Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
I don't often agree with Pat Buchanan and am an occasional target of his magazine, but his ideas (which Peter highlighted in an earlier post) are at least always provocative and he is right that we need a debate on what we can afford and what not, and why we do the things we do abroad.
On basing, ostensibly Buchanan is making sense; there is no real reason to deploy American troops on the soil of wealthy allies who for a variety of reasons apparently think they cannot defend themselves. That said, the original logic was not just "America in, Russia out", but also "Germany (or Japan) down"—an effort never again to have an isolationist America faced with a two-front war with Asian and European powerhouses. If we were to leave, we must be prepared for the vacuum to be filled by someone, and calibrate in advance the consequences of that.
An American presence was once thought to be a moderating influence to avoid the sort of nationalism seen in 1870, 1914, and 1939. Whether the current financial supremacy of Germany and its pique at its clients is reason to worry, I don't quite know. So it may well be time to get out and let Germany be Germany—again.
In the case of South Korea, the troops serve symbolic purposes as well (such things matter as the English realized when they removed a single ship from the Falklands or in the case of April Glaspie who made an offhanded remark about supposed American uninterest in the status of the Kuwaiti border, or Dean Acheson who suggested that South Korea was outside the American sphere of defense). But perhaps it is time to revisit that issue as well, and offer South Korea mostly air support in times of crises from carriers or Japanese bases—which also raises the question of Japan (there is a domino effect in pulling out from overseas). As I understand it, there is also the nuclear issue as well. Germany, Japan, and South Korea in months could make reliable nuclear weapons as they do BMWs, Hondas, and Kias. That they don't may well be due to American security guarantees based on our physical presence on their soils. But ultimately finance will decide. If we are borrowing now in one month almost as much as we just recently used to borrow in one year (e.g., 2007), then everything will soon be on the table, and if it is a question of mothballing two or three carrier groups or pruning forces stationed in wealthy allied lands, then I'd prefer to keep our own assets.
So Buchanan is right to raise the issue, as was Gates on the Middle East.
RE: Gates' Libya comments. The problem in our current Middle East commentary is that it is inconsistent, erratic, and loud with a small stick.
Is there a connection with a presidential threat and reality; did Mubarak step down because we asked him to, or, rather, because the size of the resistance simply reached a tipping point and we wanted to get in on the removal?
Timing is key: does President Obama ask a Mubarak or Gaddafi to step down because they are innately savage and he wishes to preempt inevitable popular unrest and violence, or does he do so only in reaction to preexisting growing unrest and wishes to piggy-back on apparently successful indigenous efforts to remove a dictator? Two weeks ago we were lectured that Gaddafi would be gone within hours, tomorrow, within days, within a week; today we are lectured of an upcoming Somalia-like civil war in Libya and serial chaos. And tomorrow, we will be told what?
If we sound bellicose while behind the curve, as in the case of Egypt and perhaps Libya, the U.S. seems opportunistic, predicating its principles on the apparent ebb and flow of crowds in the street.
And what conditions earn these frequent presidential put-downs? A million people in the streets of Teheran demonstrating against fascist theocracy? The subversion of Lebanese democracy, serial assassination abroad, and overt support for terrorist killers as in the case of the Syrian dictatorship? Why was Iran different from Tunisia and Egypt? I do not think that we have a consistent policy that governs the level of expressed American anguish—e.g., the degree of violence used against the people, the degree of anti-American hostility, the degree of support for international terrorism and unrest, the degree a regime is likely to fall soon?
At some point, we had better be consistent in the application of threats, and calibrate our rhetoric with our willingness and ability to use force if called upon to put up, or else shut up; otherwise the more frequent the proclamations, the more empty they sound, and the more irrelevant the U.S. is seen. Bottom line, we should either shut up or be prepared for a third intervention which would be tantamount to a war—something impossible without allied bases, which is I suppose Buchanan's point.
- Comment (20)
- · Quote
- · UnfollowFollow (4)
Comments:
Jun '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
James Wiles at American Thinker has an article about the current status of America's carrier battle groups. Apparently, we have none of our big flat tops currently on patrol the Mediterranean. This to me is mind-boggling given the strategic resources (oil) and the volatility in the region.
