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Will China Go Back to the Future?
The world has been on edge recently, as the Chinese have serially dared Japan to stop them from encroaching on Japanese air and sea space, as well as making claims on disputed islands in the region. In such brazen efforts to translate its formidable economic clout into regional military power, the newly assertive China seems to be confident that Japan—with a chronically weakened economy, demographic stasis, and energy shortages—can be bullied.
China is said to buy into the notion that the U.S. is in self-imposed decline and becoming neo-isolationist, willingly ignoring the rising tensions in the China Sea—despite treaty obligations to Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as well as the de facto alliance with Taiwan. Our recent embarrassments in the Middle East, the failed reset with Russia, the Snowden affair, and Obama’s falling popularity are all force multipliers of that impression.
Yet conventional wisdom suggests that Europe and the United States naively believe that China is too heavily invested in its global exports to risk its rising fiscal power by prematurely picking an unnecessary fight with Japan—or any of the other Westernized democracies in the region, like Taiwan or South Korea. Thus, other than the bothersome braggadocio, China will most likely keep playing by the rules and not start a new Pacific war that could easily bring in several major powers. So says this logic, anyway.
The tensions, however, continue and that invites historical analogies, most frequently to the calm before the unexpected storm of late 1914. Then also, Germany (read: China) believed its newfound power was not fairly appreciated by colonial Britain and France. America was isolationist and indifferent. The early 20th-century intelligentsia still believed that breakthrough technologies in communications and travel had created a new, interconnected world economy that no European power would be stupid enough to disrupt. Yet, supposedly, miscalculation, accident, and the unforeseen followed, triggering the nightmare of World War I— a war that no one really wanted.
In truth, wars rarely are caused by accident. Most nations know exactly what they are doing. While miscalculation can accelerate or retard the outbreak of a war, it is infrequently its primary cause. Instead, an absence of deterrence encourages adventurism, as aggressive powers are unsure of the relative strength (or the will to use it) of their rivals and thus believe they might gain an advantage by risking or even inviting war. War, then, becomes a sort of litmus test for verifying which nations or alliances of nations were the more powerful all along. Peace returns when such clarity is reestablished, as the weaker, defeated party accepts post-war subordination.
Imperial Germany, like China today, believed that the French once again (as in the Franco-Prussian War) could not defend their territory and might give concessions after a lightning quick German strike. The war once more would be confined to a border fight between neighbors. For all its protestations and talk of alliances, Britain would most likely not intervene on the continent, or would do so in a fashion that was too late and that utilized too little power—or so Germany believed.
They also calculated that Russia was not likely to pose a serious threat in the east, having recently fared poorly against upstart Japan and being plagued by political unrest against the Czar. In other words, the Kaiser felt the European family of nations either would not or could not stop his aggression, and thus would most likely either accept his aggrandizement or fight feebly against it. He trusted that German industry, the nation’s superb general staff, a huge army, and excellent military technology would all give his country an edge that would make the war short and decisive. Germany was on the rise; France and Britain were in supposed decline.
The rise of imperial Japan offers similarities to contemporary China as well. By the late 1930s, Japan’s westernized economy had given it industrial might that was reflected in a vast rearmament campaign that sought to ensure status commensurate with its newfound confidence. Japan sensed that the U.S. was happy enough to stay home, suffering through a decade of economic depression.
In short order, Japan picked fights with both China and Russia; when mired in the former and stung by the latter, it turned on America, convinced that the old European colonial order had been ended by Hitler, and that the orphaned Pacific colonies were now ready to be plucked once America was bruised and sent packing. Japan talked grandly of an Asian co-prosperity sphere, as if such racial solidarity under its aegis appealed to its bullied neighbors. Much of this sounds eerily familiar.
