Michael Chertoff On Drawing the Line Between Crime and Terror
To mark the tenth anniversary of 9/11, Dean Reuter and I have edited a compilation of essays examining the law and policy of the war on terror called Confronting Terror: 9/11 and the Future of American National Security. The book's contributors are a varied bunch and include some of Ricochet's own voices, including Richard Epstein and Victor Davis Hanson.
Over the next few days leading up to 9/11, I will post excerpts here that are of particular note. The first is from former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff from his essay "War v. Crime: Breaking the Chains of the Old Security Paradigm."
...Globalization has eroded the distinction between the global reach of the nation-state and the reach of the individual or group.
The abilities to travel, communicate, and finance activities on a global basis have generated the first true international networks. These networks, whether ideological or criminal, can and do support a presence around the world in a way previously limited to national governments.
When this global reach is coupled with the destructive leverage created by technological innovation, the danger posed by a sophisticated international network begins to rival that potentially posed by all but the most powerful countries. On September 11, a globalized al-Qaeda was able to project its operatives into the United States and to exploit America’s own aviation technology against itself, resulting in more loss of American civilian life by a foreign enemy than in any other single day in our history. Had al-Qaeda wielded the technological knowhow to create a biological- or cyber-weapon, similar or greater blows might have followed.
The threat distinction between nation-state actors and non-state networks is further effaced when we consider the number of geographic locations in which terrorist or criminal groups are able to create literal safe havens in which they set up recruiting centers, training camps, and laboratories to enhance their destructive capabilities. These safe havens thrive in ungoverned space—whether in the frontiers of Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, or regions within other weak states. From the standpoint of consequence, there is little difference between the terrorist group that is granted safe haven by a nation-state and one that seizes safe haven in a territory which lacks an effective sovereign that can police within its own borders.
In the face of these developments, does the binary distinction between nation-based security threats and network- or organization-based security threats still make sense? Their global reach is often identical. Their destructive effects are often the same. Is it arbitrary, then, to classify some of these threats as war-related and others as crime-related?
...Few would have difficulty in concluding that al-Qaeda and its operatives constitute a network against which all the tools of national power ought to be deployed. But most would think that the Unabomber—a classic lone wolf—or a gang of bank robbers are not reasonable targets for launching a missile. Why?
One obvious difference is that al-Qaeda is a global network, physically rooted in ungoverned spaces in South Asia and the Horn of Africa, while domestic terrorists or violent criminals lack an international dimension. This distinction is important for two reasons: First, the international reach of a network amplifies the threat and raises the risk that the members of the network are fundamentally hostile not just to our citizens but to our existence as a nation. Any attacks by such a network would cause a greater threat to our security than the lone wolf or ordinary criminal could.
Second, the international dimension affords an important limiting principle in safeguarding our rights as Americans. Military force is less circumscribed than judicially hedged law enforcement action. By treating an international dimension as a predicate to invoking warfighting tools, we avoid the possibility that the government might short-circuit existing legal rights to harass domestic political adversaries or to make it easier to address garden-variety criminal activity.
This leads to a second important factor in considering the range of permissible actions against a terrorist: is that person an American citizen? To be sure, American citizens affiliated with international terror networks—or with enemy nations—can pose as serious a threat as non-citizens. But the limiting principle of guarding against erosion of core domestic liberties should counsel caution in applying the full range of warfighting tools against a United States citizen.
A third factor to be considered is whether it should matter that the individual and network that pose the threat are motivated by ideology or more prosaic objectives, such as greed. The answer may be less obvious than appears at first blush. Although conventional wisdom discerns a meaningful difference between ideological international terrorists and international organized criminals, the distinction is less clear in practical terms. Mexican drug lords have for some years practiced the tactics of terrorism to intimidate their foes and to discourage government law enforcement. The beheadings, car bombings, and massacres of innocent civilians are no different in kind from the worst we have seen in news reports from Iraq. While these organized crime bosses have not articulated a political philosophy beyond their own rapaciousness, the effects of their tactics clearly terrorize and promote certain political objectives.
Moreover, criminal groups and terrorist groups may easily merge. The Colombian insurrectionist group, FARC, began as a left-wing revolutionary group. Eventually, however, they began to protect cocaine loads in return for weapons and money, and eventually became directly involved in narco-trafficking. At this point, should we consider the FARC a terrorist group, a criminal enterprise, or both? The line between the two is permeable and ever-changing. Ideology of the network may be only marginally relevant in determining the appropriateness of warfighting, as compared with the tactics and political objectives of the group.
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Sep '10
Re: Michael Chertoff On Drawing the Line Between Crime and Terror
Chertoff needs to make more distinctions in his life, like the ones between personal gain and public service. I care not one whit what this man thinks.
I'm beginning to want the government out of the business of "protecting" me,
Dec '10
Re: Michael Chertoff On Drawing the Line Between Crime and Terror
I don't mind Chertoff making a buck, after leaving public service, and am vastly more concerned when career politicians become wealthy while on salaries that could in no way support their amassing of fortunes.
Compared with Napalitano, or Brennan, Chertoff is a national hero.