Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Jeff Emanuel offers some insights into President Obama's military cutbacks, announced today at a press conference. As Emanuel notes, it wasn't really a press conference, since the president ducked out after initial remarks. He writes:
There’s no question that an agile, flexible, etc. military has its benefits, particularly in an age of widely-diffused, rapidly-emerging threats; however, just how that more agile military is designed and arrived at is an important issue, particularly in light of how stretched the total force has been over the last decade. Though long-term counterinsurgency operations will likely be avoided as much as possible in the near future (particularly by the current administration), and though unmanned ISR and offensive operations are being conducted with greater and greater frequency, there is clear danger in drawing down our nation’s force too far too fast, as well as in indiscriminately slashing defense funding.
Personally, I am concerned Obama's solution in this case isn't up to the challenge. You can't rebuild a force by cutting out troops - like it or not, we're still a nation at war, and as such, a better approach would be working to give the force we need more rest and longer lull time, rather than reducing numbers and increasing the strain on those who serve.
Here's the rub: While the language of "leaner and more agile" sounds good in principle, what does it really mean? Distinguishing between cutting out fat and cutting out brigades is the important aspect of this. Obama is describing a goal, and perhaps a worthy one, but getting there is the problem. Our experience over the past decade has shown us that small and agile forces work great for the first punch, but they can't do the security or counterinsurgency operations our political leaders have demanded afterwards.
It appears that this move marks the true end of the counter-insurgency approach engineered by General Petraeus. Despite the set-backs in Afghanistan, COIN was hugely successful in Iraq, and is really only just beginning to permeate military doctrine in a meaningful way at the training level. But in this case, it is reduced to the ninth strategy point, and its relegation is obvious. From the accompanying strategy document:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
To my eyes, this looks like a true abandonment of COIN as envisioned by Petraeus. As Vice Chairman Winnefeld wrote recently:
“We are not likely to have as our next fight a counterinsurgency," he said. While America has been teaching its troops Arabic and other regional languages, training them how to win friends and influence people at the village and provincial levels, "the world has changed," Winnefeld said. America's enemies and competitors are "coming up with new asymmetric advantages. They've been studying us closely...," he said. So, "we need to avoid the temptation to look in our rear view mirror.”
And this extends beyond the Army’s thresholds—hence this comment from the Marine Corps Commandant: “I’m pretty confident … that over the next 12 months that we can transition from what you would call classic counterinsurgency operations to ... training and advising.” This sentiment applies not just to the changing mission in Afghanistan, but also to the overarching purpose of the Marine Corps, which is looking to reclaim its individual mission from that of the Army or other services.
The difficulty for the Army is the lack of training capability on either of these fronts—either on the Big Army tactics pre-Petraeus (which have been largely ignored at the training level for some time now) or on the hybrid that is likely to come next. With these latest announcements, it appears likely that General Petraeus's legacy will drift away into the sands.
One last aside: In general, I favor cuts in Defense, but targeted at the tail, not the tooth. The challenge of bringing down the costs of defending the country are increasingly about the cost of post-service entitlements, one that is extremely difficult politically. There's an important distinction to be made here between general entitlements and military benefits earned through service and sacrifice. If such a differentiation can be made, it might make steps such as reform of Tricare (which retains absurdly low copays) more palatable.
Perhaps not. But even so, that's where cuts must be made, along with reassessing weapons systems and bureaucratic bloat. Our goal in funding defense needs to be simple: every dollar spent must be focused on supporting the warfighter as the first priority. How we get there will take real leadership - the hard kind, not the press conference kind.
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Comments:
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
You're absolutely correct about TA. It's even used almost exclusively by Guard and Reserve Soldiers enrolled in college, and they then either transfer their benefit to spouse or child, or use it for post-grad. $$$
I agree that we need to relook our retirement system to a certain extent, and you and I are on the same page re: Cool Toys, but I'm mixed on ending the pension plan. Look at the Army and Marine Corps, which services rest on the backs of enlisted warfighters. How can we ask guys to serve 20 years, put in as much field and deployment time as possible, breaking their bodies along the way, then try to go find a job in the private sector with little to no civilian education and only combat-specific work experience? There has to be a better way, but it's going to be difficult.
