Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Gabriel Schoenfeld has just published an extremely persuasive piece in the Wall Street Journal calling for an independent inquiry into the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on the state of the Iranian nuclear program.
U.S. intelligence has already had two horrendously costly lapses this decade: the failure to interdict the plot of Sept. 11, 2001, and the erroneous assessment that Saddam Hussein was amassing weapons of mass destruction. Both brought us into wars. A third failure may now be unfolding, with consequences that might dwarf the preceding two. To avoid this, we need an inquest.
The assessment that Saddam Hussein was amassing WMD may not have been entirely errorneous; I still think it's an open question. But the first failure is inarguable. I've written a few pieces about what went wrong in our intelligence community prior to September 11, and I have very little confidence that the its culture has changed sufficiently that we need not worry about a repeat.
Schoenfeld notes evidence that "political cookery" tainted the 2007 NIE, and warns:
Since late last year, U.S. intelligence has been preparing a new estimate of Iran's nuclear program. The critical question is whether the forces that led to politicization in 2007 have been eradicated. Will the drafters of the new Iran NIE call the shots as they are, or will they once again use intelligence as a political lever?
Already some hints are emerging. In late June, CIA Director Leon Panetta flatly declared that the Iranians "clearly are developing their nuclear capability." Regarding "weaponization," he stated that "they continue to work on designs in that area." This explicit statement is an unequivocal reversal by our nation's premier spy agency.
But could this stunning turnabout somehow be every bit as politicized as the 2007 NIE? This troubling possibility cannot be overlooked.
I agree that it can't be overlooked.
If we and the rest of the world are not to be surprised by an Iranian detonation ... We need absolute confidence that the answer, even if indeterminate, is not once again based on cooked intelligence.
That is why a neutral outside panel should be brought in to scrutinize the discredited 2007 NIE and the entire estimating process in this sensitive arena.
Previous intelligence lapses, like those leading up to 9/11 or with Iraq's WMDs, have been thoroughly investigated by independent commissions, unleashing potential for corrective action. Who made mistakes and why? Are those same individuals in the process of introducing errors again? The national intelligence officer who oversaw the writing of the 2007 NIE was Vann Van Diepen. Today he is a senior official at the State Department, where he "spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation."
I didn't realize this about Vann Van Diepen, and again, I agree that this is a cause for concern. It doesn't necessarily mean he's been discredited, but it definitely suggests that we need to be taking the questions Schoenfeld raises seriously. "An independent inquest might help us avoid what would be the third in an unholy trinity of hugely consequential 21st-century intelligence blunders," Schoenfeld concludes, and I can't see a single reason to think him wrong. Far better the inquest take place before the catastrophe than after.
The intelligence community tends to be less scrutinized than other branches of government, for obvious reasons. We need improved mechanisms for oversight, particularly in this case: A mistake could prove to be the most costly intelligence failure in human history.
Tangentially, a question for Judith: Do you get the sense that something has gone very wrong within the Israeli intelligence community? I'm still flabbergasted by the failure to anticipate violence on the Mavi Marmara, something I could have predicted just from using Google and a bit of common sense, and in fact did predict. Do you think that was a one-off lapse, or part of a pattern? If the latter, what do you think is going on?
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Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Claire, the IDF's committee to investigate the flotilla raid (the Eiland Committee) did indeed find there to have been intelligence failures as well as flaws in the battle plan. (The commandos themselves were praised for their handling of the situation they were literally dropped into.) Two things about the report strike me as significant. One is that blame was assigned to "the relatively top levels," which "caused the results to be different from what was planned" -- in other words, there was a disconnect between the people making the decisions and the actors on the ground. This is a problem the IDF has long been noted for avoiding and is a worrying precedent. The other striking problem was a lack of communication between the Navy and the Mossad, which would explain why the Navy decision-makers (apparently) didn't know who the IHH was, or didn't know enough. I've been wondering all along (as have many Israelis) why the Navy didn't try to disable the vessels rather than board them, but the report says it was determined at the time that there was no way to stop them without endangering them (and therefore everybody on them).
