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A Trisagion for Europe
I invite the community to pause and consider what the weekend ahead may mean for Europe as a concept.
Though their prime minister insists otherwise, this weekend the Greek people will vote on whether the mid-range future of Greece is as part of the European currency union or if Greece will begin moving toward a messy, painful withdrawal or expulsion from the Euro. If Greece leaves the Euro, it will mark the first significant setback in the process of European integration in a generation, and arguably the most serious blow to Europe as a unifying idea since the descent of the Iron Curtain following World War II.
We tend to take the concept of Europe for granted, but it is a much newer, much more important idea than many of us realize. Europe as a landmass has existed since the disintegration of Laurasia, and has been occupied by humans for 50 millennia, but it has only come to be widely viewed as a united and stable peacetime political entity in the past hundred years. In times of external threat – Tours, the Crusades, Lepanto, Vienna – rhetoric for the defense of Europe as a whole would swell; absent that, Europe was defined not by its unity, but by its bitter and bloody differences.
It was only in the wake of the most bitter and bloody manifestation of those differences that Europe truly came to realize that Europe existed. With all due respect to Victor Hugo and other early dreamers, it took the near annihilation of Europe in the early 20th century for the broad mass of Europeans to appreciate the need to cultivate the idea of Europe in peacetime and strive toward the goal of a self-aware, integrated Europe, one that would never again be a threat to itself or the world.
With an often forgotten, but critical assist from the twin pillars of global stability – American might and American cash – the postwar European project has unquestionably been one of the great achievements in the history of humankind. The per capita GDP of Western and Central Europe has more than tripled since 1950. For centuries, every period of substantive economic growth in Europe was strangled by the near-immediate descent into war. For the first time since the Third Century, Europe has known both lasting prosperity and real peace, and it has forever changed how Europeans live and how they think of the role of Europe in their lives.
This transformative period of prosperity and peace has been accompanied by a constant deepening of the economic and political ties among what were once perpetually warring states. Through the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the resurrection of Eastern Europe, and the challenges to European identity of the early 21st century, the march toward ever-tighter union has been the imperative of European politics that has kept the Continent rich and quiet through difficult times.
But this weekend, we may see a violent blow to European unity struck right in the ancestral birthplace of Western Civilization. I am not suggesting that by Monday morning, Germany will have retaken the Sudetenland or even that much will immediately change in the day-to-day lives of Europeans not directly invested in the Greek economy.
But if this weekend proves to be the high-water mark for European integration, and if the loss of Greece for the Euro begins the steady unraveling of hard-fought battles for the idea of Europe as something unique, uniting, and worthy of sacrifice and defense, the future of Europe may look alarmingly like its past.
Published in General
European unity is an illusion at best. Because of the cultural differences, the German economy will dominate. And the past results show that the rest of Europe has a reluctance to accept German domination.
For the curious: Trisagion
European unity has been a tremendous success for the geographical centre. It’s not so been so great on the periphery in recent times. As for the Greeks, I’m afraid I’m not much inclined to pay even more tax to help bail them out.
I think Europe was integrated enough after the Wall fell. What kind of treaty calls for “ever closer union” in perpetuity? Is this not aspirational baby, like Obama campaign rhetoric? Well, no, its an actual treaty. With rules like that, this is what you get. I am happy that some population, somewhere, finally gets to vote on the common currency.
I’ve always thought the European Union was a threat to European unity on a par with the Great War of 1914 and the Soviet Union. Here’s hoping it spares us a paroxysm and just dies a quiet death lasting a couple of decades.
I appreciate the tone of this post. I sense a certain glee among some American commentators at the prospect of European self-destruction, but can’t understand it. It’s nothing but tragic to consider the undoing of everything for which Americans fought in the 20th century; and it is nothing but dangerous.
Has the single currency been good for the EU or bad? They might do better without it.
The issue is not so much Greece as part of Europe as Greece selling out to some other savior who will then get a foothold in Europe. That was the case in the Greek Civil War (1946-49) and it has not changed.
I would be too, if this referendum weren’t an absolute legal mess. This is no way to do it: It can’t be celebrated as a proper and righteous re-introduction of democracy into an anti-democratic process because the Greek voters can’t possibly really know what they’re voting for. The referendum ballot reads:
There are two possible answers: “Not agreed/No” and “Agreed/Yes.”
But parts of these documents aren’t available in their updated forms to the voters. What’s more, the originals are in English. So a large part of the electorate would unable to understand them. I don’t read Greek, so I can’t say whether reports of massive translation errors that significantly change the meaning of what documents are available correct, but it seems entirely likely to me, given the haste with which this has happened. And what’s more, it’s an unconstitutional referendum: Article 44, paragraph 2 of the Greek Constitution expressly forbids the launching of a referendum on fiscal issues:
So to do this properly, you’d first have to amend the Greek constitution — which should of course be done in a legal and democratic way, not like this. This is just an appeal to the mob.
