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The US Navy and Your Autonomous Vehicle
Damage to the USS John S. McCain
The United States Pacific Fleet seems to be having a run of bad luck. Or is it?
There have been five major accidents in the last 12 months.
- August 18, 2016: The USS Louisiana (SSBN 743, Ohio Class Nuclear Submarine) collided with a USN support ship, the Eagleview (T-AGSE-3) in the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the waterway between Washington State and British Columbia.
- January 31: USS Antietam (CG-54, Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser) ran aground in Tokyo Bay.
- May 9: USS Lake Champlain (CG-57) collided with a South Korean fishing vessel.
- June 17: USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62, Arleigh Burke-class destroyer) collided with the Philippine freighter ACX Crystal.
- August 21: USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) collided with the oil tanker Alnic MC.
How does the world’s most technologically advanced navy keep hitting things? The answer may be found in the question itself. Two separate Navy officials told CNN that the McCain experienced a sudden loss of steering control right before the accident, only for it to reappear just as suddenly afterwards.
The McClatchy news service reports that on June 22 in the eastern Black Sea someone highjacked the GPS capabilities of some 20 vessels. Their navigation systems, all of which were operating fine, suddenly placed them 20 miles inland near an airport. This is the first reported instance of widespread “GPS spoofing.”
The Navy acknowledges that they may have been hacked. Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. John Richardson said there are no indications of a cyber intrusion in any of these instances at the present time but the Navy remains open to the possibility. It’s not a new thought, either. In 2006 the Academy at Annapolis ceased teaching celestial navigation but the sextant was returned to the hands of the Middies in 2016 although the Navy denied at the time that they were worried about hacks.
As Google and vehicle manufactures begin a serious push for autonomous cars and trucks think of the chaos and destruction a terrorist or foreign government could inflict in one day if enough driverless vehicles were on the road at any given time. Somebody needs to be in control. Right now, it’s not clear that is us.
Published in Technology
When you think the machine’s eyeballs are better than your own; when you think that computer inputs are better than your experience and brainpower–“stuff” happens. Stuff that shouldn’t. Stuff like a collision at sea that can ruin your whole day.
At least in this ‘modern’ Navy–the sacked Admiral is not likely to lose life or pension. And probably not even rank.
What isn’t hackable? Why/how not?
All depends on what is doing the controlling. Are all the valves manual valves?
Respectfully, I find the tone of this question and the suspicion that hacking may be the cause of these recent incidents puzzling, coming from self-proclaimed conservatives.
Aren’t we always using the DMV and the Post Office as examples of how a typical government organization is run? Why would we expect the Armed Forces to be overall more competent (not necessary or dedicated, just competent) than any other huge, underfunded, government-run organization? The same underlying structural problems that make the USPS and DMVs often so poorly run all apply to the DoD as well.
And from what I understand (which is very little), most of the “technology” in daily use in the Navy was designed in the 1960’s through 1980’s. Comparing this with private sector developments which are likely still at least a decade off seems like an apples-to-oranges comparison.
Of the few dozen Navy vets I know, every single one has at least one story of how their ship/plane got to within a hair’s breadth of hitting another ship/plane, running aground/crashing, burning uncontrollably, losing reactor coolant, etc.
Maybe they’re all just disgruntled or exaggerating for gullible landlubbers. Still, I’d like to see some statistics of whether the rate of collisions/groundings have actually increased over the years, or whether this is an issue that has always been around, and is just getting more attention now through the combination of relative peacetime, digital media, and shallow journalism.
Because the military is acutely aware that when the DMV or Post Office screws up nobody dies. You’re unlikely to see a headline proclaiming “Sorting Machine Disaster at Main Post Office; 10 Lettercarriers Missing” or “7 DVM Clerks Laminated In Licensing Mishap.”
I don’t think awareness can do much to improve how an organization is run if other structural issues are too great. Awareness doesn’t help much if you are chronically underfunded, overworked, undertrained, provided with substandard equipment and supply chains, constantly being given conflicting signals from your top brass, and have a high staff turnover rate.
And despite my previous comment, it’s likely that the military is indeed much better run than the USPS despite these common constraints. If the Navy was staffed by USPS employees there’s a decent chance we wouldn’t have any operational boats since they’d all be hung up on shoals around the world.
But with that said, I still think there’s only so much quality we can expect from any government-run organization. It’s very possible that the current rate of boats swapping paint is the best we can hope for from the Navy.
In the 70’s our teachers told us we’d end up in trouble by relying solely on calculators.
Every car is hackable. The human driven cars are hacked by operator errors, tiredness, foolishness, misjudgement, drugs, alcohol, mechanical failure, just to name a few.
Self driven cars still have a “brain” it just isn’t human.
We can not create an accident or error free world.
No. We allow aliens to serve in the military; every member of the military gets classified clearance.
from the linked article:
Then I Googled anonymous and found out he is legion.
You’re right that there have been many close calls over the years. When you have a bunch of 20-year olds running the ship at night in crowded sea lanes, bad things will happen occasionally. But I don’t remember two very serious collisions with large merchants occurring within such a short period of time (and no actual losses of reactor coolant!). Every five or ten years between serious incidents is more like it, historically.
Why these ship COs thought they needed to be in the crowded approaches to Tokyo Bay and the Strait of Malacca at zero dark thirty escapes me. We always planned to do these sorts of things in daylight with adult supervision, unless there was some compelling reason not to.
