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Why Won’t Europe Defend Itself? — Peter Robinson
Back when the United States had no qualms about maintaining an enormous defense establishment, I could see why the Europeans wanted to let us do all the nasty work, maintaining only nominal defenses themselves. But now? President Obama has devoted the last five years to reducing our commitments abroad, shrinking our armed forces, and making us, withal, much less reliable allies than we used to be.
The European response? To make their defense budgets even smaller.
From the Wall Street Journal:
The Obama theory of “collective security” is that as the U.S. retreats from its historic commitments in Europe and the Middle East, allies will step up to deter aggressors and protect Western interests. NATO budget cuts suggest otherwise.
The cuts have created “gaps in meeting core NATO tasks” and resulted in “forces that are not ready, not trained, and not sufficiently equipped,” according to a 2012 study by the U.S. National Defense University. In plain English, this means that if Vladimir Putin sets his sights on NATO’s eastern periphery—by targeting the Baltic states, for example—the alliance may not have the capability to resist even if it has the political will.
European powers in recent years have shelved entire divisions and weapons systems. The British Royal Navy doesn’t operate a proper aircraft carrier. The Netherlands in 2012 disbanded its heavy-armor division, and France and the U.K. each now field a mere 200 main battle tanks. France has cut its orders of Rafale combat jets to six a year from 11. This isn’t even a Maginot Line.
Most alliance members are also dangerously demobilized: Germany last year announced plans to cut its troops to no more than 180,000 from 545,000 at the end of the Cold War. The French military has shrunk to 213,000 from 548,000 in 1990. The U.K. now has 174,000 armed forces, down from 308,000 in 1990.
It’s not just the “Obama theory” that’s in question here. Lots of people have supposed that, if the United States scaled back its commitments to Europe, then the Europeans would very naturally take on the defense of Europe themselves.
Way back during the late 1980s and 1990s, no less a figure than Irving Kristol suggested that NATO, at least as then constituted (with the United States as very much the senior partner), was close to having outlived its usefulness. Immediately after the Second World War, Europe needed American protection. But by the late 1970s Europe had not only recovered but become, roughly, just as rich as we—and much, much richer than the Soviet Union. By continuing to permit the Europeans to free ride on our defense budget, Kristol argued, we were infantilizing them. We should cut back, he insisted, forcing the Europeans to defend themselves—forcing them, that is, to grow up.
The argument made sense to me then—and still does. But in recent years we’ve effectively put it to the test—and instead of taking their own defense upon themselves the Europeans have become…still more infantile. Good Lord. The United Kingdom—”Hail, Britannia! Britannia, rule the waves!”—without a single working aircraft carrier.
I just don’t understand. Why should this be?
Published in General
I blame John Lennon. ” Imagine there’s no country…….”
Or he might not.
The point is, being hysterical about Putin (he’s irrational, he’s unpredictable, he’s probably trying to reconstitute the Soviet Union) is as unrealistic as expecting him to exit the Caucasus leaving liberal democracies in his wake.
I don’t know what Putin’s thinking – and I acknowledge that. The fact is you don’t know what Putin is thinking either – we both only have his past and present behaviour on which to base our assessments – but you seem not to realise that. Perhaps I misunderstand you?
You always, in your comments on various threads, seems to find leaders of Iran, Hamas, and Russia to be carbon copies of ourselves, rational actors, etc.. While that hypothesis should always be entertained, it would be folly to wholly rely upon it. The rest of us are not hysterical about Putin, just wary. I don’t think you are being Pollyannish, but you could be a bit more wary, IMO. If he thinks the fall of the USSR was the worst thing that happened in the last century, that is a datum regarding his past ‘behavior’ that has much relevance to the current circumstance.
Because their actions, as far as I can tell, are rational wrt preserving their own power and authority. It’s based on my assessment on what they have done. Both my assessment (the rationale) and what they have done (the facts) can be questioned.
If someone argues that Iran, Hamas etc. are irrational actors, surely they should provide the same sort of proof ? ‘They just might be’ is true, but so is ‘they just might not be’. Why do you think they’re irrational? What have they done that makes you think this? Share your facts and argument, not just conclusions. Fair request?
(Re nostalgia for the Soviet Union – no empire is entirely devoid of good points, especially for the dominant class or group. Imperial nostalgia – from France to Britain to Turkey – is not rare, but it’s not a precursor to reconquest either. Because the past can be safely botanised over without all the inconvenient negative facts up close : -)
We are only saying that imputing rationality to them – according to our definition of that term- is optimistic. Let’s leave it at that.
