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Missile Defense: Fourth Time’s the Charm (Updated With Video)
Update: See comments 18 and 19 for video. After failing in three consecutive flight tests (two in 2010 and one in 2013), the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system finally intercepted a mock nuclear warhead launched on an IRBM from the Marshall Islands in a test flight designated FTG-06b.
For this exercise, a threat-representative, intermediate-range ballistic missile target was launched from the Reagan Test Site. The U.S. Navy destroyer USS Hopper (DDG 70), with its Aegis Weapon System, detected and tracked the target using its onboard AN/SPY-1 radar, which provided data to the GMD fire control system via the Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication (C2BMC) system. The Sea-Based X-Band radar also tracked the target, and relayed information to the GMD fire control system to assist in the target engagement and collect test data. About six minutes after target launch, the Ground-Based Interceptor was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. A three-stage booster rocket system propelled the interceptor’s Capability Enhancement II EKV into the target missile’s projected trajectory in space. The kill vehicle maneuvered to the target, performed discrimination, and intercepted the threat warhead with “hit to kill” technology, using only the force of the direct collision between the interceptor and the target to destroy the target warhead. This was the first intercept using the second- generation Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.
The system was thwarted in previous tests by a series of technical problems, which critics quite credibly argue are the result of a too-hasty deployment by the Bush Administration. Both sides like to lump all four missile defense weapon systems together (GMD, Aegis, THAAD, Patriot) and argue in generalities — somewhat understandably, because many of the details required to form specific arguments are classified. Critics use GMD’s failures to criticize the entire project, while supporters cite the aggregate test record (65 out of 81), which is buoyed by the success of the other elements, to divert attention from GMD’s spotty record (9 out of 17, including 1 out of the last 4). But as President Obama loves to remind us, this is not a political football. Americans all over the political landscape should be glad that we are making progress toward the goal of creating a defensive shield against the most terrible weapons ever devised.
In case you haven’t glanced at a map of the Pacific Ocean recently, the approximate area involved in this test, stretching from the Reagan Test Site in the Marshall Islands to Vandenberg Air Force Base on the California coast, is enormous. The tests require these vast test ranges in order to create realistic trajectories for the incoming targets, with threat-representative flight times and closing velocities. It also gives the system the opportunity to practice data handover between systems that detect enemy launches over the horizon and provide a targeting solution to the home defenders. These tests are expensive in large part because of the geographic challenges. But the speeds and distances involved will only go up from here as the system takes on more challenging scenarios.
(One other cool fact. The target IRBM was launched from the Marshall Islands on the other side of the International Date Line, 19 hours ahead of Pacific Daylight Time, on Monday morning, June 23rd. The interceptor was launched in California on Sunday afternoon, June 22nd, and successfully destroyed the target a few minutes later on Sunday. We can intercept threats from the future.)
Published in General
I was actually at Vandenberg Air Force Base doing some contract engineering work during one of their unsuccessful tests. I was always impressed with the concept: essentially missile defense is stopping a bullet by firing another bullet at the first bullet. It’s great to see the concept succeed. Amazing what technology can do.
What about commercial airline traffic in the area?
I remember the M1 Abrams tank was not the tank it was envisioned to be. It was developed, tested, failed, upgraded, re-tested, upgraded again, and finally, when it went to the battlefield, it was significantly better than anything it faced.
I have the impression that a lot of very good ideas being pursued by the military are so complex that they require development, testing, meet failure, are upgraded, are re-tested, upgraded again, and finally, when they arrive on the battlefield (wherever that battlefield may be), they are better than anything they face.
I was also pleased to learn that the Air Force and the Navy worked together to identify the threat and to put one or the other in a position to counter that threat. It appears that the Unified Command Structure (hopefully that is the name) does what it is intended to do.
Cool.
You are being too kind to the critics.
First, in a tiered defense situation, the whole point is that you do not expect 100% success from the first tier. This is particularly significant when your entire alleged purpose is to deal with a small attack. If each of three tiers has a only a 50% success rate, that’s quite useful when you are engaging only a single missile or two.
Second, only so much engineering can occur in the lab. Many improvements come only after you get something into the field.
They coordinate with the FAA and they do not launch the test until the area is clear.
The multiple tiers don’t necessarily give you multiple opportunities to knock out the same target. The tiers are designed to intercept different classes of threats. The GMD is the only system designed to counter ICBMs; the other tiers simply don’t have the legs or speed to intercept higher speed threats. You would need hundreds, if not thousands, of Aegis ships and THAAD batteries to defend the same area as GMD, but even then the Aegis and THAAD interceptors don’t have the performance to pick up GMD’s misses.