The U.S. certainly was far stronger than it acted—and yet it could not deter Japan. Japan noticed that the U.S. had been perfectly happy to let its closest ally, Britain, be firebombed by Germany without intervening. Japan also surmised that Americans were not willing to repeat their belated (but decisive) entrance into World War I, which had not lived up to its billing as “the war to end all wars.” America’s “pivot” of transferring the Pacific fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in the spring of 1940 made little impression on the Japanese.
Yet, by 1945, the U.S. had produced more tanks, planes, and munitions than all three Axis powers combined, drafted 12 million men into its military, and produced fighters and bombers that were qualitatively superior to Japan’s, in numbers that astonished Tokyo’s delusional military leadership. In just two years, America reversed the course of the Pacific war and achieved both air and naval superiority over Japan. It obliterated Japan in less than four years, while fighting Germany and Italy, aiding Russia, and conducting massive bombing, submarine, surface fleet, infantry, amphibious, and logistics operations on a global scale. Nonetheless, the United States had not made such huge potential known to the Japanese in 1941. The U.S. seemed to be hesitant, and thus had lost the ability to deter a power in no way its equal.
Where does such historicizing lead us in the present crisis? China, in theory, would be crazy to start a war with Japan. The latter’s fleet is superior to China’s. For all the talk of U.S. decline, American conventional and nuclear power dwarfs the Chinese military. Taiwan, South Korea, Indochina, and the Philippines all fear China far more than they do the U.S.—and might offer what aid they could. India is closer to Japan than to China. An opportunistic Russia is probably more interested in seeing China checked than buoyed.
As in the case of Imperial Germany and, two decades later, Imperial Japan, China has confused its rapid ascendency with a parity to the U.S. that it still lacks. Reality, however, is different than theory. Confident upstarts often look not to the real world of the here and now, but instead embrace future trajectories as if they are present realities.
China may think it will own the late 21st century, but it needs to be reminded diplomatically (backed by displays of strength) that such a day is not yet here. A determined U.S. needs to send the message that any aggression against Japan would be met by solidarity among a number of nations, spearheaded by Washington. Only by reestablishing deterrence in the region can the democracies guide China away from the path of the Kaiser and the Japanese militarists of old—and remind it that reckless new powers that act precipitously beyond their capabilities usually end up badly.
Percival, you notice that I didn’t exactly say I was in favor of maintaing sea lanes. I said I “might” be with her, depending on how she envisions doing it.
Yes, the Influence of Sea Power (that’s Mahan’s book, right?) is a classic and was incredibly influential, along with TR’s (The Naval War of 1812). Though both are excellent books, they and their authors played a critical role in turning us away from Constitutional defense and towards the unequivocal and explicit empire that we became in 1898.
Like I said, a case can be made for a global military presence. Just not a constitutional case.
Jefferson and the Barbary wars? Yes, his idea for barges with guns patrolling the mouthes of rivers was ridiculous. Still, sticking with barges would have been a far better idea than proving that a president can go ahead and start a war despite what the Constitution says. Jefferson, unlike, say, Van Buren, was not always a very good Jeffersonian.
Danny, here are a couple of major constitutional problems with neo-empire/hegemony/policing the world (whatever you want to call it).
1. You can’t police the world with a militia. “Well-regulated” militias are, historically, ferocious on defense but cumbersome and undisciplined in long term offensive war. The Constitution envisions militia defense as a solution to the problem (a huge problem, as the founders correctly saw it) of large permanent standing armies. We gave up militia defense – the kind they intended – precisely in order to maintain a world hegemony.
2. You can’t police the world without presidential warfare. To discourage such wars and the dictators that engage them, the Constitution requires Congress decide for war. (Jefferson proved the Constitution was less powerful than the President, though, by attacking Tripoli on his own). Standing armies, foreign bases, and presidential warfare make a mockery of the Constitution. You can have hegemony or you can have the Constitution. But you can’t have both.
Standing armies make a mockery of the Constitution? “The Congress shall have Power To …raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years….” (U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 12.)
