The Conservative Schism on Libya
One of the (admittedly abstract) virtues that accompanies a party not holding the White House is that it faces far less pressure to close ideological ranks. To govern, as the old saw has it, is to decide, and the energy inherent in the presidency creates a partisan groundswell when employed in the service of all but the most divisive issues.
As an instructive example, consider two of the most salient initiatives of the George W. Bush administration: the War in Iraq and the Medicare prescription drug benefit. While conservatives of good will and upstanding intentions broke ranks with President Bush on both topics, it seems safe to say that there would have been far more opposition from the right had either policy come out of an Al Gore Administration. A president, especially when he’s popular, can often persuade members of his own party who would otherwise be recalcitrant on ideological grounds. And if you doubt the importance of a president’s popularity in determining this influence, you need only look to President Bush’s failures to win over Republicans on immigration reform and TARP in the final quarter of his presidency.
I mention all this because the reaction of the conservative establishment to the Obama Administration’s intervention in Libya – free of any pressures to close ranks behind the executive – seems to me illustrative of a broader debate over foreign policy that will (if the primaries serve any intellectual purpose whatsoever – a debatable premise) play out as we head into the next presidential cycle.
On one end of the spectrum, we have the hard-core non-interventionists like Ron Paul. Of course, these folks are opposed to this action abroad, as they are generally opposed to military reactions to all but the most immediate, direct threats to American national security. That this position is reflexive doesn’t make it wrong, but it does make it uninteresting for our purposes here. It’s a philosophy so parsimonious that it doesn’t benefit much from further examination.
Somewhere on the other end we have what are most conveniently referred to as the “neoconservatives”, though I hesitate to use that term because its undeserved employment as an epithet doesn’t seem to have ended quite yet. This group (best exemplified by the editorial voice of the Weekly Standard) consists of enthusiastic proponents of challenging Middle East despotism head on and of healing the region through a long-term investment in liberal democracy. They are also prone to give greater weight to international human rights abuses as legitimate national security interests of the United States.
To the extent that the neoconservatives are critical of the intervention in Libya, it has more to do with means than ends. They blanche at the increased weight given to U.N. approval; the administration’s promise of a quick, limited and cosmetic conflict; and the ambivalence as to whether or not regime change is an explicit goal of the coalition’s efforts. They are the non-interventionist’s opposites in nearly every way.
What’s most interesting, however, is the maturation (or restoration, depending on your point of view) of a third foreign policy mindset within the party. The temptation is to call this group “realists”, but that isn’t quite right because (1) it weighs them down with a lot of the baggage of others who have appropriated that label in the past and (2) it’s simply too self-congratulatory a term to be taken seriously as an ideological marker.
This group (think of its members as skeptical hawks) represents an interesting synthesis of the other two. Like the neocons, they don’t feel backwards about the use of American power; yet their circumscribed definition of our national interests lies closer on the continuum to the non-interventionists (though its still a considerable distance away). More than anything, this group embodies a foreign policy of doubt – doubt at America’s ability to fundamentally reshape alien cultures and governments, doubt at the notion of democracy promotion and nation building as unalloyed goods, and doubt about the integrity of military adventures that have amorphous goals from day one.
A good representation of this philosophy comes from the Hoover Institution’s Bruce Thornton, who writes on Hoover’s Advancing a Free Society website:
So what are the national and security interests of the United States in this intervention? The received wisdom of Republican and Democratic foreign policy alike is that support for brutal dictators in the long run tarnishes our prestige and harms our interests by squelching the democratic aspirations of the oppressed. In the Middle East particularly, this “democracy deficit” has empowered the jihadists who turn to a debased form of Islam in compensation for a lack of freedom. Removing these oppressive autocrats thus will clear space for incipient democratic movements to create regimes founded on liberal democratic principles of freedom, tolerance, human rights, and the rest. And our efforts to liberate oppressed Muslims will buy us their affection and support, further eroding the appeal of jihadism and making us more secure from terror.
