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Arguments from Ignorance
An argument from ignorance happens when we argue that something is not the case because we do not have evidence for it, or argue that something is the case because we do not have evidence against it. Arguments from ignorance are fallacious often enough that the term “argument from ignorance,” or argumentum ad ignorantiam, is often given as the name of an informal fallacy.
That’s not quite right. “Argument from ignorance” is the name of a pattern of argument, or a way of reasoning about things. But there are few–probably not any–patterns of argument that are inherently fallacious. It depends on what the argument is supposed to accomplish and on what we’re reasoning about–not always and only on the way we reason about it. Most of what we call the “informal fallacies” are just argument patterns that have the misfortune to be used fallaciously fairly often. (For more information, see my earlier commentaries on logic and informal fallacies here and here.)
There’s some ignorance out there about arguments from ignorance. Let’s talk about that:
Arguments from ignorance are not all fallacious; some arguments about G-d or the soul that are labeled “arguments from ignorance” are nothing of the sort; and not every argument that relies on ignorance is an argument from ignorance. But it’s still a reasonable question what exactly some of these arguments are, and in particular whether certain of them can be classified as scientific arguments.
They’re Not All Fallacious!
Arguments from ignorance are not necessarily bad:
I have no evidence that there are any elephants in my living room.
Therefore, there are probably no elephants in my living room.
But it’s easy to see how the same pattern of argument can also be used fallaciously:
I have no evidence that there are any spiders in my living room.
Therefore, there are probably no spiders in my living room.
This argument reasons in the same way, and it’s bad because it’s reasoning about something different, something that yields a different answer to the following question:
If the thing were there, would we probably have good evidence for it by now?
That’s an important question, and an affirmative answer to it should usually make for an ok argument from ignorance; a negative answer should usually make for a fallacious one.
Arguments from ignorance, even if they aren’t fallacious, tend to have this disadvantage: If we learn just the right thing in the future, the argument will turn out to have been wrong. That doesn’t, in itself, make an argument from ignorance fallacious; but it does mean that, like nearly everything else, it’s fallible.
Once in a while, an elephant may even turn up in the living room, as Gary Larson illustrates.
And why should we care about arguments from ignorance? Well, we can talk about that too.
Some Interesting Arguments from Ignorance
Here’s an interesting argument from ignorance:
If G-d existed, He would have made His existence obvious.
He hasn’t.
So He probably doesn’t exist.
And this:
If there were WMD in Iraq, we would have found them by now.
We haven’t.
So there probably weren’t any.
And this:
If extraterrestrials existed, I would probably have seen some better evidence for it by now.
I haven’t.
So they probably don’t exist.
Let no one say that all arguments from ignorance are fallacious and useless!
Of course, we can quibble these particular arguments. Would G-d make it obvious? Would the aliens? And not every argument from ignorance, even if its premises do a decent job supporting its conclusion, has true premises. Evidence for the existence of G-d is a real thing, and do you need me to give you the three Google search terms I keep in my head about those WMD? (Ok, we’ll just skip to the third and best one; it’s “NYT five thousand WMD”. Look up the 2014 article, not the 2002 one.)
But what about the really interesting arguments from ignorance–you know, the arguments that G-d or an immaterial soul must exist because we have no idea how else to explain things otherwise?
Yeah, we should talk about that.
About Those Arguments for G-d or the Soul
People talk about arguments from ignorance for the existence of G-d a lot, but I don’t believe I’ve ever even seen one.
I’ve studied plenty of arguments for the existence of G-d–arguments cosmological, teleological, moral, ontological cosmontological, Platonic, empirical, and maybe a few others. Certainly there is no argument from ignorance among the many with which I have some familiarity from Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, William James, Allama Iqbal, C. S. Lewis, Richard Swinburne, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Adams, William Lane Craig, and Andrew Loke. These are arguments from things we know, not from ignorance.
Not even William Paley‘s argument was an argument from ignorance. (It was an argument from analogy.)
But here is an interesting argument.
If matter could produce consciousness, we’d have probably figured out how by now.
We have no idea how matter might produce consciousness.
So the mind is probably not the body.
One thing that interests me about this argument is that I think it might actually be pretty good. But only pretty good, and always vulnerable to the possibility that tomorrow will see the crucial discovery that bridges matter and mind.
But what really interests me is that I don’t really care about this argument, and I don’t even know whoever made such an argument. It certainly wasn’t Descartes. Nor was it anyone else I can remember ever looking at who talked about mind and matter. The arguments that the mind is not matter are arguments from knowledge of what mind and matter are.
Of course, everyone thinks that “G-d of the gaps” is the way people argue for G-d before science fills in the gaps, and that the “soul of the gaps” is the traditional way to argue for a non-physical soul. But I don’t know why people think this since I can’t remember ever seeing any such arguments. (Here’s Brandon Rickabaugh’s fine article on how arguments for non-physical souls are not soul-of-the-gaps arguments; a quick skim of page 203 should get the point across.)
