 17, 1775, traveled to NY for supplies, and then up the Hudson and Lake George to Ticonderoga. Operations began on December 5th.

Knox decided on a variety of artillery from mortars to heavy 24-pounders. There were 59 pieces in all, weighing over 60 tons! It was first moved over the old portage route to the head of Lake George and loaded aboard a New England specialty ship – a gundalow. These are large, flat-bottomed sailing craft used to move cargo on lakes and rivers. Imagine a barge sporting a pointed bow and stern wearing a lateen sail. Downright ugly. But study and capable of moving heavy loads. It took three days and several groundings, but she arrived safe at the southern end of Lake George. That was the easy bit. On December 27th, Knox wrote to Washington that he had built “42 exceeding strong sleds, and have provided 80 yoke of oxen to drag them.” Now to cross the Hudson River and overland across the Berkshires in mid-winter. But Knox was confident; he hoped “in 16 or 17 days to be able to present your Excellency a noble train of artillery.” It was a substantial underestimate. It snowed two feet on Christmas night. But it was not yet cold enough to freeze the river solidly enough to bear the weight of the heavily laden sleds. On several occasions there were episodes of cannon crashing through the ice. But in every instance the errant gun was recovered, and none were lost. Finally, on January 9th, the last sled was across. The head of the column was now far ahead. Knox’s journals contain little detail about getting up and over the Berkshires, but indicate the first gun reached Blandford, MA on the 11th of January. On the 25th, John Adams reports they arrived in Framingham. Two days later, Knox reported to General Washington in Cambridge. The “noble train” had arrived.

Historian Victor Brooks has called Knox’s exploit “one of the most stupendous feats of logistics” of the entire Revolution.

The rest of the story….

It was mentioned earlier that the British feared the Americans somehow mounting artillery on the hills overlooking the harbor and channel, but they assumed they’d have plenty of warning. It would, they thought, take days for the Americans to properly install cannons on the hills overlooking Boston Harbor. As soon as any activity was detected, the British could, and would, mount an expedition to drive them off before any harm was done. It is wise to never assume.

Now that he had the means, Washington set his plan in motion. He positioned some of his new ordnance in Cambridge and Roxbury. On the night of March 2nd, they opened fire on British positions in Boston. The British returned fire but neither side did serious harm. The cannonade was repeated on the 3rd and 4th. But it was a diversion. While occupied with counter-battery fire, the British failed to notice what was happening on Dorchester Heights. Under cover of the cannonade, Washington fortified Dorchester Heights and mounted artillery there. Using 2,500 men, and in the middle of the night, they hauled cannon and prefabricated fortifications to the Heights. The British went to bed safe and sound but woke up outmaneuvered and outgunned. They were forced to abandon Boston.