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A Look at the Leaders
More than any others, five men directed the flow and determined the outcome of World War II: Winston Churchill. Adolf Hitler. Joseph Stalin, Benito Mussolini, and Franklin Roosevelt. Understanding how and why World War II evolved as it did requires understanding these five.
The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler–How War Made Them and How They Made War, by Phillips Payson O’Brien, examines each. It shows how their early life experiences shaped them and how they subsequently shaped World War II.
O’Brien splits the book. The first half spends ten chapters on the early lives of these men. He devotes a chapter to each man’s early life, showing how they grew to adulthood, and what influences worked on them. Roosevelt and Churchill grew up privileged, raised to take the reins of power as adults. Hitler, the son of a petty bureaucrat, rebelled against the expectation he would follow the same path. Mussolini and Stalin grew up in poverty, with brutal fathers and adoring mothers.
The following five chapters examine each man’s experiences in the years leading up to and during the First World War—and for Stalin the Russian Civil War. O’Brien shows how each man’s experiences during that war forged the beliefs that drove them during World War II.
Roosevelt and Churchill came away convinced high-technology weapons could reduce soldier casualties—trading oil for blood. Mussolini was convinced that “spirit” could carry Italy to victory. Hitler believed victory lay in German superiority, especially in terms of bigger and better weapons. Stalin learned to trust no one except those absolutely loyal to him, particularly those from his own peasant class. Killing potential rivals before they threatened you was the key to success.
O’Brien devotes the last half of the book to showing how these beliefs informed the actions of all five during World War II. He also shows how they led each leader to success and victory or defeat and ignominy. Unsurprisingly Mussolini is shown as the least successful, followed by Hitler. Surprisingly Stalin is revealed as the most successful, followed by Roosevelt and then Churchill.
The Strategists offers a new, thought-provoking view of World War II and its leaders. O’Brien presents the war as driven by the highly personal decisions of five men, rather than the result of the impersonal tides of history and technology. He shows how these tides were started and steered by these five.
“The Strategists: Churchill, Stalin, Roosevelt, Mussolini, and Hitler–How War Made Them and How They Made War,” by Phillips Payson O’Brien, Dutton, August, 2024, 544 pages, $35.00 (Hardcover), $14.99 (e-book), $24.75 (Audiobook)
This review was written by Mark Lardas, who writes at Ricochet as Seawriter. Mark Lardas, an engineer, freelance writer, historian, and model-maker, lives in League City, TX. His website is marklardas.com.
Published in History
Another book I HAVE to buy.
Um. Nothing on the Japanese?
How lacking.
Not really. The Japanese participated in World War II, but they were basically along for the ride. None of Japan’s decisions dictated the outcome of the war. All they did was bring in the US into the war a few month’s earlier than the US otherwise would have. The war was decided in Europe.
The only way for Japan to have won, maybe, would have been if Germany took down Russia. Japan did not attack Russia in 1941 because the Soviets handed the Japanese their heads two years earlier in Mongolia. Unless they attacked Russia Hitler could not have defeated Russia. Japan was too weak to attack both Russia and the US/UK simultaneously. If they went after Russia after July 1941 their armies and navies would have run out of oil in six months. So they went south and east to seize the natural resources required. Which doomed them.
So, while the Pacific War was a major conflict, from the point of view of the strategic direction of the war – which this book was discussing – it was a sideshow.
That is totally dismissing everything that happened against the Japanese.
One might as well argue that there was no way the Germany could win therefore every decision they made was pointless.
If you are going to do a book that talks about the strategic decisions that were being made by leaders in World War 2 it should include the Japanese.
Not doing so frankly smacks of racism against the Japanese.
The fight of the United States and the Pacific against Japan was a significant factor in World War 2 and affected the war in Germany. It was not a side show and I think calling it a side show is an insult to all of the Americans and the allies who died fighting in the Pacific.
It was not a strategic side show. It was critically important to how the war was prosecuted. I will stand by my statement that leaving Japan out of this an error.
