Missile Defense and the Turkish Problem
Our guest contributor Kori Schake has modestly failed to mention that she has a piece about Turkey's posture toward the new ballistic missile defense system on her blog at Foreign Policy. Go over and read it all, but if you don't have time, the key point is this:
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had already set two conditions that must be met for Turkey to host essential missile defense radar components: any system must cover all of Turkish territory (a demanding operational standard), and all references to Iran as the threat must be eliminated (what should be an easy hurdle for the alliance, given its history of "dual track" decisions of deploying nuclear forces while negotiating their removal). Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has upped the ante, stating that Turkey should have command of the system. Turkey commanding NATO's missile defenses is surely a deal breaker, not least because of questions about the political reliability of their government. There are alternatives to siting the radar in Turkey, but there will be a messy dispute and another international disappointment for the Obama administration if a different site must now be chosen.
Kori, you'd be in a good position to answer a few questions I've got about this. First, from a purely strategic point of view, does it make any difference whether Iran is named as a threat? Is this important technically, in terms of strategic planning? Does it make sense, as a diplomatic compromise, essentially to say, "Well, we won't name Iran as the threat overtly, but of course we all know what this is for?" I ask this because I know well what the Turkish position on this is: "We don't want to go out of our way to make ourselves a target." And you're right that this isn't a new posture; Turkey has always tried to avoid antagonizing Iran--it remained neutral in the Iran-Iraq war, for example. My sense is that the real point of this demand is not so much a strategic matter, but a question of forcing Turkey to show which side it's on, once and for all. But perhaps I'm wrong: Is there a serious strategic argument for insisting upon this?
Second, what would it mean, technically, for Turkey to have command of the system: Does this mean Turkey, and only Turkey, would have the authority to decide when to use it?
Third, what's your sense of the technical viability of this system--does anyone think it would actually work? How much real protection against ballistic missiles do the specialists really imagine it would provide?
Finally, what's your recommendation for giving Turkey, as you put it, "constructive roles that capitalize on their desire to be seen as the Brazil of the Middle East, find terms on which we can support them, and showcase their successes?" Do you have anything specific in mind?
I'm trying to make sense of the diplomatic backstage, here, and your thoughts about this would be much appreciated.
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Comments :
Aug '10
Re: Missile Defense and the Turkish Problem
Like this sentence:
Surely an alliance with NATO's celebrated history of chimera can find a way to accommodate Erdogan's sensitivities.
That says a mouthful right there.
But one thing jumps out. This is a missile defense system. How does control of a missile defense system really matter ? Is someone in Turkey going to make a decision about defending his country that would be anything but : "YES, turn it on now !". I think Russia has been very deft in obsfuscating that simple technical fact in order to keep their costs down. They have pretty functional memories of arms race consequences after all.
This is about defusing attacks. What could be wrong about that ?
Only weak link is the security. Does the concept of Harvard -educated, Sandhurst- trained Janissary sound frightening ?
Edited on Nov 17, 2010 at 2:12pm