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A VirtuCon Manifesto
That’s a VirtuCon manifesto, not the VirtuCon manifesto. I suspect there are more visions of how virtue theory and conservatism could interact than there are actual VirtuCons. This rough first draft is a contribution to the conversation Rachel Lu rekindled last week — see Tom Meyer’s response and the conversation that followed it as well — about what an emphasis on virtue means for other parts of the conservative worldview.
Please note: The word “virtue” has recently (in the last century or so) undergone something of a change in meaning. The “virtue” in virtue theory harks back to the older meaning. Do not be misled by this choice of vocabulary, imposed by some 2,000 years of philosophical reflection.
- There is such a thing as human nature.
- There is such a thing as a form of life that promotes human flourishing. In the past this was also referred to as “happiness.”
- Virtues are those habits of character that tend to human flourishing. In the past, the development of these habits was also referred to as “the pursuit of happiness.”
- Virtues are not general understandings, but the application of general understandings to particular cases. This is known as practical wisdom.
- The virtues are inculcated in childhood through the enforcement of rules, in adulthood through deliberative practice, and in both stages of life through example. Enforcement by — and examples found in — family, local church, and one’s immediate community are better (more effective) than those enforced by or demonstrated in more distant institutions.
- Politics is an important area of human flourishing. Real participation in the life of a community requires that the rules and norms of that community are decided by its members, not imposed from afar.
- For these reasons, virtue requires a “hard” subsidiarity, where power is (sparingly) delegated upwards from the local to the general polity. (This contrasts with ‘soft’ subsidiarity, where the higher power delegates downwards, but always maintains real control, usually disguised as “support”).
- In the past, this was also referred to as “liberty.”
- Poverty, ignorance, and dishonour are the enemies of virtue. All three are opposed by the voluntary institution of the free market. Free markets create wealth, spread knowledge, and do not require social position to succeed. A free market requires the exercise of virtues, and assists in promoting them.
- In the past, this was also referred to as “life.”
- The realization of a continent-spanning republic amenable to human flourishing is a daunting task, but it requires an exquisite modesty. Fortunately, that modesty is the sure route to success, eschewing all temptation to tyranny. We need only have regard to three things:
- Life – adequate means of existence, provided by the voluntary interactions of persons making choices in a condition of freedom.
- Liberty – the room to learn and grow in practical wisdom.
- The pursuit of happiness – the exercise of wisdom and the road to human flourishing.
Well, perhaps you have at that. At least I can know that you’re accusing me of erring in the best of company!
This question you did not answer directly. I can attempt to reconstruct your answer: that you indeed have no objection to unsupported assertions as such.
However, you do have objections to unsupported assertions that are not self-evident.
No. Any first principles which Aristotle has and you don’t will not be the definitions of virtues. One of the points ofcomment # 437 was to dig a little deeper through the logic of this sort of analysis and find out what first principles Aristotelian ethics has (if any) besides the desirability of happiness.
Now you tell me something, if you can: You said correctly that “we can agree that the function of a lung is to extract oxygen from the air and deliver it to the blood stream of an organism.” On what self-evident first principles do you base the assertion that a lung has such a thing as a function? What is this “function” you speak of? What first principles can possibly justify belief in it but not in the function of the whole human person . . . dwelling in community with others?”
What is “wisdom” other than understanding when to apply something, otherwise known as holding true beliefs?
Yeah, I expected that to be your answer. Courage is a virtue if it is used in service of a good cause. The problem is, anything is a virtue if it is used in service of a good cause. A Nazi soldier was not virtuous, no matter how courageous he may have been.
I have been down this road many times. <Blank> is a virtue if it is used for good. Anything used for good is good. The good consists of the good. Just a silly tautology. I have been down this road, and it leads nowhere except back where it started. The statement that “courage is a virtue” or that “courage is a part of the properly functioning human being,” taken alone, means absolutely nothing.