Oct '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
The one remaining rationale that actually makes sense is that our European bases provide enormous utility in terms of projecting power and conducting ISR around the globe. This is a complicated subject, but there is operational-level-of-war utility the bases provide which, were we to lose them, would damage our combat potential in significant ways. To get those bases we have to do a certain amount of schmoozing with our allies. You can't just make this a transactional relationship; they aren't hookers. They want to be wined and dined. There has to be a certain amount of emotional commitment. We don't necessarily need the level of presence we have now—but that's getting into minutia. The larger point: we need to be able to flow forces and conduct ISR missions well before the fighting starts and European bases make that possible.
Apr '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
There has to be a better way, but it's going to be difficult. · Jan 6 at 10:41am
I understand your point about retirement. I'm not saying that we do away with pensions entirely or that they are totally off limits until the regular retirement age is reached. All I'm saying is that tons of retirees go on working after their retirement and don't necessarily need their pensions right away to live. Like you said, these are all things that need to be looked at. I saw an article about using the TSP as way to fund everyone's retirement and making certain adjustments to military members that have deployed and so forth.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
I read about that this past summer. There are a couple of things that worry me about the plan, mainly that it's only a matter of time before Congress starts treating the TSP's assets as a "lockbox". I also can't wrap my mind around spending a career as a warrior looking forward to a 401K. That's not a reason to keep the current pension plan for future servicemembers, it's just weird to think of our profession in that light.
Would you be amenable to splitting retirement benefits at 20 years, say 10-25% base pay, then have the servicemember eligible for the remaining 25-40% (adding to 50%) at age 59 1/2? That seems like a good compromise, while retaining the special nature of military retirements.
Apr '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
Would you be amenable to splitting retirement benefits at 20 years, say 10-25% base pay, then have the servicemember eligible for the remaining 25-40% (adding to 50%) at age 59 1/2? That seems like a good compromise, while retaining the special nature of military retirements. · Jan 6 at 2:21pm
Casey, that is a good idea. These are the kind of things I hope our higher ups are looking at. As a matter of fact I think I will get on the horn Monday and let Gen. Dempsey know you and I figured out a solution.
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
One aspect of this deserves more attention than it gets. The officer corps hates counter-insurgency work. They want to re-fight World War II. We learned an immense amount about counter-insurgency in Vietnam, then deliberately turned our back on it. In Iraq, the commanders resisted doing counter-insurgency, and it was only in 2006 -- when Bush had has back to the wall -- that he became willing to turn to outsiders like Petraeus. I am not surprised that the brass is going along with this. What they prefer is what a soldier once described to me as "welfare in uniform."
Dec '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey, ditto on the GI Bill rant. I chose to stay with the old system because I simply don't live close enough to any 4 year institutions to both work and attend school at a brick & morter facility. I chose American Military University because I could get a polisci degree without ever stepping foot in a traditional classroom, the tuition rates were very good, and the books were included in the price of tuition. Enough of my SMART transcript transfered over that I was able to do the few general requirements I had remaining, all of my major classes, and all of my minor classes in the three years I had the GI Bill. The BAH money would have been nice, but the $600 or so I had left each month after tuition sufficed. The Post 9/11 system works really well for young 'uns who did one tour and got out, but those of us who got out mid career (meaning no retirement, and with no VA disability either) with mortgages and complete families could never put life and bills on hold and live off the BAH stipend.
