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Shaking Hands with the Saudis
David Sussman’s attempt to decode the rumors about Israel and Saudi Arabia’s back-channel diplomacy has me thinking about the problem of the Saudis more generally.
Here are some questions I’d like to ask our prospective Commander-in-Chief.
The Saudis’ execution of the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr was a typical human-rights outrage from a regime that may fairly be described as an ISIS that has made it:
Black Daesh, white Daesh. The former slits throats, kills, stones, cuts off hands, destroys humanity’s common heritage and despises archaeology, women and non-Muslims. The latter is better dressed and neater but does the same things. The Islamic State; Saudi Arabia. In its struggle against terrorism, the West wages war on one, but shakes hands with the other. This is a mechanism of denial, and denial has a price: preserving the famous strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia at the risk of forgetting that the kingdom also relies on an alliance with a religious clergy that produces, legitimizes, spreads, preaches and defends Wahhabism, the ultra-puritanical form of Islam that Daesh feeds on.
The justification for shaking hands with Saudi Arabia has varied over the years. The history’s worth briefly reviewing. During the Cold War, protecting the Saudis was an obvious strategic imperative: The Gulf housed the world’s largest known oil reserves. By 1973, the The United States and its allies in Europe in Asia were dependent on the Gulf to fulfil 90 percent of their energy needs. Developing countries, in particular, would have been instantly crippled by a sharp hike in oil prices. We had far more than a limited economic interest or simple ideological motive for shaking hands with the Saudis: Policymakers feared — for good reason — that Soviet adventures in the Middle East would enable Moscow to throttle the West through slow oil deprivation. For geographic reasons, Gulf oil, and particularly Saudi oil, is particularly difficult to defend; Saudi oil is vulnerable to threats at many different points of the production cycle. Our role as the purveyor of the Saudis’ defense arsenal was clearly in our strategic interests.
We used to value Saudi Arabia as a moderate in OPEC. Their willingness to keep prices down was in our strategic interest — and theirs. It was in their interest to ensure that prices not rise so high as to threaten consumer loyalty, or, in other words, to prevent other countries from strenuously seeking to find other sources of energy. But now the Saudis are refusing to cut oil production in a bid to drive out competitors, such as shale oil producers in the US. This isn’t in our interest. On the other hand, it’s not in Russia’s interest, either.
Since the end of the Cold War, the logic of our relationship has changed. We’re less dependent on Gulf oil now, but nonetheless still dependent on it. Oil is a fungible commodity, and the US economy is still vulnerable to sudden spikes in global oil prices. And our allies remain highly vulnerable to it.
More importantly, we have a longstanding, reasonably-warm relationship with the dynasty — and a very hostile relationship with Iran and Russia. Having access to Saudi military bases is a great strategic asset. I would assume we have more of this than we disclose. We have an intelligence-sharing relationship with the Saudis that’s probably to our advantage. And we’re terrified that if they lose control, they’ll be replaced by a regime that’s every bit as poisonous, but overtly hostile to the United States and unwilling to cooperate with us in any way. Or it will be replaced by chaos. These are not fears readily to be discounted, as the past five years amply demonstrate.
But the ideology they export is clearly not in our interest — so much so that we now find ourselves talking about preventing Muslims from travelling to American soil. Our relationship with them causes us reputational damage that is not in our interest: We can’t open our mouths about human rights anywhere without the world laughing bitterly and pointing at the Saudis. The moral stain of our relationship with the Saudis is not in our interest: Their cruel and pointless war in Yemen should shock our conscience, even if no one seems to think about it. And whether they do or not, it’s further empowering al Qaeda. It is hard to imagine anything less in our interest than that.
Nor is it even clear the Saudi regime has its own interests at heart. The execution of al-Nimr and their unilateral withdrawal from a ceasefire in Yemen suggest a suicide wish. They certainly knew it would cause regional uproar. They knew it would undermine American diplomatic and military efforts to stabilize Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. It was so spectacularly inflammatory that Shia sympathizers are speculating the very point of it was to trigger an all-out regional sectarian war, pulling in the United States and reversing the geopolitical trajectory of the region to the Saudi’s advantage.
