[Editor's Note: I'm beyond delighted to introduce Fr. Bill Miscamble, C.S.C., who we've asked to join us as one of Ricochet's resident historians.  Professor of History at Notre Dame University, Fr. Bill's expertise lies in the subject of American foreign policy since World War II.  You can find a full listing of the books he's authored on his profile page.]

If the past is any guide the upcoming anniversaries of the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9, 1945, will prompt the publication of a range of opinion pieces fiercely critical of the American actions.  It will be alleged that the Japanese really were right on the verge of surrender before the atomic bombs were used, and that President Harry Truman and his associates knew this.  Further, it will be argued that the atomic bombings should be understood less as a means to bring World War II to an end by forcing Japan’s surrender and more as the opening salvo in the Cold War and intended primarily to influence and to intimidate the Soviet Union.

In anticipation of such flawed arguments let me offer to Ricochet readers the essential conclusions of my recent study: The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs and the Defeat of Japan  (Cambridge University Press, 2011).

Firstly, the principal motive for the American use of the devastating new weapon lay in a potent mix of desire to force Japan’s surrender and to save American lives.  Secondly, the atomic bombs contributed decisively in forcing that eventual surrender and in bringing the brutal war to an end prior to any costly invasion of the Japanese home islands.  Furthermore, while the A-Bomb was never entirely separated from considerations of postwar international politics, the decision to use the weapon was not driven by these concerns.  The atomic bombs were used primarily for a military purpose, and they proved effective in inflicting defeat on the Japanese.

We must be clear that Truman and his associates did not seek “alternatives” to using the atomic bombs, but viable and less costly options that might have proved successful cannot be identified with any certainty--even in retrospect and when far removed from the pressures Truman was under in 1945.  This is largely the position that Truman held from 1945 onwards.  Ultimately, he proved far more reliable than the host of his subsequent revisionist critics.

(In a subsequent post I will address issues surrounding the morality of using the atomic bombs.)

Comments:


tabula rasa
Joined
Jun '10
tabula rasa

I just finished reading E. B. Sledge's With the Old Breed, which chronicles the personal experiences of an American Marine on Pelelieu and Okinawa.  After reading those experiences, I have no doubt that the primary motive of Pres. Truman was to bring the war to an end:  the thought of fighting Okinawa again on a nationwide scale was daunting.

Aaron Miller
Joined
May '10
Aaron Miller

Welcome aboard, Father.

Can you explain why Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as the targets?

Mark Wilson
Joined
May '10
Mark Wilson

Aaron Miller: Welcome aboard, Father.

Can you explain why Hiroshima and Nagasaki were chosen as the targets? · Aug 4 at 8:53am

I understand that part of the reason was that they were relatively intact because they had not suffered much conventional bomb damage.  This would both create a more fantastic spectacle to induce the Japanese surrender, and allow a more accurate assessment of the power of the new weapons.

Steven Zoraster
Joined
Feb '11
Steven Zoraster

1 During each month of 1945 , 100,000 civilians died in Japanese occupied territory, including the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, China, French Indochina, and the Philippines.

2) Millions of Japanese would have died of starvation if the war had continued into the winter of 1945. 

3) The British planned to invade Malaya in early September 1945. When they landed peacefully after the war ended, the landing beaches were found to  backed by swamps.  Massive casualties to be expected on both side.


Joined
Apr '11
D.B. Little

Thank you too, Father. The moral argument was rather obvious to the people who fought but they have gone, sadly, the way of all things, and their children never understood just how horrible the Japanese had been to begin with.

An actual argument on the necessities is a fine book reviewed here; someone actually ran the numbers of what the operation would have cost in blood.

And Aaron, a fine, remarkably comprehensive book on the subject of the Bomb is The Making of the Atomic Bomb, which answers those questions and more. It is a book that Christopher Hitchens, apparently, never bothered to read, since it does explain we had every intention of dropping it on Berlin before V-E day came. Hitchens has been preaching as long as I have been reading him that we were racist to drop the bombs on the Japanese; we would have never done that to white folks and two of them in particular.

The reason why we dropped two on them is it took two (and the threat of another on the Emperor's palace) make them stop.