This book looks interesting, especially the earlier experiences of the leaders it portrays. Having said that, however, insofar as the final blows that closed out the Second World War took place by reason of two atomic bombs dropped on Japanese cities in their homeland, I would think the role of Japan’s militaristic politicians are an essential part of any study purporting to discuss key strategic decisions of WWII. Indeed, all of East Asia and even mainland China’s post-war realities were framed by these decisions.
Perhaps the book needs a companion study, much as reading Bruce Catton’s trilogy, a narrative history of the Army of the Potomac is well complimented by reading Shelby Foote’s multi-volume history of the armies of the CSA.
Really, you are breaking out the racism card? How tiresome…..
I believe you are reacting rather than thinking. Yes, there were other major players in World War II besides Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. But those five and only those five really shaped the war through personal influence.
Chiang Kai-shek, despite the size of the Chinese army and the scale of the war in China did not. It was a strategic sideshow. Neither did Hideko Tojo. He was one of a number of interchangeable Japanese leaders of the period. Japan was pretty much on autopilot from the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War until the end of World War II. That meant from a strategic planning standpoint the Pacific War, despite its size was also a strategic sideshow.
The broad strokes of World War II were fixed from the middle of the 1930s – 1936 or 1937 through the end of 1940. It behaved like an accelerating rocket, which could be steered at its outset, but by 1941 was moving so quickly it was going to go where it was pointed.
The Pacific War was decided by the Navy Act of 1938 and the Vinson-Walsh Act of 1940. Every major US warship of World War that fought in that war – except those already in existence prior to December 1941 were authorized under those two acts and already at some stage of construction. Every battleship, every fleet carrier, and every cruiser. The logistics train that took us across the Pacific was set in motion by those acts.
The aircraft with which the US fought in that war were already on the drawing boards or under development prior to December 1941, including the B-29. The focus on aircraft and the build-up of our air forces began in 1938-39. All of this was due to Roosevelt’s determination – even though he planned to fight Germany and not Japan. Those resources were simply pointed in a different direction. Without Roosevelt we would have fought a much different war.
Similarly Britain’s war was largely set prior to 1941. Its neglect of its army and focus on strategic bombing defined its war. Churchill through force of personality kept Britain in the war from 1940 until the US entered in December 1941. Without Churchill the war would have gone in a different direction.
Germany’s trajectory was similarly set prior to December 1941. It was fixed – and headed towards annihilation even before it invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, largely because of the strategic directions set by Hitler. His fixation with bigger and better artillery, armor, and ships, combined with his neglect of logistics doomed Germany. Had he mad different decisions – and he could have – Germany could have won the war.
The Soviet Union’s Stalin is the most interesting case in the book. He built the Soviet military which faced Germany and built a flawed system, which failed badly when tested. But Stalin, unlike Hitler, was willing to learn from his mistakes. He adapted and survived. While Lend-Lease seems inevitable today, it happened only because Stalin reversed course on accepting aid from the hated capitalistic West. He had resolutely refused to do so prior to June 1941 and had he persisted he likely would have lost. Instead he showed a flexibility he never previously demonstrated. And he built the system that turned out the simple, reliable and mobile weapons the Soviet Union used from 1941 through 1945. His decisions changed the course of the war.
Mussolini also changed the war through his actions. He would be a perfect example of hubris. By jumping into the war when he did in May 1940 he warped the direction of the Axis. He drew Germany into a set of sideshows in Africa and the Balkans which served as a distraction. (He also, arguably induced a fascist Greece, which possibly might have entered the war as German ally to join the Allied side.) He dramatically changed the direction of the war through his decisions from 1936 through 1940.
