The Red Hen Incident, in which a peaceful Sarah Sanders was peacefully ejected from a privately owned restaurant that is open to the public, generated at least one thread each on the Main and Member Feeds. Soon, someone suggested that the Red Hen should be sued into oblivion, and excellent exchanges quickly ensued about the reach of anti-discrimination laws.
A strong but not universal consensus was soon reached (among those participating in that sub-thread) that the discriminatory action was disgusting and morally degraded, but almost certainly not unlawful or “actionable,” as lawyers say. The restaurant was no doubt a public accommodation, but the category of “working for Trump” or “being a Republican or a Democrat” is not a protected class.
So the remedy must be a private one rather than a legal one. Picket, write an op-ed, boycott (formally or informally), and see what shakes out in the market of ideas and in the market of dollars.
But what an opportunity to discuss what should be deemed to be a public accommodation, and what should be a protected class. You need Richard Epstein to do full justice to this (as he has many times), but here are several of my cents. (Spoiler alert: to avoid totalitarianism, there must be some or many areas of life where citizens have the liberty to engage in discriminatory conduct, free from coercive governmental action.)
First, it is best to distinguish among three categories of settings, not just two. We need the divide between public accommodations and purely private clubs and activities in order to protect the above liberty to discriminate in areas that are not (or must not) be the concern of the state. (I should be able to announce publicly that I will not date a black woman or rent out a single room in my full-time residence to a Catholic or a Jew, without the government coming down on my head. All of my friends or former friends are free to hate me and mock me, but not the state.)
When I am operating a common carrier, though, such as a bus company, an airline, a telephone company, or certain other natural monopolies, it is appropriate to correspondingly curtail my liberty even more. A common carrier cannot discriminate against any class of peaceable people who pay the tab and abide by generally applicable rules. This is a necessary trade-off because the answer “if you weigh over 250 pounds, go start your own airline,” or “if you stutter, go start your own phone company” is just not available.
But the toughie is which classes of persons should be protected in the middle zone of public accommodations, even given that the locus of the line between public and private is not self-evident. (An example I have used before: “should” my private law firm be permitted to announce that it will represent only women or only whites, on the ground that the client-lawyer relationship is sufficiently intimate to qualify as not a public accommodation?)
The line between protected and unprotected classes of people can in a very small number of cases be drawn on the basis of so-called “immutable characteristics,” such as race, gender (although some people dispute that), and ethnicity or country of origin (but not commonly associated religiosity).
For everything else, we are making a deliberate choice between the liberty to discriminate (which is part of autonomy) and the right not to be discriminated against. Should seriously fat people be able to enlist the awesome power of the state to force entry into a theatre or a restaurant or a swimming pool? Or should the person’s friends use public shaming of the discriminating establishment to blast open the doors?
Same with political outcasts (of one stripe or another). Should Sarah Sanders be allowed to sue, or is everyone’s liberty enhanced by requiring her to use some form of self-help (if she wants to)? She can go to other restaurants just as good, she can resort to public shaming through Twitter — using only her private account — or she can see if other people will begin their own campaign of moral suasion.
Me; I’m for as much liberty from state intervention as we can get, so I want to define public accommodation as narrowly as is reasonable, and limit the classes of protected persons as much as possible (even if it puts me into fewer protected categories). I’ve been fat and I’ve been thin(er), but I don’t want no stinking government going to bat for me if someone is rude and hurts my feelings.