Earlier, Adam Freedman asked whether Alexander "Hamilton would have blessed the constitutionality (if not the wisdom) of Obamacare."
I don't think you can read Hamilton's support of the National Bank as endorsement of the idea that the government has no limits. He did think that the federal government could spend and tax for the general welfare, because of the placement of those powers at the head of Article I, Section 8. But that is different than saying he would interpret a power like the Commerce Clause to be essentially unlimited. As far as I know, he never made such an argument -- certainly not as a co-author of the Federalist, where such a claim would have been a devastating concession in favor of opponents of the Constitution, or as Secretary of the Treasury in the Washington administration.
Some have pointed to various things that Hamilton supported, such as the bank, or health care for mariners, and so on, to support the idea that Hamilton was in favor of a limitless federal power. But these examples arise under different powers -- such as the federal government's control over the navigable waters and maritime rules, or the taxing and spending power.
These commentators and bloggers overlook or ignore Hamilton's most important thinking on the nature of limited federal powers, Federalist 84, which was a criticism of a proposal for a bill of rights (an argument he eventually lost). Hamilton's argument against including a bill of rights was that this would imply that federal powers are unlimited. If you don't have a bill of rights, you understand that the limits of federal power are their description or enumeration. But when you have a bill of rights, you assume that the individual rights are carve-outs from otherwise unlimited federal powers. Hamilton would not have made such an argument if he had not believed that federal powers were enumerated and limited. His words are as important now as then:
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an injudicious zeal for bills of rights.
If Obamacare is upheld, Hamilton's dire prediction may yet come true.