Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
President Obama’s actions and words have often seemed inexplicable in light of supposed U.S. goals of stopping Iran’s nuclear program, convincing Iran to cease support for terrorists, and reaching out to the people of the Middle East. He has verbally legitimized the repressive Iranian regime and chosen a minimalist approach to sanctions.
As a new president, Obama defended Iran’s “right” to “peaceful” nuclear technology, thus handing Ahmadinejad just the words he needed for Hitler-like verbal deception. He rejected preconditions for direct, personal negotiations with Iranian leaders even though he presented Israel with preconditions for negotiations with the Palestinians. He offered Iran a “new beginning,” which promised an end to the policy of focusing on Iran’s regime type and human rights violations. To emphasize the point, he sent an unprecedented Persian New Year Message that stated, “The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.” He sent a personal letter to "Supreme Leader" Ali Khameini, even though Khameini was one of the main obstacles to domestic reform.
Then it got worse. Millions of Iranians took to the streets to protest rigged elections, marking the largest anti-regime demonstration since the final days of the Shah. Sixteen Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps officers publicly pledged to join the movement, signaling that support of the Corps for Ahmadinejad was crumbling. Protesters cried out, “Obama are you with us?” But not a word. After days of silence, when brave young Iranians were beaten, killed and sent to horrible places like Evin Prison, Obama finally made a passionless request that the “violence” stop. Even then, he stipulated that he would continue his policy of “dialogue” with the regime and said, “It’s not too late for the Iranian government to see there is a peaceful path that leads to legitimacy.” He said the difference in the disputed election between Ahmadinejad and Mir-Hossein Mousavi “may not be as great as has been advertised” and called on other nations to “recognize the government of Ahmadinejad as a legitimate government.”
How has the policy of “engagement” with Iran fared? In the reckoning of everyone except Obama’s public relations staff, engagement has been a failure. As early as September 2009, there were signs that America’s outstretched hand meant nothing to the Iranian regime; Obama had to announce to the Group of 20 Summit that Iran was building a secret nuclear fuel plant underground near the city of Qom. After that, “talks” with Iranian leaders continually fell apart, and Iran accelerated its nuclear program. It also stepped up repression of dissidents and strengthened ties with Syria and Islamic extremists.
Facing the ineffectiveness of existing sanctions, in December 2011, Congress pushed sanctions that targeted financial institutions that do business with Iran’s Central Bank. Inexplicably, the administration worked behind the scenes to weaken the sanctions bill. Even more inexplicable, the White House suddenly announced its opposition to the bill, arguing, among other things, that sanctions against the bank would interfere with the “foreign relations” of the United States. The Senate passed a watered down bill in December 2011, with Obama - under the spotlight on the matter - ultimately signing off on it and taking credit for it. In May of 2012, the Senate approved more stringent sanctions. Again, Obama claimed credit once he had no choice but to go along. He pointed to “this administration’s unprecedented sanctions regime” in response to critics that accused him of procrastination and weakness.
Iran’s obstruction did not stop Obama officials and their U.N. cohorts from giving negotiation another try. They next offered to ease sanctions and offered aid for Iran’s development of “nonmilitary” nuclear power. In return, they proposed that Iran “freeze” (not halt or dismantle) production of nuclear fuel enriched to 20% purity and ship it to a third country. But Iran rejected the offer, revealing that it was using the diplomatic process to buy time and cover for its nuclear program. In the meantime, Iran funneled advanced weapons to anti-American terrorists and the Syrian regime and continued its diatribes against Israel and the West. But the administration, strangely, seemed to work harder to prevent Israel from acting militarily than it did to prevent the possibility of having to deal with a nuclear Iran. Some commentators noted a “shift” in administration goals. Had the White House given up, they asked, on stopping a nuclear Iran, and decided instead to try to “contain” it? Was there, perhaps, some willingness to accept a nuclear Iran all along?
Obama, Clinton and their team have adopted a wait and see policy. The administration suggests that recent harsher sanctions might work and that there is still “time” for negotiations. Let us hope the White House is right.
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Mar '11
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Obama's team admits that it misjudged the situation from the first. Though the rhetoric here strikes all the right chords, Paul Ryan is right: Obama has not done enough to be credible here.
He underestimated (misunderstood, really) this regime in the past, and is too wavering and tentative now for deterrence to work effectively.
Nov '11
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
If you want to incite more comments, you'll have to say something controvertible. What you've written here and elsewhere is, sadly, all true and all too true.