Edited on Jul 19, 2010 at 4:35amRe: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
The Mossad is taking heat for the intelligence failure, but the Eiland report suggests that it was more the Navy that was at fault -- that the Mossad was talking, but the Navy wasn't listening. Ari Shavit wrote a striking piece in Haaretz that neatly expresses Israeli disenchantment with the Mossad in the wake of the raid:
I will be watching closely to see if there's any further clarification of the Navy-Mossad exchange of intelligence leading up to the raid. It looks as though it'll explain a lot.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
For anyone interested in the climate prior to and surrounding the 2007 NIE, I recommend checking out Scott Johnson's work on the subject at Power Line. Starting in about 2005, he began a series of posts with "Three Years of the Condor" which detailed his perception of an internal "war" with the Bush Administration on one side and the CIA/State Department careerists on the other. It's good reading.
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Judith Levy:
That's exactly what I'm worried about.
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Matthew, thanks. That sounds very interesting.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Doesn't it seem as though our intelligence screw-ups are in some measure over-reactions to the previous screw-ups? Underestimating the programs of Iraq and Pakistan in the 90's begets overestimating Iraq in the 00's begets underestimating Iran now.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Judy or Claire, do you think because of the intelligence failure in Iraq the NIE was more circumspect in interpreting the situation in Iran back in 2007? Because they were under more pressure not to screw it up again?
When my husband was in the Marines he had Top Secret Special Access clearance. Some of the private information from the NIE he was briefed on actually discussed the opposite conclusion of what was in the public NIE reports. So, many times what they tell the public is quite different from what they’re not saying and could even conflict. It was an intelligence game to manipulate information, so, now, I don’t know what to believe.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
We had the same thought. Another reason I like you. :-)
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
That sounds completely plausible -- although of course, not knowing much about the sources of the NIE or the details of the analytical process, it's just a statement about the way people tend to think, nothing like evidence about how they were in fact thinking. But yeah, generals tend to fight the last war.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
I suspect that Matthew has it more on-point. The lead CIA analyst for the Near East was Paul Pillar, who was Powerline principal Paul Mirengoff's roommate at Dartmouth, so they took a special interest in what came out of Pillar's shop given a not-hostile personal connection. Here is Powerline on Pillar RE the 2007 NIE:
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2007/02/016409.php
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
I agree that Saddam's possession of WMDs remains an open question. I recall pictures of fighter jets that had been buried in the sand, and Iraq's got a lot of sand.
But even assuming that our inability to find WMDs and our inability to prevent 9/11 represent intelligence failures, I'm hesitant to consider the severity of the consequences as evidence of systemic patterns (especially considering the former failure was shared with reputable agencies of other nations). We generally don't hear about it when an intelligence agency succeeds; not the frequency nor severity of those dangers. And these failures are so politicized that truth is difficult to determine.
So I would just say: greater risk demands a higher degree of certainty, while greater and more imminent danger merits a lower standard of certainty. Balacing these two considerations is the really messy part.
Also, I don't like the idea of introducing "neutral" parties to verify intel. I can't explain at the moment, but I intuitively prefer allies and enemies with known loyalties to idealists and mercenaries without skin in the game. All persons and organizations have loyalties. Some loyalties are firmer than others.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
And a long, porous border with Syria.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Duane Oyen: I suspect that Matthew has it more on-point. The lead CIA analyst for the Near East was Paul Pillar, who was Powerline principal Paul Mirengoff's roommate at Dartmouth, so they took a special interest in what came out of Pillar's shop given a not-hostile personal connection. Here is Powerline on Pillar RE the 2007 NIE:
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2007/02/016409.php · Jul 19 at 10:34am
Duane, your taste in favored sites is obviously sublime.
May '10
Re: Iran and Intelligence Blunders: Avoiding the Unholy Trinity
Matthew Gilley
Duane Oyen: I suspect that Matthew has it more on-point. The lead CIA analyst for the Near East was Paul Pillar, who was Powerline principal Paul Mirengoff's roommate at Dartmouth, so they took a special interest in what came out of Pillar's shop given a not-hostile personal connection. Here is Powerline on Pillar RE the 2007 NIE:
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2007/02/016409.php · Jul 19 at 10:34am
Duane, your taste in favored sites is obviously sublime. · Jul 20 at 6:17am
Well, I live near, and work in, Minneapolis, and I have walked right past (in my personal bank) Scott's office..... in fact, a few years back, we had a bit of a debate over prescription drugs. So I've been following them since the first piece they did for Claremont back almost 20 years ago, long before the web.
I'm always dating myself, aren't I?