Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
So, today I've argued that what happens in this region matters to you, and by implication, it is important for Americans to understand it.
I've also argued that when trying to understand Turkey's role, it is best to start with the idea that nations have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests. Of course this is not a Universal Theory of Everything, but it's a rule of thumb that from what I've seen, proves right more often than wrong. Good heuristic value, as they say in the trade.
Analysts of Turkey who don't know the country well, I've noticed, tend to miss one point more than any other. They fail to appreciate what Turkey perceives as its central interest--which is not becoming a regional hegemon, not reviving the Ottoman Empire, not advancing its own brand of Sunni Islam, not promoting states and groups sympathetic to it, and not even promoting its own economic interests, although all of those figure to some degree. It is maintaining its own territorial integrity and sovereignty. That is the number-one priority, and it doesn't matter who's in power: No government that fails to defend that interest will last a week.
Any analyst who misses this point--It's the Kurds, stupid--is going to have a hard time figuring out how Turkey may be expected to act given any particular constellation of circumstances. For an example of a basically shrewd, informed analyst missing this point, see Caroline Glick's discussion of Syria. If your analysis of Turkey doesn't begin and end with the words "Kurdish time bomb," you're missing something that's just too important to overlook.
So, what are the implications of this?
Mehmet Kalyoncu has been critical of my reporting on Turkey, which I suppose by definition means he and I don't agree about everything, and possibly don't agree about much. But if you're trying to understand the region, his (harsh, Realpolitik) assessment of the constraints on Ankara right now is worth reading.
So first start with yesterday morning's news, which I'm sure no one outside of Turkey is noticing:
One soldier died and another was injured in a clash that erupted between members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkish security forces in the eastern province of Tunceli on Friday.
Turkish soldiers have been clashing with the PKK for the past few days in the Pülümür district of Tunceli province. Two soldiers were also injured in clashes on Thursday as a large-scale military operation is under way in the region.
And now add Kalyoncu's perspective--worth reading in full:
Considering its own domestic peculiarities, however, Turkey should be extra sensitive to not ruin or even sour its relations with either Syria or Iran. These peculiarities include: first, the still-alive terrorist, Abdullah Öcalan; second, the so-called Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which is resolved to coerce the Turkish state into negotiating with terrorists over Turkey’s sovereignty in its southeast region; third, the dormant but not yet dead Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terror network; and finally 15-20 million ethnic Kurds, who may be more or less manipulated like any other ethnic group. Under these circumstances, its inability to counter increasing PKK terrorism in the Southeast, and possibly across the country, may force the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government to embark on a self-destructive course with regard to the Kurdish issue.
That is, if PKK terror surges, and the government appears unable to prevent it, which will be the case if Turkey cannot cooperate with both Iran and Syria, then the very same Erdoğan who recently stated that the government would have hung Öcalan if he had been in office may be forced to seek the chief terrorist’s help in appeasing the PKK’s endless demands it posed as a prerequisite to ending the violence. ...
However, it is for sure that no government, and probably no prime minister, can survive in a country like Turkey if Öcalan is freed during the period of rule of that government.
Whether you agree with him or not about the long-term wisdom of cultivating close relations with Syria and Iran, he's talking about the facts of life. The Kurdish issue is the key, and it is a massive constraint upon Ankara's ability to operate as it pleases in the region.
Now, add this news item from this morning:
A delegation from the Turkish state and Öcalan have reached an agreement to form a peace council, according to a report published on daily Radikal's website that cited news portals close to the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK.
Whenever you read "Öcalan," think "Turkey's bin Laden." Imagine him sitting in a jail cell on an island off the coast of Nantucket, issuing orders, through his attorneys, to al Qaeda operatives throughout the West Coast. And imagine that every day, some kid--and it's a conscript army, remember, so it could very well be your kid--comes home in a body bag because of some order Öcalan gave the day before. In addition, imagine this guy announcing the role he plans to play in drafting your country's new constitution and presenting "protocols" to Ankara and Kandil. (I repeat: Kandil. Meditate upon the significance of that.)
Now, consider this hypothesis. Why is the AKP locking up the Turkish military? I don't want to traffic in lunatic conspiracy theories, and I stress that this is not a theory for which I have anything but circumstantial evidence. Yet I think this idea is at least worth considering, because it's logical.
The AKP has decided that there is no solution to this problem that doesn't involve cutting a deal with Öcalan. The military solution has been tried, and is in their view a failure. It can only result in more bloodshed and death and the destruction of the economy--and remember, they're in power largely because of the economy. But they also know that the military--which has been fighting the PKK for two generations--will view this deal as national suicide, and it sure won't have universal public support. To say the least.
So, you've got to get control of everything first. You've got to make sure the military really understands who's boss. "It will be ugly," they're thinking, "but not as ugly as fighting this war forever. It will be unjust, but not as unjust as sending kids to get their legs blown off in the Southeast in a war we cannot win. And if we figure out some way to solve this problem, we won't have to depend so much on Syria and Iran. Depending on them is not in our national interest, because those guys are not dependable; in fact, they're nuts."