Tell you what, if you think I am wrong, put together an essay on how Hideko Tojo’s decisions prewar and during the war influenced Japan’s strategic direction in World War II. Because “The Strategists” is not a book about how those five leaders managed their wars. It is a book about how they provided strategic direction and vision and how that direction and vision affected the outcome of the war. Tojo came into power in October 1941, rubberstamping pre-set war plans. Unlike the other five he had no influence on the strategic direction of his country. None. If not Tojo, tell me which of Japan’s leaders offered any strategic direction beyond sleepwalking Japan into a war it could not win. (One thing I will say for Mussolini, he wasn’t forced into war, he chose it voluntarily.)
It doesn’t have to be Tojo.
The Japanse had their own plans and own ideas shaping the war. Japan had its own men who provided strategic direction and vision and that direction and vision affected the outcome of the war. I’d love to know more about them.
I simply cannot believe that there was nobody in Japan that shape their wars the personal influence.
So what you are saying, is no. You cannot identify a single Japanese leader who bent the shape of the war in the same way as the other five featured in this book. There is no Japanese counterpart to had the same effect on the course of the war as Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini. Otherwise you would be able to come up with a name.
I can tell you why. Because there is no such leader. From roughly 1930 to 1945 Japan was directed by a series of coalitions of mediocrities focused on there own parochial interests such as the army or the navy, instead of a greater vision for the rest of Japan. (Kind of like what is going on in the Biden Administration today – only longer. Who really is in charge?) They ran Japan by committee.
Japan lost that kind of strategic vision with the death of Emperor Menji in 1912, and coasted under Emperor Taishō until Hirohito took over. And Hirohito was a marine biologist at heart who lacked the force of purpose grand dad had. He was willing to rule as figurehead the way so many emperors before him had during the shogunate.
I’ve written eight books about the Pacific War involving land, sea, and air warfare during that war. Seven have been released and one comes out this fall. I have two more under contract to be written next year. I have earlier wrote one about the Russo-Japanese War.
What struck me when researching the books on the Pacific War was the lack of strategic direction by late stage Imperial Japan and the willingness of subordinate leaders to drag Japan into unprofitable courses of action just to benefit their particular fiefdom.
A good early example of that is the 8-8 Navy, a plan established after the Russo-Japanese War. Menji was ill by then and (I think beginning to lose strategic focus. The Imperial Navy wanted to be big – like eight dreadnought battleships and eight dreadnought battlecruisers big – a plan that would double Japan’s budget. That made it a non-starter with the government unless there was a real reason to do so beyond the glory of the Imperial Navy.
There wasn’t. After the defeat of Russia Japan was the major naval power in the seas around the Home Islands. Britain and the US were happy to keep it that way. Both had been non-belligerent allies of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War. But the Navy wanted it fleet. So it sold it on the grounds that the US – which was then friendly – was about to attack Japan and Japan needed to be prepared to defeat the US. That- to say the least – annoyed the US. It also set a chain of events into motion which eventually led to the Pacific War.
That happened not because Japan had some great leader with a strategic vision for Japan the way that Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, and even Mussolini had for their nations. It happened because some admiral wanted more ships. Just like the Marco Polo Bridge incident, the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Soviet-Japanese Border War, and the Japanese occupation of French Indochina were triggered by different and individual generals. Each one of those was a milestone on the path to the Pacific War. None were approved of in advance by the Tokyo government, and each locked Japan into a strategic position which hindered them in World War II.
I don’t think it’s racism. It’s just a narrow viewpoint.
Many people forget that Chiang Kai-shek was the fourth ally.
Mao was marching through China at the time, and he paused his assault during the war. Chiang Kai-shek was told, as I understand it from my own reading, that after the Japanese were defeated, the Allies would help him drive Mao back. Instead, tired of war, the Allies reneged and also excluded him from the end-of-war dealmaking and negotiations.
These were truly fateful decisions made by Churchill, FDR, and Stalin, the three present at Yalta.
@Seawriter I’m sure The Strategists is an important and interesting book. And that it identifies the leaders whose decisions created the war and also ended it.
Thank you for posting the review so we can get the book.
By the way, it was Chiang Kai-shek who
It boggles the mind to contemplate what would have happened had Japan realized its ambition and taken over China.
