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What Is Omnipotence?
I remember hearing some variation of “Can G-d make a rock so heavy He can’t move it?” in high school. I don’t remember thinking much about it at the time. My earliest memory of having any clear thought about it is probably around 2010 when, as I recall, I answered it “Yes, and that rock is called ‘free will.'”
Which brings us to one thing normally recognized by contemporary philosophers as a reasonable limitation on omnipotence: G-d does not have the ability to break the rules of logic. That’s part of how Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga responds to atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie. In a nutshell, Mackie wonders why G-d can’t just make a perfect world with free people in it, and Plantinga replies that even omnipotence doesn’t have the power to give us freedom and force us to do the right thing at the same time.
That’s a step in the right direction, but it doesn’t clear up quite enough. Some people seem to think omnipotence means being able to do just anything. That is incorrect. Omnipotence means having unlimited power. That’s the dictionary definition.
Now it’s true that “power” can mean an ability–the power to win a race, the power to eat candy, the power to watch television like Ratbert here:
But “power,” more fundamentally, means might or strength. “Power” can mean an ability because more power often means you can do more things.
But sometimes more power means there are things you can’t do. A powerful runner has a diminished ability to lose a race while trying to win; the most powerful runner possible wouldn’t be able to do it at all.
When I’m navigating the Hong Kong MTR system and have to switch from the East Rail Line to the Kwun Tong Line, I could hardly be the last person to hike that quarter-mile through the bowels of Kowloon Tong Station even if I tried. That’s not because I have some weakness relative to whoever comes in last; it’s because I don’t.
Superman does not have the ability to be killed by a bullet when there’s no kryptonite nearby; that lack of an ability does not mean he has a weakness; it means he has extra power.
And that brings us to the tradition. Omnipotence is an attribute traditionally ascribed to G-d by a tradition, and that tradition is classical theism.
What the word “omnipotence” means is, above all, what the traditional doctrine teaches. Similarly, the term “the Trinity” means G-d according to the doctrine of orthodox Christianity–One G-d, Three distinct Persons who are G-d. Heaven knows how many people out there think “the Trinity” means one G-d with three different roles. Their confusion does not change the meaning of a term that denotes the teaching of a tradition.
What classical theism teaches about omnipotence is that G-d has unlimited power, not that he can do just anything.
People representing the tradition–like Aquinas, and like Anselm here–also explain that certain abilities are weaknesses, not strengths. E.g., the abilities to sin, lie, die, or break the rules of logic.
Being able to do things like that is not required by omnipotence. Being unable to do them is.
Anselm’s book Proslogion introduces the general idea very well, and it’s not a hard book to read (if you don’t get bogged down in the ontological argument in chapters 2 and 3). Here’s chapter 7, where Anselm explains omnipotence, and here’s my short YouTube intro to this lovely little book.
And now . . . surprise! Once we have that perspective in place, we can actually go back to that other sense of the term that caused all this trouble in the first place–“omnipotence” as the ability to do anything.
People like Anselm and Aquinas will actually welcome that definition of omnipotence–but only as long as we understand what it actually means to do something. Sinning is not in itself the doing of a thing. It’s a way of failing to do right. Lying is not a thing you do. It’s a particular way of failing to do something–to speak the truth. Dying isn’t a thing you do; it’s just a failure to keep living. Breaking the rules of logic is not a thing you do, but a particular way of failing to do a thing–to keep the rules.
Technically, an ability to do something means an ability to do a real thing–and these aren’t even real things. And, again, being able to do these things is not some limit on omnipotence; it’s actually part of what omnipotence is. (For example, see Aquinas’ Reply to Objection 2 here.)
Or so the tradition says.
And as for the overrated rock question, if you wanna take it as some sort of metaphor for free will like I once did, be my guest and answer “Yes.”
But if you want to take the question literally and apply a dictionary definition or the equivalent historical definition of omnipotence to it, then the answer is “No”: An omnipotent G-d could not have a weakness. But if G-d made Enchanted Rock in west Texas so heavy that He didn’t have the power to move it, then he would have a weakness.
But trying to think with the tradition is hard work if you’re not used to it. So here’s a suggestion:
Try to forget about the tradition for a moment, and just suppose a few simple principles:
–G-d does not have the ability to break the rules of logic,
–to have an imperfection is to have a limitation,
–and to have a limitation is to have a weakness.
Now let’s admit that a loser like me might, constrained by extreme circumstances, have a moral obligation to lie once in a lifetime. But an omnipotent being will never be constrained by such circumstances; G-d is not a loser like me. So consider this argument:
1. To tell a lie when one is not constrained by extreme circumstances is to have an imperfection.
2. To have an imperfection is to have a weakness.
3. Therefore, to tell a lie when one is not constrained by extreme circumstances is to have a weakness.
You can add one premise and extend the argument.
