“Victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.” – Winston Churchill

There has been a lot of talk recently about victory and defeat in Ukraine recently. But what defines victory? The definition of victory is set by both sides, and are not necessarily “we win, they lose” binary. They often are, but depending on what each side seeks, it is possible for both sides to be convinced they won. (The classic example of this is the Battle of Kafji in the Gulf War. The Coalition felt they won the battle because they drove off the Iraqis. On the other hand, the Iraqis held it up as a victory because they had successfully conducted a raid against the Coalition forces. They even used it as an example of a successful battle in their war college.)

The other problem is the definition of victory for each side changes as a war progresses. The American Civil War is a classic example of that. For the Confederacy, the initial victory condition was collecting all slave states – including those remaining in the Union – as part of an independent nation. For the Union, it was simple reunification of the nation. By 1864, it had shifted. For the Confederacy, it was the survival of the states that had actually broken away. Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware, and even West Virginia could remain in the Union, if the rest obtained independence. For the Union, it was no longer simple reunification. It was reunification with the abolition of slavery.

We are already seeing these types of shifts in definition in the Ukraine War. On Day 1, Russian victory was the replacement of the existing government with a friendly one that would support the eventual absorption of Ukraine back into Russia (or possibly immediate absorption).  For Ukraine, it was survival as a nation. A month into the war, that appears to have changed. Russia now claims they have achieved their victory conditions with the territory they have seized. For Ukraine, it has shifted even further. I suspect a significant fraction of the population will not be satisfied they have “won” until Russia has disgorged all of Ukraine, not just the portions occupied by Russia since January 2022, but also those portions occupied between 2014 and 2022. How realistic that goal is less important than how badly the Ukrainians are willing to fight to achieve it.

Why the change? For Russia, I suspect it is an acknowledgment that their original goals were unrealistic and unachievable with the forces at their disposal. Their current stated victory condition has a Pee-Wee Herman “I meant to do that” feel. If makes Russia and its supporters feel better, I am good with that.

For Ukraine, it is a combination of two factors. The first is the realization that the Russian war machine is not the irresistible force they feared it was when the war began. They believe they have stopped it and are pushing it back.  The second is the cost the Ukrainian people have paid to date. To a point, the more blood spilled, the greater the eventual victory demanded becomes. When the war began most would likely have been satisfied with pushing the Russians out of Ukrainian-controlled territory at its end. Now they want more, in repayment of the blood already spilled.

I am seeing predictions on both sides of a quick end to the war with “victory” achieved by the side for which they support. I am more skeptical of that outcome. I believe the war will end when one side or the other is unwilling to continue fighting. I see no real sign that either side had reached that state. Both Russian and Ukraine are waiting for the other side to collapse, and are willing to continue until that happens.

On the surface, it seems the current stated Russian victory conditions are more easily achievable. All Russia has to do is stay where they are, and Ukraine has demonstrated the advantages of defense in this war. The Ukrainian defense has been based on the support of a friendly population. There is no evidence Russia has a friendly population in the territories it occupies. This permits Ukrainian irregular warfare in those territories, where they strike not at the Russian forces, but at their supply routes and centers. Putting down that type of effort requires massive resources, resources I suspect Russia lacks. It is fruitless to hold territory you cannot control, especially if it drains an already crippled economy.

Yet I remain equally uncertain of an eventual Ukrainian victory. I do not believe they have the resources to do much more that retake territory controlled by Ukraine prior to the war’s start, and that only if Russia decides that holding those territories is not worth it. I do not see them pushing Russia out of the Donbass or Crimea, especially the Crimea. Nor do I see Ukraine willing to cede those territories to Russia. Which means they will not end the war until a peace of exhaustion is achieved.

Ukraine has the resources to conduct the type of war I envision. It does not require mass movement of armies, but rather incursions by company-sized units supported by a friendly population striking lines of communications and supply depots. Equally, Russia has the resources to occupy the territories it holds for a year or more. Until something comes to upset that equilibrium, the war will continue.