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How Important Is the Nation-State?
Today I’ve been reading over the first issue of American Affairs, a new intellectual journal that appears to have grown out of the (largely Claremont-based) American Greatness movement. American Affairs seems to understand itself as a possible seed-ground for exploring an intellectual foundation to Trumpism.
I should admit forthrightly that I look on this project as a skeptic, and as one who considers that the founders of this project have taken a large (not to say foolhardy) burden on themselves. I’m not, in general, the sort of person who seeks to shut down ambitious intellectual projects. But to my mind, the trouble with American Greatness was always the extent to which it understood itself in rejectionist terms. The spirit of the thing seemed not to be, “The right could use some fresh ideas around now, so let’s explore,” so much as, “The whole conservative movement is intellectually and (probably) morally bankrupt, so we’re starting over. Sign onto our program or be rendered irrelevant.”
That kind of “convert or die” attitude makes it hard to climb aboard, especially if you think (as I do) that there’s quite a lot of good to be found in the conservative movement from Buckley through the dawn of Trump. I’m in favor of exploring new ideas and making needed adjustments, but I’m also quite opposed to chucking free-market economics and neoconservative geopolitics as though they were groceries past their expiration date. Reading the American Greatness blog, I regularly have the same thought: This is all fine, but apart from the overt belligerence, these arguments could easily have been advanced in the conservative movement of yesteryear. What has your blanket excommunication accomplished, except to insulate yourselves from critique that would likely be quite helpful?
Having said all this, I pulled up the first issue of the new journal resolved to give it a fair shot. I could only read three articles without subscribing, so I haven’t gone through the whole thing. Here’s my reaction thus far: This reads to me like choir-preaching. It’s hard to see how these arguments would be compelling to anyone who wasn’t already deeply sympathetic to the perspective being advanced. Perhaps that’s the idea; after all, if the rest of us anachronisms have already been excommunicated, maybe we’re not worth the trouble. Or we could just say (to put the point less snarkily) that it can be acceptable to have a journal. It still seems a little unfortunate, because after all, Buckleyite conservatism has been developed across many years, and even its origins involved some large and very theoretical brains. If the Great Americans are looking to toss out whole realms of conservative theory (or perhaps I have misunderstood?), they should really be revved to start laying some serious, theoretical foundations. I would have expected that to be the point of starting a journal.
Of course, it’s only the first issue. Maybe they’ll get there. But here’s a concrete example of where the argument seems so thin that I can only suppose that the author is presuming a sympathetic readership. In his opening article, Joshua Mitchell argues that Trumpism is not populist, because it in fact represents a struggle against a real enemy (globalists) on behalf of a real good (national sovereignty). Once we understand the evils of globalism, we will appreciate that Trumpism, as a part of the global war against globalism, is substantive and entirely coherent, and not (as detractors like me suspect) an emotion-driven uprising whose goals mostly boil down to a resentment-and-nostalgia-tinged wish-list. The globalists are deeply wrong, Mitchell argues, because they do not appreciate that national sovereignty is, “the final word on how to order collective life.”
At this point in the 9.000-word article, I was intrigued, presuming that Mitchell would now undertake to argue for the extraordinarily strong privileging of the nation-state that, in his view, is the motivating and justifying principle behind Trumpism. Although I have encountered a great many people who assert the primacy of the nation-state, I have yet to hear a really thorough defense. Here’s what Mitchell gives us to justify his principle:
The Peace of Westphalia, which formally inaugurated the modern European system of nation-states, came into effect in 1648. Shortly thereafter, in 1651, Hobbes wrote one of the great works in the history of political philosophy, Leviathan. In a now-common reading of that work, and correct so far as it goes, Hobbes’s Leviathan provides us with the individuated self, oriented by self-interest and the fear of death. These ideas are in Leviathan, but they only scratch the surface of that great work. Hobbes’s deeper concern in Leviathan was the English Civil War, which in no small part was a religious war involving the claims of Roman Catholics and Presbyterians. The doctrinal difference between the Roman Catholics and the Presbyterians need not concern us; what matters is where each of these Christian sects located sovereignty. Hobbes thought that Roman Catholics were guilty of what we might call “false universalism,” because they vested sovereignty at the supra-state level, in Rome. Hobbes thought that the Presbyterians were guilty of what we might call “radical particularism,” because they vested sovereignty at the sub-state level, in private conscience. The English Civil War occurred, on Hobbes’s reading, because of these religious wagers that peace and justice were possible without national sovereignty. In his estimation, these supra- and sub-state alternatives are perennial temptations of the human heart. Their defenders may promise much, but neither “commodious living” nor justice are possible through them. Only by vesting sovereignty in the state can there be improvement for citizens and workable understandings of justice.