That could be the outcome, but I doubt it was the intent. I doubt they’re thinking that far ahead. Peter van Buren is a former State Department official who was highly critical of the Iraq war. (He’s the author of We Meant Well: How I Helped Lose the Battle for the Hearts and Minds of the Iraqi People.) Yesterday he wrote a blog post for Reuters about the execution, and I suspect his analysis is right:
Saudi Arabia’s steadiest partner, the United States, has become prone to erratic acts, naively bumbling into Iraq in 2003, demanding regime changes here and there, and de facto partnering with the Iranians against Islamic State in Iraq.
Oil prices are falling. America is far more energy independent than it was a decade ago. It is slowly moving toward a new diplomatic relationship with Iran, dissolving the glue holding the United States-Saudi relationship together. Many disgruntled Saudis support Islamic State, an organization that has sworn to take down the al-Saud monarchy.
These destabilizing elements come as the al-Saud family faces succession issues. The current leader, King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, looks likely to be the final son of the country’s founder, Ibn al-Saud, to hold the office. Ibn al-Saud died in 1953. Salman has named a nephew as the crown prince, and his own son as second in line to the throne, which will bring an entirely new generation into power. There have been rumors of growing opposition to Salman, even of a possible coup.
The execution of Nimr thus sends multiple signals within the kingdom. The most significant is a get-tough message to all, coupled with an assurance to the Iranians that Salman is firmly in control, and able to further prosecute the open-ended war in Yemen. The execution also appeases the Wahhabists Salman needs in his corner, and gives the government a new excuse to crack down on Shi’ite dissent. Shi’ites are estimated to make up 10-15 percent of Saudi Arabia’s population. The threat is real — Nimr is now a martyr with an international profile, and may prove more dangerous dead than alive.
So here’s my question to a putative Commander-in-Chief — and to Ricochet. At what point should the United States say that our relationship with the Saudis is not, on balance, in our interest?
Is there a point at which, even if it is in our interest, it is incompatible with our values?
Published in Foreign Policy, General, Islamist Terrorism
I honestly think you overstate the relevance of the US-Saudi alliance to how the US is seen by the general public in the Middle East.
The US could dump the Sauds tomorrow and its critics could still point to its alliances with Sisi’s Egypt or Erdogan’s Turkey or Kuwait or Israel (or Pakistan, or Uzbekistan)* and find discrepancies between the US Govt’s words and its deeds when it comes to supporting or opposing freedom of expression, democracy, women’s equality, racism or ethnic cleansing.
The alliance with the Sauds gives the US some influence over the flow of oil and its use as an economic lever across the world – especially the global price – which impacts not just Europe but countries (allies/foes/rivals) like Iran, Russia, China and India.
The cost of the alliance would have to be big, and real (ie not guilt by association with the Sauds) to make breaking it a rational decision. My feeling is that only a domestic political cost has any realistic chance of convincing a US Administration to dump the Sauds.
How is supporting any of these countries* compatible with the values the US espouses?
Countries – even the US – don’t have friends, they have interests.
I don’t have reliable opinion poll data for all of those countries, but I do know that anti-Islamists in Turkey (the kinds of Muslims everyone tells me aren’t “real” Muslims — but who exist in larger numbers than the Islamists) often argue that until Mecca and Medina are no longer under the control of a regime that exports and practices the most radical form of Islam imaginable, it’s laughable for us to talk about “countering Islamic extremism.” And they do very much resent the US role in legitimizing and physically defending the Saudis.
Of course critics point to our alliances with loathsome regimes as evidence that we simply don’t give a toss about human rights so long as the relationship serves our strategic interests. Because it’s unfortunately true. But the Saudi regime is a particular problem, because of its custodianship of Mecca and Medina. That gives them the power — more than anyone else — to define what Islam is, particularly in conjunction with their wealth. Their definition is malignant, and their wealth has allowed them to spread it to every corner of the world.