This is a truism. In the case of GMD, however, only one of the three recent failures was attributable to something that could only be found in testing. Here are the published causes of the failures:
Separating stages and quality control are rocketry 101.
The design flaw in the CE-II EKV guidance system should have been found during developmental flight testing. But the first flight test (the one in which the flaw was discovered) was not conducted until after about a dozen CE-II EKVs were operationally deployed in the silos.
More info here.
Been there several times! Great scuba diving. Did you ever watch the MIRVs come in?
[Now former] MDA Director Lt. General Patrick O’Reilly, at a hearing of the Strategic Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on March 31, 2011:
With tiered defense, some areas go undefended by the inner tiers. It, however, would be easy to field systems at our twenty highest value targets with a handful of long range missiles of say 250 mile range and shorter range missiles of say 75 mile range.
How would they not have the performance?
ctlaw, I’m not sure of your technical background so I’m not sure what level of detail you are looking for (it’s rocket science!). But the simple answer is track and divert capability. High speed targets like ICBM warheads require the interceptor to have high lateral acceleration and carry lots of fuel. The lower tiers of the BMDS are designed to intercept lower and slower threats than ICBMs.
There was a proposed (and since cancelled) upgrade to the Aegis interceptor called SM-3 Block 2B that would provide limited anti-ICBM capability.
However, “Washington has always maintained that the theoretical 2B interceptor would not be fast enough to counter Russian ICBMs.”
The capability for current THAAD and Aegis system to intercept ICBMs is untested and unadvertised.
That’s plausible in theory, but definitely not the case in this instance. Each full-system intercept test costs a roughly a quarter billion dollars. It’s hard to argue that’s the most efficient way to find workmanship issues, especially when you’re only flying one unit every year or two.
I would argue it’s more related to the hasty deployment because a proper manufacturing program would have better quality controls. I quoted Director O’Reilly above as saying the deployed interceptors were “more akin to prototypes than production representative missiles in the field.”
Although I once did fix a minor engineering defect on a major missile program, I have little real knowledge of the details of shooting one down. What is the difference in approach speed of a hypothetical NorK ICBM warhead vs. an MRBM warhead?
This paper is a decent source for that information. I’ve clipped the relevant figure here.
Here’s a video of the result:
And here’s the who, what, where, when, and why:
LOL. I never screwed up that bad.
I hope you’re enjoying my old missiles. I removed the last C-4 SLBM from service many moons ago.
I haven’t read all the data, but are these intercepts being done in the boost, post-boost, or reentry phase of flight? If the first, that’s a darn fast response. If the second, that’s quite a range. If the third, I can’t even comprehend the speed required.
Thanks Mark! Really interesting stuff here.
I think they are appropriately lumped together, since they work in consort. Each level of the shield can take a crack at in incoming warhead. If each level had only a 75% shot at hitting the target, the odds of a missile getting through are exceptionally low.
Can’t give you details, but how about some not-so-subtle hints: the GMD system intercepts in the Midcourse phase, using an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle.
Probably the best place to do it, and huzzah! The tracking and targeting aspects alone are mind boggling…not to mention the timing required.
That’s not actually the case, Frank. The tiers are not designed to take multiple shots at the same target. The different tiers are designed to counter different classes of threats. I gave more detail on this in my previous comments.
Per the defense department, it is the case.
“Since ballistic missiles have different ranges, speeds, size and performance characteristics, the Ballistic Missile Defense System is an integrated, “layered” architecture that provides multiple opportunities to destroy missiles and their warheads before they can reach their targets. “
Just out of curiosity, what happens in the military contractor world when a $250M test fails due to a stupid error? Do heads roll, or does the relative lack of competition in these highly specialized niches mean that everyone just promises it won’t happen again?
Of course, even the notion of a normal private company shelling out $250M for a single test of their prospective product is absurd. But in the pharmaceutical industry, if a multi-million dollar clinical trial were botched because someone forgot to check whether the drug is stable at room temperature or needs to be refrigerated, there would be a number of project managers looking for the phone number of the Truck Master truck driving school.
I have zero expertise, but nowhere does this text explicitly contradict Mark’s assertion that only one of the layers has the potential to intercept ICBMs. Indeed, the quote’s vague language seems like a well-crafted attempt to muddle just that very fact.
Impressive now, but much less so in the future when we switch to an all-metric calendar. ;-)