I stress, again, that this is a theory; I don't want to be irresponsible and suggest that it is a fact.
It would account for a lot, though.
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Oct '10
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
You mention 'Kandil' as being of great significance. Why, is it part of a putative 'Kurdistan' in Turkey?
Mark Steyn has noted that demographics favor more conservative, religious Turks. How do Kurdish Turks birth rate/demographics compare to non-Kurdish Turks?
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
Because it's not in Turkey. It's in Iraq.
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
They're higher, though I don't trust most of the research on this. As is the case pretty much everywhere, wealth means declining birth rates, and the Southeast is poor. But one important thing to keep in mind is that the idea "Kurds are in the Southeast" is wrong: Istanbul is the world's largest Kurdish city by Kurdish population--and there are a lot of wealthy Kurds west of Ankara, too. I suspect socio-economic bracket is a better predictor of fertility than ethnicity.
Mar '11
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
I read the Kalyoncu article, but still do not understand one thing: how do bad relations with Syria have a direct bearing on Turkey's ability to control the Kurdish population on its own soil?
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
I think the best way to explain it is to imagine a very serious, armed movement by Mexican-Americans to create an independent state in Texas--with bombs going off regularly in New York. Now imagine seriously hostile relations with the Mexican government, Mexico in chaos, and a huge flow of refugees over the Mexican border, many of whom also want an independent Texas--that's a big problem if you're trying to contain this, obviously. But for a detailed analysis, this is the situation.
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
This is a very interesting post Claire. I had just finished reading Glick's essay when I came to Ricochet and saw this post.
I would be very interested to know what you think about the wisdom of the AKP strategy toward the Kurds.
Apr '11
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
Claire,
Isn't there also a bit of Finlandization at work here. Essentially Turkey is stuck between Iran and an Iranian client state in Syria. As Iran gains influence through its perceived strength verses the west. Turkey will be more and more constrained to maintain decent relations with Iran and by extension Syria no matter what the internal conditions in Turkey. If/ when Iran gets nuclear weapons; Turkey won't have much choice in their stance toward either Iran or Syria.
Aug '10
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
So first start with yesterday morning's news, which I'm sure no one outside of Turkey is noticing...nope, not even me, because (1) it is identical to every morning's news, and (2) I was reading instead something about Öcalan and protocols and an "Oath Crisis." Huh, I said, and that's a direct quote, which is I believe more than you generally get from the PKK. I am still unconvinced that the decades-long bod-a-day in Turkey is entirely or even mostly run by an organization. No question at all, though, that the Turkish military treats it as such, and that it hasn't got much to show for its efforts.
So, yes, maybe the thing to do is corral the military, then make concessions to such an organization, knowing it just barely exists and so anything given to it costs little. The daily mini-atrocities continue, because few if any of the perpetrators were ever answering to leadership. But at least soldiers aren't getting killed anymore. Big plus with voters. And at this point I think: never mind diplomacy with Iran and Syria, how much busier will Turkish police be?
Apr '11
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
Confidence Building Between Turks and Iraqi Kurds
by David L. Phillips, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United States.
"Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has made great strides towards meeting the EU’s criteria for accession. However, conflict with Iraqi Kurds would polarize Turkish domestic politics, tilting the balance of power in favor of the security establishment and secular elite. Those who oppose cooperation until the KRG cracks down on the PKK want to create a vassal state in Iraqi Kurdistan, dependent on Turkey for supplies and security. Their Eurasia strategy, which emphasizes ties to Russia, China and Iran, would also diminish the importance of the West.
Increased tensions could also cause Turkish companies to lose their dominant market share in Iraqi Kurdistan. In addition to undermining future Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) on concessionary terms to Turkish energy companies, an increase in regional tension would also interrupt energy flows to the Ceyhan pipeline, impacting consumers in Turkey and elsewhere in Europe, and eroding Turkey’s reliability as a transit country for energy supplies."
"Turkey needs a stable and strong Iraq to contain Iran."
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ACUS_ConfidenceBuilding_Turks_IraqiKurds.pdf
Apr '11
Re: Permanent Interests: A Tip for Understanding Turkish-Syrian-Iranian Relations
Was a Kurdish call for self-detrmination, December (11?)12, 2010, one step forward and two steps back?
Can Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Kurds achieve a 'golden mean"?
After all:
"Kurdish participation in both the Iraqi central government and in the Kurdish national project would seem to present a conflict; nevertheless the Kurds have found a golden mean for acting simultaneously on both planes, without the one harming the other. Mas`ud Barzani acknowledged as much, stating that “after the fall of the [Ba`thi] regime, we, the Kurds, have safeguarded the unity of Iraq and to this day we are the main reason for Iraq’s remaining unified.”
Why not Turkey as well?
The Kurds - America's friends, Turkey and it's environs, and the EU can all do business together. Good business.
http://www.dayan.org/pdfim/Bengio_Kurdish_self-determination.pdf