I would only add that, compounding Obama's amateur's naivete is the blindness caused by his antagonism toward Western values generally, the United States in particular, and most especially Israel and "them Jews" for whom Obama learned his bitterness long before he sat in the pews of Rev. Wright. His instincts simply do not incline him toward our side, and instincts are so difficult to overcome in moments of crisis.
After the Shah's Iran, how could anyone not anticipate what would happen after Mubarek's Egypt?
(Soon enough, we'll have to worry about a nuclear Egypt. Not to mention the many lasting varieties of harm done by reneging on the accommodation with Gaddafi. Whither the substantial remnant of Libya's nuclear expertise?)
Jan '11
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
In other words, we're not going to do anything. We really can't stop it. But we have to look like we're trying.
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Astonishing: If you want to incite more comments, you'll have to say something controvertible. What you've written here and elsewhere is, sadly, all true and all too true.
I would only add that, compounding Obama's amateur's naivete is the blindness caused by his antagonism toward Western values generally, the United States in particular, and most especially Israel and "them Jews" for whom Obama learned his bitterness long before he sat in the pews of Rev. Wright. His instincts simply do not incline him towardour side, and instincts are so difficult to overcome in moments of crisis.
After the Shah's Iran, how couldanyonenot anticipate what would happen after Mubarek's Egypt?
(Soon enough, we'll have to worry about a nuclear Egypt. Not to mention the many lasting varieties of harm done by reneging on the accommodation with Gaddafi. Whither the substantial remnant of Libya's nuclear expertise?) · 0 minutes ago
I'm not sure what you mean by "controvertible." I took the same approach as with my previous posts that have lots of comments.
But I agree regarding Israel. While saying he "of course" supports Israel, Obama has abandoned it.
Dec '10
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Israel terminated Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program with prejudice. Then Israel took out Syria's new nuclear weapons facility. Here we are in 2012 and Israel is the only hope the world has of keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of Radical Islamic Theocrats in Iran. Let's hope that Israel is up to the task one more time and can seriously attrit Iran's nuclear weapons program.
If Israel can't stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program and the cosmos delivers a tragic error to the U.S. on November 6 with an Obama victory, then we are surely headed for another one of Obama's "bumps in the road" when NYC becomes ground zero.
Mar '11
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Yet, while Obama fails to understand Iran (especially the IRGC), there remains a serious and historical challenge here.
Anna: Do you believe that Iran's nuclear program is guided more by the 1979 revolution or by Persian identity preceding that period?
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Crow's Nest: Yet, while Obama fails to understand Iran (especially the IRGC), there remains a serious and historical challenge here.
Anna: Do you believe that Iran's nuclear program is guided more by the 1979 revolution or by Persian identity preceding that period? · 7 minutes ago
That's a great question and I don't have an answer to it. I do know that Iran sees how North Korea got away with nuclear development by going along with the sham of negotiations. Iran no doubt sees that we now ask NK for reductions in its program in exchange for concessions. Iran is well aware that nuclear weapons increase both international leverage and regional influence. But we can't ignore the possibility that Iran means what it says about wanting to destroy Israel and bring America to its knees. Hitler revealed his real ambitions in his domestic rhetoric while going along with the sham of "negotiating" with other powers.
Oct '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Great insights here and in your blog on Syria - comment 47 really brings it home.
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
It is interesting to see that the Iranian rial has lost 2/3 of its value against the dollar recently--1/3 in the last week. The Iranians have had to suspend currency transactions.
I am trying to think of examples of regimes in collapse that become more dangerous rather than less. The Soviet Union in 1990 was a lot less dangerous than it was in 1950.
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
John Grant:
I am trying to think of examples of regimes in collapse that become more dangerous rather than less. The Soviet Union in 1990 was a lot less dangerous than it was in 1950. · 0 minutes ago
Very interesting about the Iranian rial. If the regime is near collapse, we'd better be wise.
In the 1980s, when the Soviet Union underwent glasnost and in the process removed much of its financial and military support of the North Korean regime, the truth about the communist-Orwellian nightmare known as North Korea began to emerge. Without the propping up of Russia, the North Korean economy, infrastructure, architecture and food supply rapidly deteriorated. Then, the famine and floods of the 1990s nearly destroyed the state-run economy and threatened the regime itself. But the West kept negotiating and offering concessions. North Korea's atrocities and its intransigence are still with us.
Aug '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
If the Iranian regime is near collapse they'll be selling their nuclear know-how and collectibles to the highest bidder. Instead of using them to inoculate themselves against regime change while they have something to hang on to. Has a tough approach on this really been thought through beyond the political pay off?
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Anyone out there thinking this through?
Apr '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Anne Pierce, Guest Contributor
Very interesting about the Iranian rial. If the regime is near collapse, we'd better be wise.
