Dirty Bomb Strategy
I’m reflecting on the report that Wikileaks revealed that terrorists are trying to develop a “dirty bomb.” The way the report tells it, it’s inevitable that terrorists will develop one, and then chemical weapons and nuclear weapons are not far behind.
How shall we respond? What’s our strategy for this?
- In the mid-1980s, Robert Axelrod published “The Evolution of Cooperation.” It was about game theory, aka the logic of interaction, aka the logic of strategy. The best known game in game theory is Prisoner’s Dilemma. Axelrod observed that if two players play Prisoner’s Dilemma one time, you get a predictable if unwelcome result. However, if you play the game many times, some useful dynamics emerge that allow the players to succeed. Axelrod wanted to know what strategies fared best, so he staged a tournament. All sorts of strategies were played. For example, “Tit for Tat” started with cooperation, and then mirrored whatever the other player did. “Massive Retaliation” started with cooperation, but the moment the other player defected, Massive Retaliation never cooperated again. Other strategies were mixed; some followed a formula, some were random, and there were about 200 strategies altogether. At the end of the tournament, the winning strategy was “Tit for Tat.”
- Prisoner’s Dilemma only goes so far, and doesn’t explain everything. The best game to analyze terrorism is “Chicken.” Remember the scene in Rebel Without a Cause, where two cars faced each other, and they could either swerve or die? The first to swerve was the chicken, thus the name of the game.
- So, to pass a class in game theory in graduate school, I staged a tournament like Axelrod’s, only based on Chicken. I didn’t use 200 strategies, I only used eight. It was by no means an exhaustive study, and I make no claim to statistical perfection. (Hey, it was only grad school.) All disclaimers aside, in my Chicken tournament, the most successful strategy was “Massive Retaliation.” Note: Classic game theory argues that there is no stable outcome, and so a mixed strategy is best.
Game Theory is really an application of logic and numbers. In that abstract world, you can play iterated games where terrorists kill hundreds or thousands at multiple episodes, and you can coldly discuss the strategy without caring how many die. But in the real world, our initial focus has to be on prevention. What’s the best strategy for preventing or deterring the first attack? Again, on reflection, I argue that the best initial strategy is Massive Retaliation.
In real life, what would Massive Retaliation look like? We’d have to pre-determine our retaliation, before any attack happens. If the terrorists attack X, we’ll destroy Y.
Yes, it’s the old MAD (mutually assured destruction) strategy, but then again, we’re still here, aren’t we? The difference is that we knew where the Soviets were. We could assign targets for Y. These days, we don’t know where the terrorists are coming from. We know generally, but is it moral to target a location “generally?” That’s why I’d argue that we re-apply the Bush Rule: those who harbor terrorists are as responsible as the actual attackers. If we know that Iran supports “Islamic Whacko Army,” and the IWA carries out an attack, we target somewhere in Iran … and we let Iran know it ahead of time. That way, even if we can’t catch the actual terrorists, we give Iran a motive to prevent any attacks.
In isolation, it’s horrible to target a city. But when you’re trying to prevent an attack in the first place, I argue that the morality shifts from the obvious to the strategic.
Again, I’m reflecting on how we can respond to global terrorism where evolving technology makes an attack practical now, when it was stoppable before. If we can’t prevent an attack technologically, perhaps we can prevent an attack strategically. It should go without saying that we should continue diplomacy where possible, peaceful negotiation where possible, and bend over backwards to avoid a crisis point. But we have to face the reality that there are actors afoot with whom diplomacy and negotiation are impossible. We need to deal with them.
I’d welcome a counter-argument. At the moment, I see no alternative, although I’d dearly love to have one.
