The Problem of Evil Solved
I couldn't resist the headline, but in truth, we have not yet solved the problem of evil. Our contest, however, does at last have a winner, so we have at least solved one problem.
My father's verdict:
***
Why not let Monty Hall and his problem descend into desuetude?
Whereupon the problem of evil.
It is a problem that some commentators have refused to acknowledge. Thus Larry 3435 offers what is, perhaps, a whimsical explanation of God's willingness to permit evil: He is disposed to write novels. This may be so, but the question at hand depends on the assumption that there is no God. Who is writing our particular novel in that case?
Halifax offers a variation on familiar theological answers to the question of evil. Suffering is made good in the hereafter. But this is to beg the question. With no God entering the premises of the argument, there is no obvious hereafter to exit its conclusions.
Still other commentators, determined to stick with the Almighty, have toyed with the idea that he may not be omnipotent after all. I'm willing to imagine that this may be so, but surely this is objectionable on theological grounds? An Almighty suffering a humiliating demotion in power is cousin to Wotan in Valhalla – impressive, the both of them, without being the least bit interesting.
K.C. Mulville comes close to addressing the question when he argues that without natural evil, life would be impossible. Paules demurs only to the extent of insisting the universe is indifferent to natural evil. Who would doubt the indifference of the universe? But the question is not the attitude of the universe but the fact of its organization. Attitudes have nothing to do with it. What K.C. Mulville does not provide is an argument in favor of his thesis that suffering is necessary for life. Why is this so?
Brandon Zaffini has a double complaint: The first, he fails to understand why certain forms of anxiety should feed on themselves; the second, why the word 'design' should be used in an argument addressed to atheists. Fair enough, this second point. Let us scrap the word. What remains is just the same argument. Why suffering in the universe as it is? As for the first point, just as I can be made anxious by my anxiety, so I can suffer in thinking of the pointlessness of suffering. This is just what torments Ivan Ilych, after all, in the greatest of all 19th century novellas, Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilych.
Blue Ant offers an engaging digression in which the universe is imagined as a lavish documentary, but one that God has witnessed from beginning to end. The universe so imagined is awfully close to the universe of general relativity, but whether it is a documentary or some horrible four dimensional block, why does it contain what so obviously it does contain?
Ah, Mr. Labeit -- faithful to the end to his own tenaciously held concerns.
"Without knowing precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word," he write, "I run the risk of not knowing what another is talking about. If debaters cannot settle on a common understanding of concepts, then a debate is hopeless." There are two problems with this peremptory point of view. A worry about words in Mr. Labeit's first sentence has become a concern over concepts in his second. Words are words, concepts concepts. Why mingle them thus? But in the second place, when do we ever know "precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word?" What does he mean by words, concepts, knowing, or refers?
Contests require winners. K.C. Mulville tiptoes to the edge of an interesting argument in suggesting a necessary connection between the existence of life and the brute facts of suffering. Maybe this connection is real; maybe not. But the prize goes to K.C. Mulville for considering the possibility.
Whenever he has an argument in its favor, I would be interested in seeing it.
***
Congratulations, K.C. Mulville: This was a marathon, and you made it to the end. The Skylark was behind the other door--but the Ricochet glory trophy is yours.
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Comments :
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Ah, Mr. Labeit -- faithful to the end to his own tenaciously held concerns.
"Without knowing precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word," he write, "I run the risk of not knowing what another is talking about. If debaters cannot settle on a common understanding of concepts, then a debate is hopeless." There are two problems with this peremptory point of view. A worry about words in Mr. Labeit's first sentence has become a concern over concepts in his second. Words are words, concepts concepts. Why mingle them thus? But in the second place, when do we ever know "precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word?" What does he mean by words, concepts, knowing, or refers?
Sowing philosophical skepticism I see.
Oct '11
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Congratulations on being the only person I've seen in a long, long time to correctly use the phrase "begs the question," Ms. Berlinski!
As to the part about, "An Almighty suffering a humiliating demotion in power," it makes me think of Exodus 32:9-14 (KJV). This is just after the molten calf:
"9And the LORD said unto Moses, I have seen this people, and, behold, it is a stiffnecked people:
10Now therefore let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them: and I will make of thee a great nation.