The post-1989 experiment with globalism and identity politics demonstrates that Hobbes was correct, so long ago, that supra- and sub-state sovereignty are perennial temptations of the human heart. The post-1989 version of that temptation saw global elites use the apparatus of the state to bolster so-called free trade, international law, global norms, and international accords about “climate change,” the advances towards which purported to demonstrate the impotence of the state itself. In such a world managed from above, the only task left for the Little People was to feel good—or feel permanent shame—about their identities, and perhaps to get involved in a little “political activism” now and again, to show their commitment (on Facebook, of course) to “social justice.” The Little People in such a world were not citizens, they were idle “folks,” incapable of working together, because what really mattered was not rational deliberation with their neighbors, but what they owed, or were owed, by virtue of their identities. Determining the calculus of their debt, in turn, were Very White Progressives in the Democratic Party who cared not a jot about the real outstanding debt of $19 trillion owed by the U.S. treasury. These Very White Progressives sought to adjudicate justice from above, by legal carve-outs or, if necessary, by executive actions pertaining, for example, to transsexual bathrooms, so that all “identities” could have their due. Fortunately, 2016 was year the American electorate decided this ghastly fate was not to be theirs.
That’s it. In two paragraphs, Mitchell dispenses with the absolute prioritizing of national sovereignty, and moves right along to lambasting universities, discussing different possible strains of nationalism, and complaining about the undue influence of European thinkers on Buckleyite conservatives. This is an absolutely crucial piece of his argument (and indeed, in his view, a dividing line so critical that people who fail to side with him should not even be regarded as Americans but rather as “proxies for globalism”). Nevertheless, he evidently regards those two paragraphs as sufficient to establish the point.
This seems to me like a pretty blatant example of what I call “the Fallacy of Confusing Complexity.” Political and moral reasoning are really so much easier and less complicated if we presume that we don’t have significant moral obligations to non-Americans. Once people start thinking they might have obligations that go “above” (cosmopolitanism) or “below” (individual conscience) national boundaries, who knows where we’ll end up?! Probably fighting among ourselves, like the English did! The only solution is to insist that national sovereignty is absolutely primary, and that no other sources of obligation can really count.
As a pragmatic claim it might be true. But of course, life often seems simpler when we dismiss as too messy or complicated obligations that may in fact still exist. I think patriotism and shared nationality mean something, but I don’t they don’t mean everything. I believe that I can have obligations to non-Americans for all sorts of reasons: Because they are my blood relatives or personal friends, or because they are my co-religionists, or because our nations are allies and have assumed obligations towards one another, or possibly just because they are human beings in great need. Any of those might, in some respect, affect my compatriots as well as myself, thus going outside (either above or below) national sovereignty.
In other words, I don’t see how national sovereignty can be the absolute “final word” on collective life. Moral obligation is indeed quite complicated at times! But we aren’t entitled to dismiss moral truths just because they’re complicated and confusing.
What do others think? Is there more to this argument than I have appreciated, or is it really as thin as it seems to me?
Published in General
The 17th century started violently and stayed the course. Until the Restoration took place and many of Hobbes’ ideas were implemented, at least in Western Europe. The late 17th century saw, in large consequence, the Glorious Revolution, the establishment of individual rights, the seeds of the sort of peace being brought to the world, and to America, that America would eventually make permanent. In Eastern Europe they were a half century behind, with the Turkish defeat at Vienna ushering in a better, more peaceful, age late in the century.
That’s rather ingenious, Midge, but I’m pretty sure it’s more ingenious than the work deserves. It would be one thing for these authors to say, “Since Trump has won, let’s make the best of it by using populist language to say something more substantive than Trump or Bannon would likely produce.” But I think that’s pretty clearly not their attitude. They’re inclinded to think that Trump is the best thing to happen to America for awhile, and they’re trying to explain why and keep the fire burning.