Unfortunately, the Left has completely obliterated the work done by Chiang Kai-shek and his historical importance. They have made him into some sort of monster, which he was not.
The other factor was the USSR shared a border with Mao and a huge amount of hardware crossed that border after Hitler surrendered, along with supplies and ammunition. The Allies did not do much to counter that.
Yeah, but writing on that does not result in long luxurious vacations in the people’s paradise with Tiananmen Tim and carnal distractions such as the emperors of old never dreamed of. Or seven figure grants.
If you are interested, I found this to be informative
I don’t think Hitler could have made any decisions leading to victory. Germany was resource poor and the British could establish a blockade.
The only hope for Germany was maintaining peace with Russia. Given Hitler’s ideology and lust for living space, not a long term prospect.
I think more of a European bias thing than a lack of consequence of Japan’s decision making in the war. Indeed their attack on Pearl Harbor was a very consequential action. In fact they were capable of winning in the East at least until the major attritional battle of Guadalcanal was won by the Americans and American industrialization came fully online. As for major strategic leaders the obvious answer is Isoroku Yamamoto in fact it could be argued that he engineered and drove the early war strategy that saw a lot of early Japanese success in the pacific. Although it could also be argued that his overall strategy lead to the eventual Japanese defeat. They had a sound plan, but badly underestimated their opponents both in terms of resolve and industrial capabilities. As for the Japanese grand strategic vision it is exactly the same as the Chinese’s grand strategic vision, just with Japan at the center of a “Coprosperity” sphere instead of China, that alone should make it an interesting study.
Sorry Seawriter, I have to agree with Bryan on this one. I also think that the Emperor Hirohito was much more involved in the planning and decision making of World War 2, that was just an inconvenient fact post surrender, so the extent of his involvement was minimized. This having been said I have no trouble with a book that concentrates on the War in Europe from a strategic perspective. I just think you could easily do something similar about the pacific. Especially given that China and America are on the same collision course as Japan and America were. Only this time it is entirely likely that America is in the role of the Japanese and China is in the role of America.
Japan went into the war without a plan to secure a stable source of petroleum, the key resource that the US’s refusal to sell them contributed to the crisis to begin with. They could not invade the US because of the 2nd Amendment, their analysis, not mine, and because of the US’s sheer size. They had enough issues in China with its weaker economy. Pearl Harbor firmly sealed Japan’s fate unless Germany defeated the US outright, which was not ever expected to happen in the near term.
No. Our position is similar to our position in 1940. A Navy with inadequate numbers and commitments in more than one potential theater of battle. Unfortunately, there is no Two Ocean Navy budget, our ship construction industry is weak and our ability to repair battle damage is questionable.
Our significant advantage is China is an export driven economy. It would be foolish for a nation dependent on the sea lanes to go to war with their customers. But then it was foolish for Germany, Japan and Italy to start WWII.
In other words we have a clear naval advantage at the beginning of the war (rather like the IJN after Pearl harbor) and a clear disadvantage if the war is too long, again very similar to the IJN after Pearl harbor. Additionally although much closer to parity in world war 2 we have the operational and experience advantage over the PLAN. The question is will that be enough. It may, to be fair, we have a large amount of experience with Naval operations especially carrier operations. PLAN is just learning; however, they have a large economy and a large industrial base. It isn’t clear to me that they can’t simply win by outlasting us in an attritional battle. The same tactic the Russians are using in Ukraine. It may not work, but it might work. Also while we are apparently unable (or unwilling) to protect shipping lanes. the Chinese are making aggressive moves to expand their control of shipping lanes in the South China Sea, Taiwan Straight, and Straight of Malacca.
The US cannot tolerate battle losses.
Political class never plans to win.
The military is following suit.
There is also a calculus that says that, if anyone pushes too hard, the nuclear threat will stop any attack. Now we’ve seen how well nuclear threats worked for Putin.
And, yes, reports indicate our “elites” again (still?) debate the use of limited nuclear strikes as if that would not immediately escalate. There would not be enough ashtrays in the world.