This so-called “wisdom,” of course, is knowledge of what is good. Courage in the service of the good is good. “Wisdom” consists of knowing when courage is good.
The problem is that the question “what is good?” is the very question under consideration. That is what ethics is trying to answer. You can’t answer it by presupposing that you already know the answer, characterized as “wisdom.” Just circular reasoning. Just a tautology.
So your premise is not self-evident. More importantly, I do not agree with it. As I have said too many times to count, without mutually-agreed premises, no rational discussion is possible. So let us say no more about this subject.
You’re being coy. We both know what the word “function” means. I take it as self-evident that the function of a lung is to extract oxygen from the air and deliver it to the bloodstream. Since you have agreed with that proposition, there is nothing else to say about it. It is a mutually-agreed premise. We go on from there.
Now, if you believe that a human dwelling in community with others has “a function” that is equally self-evident, state it. State “the” function of a human being, as you see it. Maybe it will be as obvious and self-evident as the function of a lung. But I really, really doubt it.
You say that I have defined the good as virtue, and virtue as the good. I have not. Courage is a virtue when united with wisdom, which knows how to reach the good.
The good, if you want to keep it simple and stick to the first few words in Aristotle’s book, is happiness.
I can make a guess (only a guess) that you might object at this point that I first said there are other first principles in play here and now say that there are no others–only happiness. You’d be wrong. I referred to those other Aristotelian first principles–having something to do with human nature (comment 336), but whichever ones might be mined out of the Aristotelian ruminations in number 437–as other first principles in an ethical analysis, not as other definitions of the good.
You think I’ve defined the good as courage, courage as preserving wisdom, and wisdom as knowing the good. I did not.
Wisdom knows the good, and courage preserves it. (“Courage is a form of preservation.”–Socrates)
I believe you got about half of that circle you think I drew for myself from number 446, where I include courage in a description of human nature. I’m pretty sure you misunderstood all the same.
There I’m not saying “Human nature tells us about the good, and the good includes X, and X is wisdom, which knows the good.” I was talking about the life of “the whole human person . . . dwelling in community with others” and living by all those virtues Aristotle lists (plus and minus a couple). That life displays the human nature living by which is the good for a human–just as a healthy lung displays the blood-pumping nature acting according to which is the good for a lung. That life displays all those attributes (which are best listed by recalling Aristotle’s book).
You aren’t even talking about one of the Aristotelian first principles (see the reference to # 437 above), so if this is an objection it’s off target. Nevertheless, what you propose sounds delightful!
Now we’re approaching the first principles!
Of course I believe in such a function! The life of a whole person dwelling in community with others and practicing the habits of all those virtues is a person functioning well. That sort of function is the function of a human being.
I’m not sure it’s self-evident: See # 437. But if you would take the simple approach with the lung, that’s fine; I myself can clearly see that such a life demonstrates the proper function of a human being.
I suppose your objection is that it ought to be self-evident, by which you mean evident to all, or at least to you. This sort of objection might bring up a slightly awkward Aristotelian topic which is lurking in the area, but I don’t think it’s time to bring it up. There’s just no telling this early if there’s any need to address it.
Speaking of telling, Larry, I wish you would tell me why someone who refuses to accept any definition of rationality save “Based on good reasoning from premises” would evaluate one first principle as inferior to another. By your own lights they are equally “irrational acts of faith.” What sort of criticism is “Your premise is not evident to all but only to some” when even premises evident to all are sheer acts of irrationality?
Is there some word you are prepared to use to describe a first principle that is self-evident (to all) but not to describe one which isn’t? If not “rational,” then perhaps “reasonable,” “sensible,” “prudent,” or “wise?”
How about the term I keep using? “Mutually agreed-upon.” We either agree on our premises, or we don’t. Since premises cannot be any of those other adjectives that you list, the only thing we can say about them is that we agree on them.