I don’t understand that (along with all the stuff about restarting the GOP) would make sense if America didn’t count as a nation state.
My experience with the Claremont Institute is that it has always rooted its philosophy in Americanism. My old professor Charles Kessler use to analyze the great works of western civilization from how they related to the American Founding. The Declaration is also the most important document for them in guiding American political thought – a curious affectation given how “all men crated equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights” conflicts with a strict Nationalist view. Constitutional Conservatism is certainly on the back burner – I remember Professor Jaffa being very critical of Justice Scalia’s views on constitutional interpretation. They are much more enamored of, or at least comfortable with, presidential power than most classical liberals or Buckley conservatives – holding Lincoln in particularly high esteem.
I feel like “Trumpism” is, to a large extent, an effort to hijack Trump’s appeal. My sense is that they are not being forced into using terms like nationalism, but find Trump’s message to be an excuse to pump out the sort of stuff that most of them had already been preaching for some time.
At CPAC, the people who were successful at persuading Trump to abandon the Border Adjusted tax did so by claiming that they were acting as supporters of Trump, taking as assumed that Trump agreed with them, despite his claims to the contrary. Back when no one else would talk to Trump, Mitchell and pals had a real opportunity to bring him toward their position. It appears to me to be an open question whether or not that opportunity will continue.
I think it is futile to try and define a coherent political philosophy or ideology around Trump, as Trump doesn’t come at problems from an ideological perspective.
I missed the announcement, but the word “Trumpism” does not appear in the magazine’s About page, nor does it appear in the editors’ mission statement, Why a New Policy Journal?
Further, “Trumpism” is not a quotation from anywhere in Mr. Miller’s article. I do not want to have to fact check Ricochet contributors, nor, having done so is it acceptable to me to find that they are making stuff up. “Trumpism” is at best a tendentious use of scare quotes by Rachel. I expect better from Ricochet contributors, particularly from one whose stance is dedication to Christianity and ethics.
I certainly expect Ricochet contributors to steer far away from what looks like “Misinformation, particularly if it appears intentional or is a recurring problem.”
I’ll give her the benefit of the doubt. Once. She might not have seen the post pointing out the deceptive use of quotation marks on “Trumpism.”
But still, yes, @rachellu is out of bounds.
I wonder if it’s all that easy to separate those two attitudes. Either or both motives could go into attempting to create a unified, substantive, and charitable case for Trump’s appeal. Trump’s appeal is bound to catch some theorists’ sympathetic attention, and not necessarily because they were all rooting for Trump from the get-go. And perhaps Trump’s appeal gives some of them opportunities, too, to advance pet theories.
Remember what Dominic Cummings said about winning – startling wins tend to attract grand, unified explanations: people want a “big why” for the big win.
Right, the Claremont folks are Americanists. True believers of the religion of Lincoln (which, if you believe GE Bradford and Co, may not be much of an exaggeration).
In this sense the alt right and Americans Greatness movements really are rather different. The former has a clear blood-and-soil yearning and actually seems to feel the “youth” of America as a defect that we should try to correct by getting back to those tangible roots. They’re kind of into old world stuff, Classics etc. And the Claremont people are enamored of “city on a hill”, American exceptionalism sort of stuff. Founded on an idea! Etc.
That’s why I would definitely say that Trumpism is populist, and I also think it’s fair to say that it’s kinda fascist, or proto-fascist or something… whatever the term would be for “softer and less extreme fascism”. But the content is not very fixed. Everyone in the tent wants to beat back the liberals and the cosmopolitans and globalists so we can be ourselves, but there’s no agreement as to what defines the latter… for some whiteness is big, for some red-pill masculinism is a major element, for some Judeo-Christian heritage, for some a nostalgic 1950’s vision of middle class prosperity. The Greatness people are in some respects the most elevated because the most ideological. But in some ways that actually creeps me out the most. Warped ideology is more likely to have staying power than a movement based on racial discrimination, especially in a country pretty heavily conditioned to think of the latter as depraved.