Assume this is so. I’m asking whether this relationship is in our interests.
The Daily Beast is hardly the place I would point to for thoughtful analysis. They quote one government source (unnamed) and rather than say that AQ is strengthened in Yemen (possibly true) they claim AQ is strengthened overall (unable to assess, given the information presented.)
What is particularly cruel about the civil war in Yemen – apart from it being a civil war and all?
At this moment imho it is, on balance, and that is unlikely to change
Would you say that is their dominant beef with the US in the ME? Take the Sauds off the table, would there still be a lot remaining that they found objectionable or hypocritical?
True. Is it possible to:
.
They’re not dependent on the Ikhwan — they’re mortal enemies of the Ikhwan.
Public opinion, M.E. critics of US hypocrisy, US opinion on a loathsome regime, don’t mean much. The alternative could be horrendous. I see no interest served by cooling relations, severing close ties, not selling arms. Shutting off the flow of radical Islamic money from Saudi Arabia, in contrast does serve our interests and we would not have to apologize for attempting to shut it down. We can figure out how to stop that without being overtly hostile. Do they not need good relations with us more than ever? We don’t have to conduct foreign policy in the headlines of the Washington Post.
Looking at the question from a slightly different angle,
What if another suitor (e.g. China) came calling? How much effort should be put into saving the relationship?
Sure, but they still pay their salaries and empower them by law. Because they fear them.
The Sauds rule, in some ways, at the Ikhwan’s indulgence.
My point was: is there a realistic alternative to offer the Sauds, or do we need to go all out for an Kemalli Hejazi (?) or perhaps outsource it to Indonesia or Egypt?
[Edit: I’m sympathetic to the Indonesia option because the food will improve and I am shallow that way.]
The wag in me would suggest that since Muslims have control of the Temple Mount then Mecca and Medina should be turned over to a Jewish synagogue for neutral control but I’m willing to bet there’d be a few objections to that proposal.
It’s depressing how often I start thinking in Realpolitik terms but the long and the short of it is unless or until Middle Eastern oil ceases to become a factor due to decreased costs for natural gas or fracking production in the Western world or development of new energy sources we have to continue to support our allies: the potential downside of leaving Iran, Russia or China as the power in the region is too great.
As a side note I don’t think we’ll ever be loved by the malcontents in the region so it’s foolish to try. Machiavelli is right: if you cannot be loved and feared, settle for being feared. Obama has tried the love strategy and it doesn’t work too well.
I’m not sure which sources you’d trust, but pretty much everyone (except the Saudis) is reporting an unbelievable lack of caution about avoiding civilian deaths, a humanitarian crisis, Saudi military failure, and gains for AQAP. I’ll give you a wide sample of analyses; maybe you can find one arguing a contrary view, but I haven’t.
Saudis Face Mounting Pressure Over Civilian Deaths in Yemen Conflict
Reliefweb:
From another Reliefweb report:
World Food Programme.
Red Cross: “Yemen after five months looks like Syria after five years.”
World Health Organization: “Level 3 Emergency.”
Yemen: UN warns of ‘untenable’ humanitarian situation and steep increase in civilian causalities
Yemen: civilian casualties top 8,100 as airstrikes and shelling continue, UN reports
Yemen Doesn’t Need the Obama Administration’s ‘Deep Concern’ It needs help ending the war that has led to a humanitarian crisis.
Islamic State Gains Strength in Yemen, Challenging Al Qaeda
Al-Qaeda in Yemen launches a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign
The Foreign Policy Essay: AQAP at a Crossroads
Make No Mistake — the United States Is at War in Yemen …The White House just doesn’t want to admit it.
Saudi Arabia is obviously a terrible ally. Unfortunately, however, I think that it is in our interest to work with the House of Saud because the alternatives are simply that much worse.