For example, let’s say that someone’s first premise is “There is no God but Allah; Muhammed is his prophet; and Muhammed commands us to kill the infidel.” I really can’t reason with that person. I can’t prove to them that their premise is “wrong,” even though I think its wrongness is self-evident. In fact, I can’t have any kind of rational discussion with that person.
You keep wanting to find adjectives for your premises. There are no adjectives. But if we agree on premises, then we can have a discussion. Or at least most people can have a discussion. With you, it turns out to be pretty difficult to discuss even those premises we agree upon.
So, if you have a premise that a human being has a particular “function” which you can state, then state it and let’s see if we agree.
By the way, Auggie, when I ask you about the function of a human being, I mean something other than “the function of a human being is to function in the way that a human being is supposed to function.” Do you have something non-tautological to say on the subject?
You know, Auggie, when I say that the function of a lung is to extract oxygen from the air and deliver it to the bloodstream, I have made a simple declarative and self-contained statement, using plain English. I have not made a circular statement, like “the function of a lung is to do that which a healthy lung does in an organism.” I have not referred you to some 5,000 page tome by a physiologist. I have made a simple declarative, self-contained statement in plain English.
Can you do that? Can you emerge from your web of tautologies and philosopher namedropping and make a simple, declarative, self-contained statement about the function of a human being? If so, please do it. If not, say so and I’ll drop it.
In reply to Larry3435, Larry3435, and Larry3435:
This isn’t the first time you’ve mentioned philosopher namedropping in a manner suggesting that there’s something wrong with mentioning great philosophers, nor the first time I’ve replied to it. But perhaps I need to reply more directly.
Larry, I’m pretty sure I’ve been talking about my own views this whole time. (I may have commented on some view I don’t hold, but I have no memory of doing so).
I have no use and no desire for original thoughts or thoughts that are my own. I follow C. S. Lewis in this regard: I want good thoughts, not original thoughts, and I want lots of them. One sure way to fail in this regard is to go it alone and produce my own thoughts.
So I’ll start with the likes of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Reid, and happily follow them when it seems to me that they are right. And when I need something new and can’t find it in any great minds who came first, or when I find that they are all wrong, then my own thoughts will be different from theirs.
Continued:
(Continued)
Now I asked whether there was some word you were prepared to use to describe the premise that happiness is good (which you take to be self-evident and obvious and evident to all), but not a premise such as “There is such a thing as human nature.” You have eschewed the term “rational” for all first principles, rejecting better counsel, and rejected “those other adjectives” I suggested.
Your reply is that we might use the term “mutually agreed-upon,” a term fitting what it’s meant to describe quite nicely. But you somehow managed to give me the impression that you were trying to object to the premise that “There is such a thing as human nature” (or to whatever first principles might lurk behind it if it turns out not to be a first principle itself).
Your reply seems to be simply this: “If we don’t agree on the premises, we should stop talking.” I would welcome that outcome no less than you, but this answer plainly renounces the opportunity to object to Aristotelian first principles.
And for two reasons:
Continued:
(Continued)
Two replies require quotations.
A thoroughly unnecessary insult. In fact, it was only very slightly difficult. After several attempts, we were able to discuss the implications of the principle we both accept, and as a result I had the pleasure of defending you from an unnecessary criticism.
Continued:
(Continued)
I did. I believe it was in English as plain and simple as could be used under the circumstances. It was declarative. It was non-circular and non-tautological. It was inspired by an approximately 2.3 thousand year old (and rather short) book by one of the five (by any standard) greatest ethicists in human history.
It was this: The function of a human being is to dwell in community with others and practice the habits of all those virtues.
Why you think this is non-declarative, unclear, or circular is a mystery to me.
Perhaps you would say that it’s incomplete since I don’t list the virtues. You’d be right, but I fail to see why this would be an objection.