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Sep '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
I am clearly not in your league when it comes to game theory. The problem I see is that any threat to be effective must be sufficiently horrific and believed to be creditable. The primary problem with the Bush rule is that Bush himself declared it and them promptly ignored it. You seem to acknowledge that terrorists do not operate on strictly logical principles and therefore the application of game theory to them directly is not applicable. Why do assume that sponsoring of terrorism is any more logical? The problem with the often stated argument that we cannot be 100% effective in our defensive strategies therefore me must do X.Y, or z; is that it provides reasons to divert resources away for making the country secure. If the resources that were devoted to Iraq were instead devoted to securing the country I argue we would be far more secure today than we are. While we may not be 100% effective we certainly can be more effective than we are. Take a look at our southern border!
Sep '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Very interesting post, thanks!
I would venture here the game is underway and they are already playing the Massive Retaliation/Provocation strategy, and retaliation in kind serves radical Islam's agenda.
I don't think we are not playing the same game, or at least we are playing a game with separate payoffs. We are playing "Chicken" with suicidal's, therefore our opponents will win either way.
Massive Retaliation should come, not as destruction or killing, but as profiling, deportations, closing down radical mosques etc.In short we suspend civil liberties to Muslims generally and target radicals. Then we will have the argument over freedom and require moderate Muslims be responsible for their own freedom. If Muslims wish to call us hypocrites, let them and challenge them to create free multicultural States. No innocents killed - this would be immoral, useless and counterproductive - and pressure would be exerted on the only population that can have any real effect while at the same time minimizing our risks.
Jan '11
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
I agree that we shouldn't lower our defenses. But that report mentioned in Wikileaks promises that the technology will soon be past the point that we can defend. I'm not sure it's an excuse to divert resources, as much as it is an assessment that those defenses need something else in addition.
Dec '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
If the threat of Massive Retaliation, killing many innocents, is an acceptable deterrent, then other options are available. For example...
You kill ours, we kill yours.
Jan '11
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
You should check out the book The Chicken Little Agenda: Debunking the Experts Lies by Robert Williscroft. He has a chapter on dirty bombs and explains them why we shouldn't be that concerned about them.
May '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
I'm not sure it's possible to have a MAD strategy with trading partners. There's a price to pretending enemies are allies.
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
I don't know if Curtis LeMay knew much about game theory. But he got the job done.
Dec '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Nickolas
If the threat of Massive Retaliation, killing many innocents, is an acceptable deterrent, then other options are available. For example...
You kill ours, we kill yours. · Feb 3 at 7:52am
I'm sympathetic to this approach, but I just can't imagine that the majority of Americans would agree with me--perhaps rightly so. Do you think that our country has the stomach for such an approach? I would argue no.
Perhaps our moral standards make us "better" than the enemy, or perhaps they make us weaker. I'm not sure where one ends and the other begins, but I'd wager that we'll find out soon.
May '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
In my rage against the atrocity of September 11 2001 I held, and still hold, that the only remedy for the attack was indeed massive retaliation; a retaliation so massive as to completely discredit and delegitimize every facet of Islamist ideology. Had I but been president on September 12...
Victor Davis Hanson said it best (paraphrasing): Germany was so utterly defeated in 1945 that no one left wanted to be associated with Nazism.
Add Bonaparte: "If you say you are going to take Vienna, take Vienna."
We didn't do any of that. Our polite restraint caused us to miss our chance to prevail years ago so, here we are, still tilting at windmills.
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Kervinlee: In my rage against the atrocity of September 11 2001 I held, and still hold, that the only remedy for the attack was indeed massive retaliation; a retaliation so massive as to completely discredit and delegitimize every facet of Islamist ideology. Had I but been president on September 12...
Victor Davis Hanson said it best (paraphrasing): Germany was so utterly defeated in 1945 that no one left wanted to be associated with Nazism.
Add Bonaparte: "If you say you are going to take Vienna, take Vienna."
We didn't do any of that. Our polite restraint caused us to miss our chance to prevail years ago so, here we are, still tilting at windmills. · Feb 3 at 1:11pm
Aaargh! I share your blood-thirstiness.
