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For Captain Crozier, Loyalty Is a Two-Way Street
“There’s a great deal of talk about loyalty from the bottom to the top. Loyalty from the top down is even more necessary and is much less prevalent. One of the most frequently noted characteristics of great men who have remained great is loyalty to their subordinates.” — General George S. Patton
As a career Noncommissioned Officer and a veteran of 20 years military service, I wonder if Navy brass — or if the senior ranks in any branch of America’s armed forces for that matter — understand what they are witnessing when they see that great throng of crew members aboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt cheering in support of Captain Brett Crozier, who risked his career to save their lives? A Navy veteran on Twitter commented that:
I love that ppl from across the country are seeing this. But only Sailors are truly going to understand how monumental & rare a sendoff like this is. Once in your career if you’re extremely lucky will you see a CO like this. And if you’re Lotto-lucky, you get to serve with them.
During my time on active duty, I worked directly for over 30 senior and flag rank officers. Of those commanders, there are precisely two for whom I would gladly storm the very gates of hell if asked. That’s not to disparage the remainder, but merely to point out the relatively few, in my experience, whose loyalty to their people ranked higher than their career aspirations.
“Take care of your people,” we NCOs were told, “and they will take care of the mission.” It seemed more of a motto at times — a catchy phrase if you will — than a dogmatic and foundational conviction. Of course, that depended on the mission itself, which too often appeared to be one of getting the boss that next star.
One of the more enduring lessons embedded deep into the mind of anyone who has been in the military for at least a day is the abiding importance of the chain of command. That is the vehicle through which orders and procedures are dispatched downward and carried out. It is also the means through which concerns, ideas, and requests are carried up to the appropriate level for decisions and action. In those instances in which the chain of command is unresponsive, or the concern is a direct result of people in that chain, then other avenues are provided, e.g., the Inspector General’s office, congressional offices, etc.
To go outside of that chain is to risk a great deal, as military law expert, Gary Solis explained in an article at Quartz, emphasizing that, “there’s no room for failing to follow accepted and long-respected chain-of-command obligations.” Indeed. Which makes Capt Crozier’s actions even more intriguing since he never would have risen through the ranks to command the USS Theodore Roosevelt had he been the reckless sort who made a habit of stepping outside accepted channels, no?
Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to wonder whether Captain Crozier — who undoubtedly was well versed in the centrality of the chain of command to military order, discipline, and mission effectiveness — had found his chain of command’s response wanting in the level of urgency and decisiveness required to preserve the lives of the people who had been entrusted to his command. No one goes into the military believing they are indispensable, but the acceptable level of risk to human life in wartime conditions quite rightly differs from that of peacetime conditions, a point Capt Crozier felt necessary to underscore repeatedly in his letter.
Commenting on that letter, Navy Secretary Thomas Modly concluded that Capt Crozier had, “…unnecessarily raised alarms with the families of our Sailors and Marines with no plan to address those concerns.” On the contrary, if those concerns revolve around the safety of the Sailors and Marines onboard the USS Theodore Roosevelt, Captain Crozier’s letter provided specific courses of action to address those concerns. As for unnecessarily raising alarms, the latest reports show that 44 percent of the crew have been tested, with 155 personnel having tested positive for COVID-19 thus far. Given how rapidly this virus seems to spread, the idea that alarms were unnecessarily raised appears dubious.
To this observer, it seems that when a commander of Captain Crozier’s caliber goes outside the chain of command, that commander is making a vote of no confidence in the responsiveness of those who constitute that chain. Secretary Modly would do himself and the Navy a favor if he would but pause a moment and consider why an officer of Captain Crozier’s caliber felt his chain of command was inadequate to the needs of his sailors.
Oh, and whatever became of the two commanders for whom I would have gladly stormed the gates of hell? They both commanded the fierce loyalty of their troops, and they both retired prematurely.
Published in General
How odd. I couldn’t disagree more with the premises and the conclusions.
I have had easily as many commanders as you have had, and a lot of them I didn’t like, but there is not a single one, even those that were overtly evil that I would not storm the gates of hell for. If those were my orders, I would do it and relish the chance of killing the devil.
It is not a sign of leadership to have your crew love you. A commander’s loyalty goes FIRST to his commander, and only secondarily to anyone under his command.
The commander of a warship has a responsibility to keep his ship ready for war. He made a bad decision to allow his crew to be exposed to the virus. That might be hindsight (I doubt it), but commanders are not limited in the scope of what they are responsible for.
This commander sent a letter telling people that his ship was not ready for war, and that he had no intention of even acting like he was prepared for war. He sounded scared. He sounded weak. He sounded like his mission to defend our nation and its interests was just secondary to keeping his crew coddled.
I would have fired him for sending the letter via non-secure means.
I would have fired him for implying weakness and sounding as though his warship’s mission wasn’t important.
I would have fired him for not keeping his crew from the virus and not doing more to stop the spread of the contagion within the ship.
If you ever have seen the movie, “Twelve O’Clock High,” this commander is Keith Davenport. He is poison for a military command and he had to be cashiered. There’s no other conclusion that is acceptable.