3. To tell a lie when one is not constrained by extreme circumstances is to have a weakness.
4. It is not possible for an omnipotent being to have weaknesses.
5. Therefore, it is not possible for an omnipotent being to tell a lie when not constrained by extreme circumstances.
If omnipotence means an omnipotent G-d should be able to tell a lie, which of those premises is wrong? Is it 1, 2, or 4?
Published in General
Oh, uh, this also opens a whole ‘nother can of worms and I should probably leave it alone in this thread.
Probably.
(But I’m of the opinion that, yeah, probably the only things that affect the future are subject to the laws of physics.)
that is the reigning viewpoint unfortunately
https://ricochet.com/323118/archives/empiricism-and-miracles/
That’s a pretty dreadful typo.
I think this is the nub of my complaint with your mental gymnastics.
What you’re saying is that some actions are not actions, but rather a failure to act in a different way.
And that is, at best, creative use of language.
Lying is not merely a failure to speak the truth. God, as traditionally understood, refrains from speaking the truth all the time, when he refuses to reveal the fullness of his knowledge. No, lying is an actual act of deception, not merely failing to speak the truth but actively choosing to deceive.
What you are attempting to do is remove lying from the category of action, so that you can then deny the ability to lie without, in your mind, denying the ability to act.
And, again, that’s sophistry. You don’t get to use creative language to make some actions just go away so that the contradiction of your simultaneous assertions that God can’t do that and God can do anything somehow make sense.
No. It’s just metaphysics.
Of course. That’s why I phrased it “a particular way of” failing to speak the truth.
Of course lying is an action. What’s real in a lie–using words, etc.–is an action. What makes it a lie is a not a thing, but an absence of a thing.
This is very basic Augustinian metaphysics, which you apparently don’t understand at all. I don’t blame you for not understanding it, but it’s definitely a mistake, and probably rude, to label what you don’t understand sophistry.
Fortunately, I understand words pretty well. When people use lots of words to contradict the plain meaning of things, that’s sophistry.
Lying is an action. If it’s an action God can’t perform, then God is limited — precluded from carrying out actions that any of us can perform. Whatever we call that, we can’t call it all powerful, as I have a power, the power to choose to speak an untruth, that God, by your formulation, lacks.
It’s perfectly okay to say that God chooses not to lie, but would be able to do so if he chose to do so. But if you want to limit the range of actions available to God, you are positing a limited God. That’s okay too. But you can’t have both a limited and unlimited God at the same time.
Once again, the only one of the two of us who is abandoning the plain meaning of things is you. The dictionaries you yourself have cited provide adequate evidence for that, inasmuch as the abilities to die, fail, lose, be a wuss, etc. manifest weakness rather than power–and therefore are not compatible with omnipotence.
As for lying specifically, why not answer the question which I now specifically ask you for the third time: With which premise do you disagree–1, 2, or 4?
One might choose to use deception to defeat an enemy in battle. That isn’t a weakness, merely a choice of tactics.
So which premise are you disagreeing with?
I’m sorry, I thought it was obvious.
Number 1, number 3, and number 5.
Why would it be a weakness for God to choose to use deception to achieve a desired end?
Two of those are conclusions. They follow from their premises.
So Premise 1 it is.
But you are not asking a question about Premise 1.
Try asking about Premise 1.
I guess your question, suitably tailored, would be something like, “Why would it be an imperfection to choose to use deception to achieve a desired end when not constrained by circumstances?”
Well, is there some reason it wouldn’t be?
But if you need a reason it would be, there is this consideration: Deceiving when deceiving is unnecessary is wrong.
Quite so. It is ridiculously hard to measure or define ideas or ideal (love, freedom, metaphor) using physics as the language.
That is not an Augustinian understanding of being. Evil is a privation- a decrement in existence, in goodness. That isn’t sophistry- it is basic to his understanding of metaphysics. God doesn’t withhold the revelation of his knowledge- it is like blaming the preschool teacher for failing to explain using integration to find the area under a curve. To know God is to know all things- but we can only have a sliver of knowledge about God (“if you understand it, it isn’t God”-again Augustine). To try to drink of God’s knowledge (or goodness, or beauty etc) is to try to sip out of a roaring firehose-it is infinitely beyond our capacity. The limitation isn’t God’s- it is ours.
Remember God isn’t an aspect of this world (reality, the universe) so he transcends your categories- the conception that God is an aspect of the universe is the basic mistake- he isn’t in the category of being/existence, he is the source of being- being itself. He is I AM-that is a conjugal of the verb to be- to exist. Some translations of that passage read “I am that I am”- I am existence itself.