Nov '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
My husband has all along taken the same point of view: we should have retaliated massively against a random Islamic country with the promise that any future terrorist attacks would lead to equally massive retaliation against a different Islamic country. His idea was to give them all a good reason to track down the terrorists and put them out of business. I wish real life worked like that.
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Lucy Pevensie
My husband has all along taken the same point of view: we should have retaliated massively against a random Islamic country with the promise that any future terrorist attacks would lead to equally massive retaliation against a different Islamic country. His idea was to give them all a good reason to track down the terrorists and put them out of business. I wish real life worked like that. · Feb 3 at 1:22pm
Lucy, I don't know whether to be in love with you or with your husband.
Menage a trois?
Edited on Feb 3, 2011 at 1:28pmMay '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Thank you, Kenneth and Lucy. Decorum restrains me from divulging my target list here. But, I feel so alone anymore.
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Hint: big, black square thingy....
Nov '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
I like your idea of massive retaliation but continuing diplomacy where possible. In politics, it helps to have a catchy phrase or slogan for any policy one wishes to sell to the public. So how about this for a slogan to describe your idea: “Walk softly and carry a big stick.”
Whaddya think?
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
TeeJaw : I like your idea of massive retaliation but continuing diplomacy where possible. In politics, it helps to have a catchy phrase or slogan for any policy one wishes to sell to the public. So how about this for a slogan to describe your idea: “Walk softly and carry a big stick.”
Whaddya think? · Feb 3 at 1:33pm
I prefer "smoking heap of radioactive rubble".
Nov '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Kenneth
Lucy Pevensie
Lucy, I don't know whether to be in love with you or with your husband.
Menage a trois? · Feb 3 at 1:27pm
Edited on Feb 03 at 01:28 pm
Awwww, gee. Thanks. I'll pass along the compliment.
Kenneth
I prefer "smoking heap of radioactive rubble". · Feb 3 at 1:43pm
My husband would say something more along the lines of "large glass skating rink."
Jan '11
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Michael Horn
Do you think that our country has the stomach for such an approach? I would argue no.
It's funny. Ronald Reagan, apparently, so hated the idea that others worried whether he could be trusted when the time came.
If we are attacked, maybe the public would suddenly develop the emotion to support retaliation, but by then the damage would be done. The trick, then, is to make the decision before the ships have sailed. That brings up the notion of options. In Chicken, there is one tricky way to win the game: disable your ability to respond. In the Rebel Without a Cause version, the way to win is for one driver to remove the steering wheel and hold it up for the other to see. Since the first driver can't possibly swerve, the second has no hope. The trick only works, though, if you do it first, and you publicize it.
Sometimes it's good to have options. Sometimes not.
Yes, I know -- it's the doomsday machine scenario from Dr. Strangelove. But from a purely strategic view, it has advantages.
Jan '11
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
Another consideration.
When we were dealing with the Soviets, we had several paths of engagement. We had trade agreements, which we could walk away from. We had the Olympics, which we did walk away from. There were spy swaps, treaties, etc. That means that we had alternatives to leverage when the crisis came.
Terrorists work anonymously, spurning engagement. But that means that they leave us no alternatives. Since we don't have intermediate ways to push back, we only have one course we can pursue: total destruction. The same goes for targets. If you don't give us a target to retaliate against, you force us to pick one. Naturally, we'd pick the target that would most likely injure the terrorists. (OK, that means Iran.)
Again, these are actions that would be immoral otherwise, but to protect against the threat of widespread murder, they may become moral. After all, it's immoral to strike a child, but if it's the only way the parent can stop the child from doing something more harmful, it may become moral.
Jul '10
Re: Dirty Bomb Strategy
That's what I was wondering about, what would be the target(s) that maximize deterrence? Would Sunni terrorists care about Tehran? Wouldn't it have to be a bunch of targets throughout the Muslim world? Or maybe Mecca?