Libya and Air Power
All questions of the uses to which air power was applied here aside, I wonder if the military-minded among us have any thoughts about what lessons this suggests about the role of air power in military conflict. Does it change any conventional wisdom? Confirm it?
From the Times of India, yesterday, in a piece the wisdom of which I'm sure they're now doubting:
The Libyan conflict has entered its sixth month with no end in sight. The doggedness of Colonel Gaddafi was certainly not anticipated, though how long he can hold out, considering the overwhelming might of Nato airpower, is anybody's guess. Was there a flaw in the planning or was the international community taken-in by airpower's seductive aura to force a quick solution? Are there any lessons for India, where the media and some commentators see military action, especially the use of airpower, an answer to any terrorist attack?
In the Daily Caller, today:
Republican Sens. John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina praised the end of Muammar Gaddafi’s 40-year reign in Libya Sunday night, but criticized America’s limited use of airpower in the fight to overthrow him.
“Americans can be proud of the role our country has played in helping to defeat [Gaddafi], but we regret that this success was so long in coming due to the failure of the United States to employ the full weight of our airpower,” the two senators said in a joint statement, after praising the Libyan rebels who drove Gaddafi from power, as well as the British, French, Arab and other allied forces who aided them.
This is a question the Turkish media should also be asking and the Turkish government debating. But I see no evidence of that.
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Apr '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
I don't think anyone questioned the importance of air power, and certainly NATO strikes helped to disrupt and disorganize Quadafi's forces, but without the rebel fighters on the ground to actually move in to take and hold towns and villages nothing would have happened. We have seen this show before. Is that not what happened in Kosovo, where NATO air power gave the Albania Rebels the muster to pushout the Serbs? IS that not how we over threw the Taliban? With US air power and the "Northern Alliance" if I recall their name.
The question is what happens now? Can they pull this together and maintain order and peace? There are no NATO or UN peace keepers on the ground to help, and be neutral. So theoretically this could turn in on itself in a series of retributions and murders. I guess we shall see.
Re: Libya and Air Power
That too is an important question, but not the one I asked. I'm asking only about what lessons might be drawn from this about air power doctrine.
Jul '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
It is not at all clear that any use of American force in Libya was prudent. Certainly the White House has not made the case. But time will tell.
Re: Libya and Air Power
I'm not asking whether it was prudent, constitutional, wise or just. Only if it changes anyone's views about the strategic use of air power.
Apr '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
I guess we can draw the lesson that NATO or US air power can be used to disrupt and organized (if we can call it that) state military giving rebels the opportunity to organize and push back. From what I have read it seems that US and NATO strikes helped to dismantle and halt Quadafi's first counter offensive. Then they prevented him from mobilizing armor and large concentrated troop movements. Thus, Allied air power more or less leveled the playing field between the rebels and the loyalist forces.
So against organized military regimes an air campaign can remove nearly all of their organizational and equipment advantage. Thus if we for instance wished to apply such a tactic with Syria, we could more or less deny the Syria Army the use of its tanks, helicopters, and war planes. We could also deny it large field operations and troop movements.
I feel that this is not really a new discovery, though. We have seen in the past what concentrated air campaigns can weaken and dismantle whole armies. What it can not do is actually eliminate those armies. Ground force are still needed for the coup de grace.
Apr '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
I think the main appeal of an Air Docterine is that for the US it is a very safe war to wage. Few countries really have the ability to match our air assets. How many planes did we loose over Iraq in 1991? From Wikipedia "75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties". (that's allied aircraft) Over Afganistan?
So that is what it offers us. The ability to fight a war on our turf, of high technology. Our weapons are designed to take out whole armies and fight nation states. We have had to adapt to insurgent low tech wars. Even here though at least this administration has favored a high tech approach, with UAV strikes.
I think in cases where the US or NATO (is there a difference?) feels compelled to act militarily an limited Air Campaign will always be option one, because it is the safest.
The one thing that we have is money to buy bombs. Body bags though can loose elections and our nation has grown very sensitive to casualties.