Of course, most books are books I have never read; if there’s something out there, there’s a good chance I haven’t read it. I’m not arguing from my ignorance of anyone making these kinds of arguments that no one ever has. My main point is a bit simpler:
The prominence of such arguments is greatly exaggerated.
But what about this one?
Stephen Meyer’s argument, as reported in this blog post:
Premise One: Despite a thorough search, no material causes have been discovered that demonstrate the power to produce large amounts of specified information.
Premise Two: Intelligent causes have demonstrated the power to produce large amounts of specified information.
Conclusion: Intelligent design constitutes the best, most causally adequate, explanation for information in the cell.
(See also this Ricochet post from Henry Racette, and there have been other Ricochet conversations on this matter.)
Ok–it’s an interesting argument. And ok–it relies on ignorance. Premise One there is a huge statement about our ignorance.
But that doesn’t make it an argument from ignorance. Let’s talk about that.
Not Every Argument Relying on Ignorance Is an Argument from Ignorance
Meyer’s argument relies on ignorance, but that does not make it an argument from ignorance. Here’s a similar argument:
There is no known explanation for the mess in the living room other than that the kids did it.
This is the sort of thing the kids normally do.
Therefore, the kids probably made the mess in the living room.
Or this one:
We don’t know of any reason to think Mark’s symptoms are caused by something other than a sinus infection.
Mark’s symptoms correspond to a sinus infection.
So Mark probably has a sinus infection.
And this last one illustrates an important point about ignorance and science: Every argument that draws some conclusion about the efficient causes of some physical phenomenon relies on our ignorance of any other cause.
In this way, scientific reasoning often relies on ignorance. But that doesn’t mean it’s also arguing from ignorance. In the example above, the argument argues from knowledge of Mark’s symptoms, knowledge of sinus infections, and an understanding of the fact that the two fit.
So what’s the ignorance doing in there? Not much; it’s just making sure we don’t know of any good competing explanation.
But Are They Scientific?
I like the Intelligent Design Arguments, but there is at least one reasonable concern with them. One can argue that Meyer’s religious conclusions are not falsifiable and are therefore unscientific.
I like that objection; it draws from Karl Popper’s philosophy of science, and Popper is the man!
The worst I can say about this objection to Meyer is that Popper’s philosophy of science is not the only game in town, and that I think Thomas Kuhn is also awesome. (He may even be right!)
Actually, I’m not even sure I care. I want to know if the premises support the conclusion. I don’t care all that much whether the premises are learned from science or not, whether the conclusion is theological or not, and whether or not the argument can technically be classified as scientific. I just care about the logic.
Published in Religion & Philosophy
1. My team has not found a causal link between A and B.
2. Several dozen teams have not found a link between A and B.
An argument from ignorance made from logical necessity (trying to prove a universal negative) becomes stronger by numerosity.
The problem with much of the pandemic “science” is that mucho utter BS was advanced ad verecundiam which spawned an opposite form of argument that if it contradicted that which was proposed by The Science(TM) it must be true, kind of a populist counter-fallacy. This in turn devolved into the argument that if the MAGA hats doubt it, then it must be true.
I see no evidence that I have anything intelligent to add, but I wanted to say “well done.”
I don’t see any intelligent comment by me. Therefore I have none. NOT!
It’s mind over matter. If you don’t mind, it doesn’t matter.
Now, I understand what you’re saying here regarding interest. My own interest is in science (which means knowledge) and the scientific method, which is a way we have found to acquire knowledge. Specifically, it involves empirical research: testing hypotheses. This is about testing to see if the premises we are putting into the logic machine are valid. As you have said, future information might invalidate a premise. The scientific method and the scientific attitude are about getting ahead of that curve as much as possible.
Another way of saying this is the old computer adage: Garbage In, Garbage Out. Your logic can be perfect and unassailable, but if your data (premises) are incorrect, the output of your logic is useless. Computers rely on logic. But relying on logic alone can really mess up your life.
I’m lost. What, specifically, is your point?
Science isn’t knowledge. (Or, rather, it’s not the only kind of knowledge.)
What I said about future information killing off a premise–I said that about arguments from ignorance. When we’re talking about a different pattern of reasoning, it’s a different issue–an issue on which I have said nothing at all.
But yes, of course: Those arguments from knowledge, which are misconstrued as arguments from ignorance, still depend entirely on the truth of their premises. You don’t have to tell me that.
https://www.etymonline.com/word/science
Logic is nice, but it’s not where the rubber hits the road. It’s an engine. But one needs a lot more than an engine to get anywhere.
Well, now. I will tell you what they told me, back in the day.
If I am wrong, I would be satisfied if you just said,
An argument from authority isn’t necessarily bad, if St. A. is the authority.
It is quick, and painless.