Mark Wilson
Joined
May '10
Mark Wilson

Fr. Bill, I wonder if you are aware that Peter Robinson recorded an episode of Uncommon Knowledge on the topic of Just War Doctrine, on which his guests coincidentally were also clerics.  They spent a good amount of time discussing the atomic bombing of Japan, and their opinions ranged from unquestionably unjust to "among the most just and moral things that were ever done".  It is fascinating that this debate still continues to this day.

Brian Watt
Joined
Jun '10
Brian Watt

Welcome, Father Bill.

Is there any mention of the petition offered by physicist Leo Szillard and other Manhattan Project scientists that they urged Robert Oppenheimer to present to Harry Truman calling for the demonstration of the nuclear weapon to Japanese officials before it was used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Apparently Oppenheimer characterized the petition as "naive meddling" though after the devastation of the two Japanese cities apparently regretted his decision to quash it. 

FX Meaney
Joined
Feb '11
Francis X

 Welcome, Father, from a fellow Notre Damer.  We appreciate the important work you do there and look forward to hearing from you in your field of specialization and on other matters.  

Kervinlee
Joined
May '10
Kervinlee

I have seen reports that the Japanese were moving large amounts of troops to southern Japan in anticipation of an American mainland invasion. The brutal calculus seems to have been (after the Japanese rejection of the Potsdam Declaration) a choice between a high number of Japanese civilian dead or an exponentially higher number of both Japanese and American dead that would have been the necessary result of an invasion.

That was Truman's awful choice but he made it and it worked. The war ended. It's easy to second-guess and criticize from decades removed. Until our generation faces the same choices of that earlier one, I will give Truman the benefit of the doubt and agree that the bomb, however terrible, was the fastest way of ending a savage war and thus was in fact humane. God help us.


Joined
Aug '11
Crystal Turner

Since my father was on the ship to Japan when the bombs were dropped, I may be biased in favor of them, but I fail to see anything wrong with using A bombs in the first place. If it were so bad, then why did it take two before a Japanese surrender? How can anyone possibly argue in favor of carpet bombing? What is the advantage to having US soldiers die in the process? Did those cities not recover?

I cannot accept the premise that we should not have used our superior weapons.

Tommy De Seno

 Welcome Father!  Interesting topics.

I too hope that in your next post you can enlighten us about Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets.

I have read arguments for their militiary importance.  But as pointed out above, they were never bombed conventionally, which suggests they were not of great military importance.  Hope you can shed some light on that.

Also, civilian vs military casualty information is hard to come by, particularly the number of children killed.  If you have the numbers at the ready, that woud be appreciated.

Sorry if you are feeling like we are all assigning you homework.  We're just excited about having you here and anxiously await your next post!

Cas Balicki
Joined
Jun '10
Cas Balicki

At this point in the war the US had enough fissionable material for four bombs, that's it, no more. The first bomb was popped at the Alamogordo proving grounds, so that left three bombs. Little Boy exploded over Hiroshima (it never hit the ground, but was barometer fused to increase its destructive radius), and Fat Man over Nagasaki. After that there was only enough fissionable material for one more bomb. This simple arithmetic is never mentioned by the we-should've-popped-a-demo-bomb crowd when the criticize Truman's decision. In addition Nagasaki was on the day a secondary target, I think but am not 100% certain. The primary target that day was clouded over. In fact, Nagasaki was also clouded over, but a gap, fortuitously or not, opened in the heavens above the city and allowed targeting.

Sisyphus
Joined
Jul '10
Sisyphus

There was no need to rehash the alternatives to using the bombs on Japan when the opportunities arose, because those alternatives had been developed and rehashed for years prior and were all far more costly in terms of allied blood and treasure. To the Allied fighting men at risk, the Bomb was a game changer. Miraculous. I had two grandfathers in the Pacific Theater in support of the invasion of Japan and have always felt very strongly that Truman's decision assured that I was able to meet both of them.