Auggie,
No insult was intended by anything I said, and I apologize for any offense given. My objection to namedropping philosophers is not that I insist on original thoughts and only original thoughts. That would be silly. My objection is that when you use the name of a philosopher to summarize a school of thought, you cut off conversation. What am I supposed to do, go read the Nicomachean Ethics and write a critique of it? I am looking for a conversation; not a homework assignment. Besides, there are plenty of things that Aristotle said with which I agree, along with plenty of disagreement. So if you just say “I agree with Aristotle,” I’m sort of stuck on how to respond. If you must make your points by referencing some philosopher, then the least you could do is to offer a specific quote from that philosopher, making the point you want. Better yet, though, would be for you to present the argument in your own words – simply and clearly. I am a firm believer that anyone who really understands an argument can explain that argument in simple, concise English.
Larry3435, thank you for these remarks. All very appropriate, except that I have been presenting Aristotle in my own words (save for when I referenced the list of virtues rather than listing them).
Here’s why it’s an objection, and here’s why your assertions are circular. We started this discussion with the subject of “virtue conservatism.” My objection to that term, and to that approach, is that the concept of “virtue” is too subjective to make it the foundation for a political movement. People are guaranteed to disagree on the question of what behavior is virtuous. I claim that instilling “virtue” in the citizenry is too slippery of a concept to make it the goal of governance.
Now, after a lengthy foray into “human nature” and “the function of a human,” you have wound up right back where we started. “The function of a human is to practice the virtues.” (Continued.)
(Response to Auggie, continued) How much more circular could we get? After all this discussion we still have no agreement on what is “virtuous.” I don’t think that the discussion of human nature or function has added anything to the debate, because we are still staring the original question right in the face. What is virtue? And since virtue is just another name for “the good,” we actually haven’t moved an inch from the original question of ethics – which is, “what is the good?”
Now I have offered at least a partial answer to the question “what is the good?” I claim that human happiness is the good, and I have Aristotle and many others on my side in making that claim. It is easy for me to fold virtue into that concept. Virtuous behavior is behavior that increases human happiness.
The advantage to my approach is that happiness can be measured, albeit imperfectly. I can say that as an empirical matter, people have consistently been happier when they are left free to pursue their happiness in their own way, rather than having it imposed on them by some central authority.
So I have offered at least one objective measure of virtue (although I prefer to avoid that word). Do you have an objective measure that is self-contained? One that does not just refer me to Aristotle, or to Scripture, or to some other authority who will define virtue for me and whose word I must take?
You have been so insistent about this point that I have given it further thought. I’ve tried to find a term, other than “self-evident,” that would describe the first principles that I accept and that I expect others to accept. I don’t want a term that denies or covers up the fact that this acceptance is an act of faith. So I have come up with this: I would describe a first principle that is self-evident as also being “intuitively obvious.”
The thing is, this phrase identifies my intuition as the source of my faith in the first principle. If you share my intuition, then we have common ground. But if your intuition leads you to a different conclusion, then I have no way to prove that my intuition is better than yours. I can’t prove that my intuition is “right” and yours is “wrong.” There is nothing left to do except to agree to disagree.
Larry3435, my responses are not circular. If you look at the virtues (handy list here) and the characteristics of each you’ll find all sorts of content beyond what you’ve noticed.
The main reason I haven’t gone into much detail with that content is that it would be too much like repeating the whole book, and I don’t have that kind of time.
I did mention some content respecting two virtues: wisdom, which knows the good, and courage, which preserves it even under duress. A good bit of the good wisdom knows is happiness, and I think we can say representing Aristotle that the rest of the good is what leads to happiness. So there’s obviously nothing circular there. (As a bonus I’ll add a bit more content on what wisdom knows: It knows that reason should govern the bodily appetites.)
You keep not noticing any content I give or reference, and you end up thinking my answers reduce to “Virtues are virtues” or “The human function is the human function.” But they don’t.
Larry, let’s take another look at that lung.