We should get @d12 in on this.
For my part, I haven’t the foggiest idea what they should be doing. I have never lived on board an air craft carrier.
Fixed that for ya.
Dave, you remember the reporting systems we saw, so you know his highers had been informed repeatedly through classified means, in detail, of the situation and readiness of his command. This point seems to miss most folk, or they aren’t aware of the reporting requirements. His unclassified message was still sent through government channels.
I can only recall off the top of my head only one CO I’d walk through fire for, and he too was forced out early.
Talking about readiness is classified.
I do have to wonder what Captain Crozier would have thought, and done if it was a junior officer, or an enlisted sailor that sent out twenty or so unsecured emails concerning conditions on his ship.
Unfortunately I suspect that for decades an MBA is now considered a big plus for climbing the ladder to promotion. As an AFROTC cadet in the late 60’s, we spent our classroom time reading Henry Kissinger position papers. If you think that your eyes start glazing over listening to Kissinger try reading his work. I suppose that they were preparing us for the day as junior officers that we would be giving profound policy interviews to the press.
The investigation of Captain Croziers initial contacts to the Pentagon should require an accounting of what actions his superiors were taking to try and protect the crew, and his ship. Sometimes you need a Masters degree in CYA to reach flag rank, and secure an office in the Pentagon.
@skyler, Trump stated as much. But, a ship’s captain does not make the decision to visit a foreign port. Presumably, that clusterfark was several levels up.
I wonder what the captain said at that time.
Why would there be an investigation?
I have asked here, I have asked on Twitter, I have asked Google: Who were the recipients of the email? Know the 30 names on the TO: line and then pronounce how serious a breach this is. If there is ONE journalist on there he is guilty as hell.
Patton was disliked by his soldiers.
It’s a mistake to confuse loyalty to your subordinates with popularity with them. That send-off by a mob of sailors that looked and sounded like a rock concert struck me as unmilitary and embarrassing. Sorry but that was my immediate impression.
Assuming he pursued this as much as possible within the chain of command (I have read that the Admiral he reported to was on board the carrier) he had two choices: (1) execute the mission in spite of his doubts, or (2) ask for reassignment. Commanders who say they cannot execute the mission are usually granted immediate relief..
@davecarter I have read that he did not communicate his concerns to his Fleet Commander (who was on his ship). Do you know if this is true or not? It seems hard for me to believe.
I’m not letting Crozier off the hook, but those that are above Crozier in his chain of command are just as responsible for that ship as Crozier is. An investigation into the timeline of the initial report from Crozier to his superiors, and the investigation should be classified.
Sky,
This seems the worst of it. We don’t have that many carrier task forces. Each one is key to our ability to project power anywhere in the world. For the captain of the carrier to behave so unprofessionally as to expose vital information about his ship’s readiness seems grossly wrong.
Of course, the idiot parasite left wing will have a field day with this. They don’t care about the Navy, the virus, or the economy. They just want power.
Regards,
Jim
No they aren’t. That’s absurd.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/magazine/navy-captain-crozier-positive-coronavirus.html
How unfortunate.
Not much he could have done if a sailor had written his congress critter. That’s the law.
Not quite. Operational readiness is classified and everyone aboard ship knows that. No one can send classified reports to their elected representatives.
Thanks, @spin. I have thought and read a lot about this case. There are two primary paradigms that I have found useful to consider when evaluating this story.
First is the “by the book” paradigm: did CAPT Crozier behave in a manner that conforms to the rules, regulations, and standards of a Commissioned Officer in the U.S. Navy, never mind the Commanding Officer of an aircraft carrier?
To answer that question, we have to know more about the facts. The SECNAV’s statement is blurry on two points: who (if anyone) in the Chain of Command saw the letter before it was sent to the press? And, what measures did CAPT Crozier take to ensure that his assessment of the situation was clearly understood by his superiors?
The implication in SECNAV’s statement is that the Commander of U.S. Pacific Fleet, ADM Aquilino, read the letter the day it was sent (30 March) to about 20 or 30 people in a single email thread, but that no one else in the Chain of Command saw it until the day that it was published in the S.F. Chronicle, 31 March. Further, SECNAV’s statement explicitly says that his office (his Chief of Staff specifically) had been in contact with CAPT Crozier. In the days immediately prior to the publication of the letter, “[CAPT Crozier] told my Chief of Staff that he was receiving those resources, and was fully aware of the Navy’s response, only asking that the he wished the crew could be evacuated faster. My Chief of Staff ensured that the CO knew that he had an open line to me to use at any time. He even called the CO again a day later to follow up. At no time did the CO relay the various levels of alarm that I, along with the rest of the world, learned from his letter when it was published two days later.”
This statement provides total vindication to the SECNAV’s decision, as CAPT Crozier failed to exercise the most basic responsibility of a commissioned officer in possession of important information: he didn’t ask “who needs to know this?” and then act accordingly. Sending a letter to the press is no substitute for walking down the passageway to your boss’ stateroom and making your case. To complain that the Navy is moving too slowly is common to every enlisted sailor and junior officer; it is certainly no excuse to brush off the SECNAV, CNO, and the Carrier Strike Group Commander and bitch to the press.