But this dogma begs any number of questions and looks more like wishful thinking rather than a sober understanding of reality. In the past we have liberated oppressed Muslims in the Balkans, oppressed Muslims in Kuwait, oppressed Muslims in Afghanistan, oppressed Muslims in Iraq, and now we’re going to liberate (maybe) oppressed Muslims in Libya. And how much goodwill has that bought us in the Muslim world? Did liberating millions of Shiites from a murderous tyrant in Iraq make Shiite Iran stop regarding us as the Great Satan? Of course not. We have to free ourselves from this curiously arrogant assumption that the whole world determines its policies and beliefs simply in reaction to what we do. Muslims have a religious world-view and sensibility that condition their actions and interests, and we must understand those spiritual beliefs in their own terms rather than reducing them to the materialist determinism that dominates our thinking. As the Ayatollah Khomeini said, he didn’t start an Islamist revolution to lower the price of melons.
The Thornton view, now ascendant, in the GOP, is in many ways a refutation of the Bush Doctrine. Which will become dominant in the Republican Party of the future? That’s a question that will depend heavily on who becomes the next GOP standard-bearer.
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Comments:
Nov '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Claire Berlinski, Ed. There's no central authority in Islam. But we've had this argument here so many times, and I'm not energetic enough to get into it again. I'll offer--again--the point that I have indeed asked many Muslims, and found quite some number who do not find the idea of democracy a heresy. You can declare them heretics if you like, but I doubt you'll have any more luck enforcing this view than anyone else who has tried doctrinally to unite the Islamic world. Whether we have a responsibility to help Muslim democrats and whether it is in our interest to do so are separate questions, but the idea of a doctrinally monolithic Islam that offers no room for the idea of "democracy" is one we can throw out. · Mar 23 at 6:04am
The number of American conservatives who claim to know more about Islam than Muslims do continues to astonish me. Especially given the inevitably outraged reaction should any non-believer make a similar claim about Christianity.
Jun '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Peter Robinson: "
A fascinating and wonderfully lucid explication, Troy. Before I weigh in--you didn't suppose I could resist, did you?--one question. How would you define the "Bush Doctrine?"
We had better get Sarah Palin in here to answer that question.
Sep '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Charles Lavergne
The number of American conservatives who claim to know more about Islam than Muslims do continues to astonish me. Especially given the inevitably outraged reaction should any non-believer make a similar claim about Christianity. · Mar 23 at 11:06am
This doesn't make sense to me. If you follow the thread of the conversation, you won't find any claims of superior knowledge. Claire took a poll of Muslims she talks to and finds many who don't see any conflict between Islam and Democracy. I am saying that while this may be true, it is irrelevant. Claire claims, rightfully, that there is no central authority in Islam and the religion is not monolithic. Therefore even Muslims can't speak for themselves or each other with any authority. My basic point is that the dominant form of Islam rejects the separation of church and state and therefore this prevents democracy from taking hold.
I know plenty about Islam and its different forms. I don't need to pray to Mecca to hold knowledge as your post implies.
By the way, people make similar claims about Christianity quite often to not-so outraged reactions.
Sep '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Let me clarify further.
Islam can be different things to different people. I could go out today and get a prayer rug, a Koran, and a compass and start praying and claim I am a Muslim. Would I be? I'm not really sure, somehow I don't think so.
There is a formal structure to Islam and every other religion outside of independent worship. The organized sects and factions decide whether you are one of them or not.
Since it is really up to others to decide, those who are the dominant players in the religion will decide what you must do and what minimums you must believe in order to be accepted.
Now some faction can say "You don't own Islam! I can be a Muslim and still believe XYZ" But if the dominant sect says, "No, you are an infidel and we will kill you unless you believe these specific things" What is the result? You must either fight or submit.
When moderate Muslims are not fighting, they are submitting. I'm not blaming them. I am merely saying that there is a self-appointed enforcement mechanism in Islam which rules.
Jul '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Jan-Michael Rives
Franco
Iraq is not a free society.
And yes, there are cultural differences. Islam. Islam is different. Just ask any Muslim. Being unique, it has certain distinct abilities and inabilities Some cultural differences are compatible with democracy, others are not.
The willingness of Westerners to throw entire nations of people under the bus when the going gets tough reeks--absolutely reeks--of racism.
So, the other day you called people who disagree with your view that we have a moral responsibility to intervene at all times and in all places "inhumane".
Now, you're doubling down and calling us "racists".
What happened to the Code of Conduct?