I don’t know about optimstic. It’s based on their past actions – ie facts, as understood by me. Different facts? Different argument? Without these, I’m not sure what your case is based on. Peace.
They do things they view as rational, but we don’t. Did you predict that Putin would invade Georgia and Crimea? Do you think it was predictable that Hamas would launch further intifadas after the Oslo Accords? Do you think it’s rational for Iran to continue to pursue a nuclear program? What will they do next, if they are rational and predictable?
I think he means optimistic in the sense of incautious. It leads to more rose predictions than other approaches which hedge against uncertainty.
A pretty interesting graphic from The Atlantic regarding the UN vote on the Ukraine.
Not surprisingly, the red are (pretty much) all countries who are explicitly hostile to the United States.
Of real note are the dark greys (abstentions), which includes all the BRICS countries that aren’t Russia, as well as Israel (an ally of the USA) and Iran (an ally of Russia).
Source: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/the-worlds-post-crimea-power-blocs-mapped/359835/
What is irrational about Putin invading Georgia and Crimea? He wants surrounding countries to be tied to Russia rather than the EU. Georgia makes a break for it, but unfortunately has not one but two secessionist movements. Russia helps the movements but also helps itself – by illustrating what happens when you try and leave the Russian sphere of influence. A few years later a similar scenario plays out with Ukraine.
Ethnical? Arguably not. But surprising? Why?
Contd.
Yes it was completely predictable that Hamas launch an intafada instead of acquiescing to deeply unpopular peace terms which in any case were extremely unlikely to be met. Right now Fatah and the PA are tarred with the failure of Oslo, the accelerating number of settlements on the West Bank and the scent of collaboration – not Hamas. Which organisation came out of that with more authority in Palestinian society?
Re Iran and nuclear weapons – yes, again completely rational. Compare and contrast how we deal with one crazy dictator (Gaddafy in Libya, without nuclear weapons) and another crazy dictator (the North Korean guy – with nuclear weapons). It’s an unpleasant regime, but wrt maintaining its grip on power and safeguarding itself from regime change (like happened in Saddam Hussain’s Iraq, another country without nuclear weapons) I can’t see how developing nuclear weapons is an irrational move for the Islamic Republic’s rulers.
What am I missing?
I think that this is the central question that Zafar has difficulty with. If you assume that the Iranians are rational actors for whom the destruction of Israel is a rational goal, then Iranian actions and statements in support of their actions make sense. If you think that the Iranians are primarily interested in the sorts of things we are interested in, then their willingness to batter their economy into its current shape in order to gain nuclear weapons and continue to support massive bloodshed (of Israelis, Iraqis, and Syrians), becomes a lot more confusing.
The North Korean threat has been, for decades, the ability to level Seoul with conventional arms, and the fact that China’s version of NATO has two members, one of them North Korea.
Iran is not like North Korea, or even Libya. It’s a vastly more open, democratic, society. If Iran didn’t support terrorism on an unparalleled scale (since their sole rival, Saddam, left the business), there wouldn’t be a demand for regime change. It’s still not vulnerable to the sort of regime change seen in Iraq, and a light reduction in sanctions would put off the domestic insurrection found in Libya, but they do not seek that.
If you resolutely ignore Iran’s history of regime change by the West – which last installed the Pahlavis in the place of a democratically elected leader in 1953? – destroying Israel with an atomic bomb (would Iran even remotely have that capability, even after developing nuclear capacity of some sort) might be some sort of an explanation for Iran’s nuclear weapon focus. But if you don’t ignore their history, regime change is a much more obvious motivator. Because it’s happened to them before, they aren’t just imagining it. And it happened to Iraq. And Libya. But not to North Korea…
jmho
It happened to Iraq to a large extent because Iraq remained interested in WMD development. To take the lesson from Iraq that WMD development is a good idea is perverse. It didn’t happen in North Korea after they got nukes, but it didn’t happen in North Korea before they got nukes, either, despite stronger arguments for attacking the Norks in the 1990s.
An Iraq style liberation is obviously impossible (where would they invade from?). Libya was just one of a number of successful domestic revolutions in the Middle East. It seems unlikely to me that the Iranians would have much use for nukes in the event of such a revolution; what would they do with it (other than firing up their base by killing Jews)?
The 1953 countercoup did not depose a democratic leader; Mossadegh ended the Iranian democracy when he dismissed the parliament and made himself absolute ruler.