Brian Watt
Joined
Jun '10
Brian Watt
Cas Balicki: At this point in the war the US had enough fissionable material for four bombs, that's it, no more. The first bomb was popped at the Alamogordo proving grounds, so that left three bombs. Little Boy exploded over Hiroshima (it never hit the ground, but was barometer fused to increase its destructive radius), and Fat Man over Nagasaki. After that there was only enough fissionable material for one more bomb. This simple arithmetic is never mentioned by the we-should've-popped-a-demo-bomb crowd when the criticize Truman's decision...

Obviously the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought Japanese leaders into submission to unconditionally surrender and potentially saved hundreds of thousands if not in excess of a million lives. And we may never know whether a demonstration of the weapon to Japanese officials would have brought them to the deck of the USS Missouri that much quicker...but we certainly were under no obligation to divulge how much fissionable material we may or may not have had; only that we had these weapons and were prepared to use them. But would it have been more ethical to demonstrate the bomb before using it?

Cas Balicki
Joined
Jun '10
Cas Balicki

As an aside Bob Caron, the tail gunner on the Enola Gay (named for Col. Paul W. Tibbets's mother), was the first person in human history to see a percussion wave. The post drop flight path called for a 7% dive at full throttle away from the epicenter of the expected explosion. A steeper dive would have generated more speed, but would not have maximized the distance, while a less steep dive would have increased distance but not speed. When the percussion wave, reported by the tail gunner as an unrepeatable expletive passed the Enola Gay it heaved the plane as any water wave would heave a cork. No one is sure of the wave's amplitude, but it could easily been a hundred or more feet. 

Cas Balicki
Joined
Jun '10
Cas Balicki

Brian, how do you propose such a demonstration to go. Buy the Japanese general staff some sunglasses and set them on a beach with little umbrellas in their drinks and then pop the bomb? Second, even the army had grave fears that the weapons might not successfully ignite an atomic reaction. Don't forget how primitive the engineering was in those days. Also, if the US demonstrated the bomb and it proved a dud due to a failure to ignite, a high probability occurrence, would that have brought Japan to its knees? Another interesting aside is that Oak Ridge Tennessee, where the fissionable material was being made was using something on the order of 1/4 of all the electrical energy produced in the entire US to manufacture the fissionable material, so there wasn't a lot of excess Ur-235 and Ur-238 around to entertain Japanese generals with.

Brian Watt
Joined
Jun '10
Brian Watt
Cas Balicki: Brian, how do you propose such a demonstration to go. Buy the Japanese general staff some sunglasses and set them on a beach with little umbrellas in their drinks and then pop the bomb? Second, even the army had grave fears that the weapons might not successfully ignite an atomic reaction. ...

After the first successful detonation, which was filmed, there was enough information even at this point to step Japanese representatives through the destructive potential of the weapons even without a live demonstration and without yielding up sensitive classified information. As it was, 83% of the scientists working on the Manhattan Project proposed presenting the petition to Truman and if the Japanese were still unconvinced were quite willing to proceed with the planned bombings. Just to add a little historical perspective.

Charles Gordon
Joined
Dec '10
Charles Gordon

Tommy De Seno:  Welcome Father!  Interesting topics.

I too hope that in your next post you can enlighten us about Hiroshima and Nagasaki as targets.

I have read arguments for their militiary importance.  But as pointed out above, they were never bombed conventionally, which suggests they were not of great military importance.  [...]· Aug 4 at 9:42am

It is also suggestive of Japan’s great size, its location’s natural defense, and of our limited resources.

Using physics to improve the productivity of our limited resources is consistent with the natural acquisition and use of our wealth of knowledge.

Is there a difference between incurring 10,000 casualties over ten days and 100,000 in one? The numbers need to be multiplied, but the principle obtains.

It is certain that 10,000 casualties would not force Japan’s capitulation. And nearly as certain that the limited infliction of casualties pursued over a longer period would impel Japan’s resolve to resist.

Aaron Miller
Joined
May '10
Aaron Miller

I wonder if the sheer number of the lives at stake warps our perception of that choice. Is it acceptable to kill one non-combatant (intentionally... not as collateral damage) to save ten of our soldiers?

Richard O'Shea
Joined
Jun '11
Richard O'Shea

 I have never spoken with a WWII vet that wasn't relieved we dropped the bombs when we did and where we did.


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