Anything that allows predictions of physical quantities to 12 significant digits (quantum mechanics predicting the deviation from 2 the magnetic moment of the electron from pure logic) can hardly be illogical.
Intuition is not logic
Not in the Hebrew. The word is in the future tense. “I WILL BE AS I WILL BE.”
Which changes everything.
Great, now I have a Doris Day song stuck in my head.
But there is no “future” for God- that use is anachronistic &/or anthropomorphic- there is only the eternal present for him.
Suppose deception is simply a better choice than alternatives? Suppose it isn’t necessary, but of all the options it produces the best outcome? Is it wrong then?
“Dream a Little Dream of Me?”
God cannot act outside His own nature, because that would require Him to choose to act outside His own nature.
Lying is at its root, a corruption of that which s true, and nothing more, nothing in its own right. That which is true can be true in and of itself; if a thing exists or is so, you say, It exists or it is so. Truth stands on its own, free and clear.
That which is not true, a lie, is not-true in relation to something else — in relation to the truth. Lies do not stand on their own, but only exist in the contraversion of something else.
Lies cannot stand on their own. Lies are merely and inherently a corruption of something else, of the truth. To say “God is good” is true, because the truth is that God is good; there is nothing more that is required to be said, or to be known, or to exist. To say that “God is bad” when He is not bad, is a lie, because it only exists in contradiction of something else, of what is true. Lies do not stand on their own, but only exist in relation to something else — that which is true.
Lies are inherently inferior in reality, not having existence solely in themselves, but are rooted in something else — specifically they are rooted in the truth, and they are in fact a corruption of the truth.
Since God is Truth, and God can’t deny Himself, this is why God can’t lie. This also speaks to God’s integrity or wholeness, relying on nothing but Himself and His being.
That is your understanding. That is not what the Torah says.
…
This is a crucial point, I think. A lot of the commentary seems to imagine God as some kind of Zeus figure living somewhere high up, like a superhuman who has extraordinary powers but really is just another person. But that’s not how the Judeo Christian religions see God.
The moral rule against lying, along with all its exceptions and corollaries, applies between human beings. I don’t think it necessarily applies to God, which is a fundamentally different type of entity. Same with the Old Testament God wiping people out with a flood. The greater good that might be served by such as act may be impossible for us to perceive. If God is good, we don’t have to worry about it. He’s taken care of whatever pain that caused, or he will at some point.
It’s a rough analogy, but I would compare it to how a person deals with their pet or a child. I sometimes have to, for their own good, take my kids’ stuff away as punishment. Often they feel that is outrageously unjust, but they cannot see my perspective, Also, they’re not allowed to take things from each other just because they are mad at each other. And that, too, is a good and necessary rule, among the children, but a good parent doesn’t have to follow it, and often shouldn’t follow it.
I once asked a guy who was reported to be “fluent in seven dead Semitic languages”, what the English translation of the name of God was, and he muttered for a few minutes and then said that is was a unique word derived from the Hebrew “be” and it implied a future tense, as if to say, “I am who I will be” or “I will be who I will be” or an emphatic “I am be who I prove I will be” or something like that. But he did say that it was not directly translatable.
My question is, Is the name of God actually translatable? Or is it only understood to be based on translatable words?
It cannot be this. The word “Ehye” is repeated. So the “to be” verb is repeated.
אֶֽהְיֶ֖ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר אֶֽהְיֶ֑ה
It is NOT unique. The word is found:
Genesis 31:3 Then the LORD said to Jacob, “Return to the land of your fathers where you were born, and I will be with you.”
Ex. 3:12 “And He said, “I will be with you”
Ex 4:12 “Now go, and I will be with you as you speak and will instruct you what to say.”
Ex. 4:15 You shall speak to him and put the words in his mouth—I will be with you and with him as you speak, and tell both of you what to do—
Deut. 31:23 And He charged Joshua son of Nun: “Be strong and resolute: for you shall bring the Israelites into the land that I promised them on oath, and I will be with you.”
The middle word is first found in Gen. 1:7. It directly means “which” or that” with no subtlety to speak of. It does not mean “who” as far as my cursory scan of where the word is found shows.
That is true for any Torah word. And yet by examining how the word is used elsewhere in the text we can understand it pretty well. That is what most of my Torah posts are all about.
Jews do not try to translate G-d’s name at all. We do not consider “I will be what I will be” to be G-d’s name in any case. G-d identifies Himself using several other names, many other places in the text.
Thanks. But I still do not quite understand. Is the tetragrammaton a word as well as a name?
We do not speak it at all. And it is not from “I will be what I will be”. It is not used in the Torah as anything except a name of G-d.