The short notice also means there can be no international monitoring of the election — a huge problem. It’s a violation of the Vienna Commission standards in quite a number of ways. That means no matter the outcome, it will be viewed by those who opposed it as illegitimate. Given that Greece is already dominated by genuine extremist parties and is surely going to face a lot more pain, I can’t see how this is anything but a recipe for disaster.
Democracy, yes, by all means. But do it right. This is a demagogic farce.
It’s been bad. But there are sensible ways to undo it and massively dangerous ways.
That too.
#6 Claire
With respect, that’s balderdash. Or at minimum, it’s a wild overstatement and mischaracterization of what Americans in the European Theater fought for in the World War II segment of the 20th century
My grandfather (an ADSEC field hospital surgeon) didn’t do what he could to save GI lives from late afternoon of 06 June 1944 through to the liberation of Paris, and repeat the same experience throughout the Battle of the Bulge (narrowly missing getting blown to bits during a Nazi aerial bombardment), due to some misty-eyed desire to see Europe finally done right by.
He — as well as great-uncles of mine who also fought through from Normandy to Paris (a sacrifice almost wrecked by those petulant jackasses comprising de Gaulle’s so-called General Staff) — was combatting Nazism and the Hitlerian death machine that sought our family’s Jewish blood just as surely as it did that of all Jews clear across the globe.
WWII-era Europe merrily turned itself into the abattoir and then the burial pit of the Jews. Postwar, only Germany has come even vaguely close to a conscious and sincere atonement for this crime — and now, all of Europe (with the possible exception of the Czech Republic) is turning what little atonement it had engaged in into a monstrous historical-moral perversion, one quite instrumental in paving the way for Iran as Nazi-era Germany’s would-be heir.
So, no “glee” about the EU situation, but no sympathy either.
I think that’s as good a three-sentence summary of European history since 1453 as can be made, but to say this doesn’t negate the point that some periods of this tension have been vastly better — for Europe and the world — than others.
Did I say anything about a misty-eyed desire to see Europe finally done right by? No. Apart from that, nothing you’ve said is incompatible with what I said, is it?
Let’s agree then that the situation is no cause for glee. We seem to be in perfect agreement that Europe has, historically, often been a monstrous thing. If we assume that the future often resembles the past, I think should be obvious why no one should feel gleeful.
Admiral Stavridas has a piece in FP about the geostrategic implications of this that makes for grim reading.
If you consider this absent the context of Putin to the east and ISIS to the south, I can see why it’s tempting to say, “To hell with them.” But that’s not, in fact, the context. The reality is that Putin’s to the east and ISIS is to the south (or in your case, Putin’s to your northeast, and ISIS is to your north, south, east, and west).
I’ve seen a few articles like this, but find them deeply unpersuasive. A Putin ally in the EU would be worth something; I agree that Grexit has to be total if it happens at all. An independent Greece as an ally of Putin, though? Seriously, what would Putin get out of that other than smug points? Some people worry about China buying influence, too, but if you’re going to give enough money to cheer the Greeks up, you’re going to be paying a lot. Neither China nor Russia are so flush right now that it would be worthwhile even if there was a clear benefit, and I don’t think that applies.
Totally worth some symbolic gifts, but not enough to purchase much loyalty.
My concern is political contagion along roughly these lines. Greece by itself isn’t a prize, but the EU’s internal fifth column is real. Just as a common-sense point, if you’re Putin, what outcome would seem most advantageous and exploitable to you? A Europe that can at least pretend to be united (with a semi-straight face), or one with pieces visibly and humiliatingly falling off?
Another concern is state failure in Greece, inherently. We’ve got a thousand refugees a day entering the Western Balkans through Greece right now — as it is. What happens if we see the Balkanization of Greece, so to speak, leading to its complete inability to control those borders? I don’t know how to rank that risk — possible, probable, so unlikely as to be not worth worrying about? But after a decade of watching states fail in ways that were previously seen as unlikely, I can’t say that it seems wise to me confidently to rule it out.
European economic integration was well established before Maastricht and the Euro. Indeed the notion that political union and economic union must go hand in hand is misguided. The ideal market size for most private goods is the world. The ideal size for public goods depends on the public good. Police or military? Environmental law for the air or for a watershed, or neighborhood trash? Some things enjoy nearly infinite economies of scale, e.g. our nuclear umbrella, the costs of extending it, or any other public good, were and are the growing complexity of the decision making process and the difficulty of assuring accountability. Public goods are tied to and limited by culture and local history. Private goods are influenced and enriched by these. Centralized public goods cause friction, fractions and factions. Private goods reward cooperation and the greater the diversity of tastes, the better. Parents naturally understand this. Kids of different ages and sexes will fight endlessly over which TV program or video to watch as these are public goods, i.e. jointly consumed and exclusion is difficult or costly, but will not fight over their different tastes in private toys. Pass them out randomly and they’ll trade. So Europe will exist and probably be stronger if most of the centralized apparatus is allowed to disappear, this will include the Euro for many countries. The idea was to avoid German dominance. Maastricht and the Euro failed in this, but not the EC. Then there’s demographics…
If I was Putin, I’d want a friendly Greece in the EU, where it could vote against sanctions against me. That would be a game changer. Since Putin isn’t paying for that, I can’t see anything worth buying in an independent Greece.
