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John, could you flesh this out a bit? I can’t recall hearing of such a thing.
This is discussed in more detail in Saturday Night Science for 2015-04-11, “Plutonium Production”. Plutonium is made by irradiating U-238 with neutrons in a nuclear reactor. This causes U-238 to absorb a neutron and become neptunium-239, which then decays into plutonium-239. But, as the Pu-239 remains in the reactor core, it can capture another neutron and be transformed into Pu-240. Pu-240 has a much shorter half-life than Pu-239, but, more importantly, undergoes spontaneous fission 41,500 times faster than Pu-239. The consequence is that plutonium with a substantial contamination of Pu-240 (which all reactor-produced plutonium will have), has a neutron background emission sufficiently high that if used in a gun assembly bomb, will result in predetonation and a fizzle yield. The only way around this is to use implosion, which assembles the critical mass quickly enough to avoid predetonation. U-235 has a very low neutron background, so there’s no problem using it in a gun bomb.
The first plutonium was produced in a cyclotron, which does not produce the intense neutron flux of a reactor, so the microscopic samples tested at Los Alamos were almost pure Pu-239, so the problem was never detected until reactor-bred plutonium from the Oak Ridge reactor arrived for testing. That is what moved implosion from a back-burner project to the critical path.
When making plutonium for weapons use, fuel is irradiated for a relatively short time, which reduces Pu-240 contamination. Plutonium with less than 7% Pu-240 is considered weapons grade. Plutonium from reprocessing power reactor fuel rods usually has 18% or more Pu-240. This is called reactor grade, and works fine in power reactors, but is more difficult to use in weapons. That’s “difficult”, not impossible—in 1962 the U.S. tested a bomb built from reactor grade plutonium, but the Pu-240 fraction of the core remains classified to this day.
I wish I could track down a quote to the effect that “Los Alamos wasn’t about Hiroshima; it was about Nagasaki”, meaning the classic gun-style uranium bomb that exploded over Hiroshima didn’t require a vast laboratory to figure out how to detonate it, but the plutonium bomb set off over Nagasaki did.
So it’s the classic problem in explosives that it will blow itself apart and scatter before it can explode with efficiency?
I’m reminded of the 1986 movie The Manhattan Project, where John Lithgow is producing ultra-pure plutonium, 99.997% pure. Would that be an actual scientific basis for why it was particularly dangerous? Near absolute efficiency?
I don’t know the source of the quote but, historically, Los Alamos was in operation well before it was discovered that gun assembly would not work for plutonium. The initial design for both bombs were gun designs, with a more extreme, higher-velocity gun for the plutonium bomb which was called “Thin Man”. Work on Thin Man continued into 1944, when results from testing the reactor plutonium showed it would not work. Thin Man was cancelled at a meeting on July 17th, 1944, and afterward all work on the plutonium bomb was on the implosion design.
There was a great deal of work for Los Alamos to do apart from implosion research. At the inception of the project, nobody knew the critical masses of either uranium or plutonium, and these had to be determined experimentally by “tickling the dragon’s tail”. Experiments also had to be done on neutron reflectors and initiators (neutron generators) which were used in both the gun and implosion bombs.
Precisely—the core has to stay assembled long enough for sufficient generations of fission (each of which roughly doubles the yield) to occur before it explosively disassembles. A gun design using plutonium will always predetonate before it is completely assembled due to a stray neutron from the Pu-240 contamination, resulting in a fizzle yield.
Plutonium used in bombs is essentially that pure in terms of elements. The question is isotopic purity. If you could get Pu-239 with 99.997% purity, you’d be able to build a gun bomb with it, but once you’d figured out implosion that wouldn’t make any sense since implosion is so much more efficient you can make four implosion bombs with the same quantity of fissile material it would take to make one gun bomb. But the only way to get plutonium with that isotopic purity would be to first produce it in a reactor, then perform isotope separation as you do with uranium. But the whole point of the plutonium path is that you don’t need to do isotope separation! If you’re building an enrichment plant, there’s no reason to bother with plutonium. Also, since the difference in atomic weight for plutonium is just 240/239 compared to 238/235, a separation plant would be even less efficient and correspondingly larger than one for uranium.