First, abandoning Saudi Arabia will likely force the House of Saud to behave even more poorly. As Iran closes in, Saudi Arabia will likely develop a nuclear program to protect itself and try to further inflame Sunni extremism to counter the Shiites.
Second, if the House of Saud were to fall, the resulting instability in the peninsula would provide fertile ground for ISIS and other more radical Salafist groups to operate. Yes, the Saudis also profess a form of radical Islam, but they at least have some rational interest in cooperating with the US on issues of terrorism.
Lastly, with the Iran emerging as the dominant power in the Middle East, there needs to be a strong Sunni power to keep the larger region stable. If Saudi Arabia falls, Lebanon and Bahrain are surely to follow. Israel will face even greater security issues if Iranian influence continues to expand.
Saudi Arabia is a poor friend, but an even worse enemy. For now, we are stuck with it and are better off trying to engage with the Sauds and move them in our direction.
I’m not sure why people are blaming the Saudis here. Perhaps it was not wise to execute Nimr al-Nimr, but he was a subversive who advocated and worked toward the overthrow of the Saudi government. Given what is happening in Yemen, right on the Saudi border, the execution was within the Saudi purview, and probably constituted common sense from the Saudi leadership point of view. The Saudis executed Sunnis as well as Shia. To me, it’s Iran that has over reacted and taken this up as a casus belli. They are feeling their muscle with the drop of the sanctions and were looking for an issue to instigate against Sunnis.
Do you mean the ones Ibn Saud defeated at the battle of Sibilla? Or are you using the term to mean “conservative clergy who just might pull another ’79?” I wouldn’t call the ’79 types Ikhwan because the term’s come to mean the (Egyptian and global) Muslim Brotherhood — who the Saudis fear for other reasons. The Saudi Ikhwan became the National Guard, and as far as I know they’re probably the force that’s most loyal to the House of Saud these days.
I am confused on vocabulary here. I always understood the Ikhwan to be the Wahhabi military forces assembled by ibn-Saud to defeat the Rashids and the Hashemites.
Maybe this is an issue for the UN Human Rights Commission.
Oh wait….
Anger after Saudi Arabia ‘chosen to head key UN human rights panel’
Claire’s right. They became the Saudi National Guard. and they are the backbone of the regime.
The SANG was founded as the successor to the Ikhwan, the tribal army of King Abdulaziz.
In the same sense that we are. But when we try to change our government, it’s considered quite a normal thing — given that we have meaningful elections.
Not only that, but Texan secession is periodically advocated on Ricochet. And Canada, the UK, and Spain all have non-fringe political parties who openly state they want to break away from their respective countries.
And when the Southern states voted (overwhelmingly) to secede, how did we respond?
That’s right. Then they rebelled: They disliked his coziness with the British and his association with such demonic innovations as telephones. The ulama sided with Ibn Saud, and he crushed the Ikhwan. Those who survived became the National Guard.
I love Spengler for his brutal realpolitik analysis of global politics. His constant refrain is that the task of the 21st-century statesmen will be managing the decline of the muslim Middle East. His latest column on Saudi Arabia is good reading.
As for “shaking hands with the Saudis”, we do it because, though I love the spirit of Dubya in ’04-’05, we frequently decide that alliances with devils are in our short- and medium-term interest. We embraced Stalin to defeat Hitler, then embraced dictators throughout the third world to contain communism. Most of the third world, while despising our support for butchers, hasn’t retaliated (thank you Latin America, we owe you).
The most notable exception: Iran in ’79. While the global narrative was Free World vs Communist World, they did their own thing and started exporting jihadism. We’ve been propping up the Saudis, and they’re doing the same. If we were to abandon the Saudis, the world’s largest supplier of oil could end up looking like Iran, or like Syria. Neither option is appealing.
My ideal President would use both carrots and sticks on the Saudis. They need us, and we desperately want stability and friends in the region. Offer plenty of military aide, while demanding a less barbaric justice system and more rights for women. Eventually though, the regime will implode: when it does, we’ll want to help pick up the pieces, and a record of supporting liberty there.