Given that we have almost nothing in the form of a strike capability, why are we not at least arming the opposition to Qaddafi? We got considerable bang for the buck when we armed and supported the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, and Libya is far more accessible than the Hindu-Kush. It strikes me that the Obama administration is either timid or lacking in imagination.
Oct '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
As I understand it Obama was asking the Saudis to supply the rebel forces with arms. I think they turned him down if I remember, probably because it became public.
May '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
I agree that while there may be some strategic value in maintaining a physical presence in Germany, there is no financial or moral logic behind it. Japan is another matter - in that we had a heavy hand in writing their Constitution which would require change in order for them to fulfill a full military roll. Not impossible but would require some time.
South Korea is symbolic and (I suspect) not tremendously expensive. I think our interests are better served maintaining a physical presence there. A pull out would have far ranging and potentially very counter productive ramifications to our (& our allies) interests in Asia.
Aug '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
The current strategic model for deterrence is Assure, Dissuade, Deter.
Assure: We extend America's protection (both nuclear and non-nuclear) to America's allies in order to assure their security in the hopes that they don't develop nuclear weapons on their own. If an ally has nukes, Assure is intended to encourage them to give them up.
Dissuade: We engage in robust activities designed to dissuade non-allies from pursuing nuclear weapons and other WMD.
Taken together, Assure and Dissuade is how we attempt to retain the value of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty.
Deter requires that the US maintain a credible force capable of responding to an enemy threat as well as the will to use it. The goal is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by our enemies. MAD doctrine made that an existential threat.
Japan is an interesting case as their post WW2 constitution forbids them from having a military for other than self defense purposes. In this context, self-defense does not include pre-emptive self defense.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Policies governing our foreign entanglements are inextricably entwined with domestic programs. To decipher the duplicitous nexus of our historic first Islamic apostate president’s words and deeds, the sequence of events unraveling before our eyes points to the following means to a promised end—fundamentally transforming the American way of life:
Deplete our domestic oil supplies—not by production, but by the regulatory interdiction thereof;
Stoke the Mohammedan resurgence in the Middle East in which the side we take in conflicts between the people and leaders is the one most likely to be in conflict with American interests—yes, the ends justify these necessary means. This is where the periperteia in our alliances with friends and enemies abroad are with foreign and domestic policies most entwined;
Ride the price of oil up on the world markets—yes, we consume more Canadian oil than Saudi, but Canadian prices are set in the sands of Arabia and in the waterways of the Persian Gulf;
Use the precedent of gasoline rationing as the model, the archetype, the embodiment of the new New Way, to extend rationing (electricity, credit, cigars, etc.) and the collectivization of American life as fast as our submission allows.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Gates said close to the same thing in his Annapolis and West Point speeches. He said that funding of naval and air forces will take precedence over funding of ground forces. Also, he pointed out that the future ground force missions will be more limited and narrow and that a smaller lighter force could better achieve those missions.
Rumsfeld said similar things when he was appointed DoD. He wanted to reorganize and reequip our ground forces into smaller, lighter, faster forces more able to quickly respond to achieve limited objectives. It made him unpopular with some Army generals.
S. Korea already has a very large defense force. Withdrawal from there could quickly make war more likely. Our ground forces serve as a deterrent, by threatening immediate US involvement on the ground. They also protect our airfields and naval facilities there.
Withdrawal from Germany would have little short term impact on the likelihood of war, if any.
If we must trade ground forces for aircraft carriers, forces in Germany should go first.
Edited on March 8, 2011 at 9:02pmDec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
While there will be cost savings in moving ground forces stationed overseas to the US, the savings may not be as great as some think. Those same forces must still be maintained, supplied, and continually trained in the US.
The largest cost savings would come in reducing the number of active divisions, brigades, and regiments. After the Cold War we cut the active number of these units dramatically, more than in half IIRC. I think we've increased that low number by about 20% since 9/11, primarily to have sufficient forces to deploy in Afghanistan and Iraq and still maintain significant ground forces in S. Korea and Germany.