11And Moses besought the LORD his God, and said, LORD, why doth thy wrath wax hot against thy people, which thou hast brought forth out of the land of Egypt with great power, and with a mighty hand?
...
14And the LORD repented of the evil which he thought to do unto his people."
Other translations, I gather, don't use "repent," choosing "relent" instead. Repent is pretty specific. In the KJV, Moses has rebuked God, and God feels guilty, so God repents.
Humiliating? I don't know. Demotion in power? Seems like it.
Mar '11
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Contests require winners. K.C. Mulville tiptoes to the edge of an interesting argument in suggesting a necessary connection between the existence of life and the brute facts of suffering. Maybe this connection is real; maybe not. But the prize goes to K.C. Mulville for considering the possibility.
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In other words, to live is to suffer. Sorry, but that idea is thousands of years old.
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
The connotations of "evil" and "God" are much more significant in this discussion than the connotations of "words" and "concepts" and "knowing". A sophist doesn't do his dirty work by equivocating on "words" and "concepts". By contrast, much casuistry has been committed by clever swindlers with regard to "evil" and "God".
Sep '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Michael Labeit
Ah, Mr. Labeit -- faithful to the end to his own tenaciously held concerns.
"Without knowing precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word," he write, "I run the risk of not knowing what another is talking about. If debaters cannot settle on a common understanding of concepts, then a debate is hopeless." There are two problems with this peremptory point of view. A worry about words in Mr. Labeit's first sentence has become a concern over concepts in his second. Words are words, concepts concepts. Why mingle them thus? But in the second place, when do we ever know "precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word?" What does he mean by words, concepts, knowing, or refers?
Sowing philosophical skepticism I see. · Oct 15 at 8:48pm
Merely asking you to clarify your definitions, Mr. Labeit, lest all your musings become mere footnotes to Western philosophy, somewhere near Turkey.
Edited on Oct 15, 2011 at 9:28pmNov '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Let's here it for K.C.! A genuinely good guy so far as I'm concerned.
Sep '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
A sophist doesn't do his dirty work by equivocating on "words" and "concepts".
A sophist does his dirty work by equivocating on his definition of terms
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Pseudodionysius
Michael Labeit
Ah, Mr. Labeit -- faithful to the end to his own tenaciously held concerns.
"Without knowing precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word," he write, "I run the risk of not knowing what another is talking about. If debaters cannot settle on a common understanding of concepts, then a debate is hopeless." There are two problems with this peremptory point of view. A worry about words in Mr. Labeit's first sentence has become a concern over concepts in his second. Words are words, concepts concepts. Why mingle them thus? But in the second place, when do we ever know "precisely what qualities to which one refers with a given word?" What does he mean by words, concepts, knowing, or refers?
Sowing philosophical skepticism I see. · Oct 15 at 8:48pm
Merely asking you to clarify your definitions, Mr. Labeit, lest all your musings become mere footnotes to Western philosophy, somewhere near Turkey.
Asking disputants to define "evil" and "God" is not comparable to asking them to define "words" and "concepts". Sounds more like Clinton's lousy admonition to define "is".
Edited on Oct 15, 2011 at 9:40pmMay '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Pseudodionysius: A sophist doesn't do his dirty work by equivocating on "words" and "concepts".
A sophist does his dirty work by equivocating on his definition of terms
Trying to create a meaningful distinction where there is none?
Sep '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Asking disputants to define "evil" and "God" is not comparable to asking them to define "words" and "concepts". Sounds more like Clinton's lousy admonition to define "is".
CS Lewis once quipped that "an atheist cannot be too careful what he reads". I suggest you not buy David Berlinski's book, lest you read his discussion of Ockham on that very topic or the discussion of Ockham by Ed Feser. Your co-religionist, Mr. Hitchens, makes a terrible hash of the topic in his book I'm afraid.
Sep '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Michael Labeit
Pseudodionysius: A sophist doesn't do his dirty work by equivocating on "words" and "concepts".
A sophist does his dirty work by equivocating on his definition of terms
Trying to create a meaningful distinction where there is none? · Oct 15 at 9:46pm
A meaningful definition of sophistry comes from the sophists themselves in ancient Greece. A trivial exercise for a philosopher I would think. But don't let me interrupt your non discussion.