That aside, the US currently does the stuff it was doing in 1953 (they train and fund opposition movements). You think that a nuke would stop the US from opposing the Iranian regime? Do you believe the US has ceased to oppose the Kims?
Do you imagine that the Iranians would demand that the US ceased broadcasting radio signals on penalty of a nuclear attack? In what way would the nukes be valuable in your proposed scenario?
Again, you are missing my point. I am not saying Putin is irrational. I’m saying Putin has goals and values that we may not understand, and thus, if we apply our rational analysis to it, we may not be able to reliably predict his behavior.
As Rudyard Kipling wrote:
I’m afraid I can’t share your optimism.
The Queen Elizabeth class carrier is a harrier carrier, not an all-up high-performance aircraft carrier. Comparing it to a Nimitz class carrier is like claiming a Ruger 10-22 is equivalent to an M-16, because they both fire a bullet of approximately .22 caliber.
It depends on who has the codes to arm the warheads.
Putin has long lamented the demise of the Soviet Empire. He wants to restore it.
It would stop a military attack on Iran (or an invasion, as happened in Iraq), for fear of what they would do in extremis when the regime felt it had nothing to lose.
Re radio stuff – I don’t know whether US based radio programs are perceived as a major threat by the dictators of the world. Do you think they’ve been particularly effective in winning hearts and minds that weren’t already won?
On a segue – it’s interesting how much one tends to reach for facts that justify one’s own world view. I see Mossadegh’s removal and the (re)imposition of the Pahlavis as a response to the nationalisation of Iran’s oil fields and in the context of the ongoing attempt to control profits from them. You may see it differently, and in a different context, and have the facts to support your pov. It’s challenging.
I think that you can’t say that propaganda and opposition training are unimportant and then claim that 1953 was about America, when all America did was train and fund some of the opposition and belch forth propaganda. CIA haters and CIA aggrandizers make the tiny CIA Iranian budget seem much more important than it was.
A US invasion of Iran is obviously impossible, and a Russian invasion hard to imagine (eg. why?) and absent nukes, what would be the motivation?
I think that’s partly true, but overly anglocentric. Mossadegh’s coup and massive, protracted, mob violence destablized and impoverished Iran, and the CIA enhanced protests grew from that, not nationalization.
I keep hearing this, and I just don’t buy it. I think Putin wants to restore the prestige and power of Russia when they were the big dog in the Soviet Union, and I definitely think that he wants a renewed buffer of Russian-friendly governments between Russia-proper (which will soon almost certainly include most of Ukraine and Belarus) and NATO, as he sees NATO as basically nothing but American lapdogs, and Russia IS paranoia (with good reason) . But you’re simply not going to see Russian tanks in Poland or Prague, let alone poised on the Fulda Gap again. Some of this I have to chalk up to a strange kind of Cold War nostalgia on the part of American Hawks.
I think his nostalgia goes further back than that, to the time of the Czars.
The Soviet Union wanted to take over the whole world. I’m not convinced that’s Putin’s desire.
In contrast, the Czars wanted to create a new Rome. I can totally imagine Putin reinventing himself as Caesar.
He wants a geographic Russian empire, not global ideological domination.
IMHO, of course. It’s not like I know the man personally.
<devil’s advocate mode = on>
According to one of his former advisors, Putin’s ambitions for territorial expansion may be greater than you think. This guy says Putin is even eying Finland.
Is this guy right, or is he a nut? Who knows.
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/03/30/vladimir-putin-conquer-finland-_n_5058483.html
<devil’s advocate mode = off>
Well, in the realm of speculation, I think you’re right about a Russian Empire being a more sympatico goal for Putin than the Soviet Union. Isn’t the Government’s relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and traditional Russian culture more similar to the Romanovs’ than the Communist Party’s?
Wrt the Empire – isn’t it more beneficial for Russia to be surrounded by client state run by dependent strongmen than to actually try and (re)absorb countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan etc? Even in Eastern Europe – how much would it cost to absorb Ukraine and Belarus, how much would it cost to keep them notionally independent but on side?
An interesting video from the Bruges Group.
Someone Had Blunder’d – The EU and Ukraine
The US is funding and training opposition groups today, and didn’t do much of it before. The eventual collapse of the liberal regime does not demonstrate that support could not succeed. Similar efforts were successful in Chile, Egypt, South Korea, and elsewhere. The Russian efforts were more civilized in most countries, but this was because most of what went on in Iran was about Iran, and no reliable principle said that the Shah would fall, while other leaders would succeed.