I don’t understand why “Trumpism” would be seen as an insult. It just means “the popular movement surrounding Donald Trump”. American Affairs is clearly friendly to that movement and sees itself as working to explain, justify, and continue the movement. Do you agree that there is such a movement? Why shouldn’t it be called “Trumpism”?Let’s not let niggling semantic discussions prevent us from exploring interesting questions.
https://youtu.be/47a9K05Qi9Q
Questioning whether the United States even counts as a nation seems to be splitting hairs unnecessarily though. Taken in context, I’m pretty certain it does.
Editor Note:
Tom is in error regarding Decius's identity; please see his response at #153.Given that the magazine is edited by the guy who wrote under the Decius pseudonym and that the mission statement opens:
… describing it as “exploring an intellectual foundation to Trumpism” seems rather apropos, yes?
Looking back at Mitchell’s article, “nation-state(s)” only one mention, referring specifically to modern Europe. What’s mentioned repeatedly is “national sovereignty” (seven times). For example,
It seems to me Mitchell’s concern is not with nation-state-hood as such, but with vesting sovereignty in the state, rather than in identity-groups “above” (“cosmopolitan”) or “below” (“interest-group”) it – whether or not the state in question is a nation-state.
Hence Mitchell’s eagerness to make it clear that “American nationalism” isn’t ethnic nationalism, but liberal and covenantal nationalism, described as follows:
and
Mitchell is framing it so that somehow, subsidiarity is included in American “covenantal nationalism”. Personally, I’m still unclear as to why America’s founding as a highly subsidiary government – a federal republic with states’ police powers typically delegated to municipalities – is well-described by the phrase “covenantal nationalism”. But that’s evidently the phrase Mitchell has picked to describe… that.
Mitchell might as well have said, American nationalism isn’t national nationalism, but highly subsidiary, including allegiance to one’s local and state government – in which case, why call that “nationalism” nationalism? But he wants to call it that. He wants to find a way to use “nationalism” to describe allegiance to the form of government we have, or are supposed to have, even if it goes against common intuitions of what nationalism is.
Fans of Star Wars are familiar with this kind of task. Where by legions of obsessive nerds find a way to back fit rationality on irrational statement, made for entertainment purposes. If Trump had actually been using the best words like he promised us, maybe the Trumpist philosophers would have an easier time. Oh well.
Here is the thing though why do they feel a need to discard the old baggage? Maybe that is what is popular about Trump? How do you rule out that possibility? Don’t you have to first establish whether that is true or not first before redefining terms to explain reality. The main accusation from the left and some on the right has been that Trumps appeal is precisely the old appeal of nationalism baggage and all, which is why they either imply or out right call him racist.
Rachel Lu Post author: … Trumpism is populist, and I also think it’s fair to say that it’s kinda fascist, or proto-fascist or something…
Oh come ON. Fascism comes from the Left. This is just absurd.
Midge, I still don’t understand why any of this makes the argument as I presented it unfair. The fact that he mentions subsidiary and views it as an inportanr aspect of American government is perhaps a little bit comforting, though there may be some tensions and inconsistencies hiding there, but whether or not that’s true… do you really think something *other than a nation-state* can claim national sovereignty? So, as an American discussing American politics, doesn’t he clearly want America to claim our (rather strong) allegiance?
The subsidiarity parts are more secondary, just fleshing out further what that commitment to American sovereignty actually looks like in practice.
I guess one question between us may be: Do we love America because she deserves it, or because nationalism is a requirement of justice simpliciter (which can take various forms depending on what sort of nation you have)? I think the initial set-up pushes us in the latter direction, making the later stuff more like the minor premise to which the first part is “major”. I agree that that makes the major premise much stronger than is really warranted… but it does seem like the most accurate interpretation of what he *says*.
A better way to phrase the above question: Do we love America because she merits it through her excellence, or because all men are obliged to love (and respect the sovereign claims of) their nation?
It’s something of a false dichotomy, but it seems to me Mitchell wants to make a strong plug for the second option.
I don’t see it as an insult. When talking about Mr. Mitchell’s article, I see it as a straw man. He wasn’t talking about “Trumpism.” There are certainly valid criticisms to make, you made some. Why inject unneeded confusion?
If you think a rear guard action to defend the Westphalia system is a mistake, make that argument. If you think that Mitchell misunderstands Westphalia, demonstrate it. If you don’t like his taxonomy of nation-states, offer substantive criticism.
Don’t put words in his mouth.
OK. Let’s say for the sake of discussion that you weren’t falsely attributing. (Repeatedly.)