To achieve significant cost savings over mid-1990's thru 2001 levels we would have to cut below those levels.
Also, if we withdraw almost all ground forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, S. Korea, and Germany we will have relatively few major ground forces deployed outside of the US anywhere in the world. We would still have large Army and Marine bases in Okinawa, but that is about it.
Jan '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Game theory teaches that when you make a threat but don't back it up, it doesn't just show weakness, it invites response. Opponents may have wondered whether Obama was going to move in Egypt, but now with the empty threats, they know he won't. They now have assurance that they can proceed.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
As I said in response to Peter's post, a protection racket can only work if the extortionists really are the only party to which the weak can turn to keep bad things from happening to them. If there is no authority to protect the weak and punish those who prey on them, the weak will turn to whatever strong party can fill that void.
If the USA abdicates its leading role in providing authority and power to protect the weak and punish those who prey on them, the weak will flock to other strong parties: Russia, China, Al-Qaeda on a larger scale, and even Venezuela and similar parties on a smaller scale. The resulting "multi-polar world" would not be a friendly place for the USA, its citizens and its businesses.
Feb '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Would it be desirable or possible to make a grand deal using the 28,000 troops in Korea as a pawn?
Taiwan is highly integrated economically with China. China wants it back and this might be arranged so that Taiwan could maintain a degree on internal political autonomy in the way Hong Kong has. In exchange, the Chinese would pull all props for the North Korean government with agreement to withdraw the troops from Korea.
Feb '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Stuart Creque: As I said in response to Peter's post, a protection racket can only work if the extortionists really are the only party to which the weak can turn to keep bad things from happening to them. If there is no authority to protect the weak and punish those who prey on them, the weak will turn to whatever strong party can fill that void.
If the USA abdicates its leading role in providing authority and power to protect the weak and punish those who prey on them, the weak will flock to other strong parties: Russia, China, Al-Qaeda on a larger scale, and even Venezuela and similar parties on a smaller scale. The resulting "multi-polar world" would not be a friendly place for the USA, its citizens and its businesses. · Mar 8 at 1:00pm
You mean like Serbia in 1914 and how this weak power drags everybody into World War I?
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
The Buchanan foreign policy in a nutshell. Explicitly stated in his essay.
The 1930's American isolationists said almost exactly the same thing. Buchanan would hand S. Korea to N. Korea without a fight. He would similarly hand Taiwan to the Chinese. Would the Japanese rely on President Buchanan to come to their aid if they make that phone call? Would you? Would anyone? I doubt Buchanan would even answer the phone in many cases.
It is about deterrence and drawing lines potential aggressors are convinced you will fight to defend. Buchanan and many libertarian neo-isoloationists have trouble drawing a convincing line anywhere short of our own borders and shores.
It is an understatement to say that potential regional aggressors will be emboldened if the US starts unilaterally backing off and redrawing lines, tossing aside previous treaties and commitments, and cutting allies loose to largely fend for themselves.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Hang On
You mean like Serbia in 1914 and how this weak power drags everybody into World War I?
Not quite accurate. Serbia didn't drag everybody into WW I. The Austria-Hungarian Empire did by attacking Serbia. Austria-Hungary was the aggressor. Serbia even tried to accept the conditions of Austria-Hungary's ultimatum. Austria-Hungary was determined to attack them anyway.
How about this example... If France and Britain had lived up to their treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia WW II would have probably never happened. If Hitler had ordered an attack on Czechoslovakia the German Army was prepared to remove him from power. The coup was well planned and supported and ready to go.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Hang On: Would it be desirable or possible to make a grand deal using the 28,000 troops in Korea as a pawn?
Taiwan is highly integrated economically with China. China wants it back and this might be arranged so that Taiwan could maintain a degree on internal political autonomy in the way Hong Kong has. In exchange, the Chinese would pull all props for the North Korean government with agreement to withdraw the troops from Korea. · Mar 8 at 1:21pm
That would be swell, except we don't own the Taiwanese or the South Koreans, and we can't barter them like so many cattle.