One important debate at the constitutional convention was this: Should we have no standing army at all or a small one to absorb the first blow while the militia was being mustered?
Many (most?) felt even a small standing army was too dangerous. Hamilton (who naturally did not think so) used that very clause you quote, Matthew, to convince the convention that a small standing army was ok. He basically said, “The decision to continue funding will be debated every two years so no need to worry too much.” That’s the argument that won over the convention.
So, when was the last time you ever heard of a debate over whether we should fund a standing army for the next two years?
Yes, permanent standing armies in foreign countries make a mockery of the Constitution, just as Hamilton managed to make a mockery of convention members who naively believed we would debate the continued funding every two years.
All true…someday, when we have a REAL American president, it may happen. I hope it’s not too late.
It’s good to see you back, Dr. Hanson.
I’m afraid that this administration has moved away from deterrence, seeing it not as a responsibility that our country has but as an abuse of power that must be checked. Unfortunately, this could have, as you point out, tragic consequences.
Does the fact that China’s one child policy has resulted in a surplus of men of military age with no prospects of family life play into this equation?
Like I said, a casecanbe made for a global military presence. Just not a constitutional case.
The Constitution doesn’t say, one way or the other.
When they are lucky, and the opposition is incompetent, and the technological gap between the two is insignificant. Winning on defense depends entirely on the aggressor becoming disenchanted with or distracted from the war. That is more commonly something that happens to democracies than any other form of government, which means that a well-regulated militia would probably be enough to keep the Canadians from kicking our Yankee butts, but other than that….
Oh, and back to the War of 1812: the Canadians and Brits did manage to burn Washington D.C., when faced with a well-regulated militia fighting in defense.
They haven’t done anything nearly as nice for us for 200 years, though.
Of course history is also filled with examples of decisive and aggressive warlords who saw their larger more powerful yet disorganized neighbors as easy pickings. The Jin Dynasty was surely more powerful and wealthy than the Mongol Horde, but they were invariably conquered. The same might be said of the Persians and Alexander.
The question is is the west only impressive on paper? Do we actually have the will to fight back an aggressive China? I don’t think Obama does, he certainly doesn’t have the brains.
So I think it is open season on the smaller nations of the world. They should start making plans that don’t depend on us.
You make some interesting points, Dr. Hansen. But you gloss over all the examples of us dumping those we encouraged to step up, or to count on us for support/ help. Certainly Israel, Poland, Czech, South Vietnam – just to name some – have a strong sense of this.
So your advise may be good, but we don’t follow such advise often.
I think your analogies are more prescient than you realize. In Imperial Germany and Imperial Japan, the military was eager for war and had significant influence on policy decisions. Both felt they had the power and might to defeat their expected enemies. In China, the military seems to becoming more influential as the ChiCom factions spar for power. They also seem eager to display their newly acquired war machines. I do not think it impossible that the Chinese military would provoke an incident which would lead to multi-national conflict in Asia.
I think a better analogy to the Kaiser, who I blame for the war, is the Iranian leadership. Wilhelm was jealous of his English cousins and irrational enough that the General Staff did not keep him fully informed. Both the German and English citizens were happy to be going to war having no inkling what it would be like.
Whoa, whoa! Percival!
The Canadians kicked our butts because we invaded Canada! The Brits burned DC, but then turned north – and ran into a buzzsaw outside of Baltimore. ALL militia. Their vaunted redcoats could make no inroads against the Baltimore militia, so they chose to try the sea route (hence the bombardment of Fr. McHenry). Likewise down south in NO, Jackson mustered a collection of militia that waxed the Brit regulars with almost no losses to the Americans.
Technology changes, but not man’s will to fight. Al-Queda fights with relatively primitive means against THE most technically advanced military in the world – and is still around. It isn’t for the lack of the military trying. And the BG’s aren’t exactly nice guys who would garner the locals’ support.
