Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Let's continue the conversation about our policy in Afghanistan and the idea of negotiating with the Taliban. I promised to return to this issue and in particular to come back to the points raised by our member Tristan Abbey. I have to say that I've found the lack of widespread discussion of this issue amazing. We've been at war there since 2001. We have nearly 100,000 troops there--many have been killed or suffered catastrophic injuries--and now we're hearing all this background chatter of "talks" with the Taliban, yet having almost no real national debate about what this means or whether it's a good idea. It's as if somehow this is all happening on a distant planet with no connection to ours.
Let's start the discussion here. First, an October 2010 interview with Abdullah Abdullah, who ran against Karzai last year:
... [the] Taliban are not fighting in order to be accommodated. They are fighting in order to bring the state down. So it's a futile exercise, and it's just misleading.
Second, a March 2009 panel discussion on the idea of negotiations--read it all; I'm only highlighting the "deeply skeptical" views, but you may find the "in favor" views more convincing than I do:
Thomas H. Johnson: Since 2006, various partners of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan have pursued a dialogue with regional Taliban figures as well as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. None of these efforts have borne fruit. It's been difficult to identify who can in fact speak for the Taliban insurgent leadership. While these talks proceeded, the insurgency has become more violent and casualty rates have soared for the ISAF. ... Historically, Pashtuns (who constitute the core Taliban constituency) have negotiated only when they perceive themselves in a position of strength. If their public statements are to be believed, the Taliban today think they are in a position of strength. Taliban spokesman Qari Yousuf Ahmadi recently stated: "We struggle for almighty Allah and we are sure we are winning."
Robert Templer: Not yet. Negotiations from a position of weakness will end up boosting the Taliban and further weakening the Afghan state. First, Afghan government institutions need to be strengthened, particularly the police, courts, and prisons. Local government structures need more powers and more money. Then Afghans needs to discuss some basic principles for negotiations. Should the Taliban have to accept the constitution? Are there people in the Taliban who are beyond the pale? Would there be an amnesty? Would they be allowed to keep their arms? And if so, what would the response be from other ethnic groups who bore the brunt of Taliban violence before 2001?
So far hardly any of the key questions have even been asked, never mind answered. Negotiating without some consensus on what these talks would mean is a recipe for even more divisions within the country. Talks that are driven by an outside power such as the United States will not result in enduring agreements. If there are discussions with the Taliban, they need to be driven by Afghans with the basic principles agreed ahead of time. They also need to take place in an environment where a stronger state can absorb insurgents, not be taken over by them. The lessons are clear from earlier agreements with insurgents in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They have mostly resulted in concessions of territory and power to people who have no intention of following the rule of law.
Masood Aziz: When it comes to the Taliban, we first need to understand who the Taliban are before we start demarches for negotiations. I would distinguish between the al-Qaeda variety of the Taliban and everything else, calling it the "Qaliban." This leading faction represents an actual morphing of key Taliban forces with al-Qaeda, making it virtually impossible to distinguish between them. There is no negotiating with this group. The rest of the "bad apples" are composed of drug traffickers, warlords, and criminals. This last group along with the Qaliban and al-Qaeda itself constitute an influential but small number of individuals which will never support the true interests of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan and need to be eradicated.
That was March, 2009. Has the situation changed sufficiently to warrant revisiting the idea?
And then let me call your attention to this address by Newt Gingrich in July, 2010. Let's keep Newt-the-candidate out of it for the purposes of this discussion, and just focus on his argument--viz., that this conflict cannot be isolated from a broader conflict with Islamic extremism. Newt is, basically, advancing a modern domino theory. He begins with an allusion to Camus:
Camus wrote in The Plague, "There are times when a man can be killed for saying two plus two equals four because the authorities can't stand the truth." I think that, frankly, our debate over national security in many ways represents that level of establishment pressure to avoid telling the truth.
And continues (several pages later) thus:
We cannot afford defeat in Afghanistan. The moral effects around the planet, the increase in morale of the radical jihadis and the damage to Western civilization will be incalculable. Great powers should be careful about starting but once they start, they should be relentless and implacable about winning and it is very dangerous for us to talk about how we're going to somehow have a magic date at which we leave no matter the consequences because that means we're not thinking about the consequences. They would be horrendous. That doesn’t mean we don’t need a better strategy. It doesn’t mean we don’t need new ways of thinking about it, but this is a serious long-term problem with enormous worldwide implications.