Edited on Aug 21, 2011 at 11:26pmApr '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
The problem is that an Air Campaign is not really suited to the wars we are most actively engaged in, or that most countries are engaged in. Air power can not force determined fighters to leave their safe hills and mountain caves. Nor can you easily target fighters hidden among civilian population with bombs.
This will lead to a missmatched fight. Where we deploy great and expensive assets that can only be partially effective. The end result is a long and expensive war, but one low in casualties. But, the thing is all of our casualties will be amplified and all our mistakes as well, by our own sensibilities. Our leaders will sell Air Wars as the safest least bloody wars and thus every drop of blood will seem like a torrent, and progress will be slow.
I realize I may have gone off on some tangents, here. So let me retrench.
I think Lybia is a win for the proponents of an Air Doctrine. Without NATO air support I think we would have seen the Lybian rebels fall in March. It's not a bad Doctrine, but it is not the answer to all problems.
May '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
Claire, you ask what this sub-war in Libya is supposed to mean for the conventional views on air power, but you don't really explain what you think that conventional view is.
The theories of Douhet and his American disciple Billy Mitchell were never very sound and have been disproven in every attempt to use them, from the Spanish Civil War, the first and second world wars, Korean war, Vietnam War, etc. It's been recently disproven again in the Gulf War and our current wars. Bombing does not destroy morale. Bombing cannot eliminate human control over other humans. Bombing never ends regimes. This is the conventional view among all military theorists except perhaps for a few die-hards in the air force.
It should have been no surprise that no-fly zones didn't work in Iraq or Libya. Regimes will not change until people act to change them. Usually those people need guns in their hands. Absent the physical presence of people, regimes will not end. Even if the head of government is killed, successors step up unless people are there to stop them.
That is the conventional view. This latest war further confirms it.
Re: Libya and Air Power
There were a lot of people here--including me--who felt NATO was just out of its mind for imagining air power could be decisive here. This is certainly forcing me to think that I need to read and think more about this.
As almost everything does.
Jul '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
Claire Berlinski, Ed.
I'm not asking whether it was prudent, constitutional, wise or just. Only if it changes anyone's views about the strategic use of air power.
Fair enough, but the questions are inextricably linked. Providing air support without a strong presence in the ground game or other, similar leverage just lends our strength for a very uncertain advantage, if any. In the land of post-colonialism, it makes us instantly responsible for whatever the new leadership does that is weak or evil. Regardless of how feeble our efforts are to affect that leadership and the resulting policies.
In this sense, the use of Western air power did not break any military doctrines on the use of air power. Using US air power to support foreign guerrillas and resistance is at least as old as occupied France in WW II.
Re: Libya and Air Power
Sisyphus
Claire Berlinski, Ed.
I'm not asking whether it was prudent, constitutional, wise or just. Only if it changes anyone's views about the strategic use of air power.
Fair enough, but the questions are inextricably linked.
In one sense, they are. In another, it is up to the civilian C-in-C, and the civilian Congress, to make that decision--constitutionally. The military is charged with carrying out the orders. My question is a narrow one: From what we know so far, would any of us change our views about air power as a useful continuation of diplomacy by other means? (Granted, the history to date is far from clear.)
Jul '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
No, it doesn't really change anything.
The ability of exemplary air power to tip the balance in a contest between two shoddy ground forces was never in doubt. The only question was about the relative shoddiness of the two ground forces.
Jul '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
I'm afraid mine is the boring answer in this case, but here goes. The Libyan experience hasn't changed my mind because total air superiority is an incredible advantage militarily, and it was competently exploited on the ground in Libya. With air superiority you can move your troops, ammunition, food, and the other guy has to worry about his trucks and troops coming under fire at any time. NATO always said they wanted to shift a situation at equilibrium in favor of rebel forces and they did.
The difference between this and Clinton's air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994 and 1995, or the enforcement of Iraqi no fly zones, is feet on the ground. The difference between this and Vietnam is the political will to invade enemy territory.