We’re not advocating for the violent overthrow of our government. We’re advocating policy and candidates for legitimate elections. Your point Claire addresses a separate issue – democracy in Saudi Arabia. But that’s not in the near future or if ever. That’s not why Nimir was executed.
Let me correct myself. Nimir wasn’t advocating for a violent overthrow of SA. Still his actions were provocative, at least in the Saudi world, and he should have known that. My main point still holds. His execution is way more complex than just the elimination of an agitator for democracy.
How many civilians? just “many”? Besides, no sane person argues that civilian deaths are completely avoidable – that level of precision is unavailable anywhere at anytime. The “for the children” tug at the end is particularly nice though – great propaganda for hand-wringers.
Love the “food insecure” part. In the US that has replaced the measure for chronic hunger – because no one is starving in America. One of my favorite definitions of food insecurity is if you wondered where you were going to get your next meal – one time in a 30 day period. Since I often leave the house without sufficient lunch plans – I qualify as food insecure under most measures. Everyone suffers in a civil war – nothing new here and I wonder if this description exists in Yemen independently of the state of Civil War.
Those essential services didn’t exist in 19th Century England (or even in WW2 Europe) – if something is a modern invention, it makes me wonder how actually “essential” it is. I mean if the climate change alarmists have their way services described here won’t exist either. I think leftist organizations overuse the term “essential services” to really reflect how their socialist government priorities fall. While ignoring that there is a Civil War going on. Normally those tend to inconvenience civilian populations wherever they are fought.
Because nothing is more important than “the children”.
Great post, Claire. For now, I think we need to keep our alliance with the Saudis. I agree with American Abroad–it’s a balancing act, and although it’s unclear how long the al Saud family will be in power, we have to continue our deal with the devil. For now.
Comparing Yemen to Chicago.
Population Chicago: 2.7M
Population Yemen: 24.4M
Homicides Chicago (2014 – Wikipedia): 492 (rate/100k – 18.22)
Homicides Yemen civil war (above):5604 (rate/100k – 22.9597)
Violent Crime Chicago (rate/100k – Wikipedia): 884.3 (total violent crimes, working back from the rate – ~23876) – includes homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery)
Causalities Yemen (above): 32307 – (rate/100k – 132.3515) – reports from healthcare facilities in Yemen
Just a little perspective between a place where AQ is “getting stronger” and Saudi is waging “a cruel and pointless war” and a place controlled entirely by Democrats.
The witchcraft of those witches they execute — they should have known better than to practice witchcraft. And those adulteress women they stone to death — they should have known better. (Of course, some of them couldn’t have known better — they’re victims of human trafficking who don’t understand Arabic.) There is no way for any woman to live in a dignified human manner in the Saudi world without being provocative.
“He had it coming” isn’t good enough.
I’m not a cultural relativist. I think the Saudis’ interpretation and application of the Sharia is evil. In an absolute sense. It’s repugnant, evil, and disgusting when practiced by ISIS, disgusting when practiced by Iran, and no less disgusting when practiced by our allies.
Of course these executions for crimes like witchcraft are disgusting and a moral abomination. The Nimr execution, however, is different. Sharia might be the excuse, but this execution was clearly designed to send a message to Iran.
I would hope that a strong US-Saudi alliance, which clearly doesn’t exist right now due to Obama’s courting of Iran, would hopefully apply pressure on the Saudis to mitigate the worst of their legal practices.
However, if the existence of the Kingdom itself becomes the issue with the US absent, we can only expect the Saudis to try and inflame Sunni sectarianism even further with more gruesome displays of sharia law and anti-Shiite actions.
By Ikhwan I mean that crowd that runs around enforcing modesty and busting men and women driving together in cars. The modesty police – which polices Saudis and thereby gives the Saudi state the appearance of righteousness.
The Sauds needed them before – I don’t know if they really need them now.