These, he thinks, are the elements of a better strategy:
... if you go through what I've just walked you through, you also begin to realize that the problems in Afghanistan are probably 90 percent nonmilitary. This is not a military campaign. This is a campaign which has a significant military component but if you were to look today--and this is not just to comment on Obama, it's not just to comment on George W. Bush, it's a comment on the entire American bureaucracy and the way we've approached this--the fact that we have been in this country for seven years, almost eight years, and we have not flooded the country with highways, we haven't guaranteed that every Afghan has a cell phone, we haven't undertaken the logical steps towards fundamentally modernizing their society, we haven’t developed a program to help farmers get off of growing drugs.
I mean, just go down the list and say to yourself in the model of World War II or in the model of George Catlett Marshall, the Marshall Plan, NATO, think about the scale of what we did after 1947. We said all right, we're faced with a genuine worldwide Soviet threat, all right, invent the Central Intelligence Agency, the Strategic Air Command, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, rebuild our military capabilities, send aid around the planet, rebuild Europe through the Marshall Plan, create a momentum of scientific, technological, economic and political change so that the Soviet Union is isolated and incapable of competing. It took 40 years. The planet got richer and it got freer and it became more working together and greater world trade and the largest middle class in the history of human beings. In the process, we contained the Soviet empire till it collapsed. That was the right scale.
I'm not saying that tomorrow morning you win, but the fact that we haven't figured out probably the most important military units we could have sent into Afghanistan were military engineer battalions. If we had mobilized every National Guard engineer battalion and rotated them in there building roads and just build as many roads as possible, to make as many commercial trucks as possible in order to get people traveling back and forth to break up the isolation, we would have done more in the last 600 tours by people who were policing because we're policing the same community that isn't changing. You need a vastly deeper focus on creating a modern Afghanistan of which there's a security component.
And another key point:
Most American politicians do not understand ... the consequence[s] in a world that isn't a benign, middle class, law-abiding society. When the president says well, we got to start withdrawing in July of 2011, the first two signals that went out were if you're on our side, you better figure out what to do when we sell out, the Saigon complex. So don’t tell me it's not possible. And if you're on their side, you figure out, how do I hang on for one more year? That signal is instant, the moment an American politician says that.
My view: The Taliban rolls back into Kabul, there is no way we get to wash our hands of it and say, "Well, we lost that one, it doesn't matter." Are you kidding me? How can people not grasp what that would mean to the world? But we also need to face the truth: The scale of this challenge is massive--Cold War massive. This can't be a discussion on the periphery of our minds, and the problem won't go away if we say, "Well, let's just negotiate with these fellows and skedaddle."
Inevitably, someone will say, "The domino theory was wrong." Well, ask the rest of ASEAN about that. Ask people in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Nicaragua. And, for that matter, ask people in Afghanistan.
The Taliban just assassinated the police chief of southern Afghanistan's Kandahar province, by the way.
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Comments :
Aug '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Bush bad. Obama good. No debate allowed. Such a disgrace. The Russian defeat ignored. What a waste.
May '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Currently my oldest son is a civilian contractor in Afghanistan (after serving 7 years in the Air Force, including a tour in Iraq). My three youngest are all in the Army (none in Iraq or Afghanistan, yet). I've got "skin in the game."
Our mistake at the outset was not going in. Killing everyone we could get our hands on who needed killing. Razing to the ground any location where credible evidence pointed to it being a Taliban stronghold or safe haven. Pulling whoever we could grab in the way of warlords, chieftains, etc. together. Locking them in a compound. Working them 14 hours a day at forming a government. Not letting them out until they hammered out some kind of government they could live with for a couple months. Telling them "YOU. DON'T. WANT. US. BACK." Then leaving in good order before their cobbled together government could collapse.
Cold-heartedly bloody, yes. But the most humane way to fight a war is to get the damn thing over with as quickly as possible, with as few casualties on your side as possible.
Edited on Apr 16, 2011 at 5:35amMay '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Still not too late for some variant of that, although it will be much less effective than if we'd wrapped up our involvement in 2 years or less.
The counterinsurgency, clean water, meals on wheels, lectures on Jeffersonian democracy, &tc. are a waste of our time and resources.
Edited on Apr 16, 2011 at 5:32amRe: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
We can all have a wonderful discussion about what we should have done, I'm sure. The moving finger writes and all that. The question is what to do now.