The second pile was in Palos Park Woods? That is about 2-3 miles from Argonne National Laboratory. I had a job interview there once.
Stagg Field was named after famed football coach Amos Alonzo Stagg. The land for the field had been donated to the University of Chicago by Marshall Field, founder of Marshall Field and Company, and was therefore known as “Marshall Field,” or maybe “Marshall Field Field,” or if you wanted to “Marshall Field Marshall Field.” So they renamed it after Stagg to cut down on the jabbering.
May I speak of something about Fermi that didn’t make the cut for the main article and doesn’t have anything to do with bombs?
By my count, he had four achievements in physics each of which would individually have merited a Nobel prize:
Of these four, the first two were theoretical and the second two experimental.
The Nobel committee has been reluctant to award the prize twice to one person. The only person to win two Nobel prizes in physics is John Bardeen (1956 for the invention of the transistor, and 1972 for the BCS theory of superconductivity). The only person to win a Nobel in two different sciences was Marie Curie (Physics, 1903, for radioactivity, Chemistry, 1911, for the discovery of radium and polonium).
Just imagine if he had previously held five-star rank in the British Army: Field Marshal.
The “Marshall Field Field Marshal Marshall Field Field”.
Thanks, Teach!
Fermi became my physics hero when I studied the subject in post-graduate school. Probably it was due to his being top drawer both in theoretical and experimental physics as well as his personality. I always felt he did not receive the public acclaim that was his due like some of the other giants of his time.
One of my favorite films on the Manhattan Project is “Fat Man and Little Boy” (1989) with Paul Newman as General Groves and Dwight Schultz (Murdock of The A-Team) as Oppenheimer. The film is fairly accurate historically and technically and also entertaining (at least to me).
There is a portrayal of an actual accident that occurred during the “tickling the tail of the dragon” experiments referred to above, in which a malfunction in the equipment allowed two sub-critical masses to get close to at least a near-critical stage. An experimenter named Michael Merriman, played by John Cusack in the film, swept the experiment off the table with his arm exposing himself to a lethal dose of radiation. He died within days. There were other people in the room and, again as I had heard the story before the film came out and as shown in the film, Merriman calmly strode over to a blackboard and calculated that he was the only person in the room to have received a lethal dose.
It seems two factors may have been relevant.
First, the second was a shared prize (so was the first, but that’s not relevant). Denying it to Bardeen would deny it to the other two worthy recipients.
Second, the 1973 prize seemed to build on the BCS work. Contrary to Nobel’s intent there is a long lag between Nobel work and the award. It likely would have been anticipated in 1972 that the 1973 winners would be up for it soon. Granting it to them without having granted one to BCS would seem an omission.
The Michael Merriman character in the film was based upon Louis Slotin, a Canadian physicist and chemist who received a lethal dose of radiation in a criticality accident on 1946-05-21. He was the second person to die from a criticality accident from this same core: Harry Daghlian was the first, irradiated on 1945-08-21 and died 25 days later.
This so-called “demon core”, involved in both accidents, was originally intended to be used in the Operation Crossroads tests at Bikini Atoll, but was eventually recycled for use in other weapons.
The “demon core” was not responsible for either accident: both were the result of operator error. As a result of these accidents, procedures were put in place to prevent further criticality accidents. Note that both of these accidents happened after the end of World War II, so they cannot be attributed to wartime crash project carelessness.
I will remember this one. I wonder how many it takes to fit climate change.
BTW, here is an example of the elephant: https://www.johndcook.com/blog/2011/06/21/how-to-fit-an-elephant/
John, well done.
As your reference notes, “with enough parameters, you can fit any data set” !!!
It’s interesting to note that “on the ship back home from Brazil, [Ottorino] Respighi* met by chance with Italian physicist Enrico Fermi. During their long conversation, Fermi tried to get Respighi to explain music in terms of physics, which Respighi was unable to do. They remained close friends until Respighi’s death in 1936.”