The "highway of death" in the first Gulf War and the coordinated armor raid on Baghdad in the second Gulf War were textbook cases of intimidation by air power. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War the Israelis focused on establishing air superiority right out of the box. In 1945 the Germans could move nothing on the highways in Europe in daylight.
For 80 years, air superiority has ruled.
Mar '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
As we say in science, air power is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
The rebels couldn't have ousted Gaddafi without it, but neither would he have been ousted without the rebels. It took a long time because the rebels were incompetent but, fortunately, Gaddafi's men were even more incompetent.
It's unlikely this could have worked in Iraq against Saddam - he had too firm a grip on the country. It might just work in Syria, but it's unlikely Nato will go there - we may see what happens without air power, there. I'm guessing a lot of dead people - more than would happen with air power.
Edited on Aug 22, 2011 at 1:45amMay '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
Claire Berlinski, Ed.
There were a lot of people here--including me--who felt NATO was just out of its mind for imagining air power could be decisive here. This is certainly forcing me to think that I need to read and think more about this.
As almost everything does. · Aug 21 at 11:59pm
Oh, I see your meaning now. This doesn't really change any opinions of air power. Certainly air power is helpful and often very helpful, but even here it did not help to overthrow Khaddaffi except for the men on the ground with rifles who were able to exploit that air power. Note that with just bombing, Khaddaffi was able to stay in charge for quite some time.
Our aircraft helped them, but jets would never have been enough by themselves.
Aug '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
Claire Berlinski, Ed.
There were a lot of people here--including me--who felt NATO was just out of its mind for imagining air power could be decisive here. This is certainly forcing me to think that I need to read and think more about this.
As almost everything does. · Aug 21 at 11:59pm
Air Power hasn't been decisive - not in the military sense of the word. Decisive means "...achieving [decisive] or significant results, disproportional to
the military resources applied".
The result hasn't been disproportional to the military resources applied. No doubt air power 'set the stage' or 'leveled the playing field' otherwise the rebels would have fallen to Qaddafi's conventional forces.
This operation has already gone on 2x as long as Operation Allied Force. For an example use of decisive Air Power, I would nominate the Afghan Campaign at the start of OEF.
Apr '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
IMHO air power was absolutely critical, particularly in the most recent past. But modern smart air power takes someone on the ground to target the smart strike, either by infrared, laser, coordinates or radio contact The NATO effort was somewhat limited by a hesitancy to deploy westerners to coordinate air strikes. Although I guess there were some very secret boots on the ground. Otherwise airstrikes are NOT smart and are old fashionedly inaccurate.
RAF raids and Royal Navy patrols ensured the downfall of the dictator as rebel forces surged into Tripoli.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8715235/Libya-how-British-forces-pounded-Gaddafis-apparatus-of-repression.html
"Sunday, August 21Midnight: In a co-ordinated assault, NATO bombs fell around the Gaddafi leadership compound of Bab al-Aziziya as fighting continued on the streets. Regime spokesmen said that a few rebels had crept into the city but been crushed. But the sound of shooting continues." UK Telegraph
Surveillance and Coordination With NATO Aided Rebels
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/22/world/africa/22nato.html?_r=1
Also very recent reports of NATO attack helicopters deployed which I cannot put my fingers on now.
May '11
Re: Libya and Air Power
Instugator,
I don't see that definition of "decisive" in my MCRP 5-2A, Operational Terms and Graphics (also known as FM 101-5-1 to the army). I know there are many other sources of operational terms such as joint or NATO. Where did you get your definition?
Nov '10
Re: Libya and Air Power
The first villain of my youth has been ousted. Air Power seemed to make that possible, and give otherwise a hopelessly unorganized opposition a chance. Once the facade of Gadahfi's grip on power fell to the ground, it seemed to be a foregone conclusion that he would fail. It was just a matter of time. And opportunity. And boots on the ground. Maybe not ours, but someone's.
For airpower to be effective and practice, there must be certain conditions on the ground.
Re: Libya and Air Power
We have long dreamed that air power can be a substitute for boots on the ground. Even now -- when we really do have precision munitions -- that is not true. But it is certainly useful in an ancillary way, as has been shown in the Libyan conflict.