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Quote of the Day: War
“No war is over until the enemy says it’s over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote.” – James Mattis
We are seeing an application of this in real-time as the war in Ukraine unwinds. Certainly, Russia has learned the enemy gets a vote. Their three-day war has turned into a month-long quagmire (literally in the north, with its Rasputitsa “mud season”). Now the Russians are declaring victory in Ukraine, claiming their goal was to liberate the Donbas and that has been achieved. Of course, the enemy, Ukraine, gets a vote. They have begun limited counteroffensives, and Russia may not find it easy to end the war by declaration as Russia hopes.
It is important to realize Mattis’s aphorism applies as much to Ukraine as it does to Russia. Should Ukraine take the offensive, even if it proves initially successful and Ukraine achieves its objectives, it may find itself as unable to end the war as it hopes. Russia gets a vote in that. It may choose to double-down, reinforce and counterattack. Or even go nuclear.
I suspect the final outcome will be determined by the side more determined to win. Obviously, when one side has a clear military superiority over another will to fight becomes secondary to military might. But when neither side has clear military superiority over the other, the size of the “fight in the dog” really does become more important than the size of the “dog in the fight.”
Published in Group Writing
Maybe war has changed since the early 19th century, but Napoleon said “in war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one.
Appropriate for the misery referred to by those dictators’ names. Poor in comparison, really.
He can “settle” for everything left of the Dnieper from Dniepro or shortly south of there and meet all of his southern objectives, with or without Odessa. Odessa is just a comfort factor. With that land bridge, he can project power far inland of Odessa even if he cannot take it. That would be enough to dominate the oil resources and maneuver space.
And the French paid dearly for believing this years down the road.
Vikings don’t wait for permission to cross the street.
Or maybe just no cookie jars.
That is just the coolest costume.
Thing is, if he wore it to school these days, his parents would be arrested and he would be taken into protective custody and have years of psychological counseling.
So did the Confederate States of America
Way to rub it in, Aardo!
With some interesting parallels. Official leadership stressed elan and sought to reassure (and enforce) tactics that did not suit the larger strategy nor the forces provided, while a hefty fraction of subordinate commanders saw the thing more conventionally and argued against the Received Wisdom of elan or fighting spirit.
I don’t mean to pooh-pooh the whole notion — overwhelming superiority wielded by slack cowards can still produce defeat. Elan or spirit is indeed an important edge to gain — one of many. The mistake the French made was in counting too heavily upon elan — they elevated it to an inflexible doctrine of offense, to the point that new defensive preparations were forbidden, as well as falling back to consolidate lines. Of course, this plagued Hitler’s miserable decision-making, but as his offensives famously succeeded until they didn’t, whereas France buckled miserably from the outset twice in a row, it shows much more clearly in the French example.
The Union almost lost the battle of Shiloh on the first day. In part that was because they had no idea Johnston was so near, but also because of a notion that digging in was bad for morale.
Well, the Confederates lost in large part because they got outgeneraled. By the end of the war the Union leaders were better than their Confederate counterparts. The Lost Cause movement was led by some of those inferior Confederate generals who wished to divert blame from their own inept performance to a myth of Union invincibility due to superior resources.
It was true in a sense. Union generals (by war’s end) were a superior resource.
True, but “one Southerner can lick a dozen Yankees” was tragically incorrect.
Not rubbing it in. Just pointing out that in war, when your beliefs and reality have that much of a mismatch, the result is A LOT of your own people dead, and a lost war.
Especially since when the Union troops were equipped with repeating rifles, it was the other way around.
Democratic wars or Democrats’ wars? In the latter you get a reinforcing feedback loop as the dead vote Democrat.