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Pseudodionysius: Asking disputants to define "evil" and "God" is not comparable to asking them to define "words" and "concepts". Sounds more like Clinton's lousy admonition to define "is".
CS Lewis once quipped that "an atheist cannot be too careful what he reads". I suggest you not buy David Berlinski's book, lest you read his discussion of Ockham on that very topic or the discussion of Ockham by Ed Feser. Your co-religionist, Mr. Hitchens, makes a terrible hash of the topic in his book I'm afraid.
Would you like to reduce this to a battle of quotes and cute labels (co-religionist, ???).
Oct '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Is evil a deed or a thought, does it even require a God ? A social definition to promote conformity ?
What is evil to one may not be to another... Late in on this...
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Pseudodionysius
Michael Labeit
Pseudodionysius: A sophist doesn't do his dirty work by equivocating on "words" and "concepts".
A sophist does his dirty work by equivocating on his definition of terms
Trying to create a meaningful distinction where there is none?
A meaningful definition of sophistry comes from the sophists themselves in ancient Greece. A trivial exercise for a philosopher I would think. But don't let me interrupt your non discussion.
???
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
If you can't count on a Berlinski to get that right, you can't count on anyone.
May '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
"Brandon Zaffini has a double complaint: The first, he fails to understand why certain forms of anxiety should feed on themselves; the second, why the word 'design' should be used in an argument addressed to atheists. Fair enough, this second point. Let us scrap the word. What remains is just the same argument. Why suffering in the universe as it is? As for the first point, just as I can be made anxious by my anxiety, so I can suffer in thinking of the pointlessness of suffering."
I must have been unclear. With the first point, I do not fail to understand why certain forms of anxiety should feed on themselves. I just fail to see why it matters and is a problem for the atheist. Perhaps the issue here is that I am looking for a logical problem, and you are defining "problem" in a different way.
The second point depends on design. Once you give up the concept of design, you cannot legitimately ask the question "why." That question, as you are using it, implies that there must be a rational explanation for evil besides the chaotic spinning of countless particles.
Jan '11
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
I'm delighted to accept the award.
I'm also intrigued at Dr. Berlinski's invitation to discuss the connection between "the existence of life and the brute facts of suffering." Yes, I do see a connection, and I would like to offer some thoughts on it. However, I'll use the "think first, write later" technique, so give me a little time to prepare.
Frankly, I sympathize with Blue State Blues that an answer is thousands of years old. But then again, so is the question. We're certainly not the first people to address these issues. The fact that we still wrestle with them only testifies to their enduring power.
Jan '11
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Thanks, Lance! High praise indeed.
Aug '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
Sorry, maybe I missed a line of reasoning in this whole discussion, but when did we make an absolute equation where "suffering == evil"?
There are two major hurdles to this. First, some suffering is a side effect of necessary, (relatively) benign systems. Physical pain alerts you to the need to fix something in your body or environment (your hand hurts when you touch a hot stove). Sorrow over losing a loved one may feel bad, but the source involves the very definition of humanity; all mortals must die eventually.
Either we define every personal inconvenience as evil, or we have to conclude that some suffering is not evil.
The second objection is that evil may be a motive force. Intentional human acts that cause suffering may be evil, or not (the surgeon famously cuts patients and causes bodily trauma attempting to make them healthier). So suffering alone is not enough to detect evil acts; intent must be a part of it.
Given an uncaring universe inhabited by mortals, suffering cannot be the basis for "evil". There must be more, and speculation about the need for suffering is analyzing the picture frame while ignoring the complex painting it encompasses.
Oct '10
Re: The Problem of Evil Solved
The theological answer that always made sense to me was based on Free Will. God gave us Free Will and some used it for good and others used it for evil. I was brought to that construct through a book review in the Weekly Standard about the Baatan Death March in November of 2001, after surviving, but having about 658 of my colleagues killed on September11, 2001. Is God suppose to be our Nanny? Inherent in such a construct is that the Kingdom is in Heavan and not on earth. There are many who believe otherwise theologically, including Marx, that the Kingdom of God will be on Earth. That divide creates the need for the Nanny God for many and evil should be gone.