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From the Editors’ Desk: Feds Hate Encryption… Except When They Fund It
From the WSJ:
Published in Science & TechnologyResearchers in London last year discovered an online jihadi handbook with instructions on sending encrypted instant messages that would be indecipherable to law enforcement. The tools it recommended—ChatSecure and Cryptocat—are popular throughout the Middle East, making them easily available to extremists from that part of the world. They were also developed largely with money from the U.S. government. The U.S. federal government can work at odds with itself, but not often so directly on a topic with such clear national-security implications. Some federal agencies have funded the development of nearly unbreakable encryption software, while others, especially in intelligence and law enforcement, fume over their inability to read protected messages when they have a court order.
Sounds like the way some in the government treat gun ownership: It’s fine for me, but not you!
The value of encryption is dependent on how long it takes to break the encryption. The military is constantly changing its code keys and codes because it understands that with any code it is only a matter of time before someone breaks the code. The military also understands that the value of intelligence decreases over time. Even using fairly simple codes terrorists could delay law enforcement from decoding information long enough to complete an act of terror or cancel the planned event.
At least in the current case under discussion the FBI was able to obtain a search warrant. May be if they had been able to do so with Zacarias Moussaoui computer they could have prevented 9/11.
The topic of encryption too often is framed as “bad guys encrypt,” and “good guys must stop them.” But I think a thought experiment is in order to discuss all the ways “good guys” outside of government might want to encrypt. Maybe a top ten list?
This issue is really being mischaracterized. In general, I would not want to see “back doors” embedded into operating systems; I think that most would agree.
But in a specific case, where there is s0me unique software for a one shot compliance with a national security court order that is pretty easy to understand and agree with- and provided that the government covers the costs, I actually would not buy the civil libertarians’ or EFF absolutists’ case. This needs to be a very special case, not a regular occurrence, but as a special case, Apple should cooperate with the US at least as much as they cooperate with the Chinese government.
A part of the reason government funds encryption is too weaken it and control its development in a way they prefer.
The existence of widly available encryption tools they can not (or claim not to be able to) break is in spite of government funding/help, not because of it.