Feb '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Leave. They hate us. It is a massive country. The government is corrupt. Warlords and the Islamic leaders will fight us forever, never really surrendering, no matter how hard we hit them.
We will be at war with militant Islam for the rest of our lives. Possibly for the rest of our children's lives.We must pick out battles. Afghanistan is not a good choice. It is at the end of an impossible supply line. To costly to fight there. Save $60 billion a year.
Leave. But to make sure Islam knows we are not wimps, guarantee independence of South Sudan. Much cheaper, and more shocking to them to actually roll back Islam.
May '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
I think the lack of discussion is because we don't like Afghanistan, so we try to avoid it. Hence the "don't buy it, just break it" vibe having currency. We don't really know what we're doing there, and it kills our guys, in addition to tying down our power.
And will now plow through these thoughts on Grand Strategery.
May '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Which is a point you made, now I've Read the Whole Thing. But we are talking Cold War commitment. Over what? Prestige? Street cred? That seems to be the argument. Are we trying to achieve anything except not appearing to lose? Cause that train left the station to try and catch the ship that sailed after the barn door was open.
Cold War commitment means we get guys killed for decades, and tie down half of our military that could be used for something valuable. In Afghanistan?
I had an ancillary comment on how idiotic it is to let the drug war drive our foreign policy, but will use the remainder of my minutes to say: Leave. Now. Don't mess with deadlines. Surprise them.
Jan '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Ms. Berlinski, you're hammering on cold iron. Not that your concerns, or Gingrich's assessments are false or even weak, they are clear and compelling.
Making informed judgments of news and opinion is far beyond the typical attention span, and, sad to say, comprehension of the great majority of Americans. These are not easy times for analytical appraisals and prudent management of events. Too many social changes are happening, most very quickly. Too many variables, many of them poorly understood. Too many players like Soros, not all of them plainly visible.
It’s not that our problems are incapable of solution; they are. Our politicians would seem to be the ones to blame. They’re careerists, and bend to the will of those who help keep them in their jobs, even if that damages the general welfare. But that’s self-interest, and ought to be expected.
Our problem is the great majority of those who vote without knowing why and without understanding the consequences of their action. Our problem is that we are unprepared by education and inclination to do the work required of an informed citizenry.
We, not the politicians we elect, are the real problem
Nov '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
What should we do now? Leave.
We should only be actively supporting states that share our values, which in that region is pretty well just Israel. The rest need to drag their own cultures out of the 15th century. As Camus pointed out, you don't really own what you don't purchase yourself. The West did this through centuries of internal warfare, particularly during the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. It's not something that happens in a decade or two.
As for comparisons with the Marshall Plan - keep in mind that the Axis powers were absolutely flattened by the end of the war, but deep underneath the evil were cultures that were highly literate and culturally advanced. There were traditions to build free, democratic, allied states on. Afghanistan? hardly.
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Anon:
Our problem is the great majority of those who vote without knowing why and without understanding the consequences of their action. Our problem is that we are unprepared by education and inclination to do the work required of an informed citizenry.
We, not the politicians we elect, are the real problem · Apr 16 at 8:18am
Well, we solve that one step at a time. Let's at least get our thoughts straight about this on RIcochet. For everyone on this thread who says leave, what's your response to the argument Gingrich is making? Where do you think his logic is wrong?
Oct '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
We can't leave now but we should leave as soon as possible. That would require more from our allies and less from us. We need to make this clear, set a timetable and stick to it.
May '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
I think his logic is wrong because he ignores the costs. It's all very well to say leaving would have consequences, but staying has far weightier costs. Cold War commitment isn't something you brush aside. It's serious, and has costs both here and abroad, as we diddle and futz, with half of the world's military.
What nobody has yet stated is what is the endgame, aside from hanging on as long as we can to avoid the appearance of losing? Even Michael Yon says it'll take decades. For what?
Jul '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
I say we take off and nuke the entire site from orbit. It's the only way to be sure.
In all seriousness, we have the the tools and weaponry to obliterate opposition, but we lack the stomach to do so. Look no further than the first Gulf War and how we left Saddam in power to see that our leaders no longer possess the fortitude and will that is necessary to win a war. Can you honestly see either of the Bushes, Clinton, or Obama making the decision to drop an atomic bomb a la Truman?