Oct '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Charles Lavergne
Claire Berlinski, Ed. There's no central authority in Islam. But we've had this argument here so many times, and I'm not energetic enough to get into it again. I'll offer--again--the point that I have indeed asked many Muslims, and found quite some number who do not find the idea of democracy a heresy. You can declare
The number of American conservatives who claim to know more about Islam than Muslims do continues to astonish me. Especially given the inevitably outraged reaction should any non-believer make a similar claim about Christianity. · Mar 23 at 11:06am
The Islamists are so successful at portraying their views as defining Islam (among English-speakers, at least), it doesn't surprise me people feel that way. It's hard to know what real Muslims believe, since the real ones usually don't speak English.
Oct '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Joseph Eagar
Charles Lavergne
Claire Berlinski, Ed. There's no central authority in Islam. But we've had this argument here so many times, and I'm not energetic enough to get into it again. I'll offer--again--the point that I have indeed asked many Muslims, and found quite some number who do not find the idea of democracy a heresy. You can declare
The number of American conservatives who claim to know more about Islam than Muslims do continues to astonish me. Especially given the inevitably outraged reaction should any non-believer make a similar claim about Christianity. · Mar 23 at 11:06am
The Islamists are so successful at portraying their views as defining Islam (among English-speakers, at least), it doesn't surprise me people feel that way. It's hard to know what real Muslims believe, since the real ones usually don't speak English. · Mar 23 at 1:24pm
The real ones with the credibility to challenge the Islamist narrative, I mean.
Sep '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Another practical element that refutes the Bush Doctrine is the modern Democratic Party. Had I known how low they would go to exploit these actions politically, I would never have agreed.
As is now plain to see, the Bush Doctrine is naive on several dimensions. No Republican can launch a war for any reason without knowing that he will be fighting that war on the home front in the near future. It is a political template the opposition will use every time, in every case. While Mr. Republican spends political capital fighting for the cause of the troops and their mission, the Democrats will push for domestic policy concessions in return.
Nov '10
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
Troy Senik:
Somewhere on the other end we have what are most conveniently referred to as the “neoconservatives”, though I hesitate to use that term because its undeserved employment as an epithet doesn’t seem to have ended quite yet.
Not to worry! We neos wear the badge proudly; how could one possibly be ashamed of siding with William Kristol and Vice President Cheney?
More than anything, this group embodies a foreign policy of doubt – doubt at America’s ability to fundamentally reshape alien cultures and governments, doubt at the notion of democracy promotion and nation building as unalloyed goods, and doubt about the integrity of military adventures that have amorphous goals from day one.
This group makes an interesting and truthful observation, although Japan and Germany remain significant exceptions. Many of us are beginning to doubt the possibility of reform in Arab nations.
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
David,
Thank you for referencing the terrific Dueck piece, which I read with great joy earlier in the week (he deserves a more prominent place in foreign policy discussions on the right). I'm not sure, however, that I would put Professor Dueck's exposition of the Reagan position in a category of its own.
Rather, I would identify it as a shade of the skeptical hawk's position. Not skeptical in the sense of being unsure of first principles, but skeptical insofar as it understands the doctrine of unintended consequences when it comes to major military interventions. Rather that using this skepticism as a rationale for doing nothing, it channels it into more productive, pragmatic efforts by government. In many ways, it's about finding means more likely to generate the ends desired by neocons in the long run.
Re: The Conservative Schism on Libya
You mischievous man. In some ways, the debate over what the Bush Doctrine means reminds me of the debate over the true meaning of Islam. Defining its metaphysical essence is less important than defining what people think it means.
However, I won't hide behind that dodge. In the post, I refer only to the aspect of the doctrine that holds that investment in Middle Eastern democracy would have a catalytic effect on the region and upend some of its longstanding pathologies. This may be the trait most widely accepted as part of the Bush Doctrine's definition.
What constitutes the doctrine beyond those limits is open to debate (much of which, I should note, occurred within the administration). I don't propose a universal definition, but could do no better than recommending Dr. K's masterful column-length exposition and my friend Bob Kaufman's terrific book "In Defense of the Bush Doctrine".
Peter Robinson: . How would you define the "Bush Doctrine?"
As best I can tell, the term means all kinds of things to all kinds of people.