I will issue you the same challenge as I issued earlier: name the single Japanese leader whose decisions had as significant an influence on the long-term course of the war as did Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, Churchill, or even Mussolini. List the gentleman’s accomplishments that bent the course of the war long-term. Name one Japanese leader that was in charge as long as any of these five – because you cannot have a long-term influence if you were not in for the long haul.
I listed two. I think that Yamamoto had a large strategic prospective that had a outsized influence on the Pacific war, and shaped both his countries and the US’s war plans. I would even argue that it outlasted him considering he was assassinated about mid war. I also stated that I think Hirohito was a much more important figure in Japanese war planning than history makes him out to be for post war political reasons. Given that however maybe it isn’t possible to really treat Japan the same way, since the ultimate architect of their strategy was given a get out of jail free pass. Yes you could say the rivalry and infighting between the army and the navy ultimately hampered the effectiveness of the Japanese strategy in the pacific but the same could be said about Macarthur and Nimitz, so that wasn’t a uniquely Japanese problem.
The fact is Europe is easier to understand and grasp, since by and large it is a land war. The Pacific is much harder to understand, because of its nature. It is difficult to conceive of how the Japanese could have won, but they really could have with a couple of changes in fortune like who finds who first at Midway, or committing enough Naval assets to retake or at least effectively resupply Guadalcanal.
Yamamoto was an admiral and not really the highest ranked admiral in Japan. He was a tactician. The Pearl Harbor attack was tactical, not strategic. This book is about the grand strategic decisions made – not the actions of a single fleet. He was no more (or less) important to the war’s outcome than Nimitz and McArthur. But neither Nimitz nor McArthur were on the same level as Roosevelt. Surely you are not equating Yamamoto to the five in the book. If you are I have failed to convey what the book is about.
As for Hirohito, suspicions he had been more involved do not equate to the level of participation that Roosevelt, Churchill, Hitler, Stalin or even Mussolini. His desires were constantly overridden by other Japanese leaders. None of the other five would have allowed that.
The real problem is that in today’s world the thought that five white men were the primary decision makers is just unacceptable. Facts and the historical record be damned – we have to include a person of color.
It has nothing to do with them only being 5 white men. It is the idea that reducing everyone in Asia to being unimportant. I guess they were totally in thrall to events and there was no people at all shaping them.
The Japanese has agency. The Chinese had agency. There were not at the mercy of decisions being made a world away. They made decisions that had consequences.
They did not have leaders that used that agency. Again, the idea there has to be a Japanese leader on the same level as Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, and Mussolini is reflex, based on modern sensibilities. It’s like insisting there was some European leader on the same level as Genghis Khan in the 12th and 13th century. (Spoiler alert: there wasn’t.) So far, all the example of Japanese leaders I have been offered are either theater commanders on the same level as Nimitz and McArthur, or a head of state that was largely a puppet. Give me an example of a Japanese leader who functioned at the same level as Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Hitler, or even Mussolini.
That just cannot be what you mean. I read that to say they didn’t have any impact on the war outcome at all. It just happened to them.
If I am understanding you, it is that they had no one person as big as any of these five. I am still not sure I agree. I agree with Rax that the Emperor was more involved from what I have seen. However I’ll give you that point.
What I don’t agree with is that these 5 men these tides were started and steered the tides war all by their lonesome.
The men in Japan and China had some say. Maybe not singular individuals like these five, but their experience of WWII was not solely based on the tides of war of these five men.
In short, World, War II was more complicated than these five men. Incredible men that they were. And I believe great men change history. I also believe that groups of men can change history.
The Emperor did not control the military. The navy and the army did not communicate and had no effective common command structure. The attack on Pearl Harbor was a product of the Japanese navy. None of this could be publicly conceded at the time without losing face, just like accepting actual rather than a public, ceremonial subservience to the Emperor would be humiliating. Imperial Japan was not a well-run modern state with loyal and obedient bureaucrats like ours.