I’m running against a word limit, so I’ll finish my thoughts in a second comment.
What’s classified? Crozier sent classified reports through proper channels, but any sailor can send a letter saying “we’re all sick and ain’t nobody doin’ nuffin’, help!” to his congress critter.
The second paradigm to analyze this case is that of “judgment.” Did CAPT Crozier display the judgment expected of someone given his awesome responsibility? As far as I can tell, this is the simplified thought process of CAPT Crozier (which I’ll write from his perspective).
1. COVID-19 is infecting the crew of my ship.
2. The only way to prevent casualties is to evacuate the ship, save about 10% mandatory manning to disinfect the ship, maintain the nuclear power plant, and provide security.
3. We are not at war, so this is acceptable.
4. The Navy is moving too slowly and the only recourse I have left is to get the press involved.
I would argue that CAPT Crozier’s assessment of the hazard facing his crew was grossly skewed toward panic, fear, and doom by the irresponsible press coverage of this entire pandemic. Also, he cited in his
articleletter that the cruise ship Diamond Princess was the “comparable situation” to which he measured the peril facing his crew. This betrays a shallowness of thought that is truly incomprehensible for a man in his position. Critical differences that perhaps he might have considered before panicking:– COVID-19 is devastating for the elderly, but presents overwhelmingly mild symptoms and only very rare death in people under the age of 50.
– Of all the people on board the Diamond Princess, the “average age was 58, and 33 percent were 70 or older.” Even in that population, in that circumstance, the death rate was only 1%.
– Aboard an aircraft carrier, the average age is 24 and no more than a tiny handful of people would have been over 50 years old.
– CAPT Crozier’s crew is overwhelmingly not only healthier and fitter than the average US population in their age group, but preexisting conditions like asthma, cancer, obesity, and diabetes (you know, the oft-cited co-morbidities that makes COVID-19 deadly) are aggressively screened for and (with the possible exception of obesity) are almost totally absent on his ship!
Of any population of Americans, CAPT Crozier’s crew were among the least likely to suffer fatalities on account of COVID-19. This is, to me, the most damning indictment of his judgment: he was unable to break away from the panic induced by CNN/MSNBC/FOXNEWS/NYTimes/SFChronicle’s hysteria to think and act like a man in command of himself, much less in command of the USS Theodore Roosevelt.
I haven’t even touched on the absurdity and folly of his “we are not at war” statement. I trust readers have enough sense to see the foolishness of that assertion.
In sum, CAPT Crozier failed to exercise the judgment, professionalism, and leadership the Navy has a right to expect of him. Based on the information available now, I fully support the SECNAV’s decision to relieve him of command.
My apologies, folks, for being late to the discussion here, but the comments above are illuminating and infinitely interesting. To the vets commenting here, first and foremost Thank You for your service!
I am totally open to the very real possibility that my perspective on this subject is necessarily influenced (and perhaps colored) by my own experience. When I wrote that I had served under over 30 senior and flag rank officers, what I meant was that they were my immediate supervisors. In my capacity as an active duty historian I was on the commander’s immediate staff and was required to have a front row seat to their decision making processes and document same to preserve the official record of operations from their perspective (the idea being to provide a corporate memory for future generations to know what worked and what did not work).
As I’m sure you can surmise, I saw a great many different leadership styles, and I watched the sort of results those styles garnered in terms of mission effectiveness. Like my friend and fellow historian Robert E. Lee (yep, that’s his real name), I saw some truly inspiration examples of leadership, and the inverse was also true. But I’ll grant that the tendency toward cynicism is real and not always easily transcended, depending on one’s experiences.
I’ll comb through the above responses with some specific comments, but thank you all again for taking the time to comment on my musings.
I knew you’d have some good words for us. I generally consider most members of the United States Navy to be scoundrels and rascals, so my view starts off jaded. ;-)
There’s much to consider here, Skylar, and thanks for responding so thoroughly. Taking your last point first (because that’s the easiest) I haven’t seen Twelve O’Clock High, so the analogy is lost on me. I’m cinematically challenged (to my wife’s dismay), and there are a great many movies that I haven’t seen. On the the rest:
Yes, Bob, I can’t help but wonder why a commander, steeped in Chain of Command protocol, OPSEC, operational logistics, etc., as he undoubtedly was, would take action that he knew could be suicidal professionally speaking. And yet he did so just the same. That makes me wonder why, and wonder what was happening behind the scenes.
Good points, all.
If I understand correctly, an investigation into Capt Crozier’s actions is being initiated at the SEC/NAV’s order.
I have the same question.
I’ve seen the same thing. And this Fleet Commander, if I have my facts straight, was onboard ship with him. Now, if the Fleet Commander was privy (as I’m sure he was) to the routine mission readiness reports and the other official communications up and down the chain, there is no way he would not have known of Capt Crozier’s concerns. But if he was not an addressee on Capt Crozier’s letter,…then the mystery deepens, in my mind at least. Why wasn’t he an addressee? Something odd was going on here, and I’m not willing to throw the Captain under the bus just yet.