I’d have thought an independent Greece would be easier to manage from this respect, too; essentially, a wall could be put up on the Bulgarian border that is not possible now. Also, aid could be sent to Albania and Macedonia to do the same.
It’s much more of a problem having Greece being an enemy of mankind when we have strong formal institutions claiming it as an ally.
Yes, that would be a bad outcome.
I just don’t know. I’d be exaggerating my knowledge and my ability to predict the future if I said I really knew how stable Greece is or how well it would do on its own. I’m making nothing more than this point: the past decade has impressed upon me that states can be far more fragile than we realize. This may not be a wise lesson to over-learn, nor a good one to over-apply. But “independent” or not, someone’s going to have to make sure it doesn’t fail — or live with a failed state in southern Europe, which obviously no one wants, right?
Thank you, Dr. Berlinski, for driving the conversation while I slept. I did not expect when I left for dinner after posting last night that I would return to so lively a discussion in the morning.
I also didn’t expect that whoever does the light editing around here when a post gets moved to the main feed — that ham-fisted butcher :) — would be the one person on Earth fonder of the semicolon than I am.
Lesson learned: Ricochet punctuates.
Replies to everyone’s insightful and much appreciated comments are forthcoming.
You are certainly right, EJ; the German economy plays such a central role in this drama that it makes the rest of Europe fade into the scenery a bit (look! A semicolon!).
But I don’t think it follows from the disproportionate role of Germany that Europe is an illusion. Rather, I would argue that the outsized role of Germany is one of the many critical flaws in the European project that has brought us to this weekend’s crossroads.
Again, though, you’re absolutely right. And if something isn’t done about it, the Europe that may or may not be an illusion will soon be a ghost.
Right. It would appear we should be worried that Greece will throw in its lot with Russia and China.
Also, the odds are good that all three will sink under the unsustainable kleptocracy model. Trouble ahead.
Too pretentious a reference? I don’t want to be that guy, you know?
That is definitely the prevailing wisdom, Charles, but what I just can’t get past is this chart:
We’re looking at the growth rate of GDP for the Greek and German economies since the adoption of the Euro.
Throughout the expansion period, the German economy grew only modestly, while the Greek economy grew much more robustly. Where Greece suffered disproportionately was during the years immediately following the financial crash, which is precisely what we would expect from a heavily-leveraged country with weak domestic institutions. Thanks in large part to the intervention of its generous neighbors, the Greek economy out-grew the German economy in 2014.
Certainly other peripheral countries have had different experiences than Greece, but it is hard to see an argument here for unity favoring the core at the expense of periphery. If anything, I wonder what’s in this for the core.
Welcome to America. I hear the states used to have rights.
I think you’re right to note the aspirational nature of the European project and how odd that seems when set against the normal dry push and pull of international relations.
But that speaks to just how unusual European integration truly is, historically speaking. It has, to borrow from our Greek friends, a telos: it’s going somewhere. We can and should argue over whether the European leadership has the first clue how to get where Europe is going. But if we can agree that the destination is a worthy one, no one should celebrate a U-turn.
I have the great joy to work in Europe. As an American, I have the financial means to enjoy it. Every European who will have a serious conversation with me tells me the same thing: there is no “EU”. There is merely a collection of countries who have decided to band together economically, so that they can trade more easily among themselves and more competitively in the world.
Not one European will give us his/her cultural norms for the betterment of “Europe”. In fact, the old biases remain, but are merely pushed into the back offices. Most Europeans have no allegiance to the EU governing bodies, preferring to identify with their country. I don’t see this changing.
The EU is a bureaucratic quicksand as well. All documents are copied in three languages, which is great if you speak one of them. It’s not so good if you don’t, and most member nations do a lot of translating. Governance is ponderously slow, and is more by dictate than consent. There is an entire governing class of people, who know no other lifestyle.
I don’t see this ending well for Europe. Still, it needs to. Greece exiting will open the door for additional influence by Russia and China, which may be a foregone conclusion. I see the entire region being upset within a generation if it is not stopped.
Further, the movement of people is a problem that seems to have no solution.
An interesting point; you may well be right. Like I said above, I would be the last person you’d catch defending the actions of European leadership in recent years and I have no affection for the governmental structures of Europe at all. It may well be that the European Union, itself, is neither truly European nor especially unifying.
We should organize a Ricochet get-together in Europe, don’t you think? (I’ve never been to Prague … hint, hint.)
Lucky you. I have the financial means to spend every minute of my life wondering if the bills will be paid next month. What do you do? Do you think your company might want to hire me?
Word. I’ve heard the same from everyone, too, and never once heard any different
Me neither, and I can easily see it worsening.
I’ve actually found the French bureaucracy surprisingly helpful and polite. But I haven’t had much dealing with it.