*Two pretty well-known pieces: Fountains of Rome (1916); Ancient Airs and Dances Suite No. 1 (1917)
Cool. To see that dialog would be awesome and educational.
Interesting tidbit – each of these generations is called a “shake” – as in “two shakes of a lamb’s tail.”
Laxity in those procedures has resulted in Los Alamos being unable to perform its work on warheads since 2013.
There is no comparison between procedures in the 1940s and those of today. Also, your definition of “shake” is not quite right — a shake is simply 10 nanoseconds.
@johnwalker, great article on a great man. Fermi deserves far more recognition for his contributions to national (and international) security.
To be sure, I don’t think the quote I recalled (which was, I think, from a British or Canadian participant) was meant to be taken literally, but to make the point that the 1941 UK conception of how to make a bomb wasn’t, at least as its original goal was concerned, unimaginably off the mark. The scale and the expense of the industrial-level U-238/U-235 separation techniques was certainly greater than the British anticipated, justifying their painful, if tacit, yielding of real control of the bomb project to the US. Certainly in any case a real world calculation of things that John lists, like critical mass and the design of a neutron initiator, would have required a lab compound run within a military base or reservation of some kind.
The remark should probably be taken to mean simply, “It turned out that implosion was required and damn, even with Von Neumann’s help, it was tough. If we hadn’t had to deal with implosion, it would have been a lot simpler”.
If I may paraphrase a John Walker quote (I think accurately), “No nation that’s ever mastered implosion has ever looked back”.
Guess again – the term was developed as part of the weapons program because I guess 10 nanoseconds is somehow magical enough to deserve its own term?
The term is used to define the generation.
Other than they are both designed to prevent criticality.
And Los Alamos is unable to do their job because they lack the expertise to either determine or follow whichever procedures are necessary conduct their evaluations.
Another curious unit coined during the Manhattan Project was the “barn”, a unit of area used to measure cross-section in scattering processes. In SI units, a barn is equal to 10^−28 m². One barn is roughly the cross-section of a nucleus of uranium. It comes from the idiom “couldn’t hit the side of a barn”—a uranium nucleus is a large target for a particle accelerator.
The inverse femtobarn (fb^−1) is the conventional unit for integrated luminosity of particle accelerators and colliders. It allows estimating the number of events for a process with a cross-section given in femtobarns you can expect to find in a run with a given luminosity and time. Hence the announcement that at the conclusion of the Large Hadron Collider’s 2016 run, it had accumulated 40 inverse femtobarns of integrated luminosity.
John – I don’t say this as frequently as I should – I am really thankful that you are a contributor here.
I appreciate the effort and the outcome of your work.
Thank you.
True, but the 2011 plutonium photo-op incident at Los Alamos demonstrates how subtle avoiding criticality accidents can be and the extent to which attention to detail is essential.
Had only a few more rods been included in this picture, this could have ended badly. Further more, once you’ve created a potentially dangerous configuration, it’s necessary to step back and let the criticality experts decide how to proceed. Removing something with your hand or a with a plastic tool might provoke a criticality accident because the flesh of the hand and the plastic tool contain plenty of hydrogen atoms which can moderate the neutrons emitted by the Pu-240 in the rods and increase the fission cross-section as those neutrons encounter other nearby plutonium.
If memory serves, the Chernobyl disaster occurred because they put the reactor in a condition where the correct response turned out to be counterintuitive. The intuitive response (i.e., inserting the withdrawn control rods) sped up the reaction.
Makes me feel a lot better about not turning my physics degree into a paying gig.
Major Major Major Major?
I had not heard of this before. My goodness! I just read the Science article you linked, and it’s surprising how the safety rules for avoiding criticality were treated so cavalierly.
Richard Feynman was sent to Oak Ridge during the war to do a safety assessment. He found huge barrels of uranium oxide being stored way too close together because while the uranium itself was nowhere near enough for criticality, being in solution slows down the neutrons sufficiently to pose a real danger with less mass.
When Feynman told it, it was funnier.