Matty Van isn’t discounting your proposition; he is asking you to choose whether you wish a constitutional government where we don’t do that, or dump that and do that.
Excellent as always Dr. Hanson. Reading your words earlier at NR I am left to wonder if they receive your initial thoughts and Ricochet is gifted with the final thesis.
Be that as it may. What disturbed me in your writing is what I find missing from many foreign affairs ruminations. There are many reflections on the rise of China, some praising, many neutral and some fearful however few speak of events in Japan.
It is as if that nation is some static constant in world affairs, yet this is not at all the case. A great deal is changing, after all the economic malaise the United States has faced since the financial crisis have been the lot of Japanese citizens for two decades.
Reading various reports out that nation one can be left with disturbing impressions. I fear a stoic soldier holding position year, after year, after year, never revealing the cost to others until…
It is not unknown for someone being pushed too far to suddenly snap when pressed and the PRC have never appeared a cautious sort.
Devereaux, it wasn’t an invasion, only a raid. They didn’t come to stay. You are right that the defense of Baltimore was successful, but the Royal Navy sat off of Ft. McHenry and bombarded it and there wasn’t a thing we could do about that except hunker down and wait for them to run out of ammunition. Had they taken or reduced McHenry, Baltimore would have fallen.
The first wave of the assault at New Orleans had experience, courage, and tenacity. What they didn’t have were their assault ladders. Someone had neglected to bring them up to the fortifications. I’d file that under “incompetence,” but I’m a strict grader.
Matty Van keeps telling us there is no constitutional case for a global military presence. Does the constitution prevent us from doing this?
I’ll agree to Matty Van’s proposition regarding standing armies on the same day I turn over my 870 to the sheriff.
Dr. Hanson,
Wonderful article, as always. However, you state: “China, in theory, would be crazy to start a war with Japan. The latter’s fleet is superior to China’s.” While Japan’s fleet is clearly technologically superior to China’s, I don’t think that is true numerically. This is especially true in Chinese home waters where their costal forces and air power can play a larger role. China might not be able to dominate Japan’s home waters, but I suspect that the PLAN (Chinese navy) could indeed push the JMSDF (Japanese navy) out of the South China Sea.
Would that our ‘leaders’ engaged in the level of thought in Prof. Hanson’s post. Those are some frightening parallels.
I wouldn’t take it as given that even the latter part of this century belongs to China. Surely, their claim to the century is premature. The question is, what specifically should the West and its Far East allies do to contain the dragon? It’s clear nothing good will happen on Obama’s watch.
If one takes the demographic view of history, China is becoming belligerent because 40 years of a one child policy has led to an excess in the male population that needs an outlet for their unfulfilled sexual energies. Japan is a powerful nation in decline due to demographic suicide. It could be a powder keg, the important question is if the demographically robust India joins in against China, or stands aside.
Even if our President and the Congress were in agreement about waging war, how could we ever sustain a war effort in the South China Sea?
Japanese are a deeply sensitive people and don’t like to be insulted, especially by people they deem to be inferior (i.e., the Chinese). The Chinese are nursing an intense grudge against almost everyone because of the unpleasantness of the last 100 years. It’s not a recipe for peace.
Very nicely done, as always! And, as always, framed around the assumption that America play at being an imperial world power.
I know, I know, America isn’t “really” an empire. Just like the Fed isn’t “really” a central bank.
But when you have bases around the world and advocate using them in the world, when you talk about what “we” should do in response to what happens in the world, you are thinking and acting like an imperialist. Which is not necessarily bad. You can make a case, like Dr. Hanson and many Ricochetti do, that this is America’s job. But you can’t make a constitutional case.
If you believe that the American Constitution and the American experiment are more important than being a “good” empire, then Dr. Hanson’s views should be fought tooth and nail.
Percival – They went to “liberate” Canada from British rule. Seems the Canadians didn’t want to be liberated. Now take that misconception we had then and apply it to any number of actions we have taken around the world. And then dropped when it got tough. Or the Left beat us up (Vietnam).