Feb '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Read the NY Times review of "Wrong War" by Bing West:
http://tinyurl.com/46hfjwn
Bottom line is that counterinsurgency is what we are doing in Afghanistan today and it is not working. No matter what you do for those people in the way of building infrastructure and being nice to the kids, they still hate us.
Gingrich seems not to understand that we are already doing what he says we should be doing. He is getting bad information from someone.
Leave, starting today. Blow up military supplies we cannot take out. I dread our soldiers being cut off in that God forsaken land. Sure we would get them out, but at what price?
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Have you read the book? I haven't, and would like to. I'm having a little trouble reconciling this review with this, though--in which Bing West defends the very strategy that his book seems to be against (in no uncertain terms, either).
Sep '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
I am inclined to view our Afghan policy more in terms of our Pakistan policy. It seems to me that Pakistan continues to have an arms-length pseudo-adversarial relationship with the Taliban and radical Islamic elements. To me it seems that they use these elements as foils in their adversarial relationship with India. Making a fundamental change in our relationship with majority Hindu India giving them greater influence in the region could possibly have a greater effect than what we can do militarily or diplomatically either in Afghanistan or Pakistan. I view talk of negotiations with the Taliban as a face saving way of retreating.
Jan '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
The Afghanistan “happenings” are at present a vaguely defined set of commitments and purposes. There’s no unified, objectively articulated declaration of political and military purposes, or whether, whatever they are, are coordinated or even related.
"War” is used by media reports, but not by our government. That’s a political cop-out, but perfectly understandable; politicians realize that the publics’ understanding isn't based on facts, but on a cacophony of opinions that change instantly for trivial reasons.
The purpose of war changed in the past 50 years, starting with Viet Nam. Victory is no longer a clear objective; winning means many things. They are discussed in subjective rather than objective terms. What remains fixed is that war, no matter what it’s called, means lives risked, and lost.
One would think that our government would at least pay homage to the risk-takers by telling them what they are fighting and risking their lives for. But, that involves political risk, and that consideration appears to be foremost. After all, jobs and careers are at stake.
If that sounds blatantly cynical, keep in mind that it's the message, not the messenger. If you disagree, challenge it - with facts.
Feb '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
Claire Berlinski, Ed.
Have you read the book? I haven't, and would like to. I'm having a little trouble reconciling this review with this, though--in which Bing West defends the very strategy that his book seems to be against (in no uncertain terms, either). · Apr 16 at 10:12am
Got me there. I have not read the book and cannot reconcile the NY Times review with the WSJ editorial by West. Well, I note that the WSJ editorial is dated to July 2009. Have you seen signs since then that we are making progress? I have not.
So I went to Amazon.com and looked at some of the reviews
"Wrong War" reviews there. A mixed bag, they seem to agree that Bing believes investing in Afghanistan infrastructure is not winning us friends.
Certainly since the WSJ editorial and more recent then the book, Karzi called attention to the Koran burning. Thereby inciting rioting and murder by Afghans against the UN aid missions. That is not progress.
Dec '10
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
What we need to do now is reiterate to the Pakistani government and military that our view is that you're either with us or you're with the terrorists. The situation in Afghanistan is wholly dependent on the situation in Pakistan, and indeed much of the terrorism around the globe is inspired, directed and funded out of Pakistan. We could build six-lane highways between every pair of villages in Afghanistan, but it wont do a bit of good so long as Pakistan and it's institutions (especially its ISI military intelligence agency) are in the thrall of Islamicists hell-bent on establishing a world-wide caliphate.
Apr '11
Re: Newt Gingrich, Camus, and Negotiating with the Taliban
All discussions about what to do in Afghanistan founder on the rocks because there is no blueprint anyone can point to to show what Afghanistan is supposed to look like when we're done. No one can list any specific targets, claiming instead only such nebulous goals as "establishing democracy."
Taliban is not a particularly useful identification. "Talib" simply means a student of Islam. When using the term "Taliban" as a political identification, however, usually means the Pashtun Tribe whose belief system is a confused mish-mash of Islam and the Pashtunwali - or Pashtun Tribal Code. But, though the Pashtuns predominate in the south, the Tajiks, Hazarra, and Uzbeks control the north of the country and have their own agendas for how the country should be divided and governed.
I was there in the winter of 2001/2002. When I left in June of 2002, the Taliban was out of power, and a country-wide tribal council was on the verge of electing Hamid Karzai President. We had done whatever good we could do then. It's long past time to come home and let the locals work out their own political arrangements.