We seem to agree that it has a function, that this function can be recognized, that we can evaluate a lung in terms of whether it’s performing its function, that its function contributes to happiness, and that happiness is good.
That’s quite a pile of agreements!
You’ve already conceded the possibility–though not yet the actuality–of everything you need for a real Aristotelianism. To be precise, you’ve conceded that the existence of a function contributing to happiness can make a good first principle.
You say you can agree that “Virtuous behavior is behavior that increases human happiness.” Good. That’s Aristotelian. The main thing you’re missing is that humans have functions the performance of which contributes to happiness. And why shouldn’t they, if even lungs have them?
Factor in a bit more medical science, add a bit of psychology, add a healthy testimony from experience about how all those virtues exercised by a person dwelling in community with others increase happiness, and keep in mind that what leads to happiness is good–and I think you’ll be all the way there.
Good job. That’s a nice term.
So you don’t object to any first principles of Aristotelianism such as that “There is such a thing as human nature” (or whatever first principles might lurk behind it if that turns out not to be a first principle itself).
Yeah, there is an objection that I can make, and I would make it to this “human nature” thing. While I can’t prove that a first principle is “wrong,” I can say that it is not useful. Which, to my way of thinking, is at least as bad.
In my world, a first principle is supposed to be the starting point of a rational argument. My intuitive belief that human happiness is good allows me to reason my way to various conclusions, including my belief that liberty is good and that personal freedom is better than subjugation to a central authority.
I don’t see how the statement “There is such a thing as human nature” allows me to reason my way to anywhere. My reaction is a big “So what?” And that is especially the case when I know that you are using the term “human nature” as a normative, rather than descriptive, term. All you have said by using that term, so far as I can tell, is “there are proper ways for a human to behave.” Well, okay, but big whoop! You have told me nothing that helps me understand what those proper ways are. All you’ve done is rephrase the question.
If you’re just talking about health, then I suppose you could make something of that. And yes, health is a big component of happiness. The left has done this. They have made health the basis of a moral argument. “Eating organic foods is morally good.” Not just good for you, but morally good. To a lefty, someone who smokes is worse than Isis. They have created this cult of health as morality, and I don’t think I like it.
Besides, I don’t have much faith in those medical or psychological experts. For years they told me to eat margarine instead of butter. Then one day they tell me that margarine is actually “transfats” and eating it is actually the worst thing I can do. I think that almost everything I was taught in my high school health class has since been proven to be wrong, including the “food pyramid.”
So my basic objection still applies. Even in the area of health, our knowledge is too slippery to make this the basis for governance. The left wants to outlaw GMO’s, limit the size of sodas, etc., etc. Don’t like it.
About the function of a lung – that is not a first principle. That is empirically established by the science of physiology. A lung only does one thing. It oxygenates blood. So that is its function.
Not so of a human. Humans don’t do only one thing. Humans do millions of things. There is no scientifically demonstrable “function” of a human, the way there is of a lung. You want to select certain things that humans do, out of the myriad of choices, and say that those things are the proper function of a human. There is no analogy to a lung there.
Perhaps the most common thing that humans have done throughout history is go to war with each other. So is that “the,” or “a,” function of a human being? Going to war? A lung’s function is to do what a lung does. If a human’s function is to do what humans do, then going to war is clearly part of that function. But I suspect you will disagree.
Exactly. Ethical intuitionism is the only way to make the most convincing arguments. If something doesn’t appeal to you most fundamental common sense intuitions at its core, it’s leaving itself open to a more convincing argument.
I think the table you link proves my point. “Virtues” are not clear and obvious. They bleed over into vices, and the dividing line between them is subjective. Virtues require judgment. And central authorities like the government are notorious poor at exercising judgment. Rather, they promulgate “one size fits all” regulations, which can (and often do) result in seriously malign unintended consequences.
I say again: Promoting “virtue” is not a proper goal of governance.
I’m glad we agree.