You were just hammering away with sneer quotes. We all use them sometimes, but in reality Jonathan Chait was right when he was at The New Republic and wrote:
Maybe it is a snide insinuation you keep making, in other words, in your lexicon, an insult.
Where Mitchell is concerned? Because of Mitchell’s written efforts to discard the old baggage. Likewise, with many of my Trump-supporting friends and acquaintances, because I know them well enough to know that of course they would want to discard that kind of old baggage. But yes, if you didn’t have this additional information, it could leave you wondering – that’s part of the problem with attempts to reclaim or rebrand terms like “nationalism” and “America first”.
And there are Trump-supporters, decent people, who hear that accusation and laugh, because they know that’s not them.
It’s not hard to understand worries that Trump appeals to blood-and-soil baggage. But it’s also evident that Trump appealed – or at least appealed enough – to many Americans who don’t think of their nation in a blood-and-soil sense and who are of course horrified to be perceived as doing so.
I don’t think the US is a nation-state, but the phrase “national sovereignty” can be applied to the US, so… yes?
I think it’s worth acknowledging that some of the latter is inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing; it’s normal to like those things we’re attached to simply because we’re attached to them.
That said, I don’t think it’s particularly praiseworthy. It’s like saying “I love the Mariners because I’m from Seattle.” Maybe that’s what brought you to become a fan of the Mariners — and there’s nothing in the world wrong with that — but it’s a pretty low-grade fandom to have nothing specific to say in praise of them beyond their connection to you.
Trump has gotten better about this sort of thing of late, but the kinds of things he generally describes about America that once made it great could apply to just about any other country in the world. The more Trump talks about specifics about what has made America great — our bottom-up society; our focus on individual liberty; etc. — the less blowback he’ll get on this sort of thing.
Yep, and the founder of the Fascist Party – Benito Mussolini – was originally a socialist.
Yes. Hitler too. Read a book, people. You know, sometimes I can’t tell if I landed on the main feed of Ricochet or Vox.
Editor Note:
Tom was in error; please see his response at #153.The “guy who wrote under the Decius pseudonym” has been identified as Michael Anton, the magazine is edited by Julius Krein, and Anton is nowhere on the masthead – what on earth are you talking about?
No. Here’s from the magazine:
At this point, I don’t think assuming that there is an intellectual foundation to “Trumpism” is justified. I think that people using the word are exhibiting magical thinking and by speciously and tendentiously putting a label onto a new thing they are both reassuring themselves that they control it and trying to control it. Maybe some of them will be able to honestly describe it, but I think that’ll be for historians.
Joshua Mitchell did not use the word once in 9000 or so words. It occurred several times in @rachellu‘s article. I stand by my criticism in #138.
Frankly, I think Mitchell wants to have it both ways.
Mitchell somehow wants to cram American exceptionalism and our original subsidiary structure of government into the phrase “covenantal nationalism”. That seems to be saying that America is bound by some “covenant” to have some sort of particular moral excellence.
And we should love our sovereign because our sovereign is sovereign – although in our case, the sovereign in question is supposed to be the people.
What value do you think this ridiculous and combative comment bring? Do you think that we are unaware of the roots of different political philosophies? Sometime I don’t know if I’m int he comments of Ricochet or Brietbart.
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http://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-intellectual-harvard-233150
This article traces the genesis of American Affairs – the idea that it was created to coalesce the ideas that were endemic to Trump’s rise is pretty obvious.
That is certainly what he is attempting to do, but it ignores the genesis of what American Exceptionalism is – it arises from the character of the American People and not its relationship to its government. The exceptionalism of the American People made our founding possible, not the other way around.
Tom, I actually agree that “love of one’s own” is natural and to a point healthy. In this respect I’m somewhere between the alt right and the “founded on an idea” people. Looking at our patriotic songs I see both blood (“land where my fathers died”) and soil (“amber waves of grain”) and I think that’s fine *within moderation*. I disagree with Mitchell, the alt right, and others not so much on the reasons underlying proper patriotism, but more on its place in the order of loves. They’re just attaching too much importance to nationality. The nation matters, sure, but it’s just one of many things with moral significance to which we are (to some extent) beholden. They’re elevating it too high, which tends to precipitate both imprudence and injustice.