Back in the day, I was taught that
In the example you gave, the argument is one of strict deductive logic, as stated (its conclusion is given as an unqualified truth). The conclusion does not follow from the premise. Therefore, it is formally fallacious.
My argument in categorical logic concerning the question you raise
is
*I recall that there are systems of logic where premises and conclusions can have qualified truth values; I forget what they’re called and for the moment don’t want to look it up. Cause, like, what…I am going to teach you logic?
Yes, etymologically, science means “knowledge.”
Just don’t tell me all knowledge is science, and we shouldn’t have any problems.
And what else do we need?
True premises? If that’s your point, then of course I agree.
You’re right that they taught you that–I guess. That might even be true if those were the stipulated meanings of the terms in some particular textbook.
But no–fallacies happen in inductive arguments too.
The truth or falsehood of a conclusion has no bearing on whether an argument is fallacious. However, it can indicate that an argument either is fallacious or has a false premise.
The elephant example was not deductive, and I can clarify that in the post.
Well, if you know more of the bits of logic I never taught, you might!
Violently. 😜
True. And that is the point. Logic is a tool. The scientific method is a tool. I have a big tool box because hammers are not great at sawing wood.
I dig.
Okay, what am I missing here. It seems to me that these are not arguments from ignorance. They are arguments from “known normal circumstances or routine patterns.” (I made that up. Do I get credit for inventing a new argument theory?) While the arguer may not know specifically about elephants or spiders in a specific living room, he does have the knowledge of past history and probabilities. Does that count as “knowledge” as opposed to “ignorance” in this case?
I’d say that’s just how we know whether this principle is in place:
I.e., the principle that says “If it were there, we’d probably have good evidence for it by now.”
Ignorance is one of those words that has gotten a bum wrap like ignorance is a bad thing. I just point this out to clarify ignorance is simply the state of not knowing something. We are all a great deal more ignorant than we are knowledgeable.
Side note: Never mind. I think I’ll go write a post on this note.
Socrates!
Knowing isn’t always cut and dry. I knew a lineman who often had to go into derelict city houses and cut off the power. One time he got a funny feeling while he was still in his truck. He hesitated and hesitated getting out and going into the house as he’d always done with every other house. And the feeling got more intense so he drove off. As he was pulling away from the curb, he saw two guys come out of the house carrying guns and stuff. Clearly it was a drug deal. Did he know something that made him not go into the house? He says he did. I think he did. How did he know it? A million little things that subconsciously didn’t look right? Or some other source? How did he know there was imminent danger within?
Yes. There are two ways of knowing true facts: deduction and induction.
The arguer used the latter.
Steven,
You bring up something worth mentioning, though it may be slightly tangential to whatever point SA is making in his post.
When talking about the suitability, the probable effectiveness, of a given line of reasoning, it matters quite a lot how consistent the hypothetical conclusions are with the vast bulk of our experience. It’s one thing to make predictions about spiders (spoiler: there’s at least one in your living room) and elephants (relax; I’ve got one in mine, but almost no one else does).
SA, like Stephen Meyers, is making arguments about the existence of God and His role in the creation and/or operation of the universe. Those arguments are predicated on an absence of satisfactory alternative explanations for observed phenomena. More, they are predicated on an absence of satisfactory explanations at the edge of science, in domains that are new, particularly challenging in their complexity, and full of competing theories.
There will always be such domains, and there will always be those ready to backfill our lack of knowledge and understanding by invoking a supernatural explanation. That doesn’t mean that the supernatural explanation is wrong. It does, however, suggest that, as a “pattern of argument” (as SA put it), it’s something of which we should be wary.
— Hank
I agree with your point. My spider/elephant example doesn’t work when postulating the existence of God because we don’t have prior known God examples with which to compare. My own take on this thing is that because science cannot explain consciousness, not even a little bit, which is the most important thing in all our lives, then there must be something more to the Universe other than matter.
How do you know?
Are we convinced that “science cannot explain consciousness, not even a little bit?”
I suppose we’d have to begin by defining “consciousness.” I think we’d discover that it’s one of those “edge of science” topics I was talking about — and that science offers various not-yet-disproven hypotheses to attempt to explain at least a bit of it.
I don’t think I can define it but I sure know that it’s there. Renee Descartes will back me up on that one.
Maybe it’s edge of science, but I’ve never seen an explanation, or even a decent guess as to what causes consciousness or what it is. Do you know of any?
Does your notion of “ignorance” include a test for truth? I mean, is it possible to be ignorant of something that does not exist?
If one were to have no awareness of the latest town gossip or exoplanet sighting, and the truth happened to be that the teacher did not dine with the minister or that the telescope data was mishandled, would one be ignorant of that assignation or that planet?
FYI, I’m fairly well convinced that we have enough neuroscience now to plausibly explain consciousness.
And however we know basic beliefs–the first principles we reason from, the ones that provide evidence for everything else, the premises that don’t need any sub-arguments.
But you did notice the second premise in that pattern of argument, right?