In fact, our commitments to Taiwan and South Korea are based on the premise that human beings aren't cattle and that therefore the Taiwanese and the South Koreans should not be subjugated by regimes that want to reduce them to cattle -- less than cattle, in fact, for even Maoists understand the importance of taking care of one's livestock.
Taiwan cannot on its own resist mainland China, and while South Korea could likely stave off a North Korean invasion, China might well come to North Korea's military aid in that event.
May '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
I heard somewhere (Krauthammer maybe) that in the event of hostilities, Italy would serve as our aircraft carrier, so moving one there is not as necessary as it seems. Fwiw.
Feb '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Scott Reusser
I heard somewhere (Krauthammer maybe) that in the event of hostilities, Italy would serve as our aircraft carrier, so moving one there is not as necessary as it seems. Fwiw. · Mar 8 at 3:53pm
There is no conceivable scenario in which Italy would provide an effective base. The first hostile threat would bring the government down if internal uproar had not already done so. It is difficult to conceive of any European country - and even less NATO - having the backbone to take such a risk at this time.
One of the core justifications for the maintenance of costly carrier groups is that they provide at once a diplomatic presence, an visible demonstration of resolve and an implicit threat independent of the political constraints inherent in dealing with wobbly fair weather allies and ostensible neutrals. After months of turmoil in North Africa and the Middle East, the absence of those carriers says far more about US policy, or lack thereof, than the inconsistent and feckless statements issuing from Washington.
May '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
jrb: Krauthammer's take is here, fwiw. Like you, he finds a carrier wise (my mistake) but would support a campaign only under certain conditions, one of which being that it be in concert with a NATO effort with aircraft based in Italy.
Dec '10
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Many excellent arguments posted above. I think the problem comes down to balance where the U.S. and it's allies act in a co-operative and unified effort. That takes leadership and that's something that POTUS seems not to care about. Time and again I get the impression that all issues pertaining to foreign policy are a distraction -- even an annoyance for him. While I think it is time that our allies stop living off of our dime to defend their freedom, we can't leave them out to dry.
An excellent example that combined leadership and co-operation was our interactions with Latin America prior to the outbreak of WW II. Critics will say we bullied our way in; however, they view this from a super-power perspective --something we were not at the time. Latin America gravitated towards what they percieved as the "strong horse" (Germany & Italy), fortunately we actively took steps at all levels (diplomatic, military and economic) to prevent this. Admittedly mistakes were made along the way, but overall we achieved success through co-operation while providing leadership and the financial, and military capital that shifted Latin America back in our direction.
Feb '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Stuart Creque
In fact, our commitments to Taiwan and South Korea are based on the premise that human beings aren't cattle and that therefore the Taiwanese and the South Koreans should not be subjugated by regimes that want to reduce them to cattle -- less than cattle, in fact, for even Maoists understand the importance of taking care of one's livestock.
Taiwan cannot on its own resist mainland China, and while South Korea could likely stave off a North Korean invasion, China might well come to North Korea's military aid in that event. · Mar 8 at 3:50pm
Taiwanese aim is for reunification (or at least KMT aim). South Korea's aim is for reunification. The government of North Korea will be gone without Chinese help, so the South Koreans are in charge. No coercion involved. Just negotiating the way. There is no such framework currently existing. The Chinese get most of what they want (reunification). The Americans get most of what they want (disappearance of North Korea). Taiwan with Hong Kong-types of assurances will as well. South Korea also gets reunification. Major tripwires are also removed and builds better relations between world's two superpowers.
Feb '11
Re: Obama's Foreign Policy Crossroads: Put Up or Shut Up
Nickolas,
Serbia's terrorists backed by Serbia's security services killed the Austrian archduke. Serbia certainly did drag the world into World War I. Russia's assurances to Serbia (the weaker power), Germany's assurances to Austria (the weaker power), and France's assurances to Russia (the weaker power) and ultimately Britain's assurances to France (the weaker power) led to a catastrophe.
As for the citation of Czechoslovakia, it would have been seen as yet another "Dolchstoss von hinten" and maybe the coup works and maybe it doesn't. Hitler had already divided his national security forces and the Wehrmacht was only a portion of them.