I believe Matty’s point is that no one in his right mind would invade Switzerland – technological or not. They have prepared their defenses, and will fight to the end. And everyone knows it. The United States as formulated in the Constitution had a similar idea in mind. We fight for our own nation; others can do as they wish.
I would submit that the whole discussion of what our stance ought to be vis a vis the world hasn’t really been debated in the nation. We get the defensive arguments, the world-needs-us arguments, even these thing like Dr. Hanson’s argument that if we don’t do something now, we may well find ourselves in a serious shooting war in Asia. They all may have merit. But we really need to decide just who we are.
For all the talk of U.S. decline, American conventional and nuclear power dwarfs the Chinese military.
Nuclear potential might be a moot point depending on the leadership.
The Left considers the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki irredeemable sins. They reduce our stockpiles and pretend nuclear weapons can be de-invented.
Even leaders who have the will to use nuclear weapons apparently would use them only at the brink of defeat, for fear of diplomatic and historical condemnation if nothing else.
President Obama probably has the will to use nuclear weapons in extraordinary circumstances because the core of his thinking is driven by narcissism and totalitarian impulse rather than by any political philosophy. But America’s enemies, particular those of cultures so fundamentally unlike our own, might mistake the President’s liberalism for lack of a nuclear will.
This is an excellent article, better, if I may say so, than an earlier (?) version in NRO…outstrip, I beg to differ in regard to your statements about the Japanese. I speak as a Japanese citizen, living in Japan. Most everyone I know has little use for nationalism, esp. if all it amounts to is gesturing. And while the Chinese and the Koreans may feel the need to hate Japan, it’s largely an unrequited hate. The Chinese are not thought to be “inferior”; after all, so much of Japanese culture came from China. I can’t even write my address with using Chinese characters. But China is today a semi-totalitarian bully. And there are millions of poor single men with no marriage prospects who see my compatriots as easy pickings. We cannot afford to be sentimentalists.
#12 Matty Van
I can point to someone who is:
1) a zealous (or better said, judiciously zealous) advocate of a return to Constitutional principles in support of the American experiment, which she deems of supreme importance;
and
2) a judiciously zealous advocate of precisely the strategy of deterrence vis-a-vis China that Professor Hanson propounds here;
and
3) a 20-plus-year veteran of USN Intel (retired at Commander rank) who actually *understands* the whys and wherefores woven into attributes 1 and 2
I strongly suggest that you take the time to study her analyses on the China military challenge, including but not limited to this most recent post:
http://theoptimisticconservative.wordpress.com/2014/01/07/chinese-power-move-in-south-china-sea-this-is-big/
See also here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Constitution_is_not_a_suicide_pact
Danny, I read both articles. The first is excellent, the second I have serious problems with.
The first makes a powerful case for American protection of sea lanes. If that is as far as she goes, I might be with her. Does she advocate a radical dismantling of American bases around the world, of the military-industrial complex, and a return to a largely militia-base defense ala Switzerland and Israel? If she does, I will believe her when she says she is only advocating freedom of the seas and not American neo-empire.
If she does not advocate those things, then she is in contradiction with herself when she says she supports both world hegemony and the Constitution. Like I said, a case can be made for American hegemony over the world, and she is making a good case here, as does Hanson always. But you can’t make a constitutional case. You have to decide which is more important to you, hegemony or the Constitution.
#14 Matty Van
I’m sorry, what Supreme Court decisions have been handed down that deem our military posture to be in contravention of the Constitution — and are there any such decisions that also have instructed our government on the finer points of American base positioning?
You say there is no use for nationalism among your Japanese neighbors, but is there any interest in modifying their constitution to allow for a more responsive Army? I know the SDF is far more restricted than a conventional army is, and I have heard some argue that it needs to be made again into more of a standard army.