In the 1980s, when the Soviet Union underwent glasnost and in the process removed much of its financial and military support of the North Korean regime, the truth about the communist-Orwellian nightmare known as North Korea began to emerge.
This was going to be my point about economic sanctions. Iran is far more inclined to suspend any pretense to democracy and endure hardship than sacrifice its military potential.
We can't expect regime change in Iran, just more belligerence.
Iran is already selling its nuclear know-how, as well as trading it for strategic purposes. We've already seen how willing they are, and what level of power is necessary, to suppress revolutionary activities.
Revolutions need allies to be successful, where's Obama?
Dec '10
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Anne Pierce, Guest Contributor
Anyone out there thinking this through? · 5 minutes ago
Who are they going sell it to? Syria? Egypt? Libya? How could they possibly make a financial transaction? Russia and China don't need the weapons technologies but both could have an interest in helping maintain the current regime.
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Yes, regime change has worked out so well in Iraq, right? Iraq is now working with Iran (allowing Iran to ship weapons through Iraqi airspace to support the Assad regime).
Highlama
This was going to be my point about economic sanctions. Iran is far more inclined to suspend any pretense to democracy and endure hardship than sacrifice its military potential.
We can't expect regime change in Iran, just more belligerence.
Iran is already selling its nuclear know-how, as well as trading it for strategic purposes. We've already seen how willing they are, and what level of power is necessary, to suppress revolutionary activities.
Revolutions need allies to be successful, where's Obama? · 1 hour ago
Dec '10
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
John Grant: Yes, regime change has worked out so well in Iraq, right? Iraq is now working with Iran (allowing Iran to ship weapons through Iraqi airspace to support the Assad regime).
6 minutes ag
What's the downside to regime change in Iran? The Iranian regime is already a nihilist Radical Islamist Theocracy ... it all looks like up from here.
Aug '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
[Iran is already selling its nuclear know-how, as well as trading it for strategic purposes.]
The more desperate they are, the less restrained they'll be because the less they have to lose.
Who would they sell these to? Any number of unpleasant terrorist groups with no restraints imposed by the necessity of actually governing a country. (Restraints which do exist for Iran, despite Ahmedinejad's rhetoric.)
Imagine the Jaish e Mohammed or Sipaha e Sahiba (Pakistani terrorist groups) getting their hands on just enough material for a dirty bomb. How destabilising and dangerous would that be?
Iran needs to be engaged with and managed the way Pakistan needs to be engaged with and managed. A politically motivated dummy spit is deeply self indulgent = and dangerous for the rest of the world to boot.
Apr '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Zafar:
The more desperate they are, the less restrained they'll be because the less they have to lose.
I think you may be misreading Iran. They are not interested in gaining credibility with the world, as is the European obsession. Iran simply wants to be the uncontested power in the Middle-East and leader of the Moslem world, for starters.
No one is backing them into a corner, they are executing their plan as best they can.
Pakistan has no such lofty ambitions and is thus, ostensibly, easier to manage.
Aug '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
Highlama - imho the Iranian Administration is most essentially interested in remaining in power in Iran - and their actions in Lebanon, Syria etc. are more or less aimed at achieving this goal, in a crude realpolitik 'things to give up in exchange' sort of way. Having nuclear weapons isn't about cred with the West, it's about making it too potentially costly to remove the Iranian Administration through military regime change (as the US removed Saddam Hussain in Iraq - so it is not an unreasonable fear for the Iranian Govt to have).
Pakistan is profoundly more dysfunctional than Iran - including in terms of being an active source of disorder for other countries, where was OBL found, after all? - but the Government of Pakistan is handled very very carefully by the US because it has nuclear weapons that could fall into the wrong hands (again).
That was a core achievement for the Pakistani Administration (read the Pakistani Army) from its nuclear program, and I think that's what the Iranian Administration really wants for itself.
Leading the Muslim world - sounds very airy fairy stump speechy. The desire to stay in power no matter what, otoh, make all too much sense.
Regards
Edited on October 4, 2012 at 7:11amApr '12
Re: Strange "Strategy" Toward Iran - Foreign Policy Mythology Part III
It must be morning in Australia.
Have you been paying attention to the Iranian message? Do you try to feel the Iranian zeitgeist?
Iran is a very proud nation laying claim to ancient Persia, the Aryan Race, and inheritors of Mohammed. While there are many Iranians with no major ambition, you can be sure that their nuclear program is a real manifestation of their national pride.
Sure, most immediately they want to hold onto power, but they're not being meaningfully threatened freeing them to look to loftier goals.