I’m sure that all of our potential enemies will make sure that we will never have to pull into port in the dead of night.
Well, you’re right – this is a skill that our Navy must have and exercise. But, it’s not possible for the most proficient watch standers to be on deck all day and night, and the captain can’t always be awake. If the ideal is not the reality, then you need to recognize that and take reasonable precautions. There is a lot at stake; there are several hundred sailors on these ships. A man has to know his limitations.
If I remember correctly, the guy on the ‘scope is only watching for an hour at a stretch before he’s relieved. Think of it as watching Don Lemon on CNN Tonight without the opportunity for occasional laughter.
From my side of the street, which I confess is second hand (my father, Navy, my son, Marine), I would ask, “Shouldn’t every unit be 3 to 4 deep?” What happens when more senior and more experienced COs become incapacitated?
Is this what is supposed to happen when one US senator from Arizona decides to take it upon himself to kick the fixing of Obamacare down the road? From the indent, that was one big shoe.
The ship was not named for the Senator. It’s named for his father and grandfather, both admirals and long enough gone they can no longer tarnish their respective reputations.
Interesting reading…
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-08/collisions-part-i—what-are-root-causes
You can say that again. Wow.
Indeed, and this matches what I’ve heard from the Navy vets I know. It’s much more likely to be training issue than “hackers”. But it’s not anywhere near as exciting or attention grabbing, so expect to hear a lot more about these mythical super-competent “hackers”, especially on the ratings hungry cable news channels and click counting websites. Everyone loves a good conspiracy theory, but it’s much harder to get people to accept an ugly truth.
I have to admit, I found it stunning that someone thought newly commissioned navy officers didn’t need any kind of basic course. The average army 2LT goes through a three month basic course learning the duties and technical skills required to be a platoon leader. And I’m certain the technical skills required to be an officer on a ship are far more extensive.
Excuse my asking, but what are they teaching at Annapolis? Don’t they have summer cruises on ships? Is it all just history, English, and SJW these days?
Yes, very interesting. I was a product of the old training pipeline. My training included NROTC classes at college (Univ of Michigan), two extended summer training cruises, and 3 1/2 months at the old Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) school in Coronado. I even had a month or two on my ship to observe operations until my SWOS class started. Even with all of this training, it still took about 2 years for me to get my OOD underway qualification. My case wasn’t unique, others took about the same amount of time. The CO wanted to make sure we had gained a certain amount of experience, and he had enough officers in the wardroom to support this sort of program. I definitely don’t like the current system. I couldn’t imagine being a CO trying to do my job, and get the limited number of entirely untrained and unseasoned junior officers ready to drive the ship for me.
Others have said it, but I’ll reiterate: No matter how many electronic navigation and radar systems there are on the bridge, the most important thing the OOD needs to use are his eyes. It’s not so much that the systems aren’t reliable, it’s that the OOD needs to see what’s happening. While I would look at the radar occasionally, I could depend upon the Combat Information Center (CIC) watch to dedicate their attention to the radars. Most of my time on my two ships as OOD was spent walking across the bridge looking out the windows or on the bridge wings. This was how the CO liked it, and over time I came to appreciate the value of doing it.
When I was an OOD, we had 3 lookouts, port, starboard and aft. I understand that the port and starboard lookouts have been eliminated. This is too bad, since having 3 other sets of eyes helped maintain situational awareness. This is especially true with smaller contacts like pleasure craft and small fishing boats, which might not show up on radar until they were very close.
Discussing this type of story is rife with potholes and Catch-22s.
If the problem is technical failure or software related then nobody can really talk about. If it’s budgetary then there’s a built-in skepticism because the number one game in all of Washington is to increase the money flow. Any excuse is a valid excuse if it grows the budget.
The article says the Pentagon saved $15M (and I guess that means annually) by shutting down SWOSC (Surface Warfare Officers School Command.) Estimates to fix the Fitzgerald is in the neighborhood of $500M, or 33 years worth of officers’ school. Add the repair bills for the other three surface ships and we’re probably well into 22nd Century funding.
My ships also approached ports and busy straits during daylight hours. But be aware that Fitzgerald was well outside of Tokyo Bay when the collision happened. She was already passing out of Sagami Wan, not far from the Izu Peninsula. McCain’s collision happened just before sunrise, which wouldn’t be abnormal for a ship about to transit the straits.
Amen.
Minor correction–the Strait of Juan de Fuca runs between Seattle and the Pacific Ocean, so it falls within Third Fleet’s area of operations.
I agree with your perspective in the several posts above. Because of the series of accidents, this is most likely tied up with systemic issues “outside the lifelines.” But it’s interesting to consider the impact — at the tip of the spear– of decisions made at higher levels — over years.
Based on fading memory, heading south from Sagami Wan (as Fitzgerald was) brought you directly across heavy Japanese coastwise traffic, as well as the streams of container ships heading to/from the South China Sea to/from Tokyo Wan. “Not far from the Izu Peninsula” means they were not far from (in) the bottleneck, of which Izu forms the NNW side.
John S McCain was not about to transit the strait. They were heading into Singapore (at the east entrance to the Strait of Malacca) and too early to be where they were IMO.
I’m going to just leave this here.