Edited on January 7, 2012 at 1:29amJan '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
I'm not sure I agree with you Professor. The officer corps is not a monolithic entity. The officers with a 'light' background were raised in an environment where COIN (or MOOTW, LIC, or any of the multiple names they have come up with to describe what was seen as unconventional warfare) was a regular part of their planning and training. The 'heavy' side understandably did not spend much time thinking about it. GEN Petraeus was a successful (light) division commander who then moved to the Combined Arms Center, not sure how he was not part of the 'brass.'
As for the post-Vietnam Army, the primary threat on the horizon after the war (and during it) was the Soviets in Europe. The concentration on mechanized warfare was not only understandable but necessary.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Josiah Fast
Casey Taylor
Would you be amenable to splitting retirement benefits at 20 years, say 10-25% base pay, then have the servicemember eligible for the remaining 25-40% (adding to 50%) at age 59 1/2? That seems like a good compromise, while retaining the special nature of military retirements. · Jan 6 at 2:21pm
Casey, that is a good idea. These are the kind of things I hope our higher ups are looking at. As a matter of fact I think I will get on the horn Monday and let Gen. Dempsey know you and I figured out a solution. · Jan 6 at 2:59pm
If Marty gives you any pushback, tell him he still owes me for that deal in Vegas. He'll know what you're talking about.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
The King Prawn: The Post 9/11 system works really well for young 'uns who did one tour and got out, but those of us who got out mid career (meaning no retirement, and with no VA disability either) with mortgages and complete families could never put life and bills on hold and live off the BAH stipend. · Jan 6 at 4:27pm
Edited on Jan 06 at 04:29 pm
That's exactly right, and you prove the point that with a little dedication and a willingness to manage your own affairs, the MGIB 30/31 worked well and saved money. Part of the selling point of the Post-9/11 Bill was that it would save money -- and of course, it's for the troops! How could you not vote for it... unless you hate the troops -- but just like the new health plan, DHS, TSA, etc., the bureaucracy was unleashed and costs have skyrocketed.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
We also learned in the Balkans that air superiority and missile batteries don't mean a whole lot if we don't have men on the ground to observe and secure. That wasn't even 20 years ago, yet somehow GEN Clark's misguided ideology is once again ascendent. We are plagued by O-7s and above who have zero operational experience and who live a life of academic strategy and large-scale wargaming. What happens to a battlefield full of all of our coolest super-tech toys when a farmer with an EMP device sets it off? The guys who live in caves with their AKs win, that's what. That should be our concern.
Jan '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
We also learned in the Balkans that air superiority and missile batteries don't mean a whole lot if we don't have men on the ground to observe and secure. That wasn't even 20 years ago, yet somehow GEN Clark's misguided ideology is once again ascendent. We are plagued by O-7s and above who have zero operational experience and who live a life of academic strategy and large-scale wargaming. What happens to a battlefield full of all of our coolest super-tech toys when a farmer with an EMP device sets it off? The guys who live in caves with their AKs win, that's what. That should be our concern.
Who are these O7's and above without operational experience? I went to the GOMO Active Duty resume page and randomly selected about a dozen or so general officers of all grades and found only one without multiple combat tours from Just Cause, Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The vast majority of the combat arms GO's were Division or BCT commanders or G/S3's in Iraq and Afghanistan and Company Commanders in Panama and the Gulf.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Klaatu
Who are these O7's and above without operational experience? I went to the GOMO Active Duty resume page and randomly selected about a dozen or so general officers of all grades and found only one without multiple combat tours from Just Cause, Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The vast majority of the combat arms GO's were Division or BCT commanders or G/S3's in Iraq and Afghanistan and Company Commanders in Panama and the Gulf. · Jan 6 at 8:10pm
Pardon me, direct action. I'm on GOMO right now working through the names, and out of 32 I've looked at, I've found 5 that have seen combat. Operationally, the rest were all staff, and I have yet to see a battalion commander from OEF/OIF. I've found 2 who were commanders in either Panama or the Gulf.
Edited on January 7, 2012 at 5:51amJan '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
Klaatu
Who are these O7's and above without operational experience? I went to the GOMO Active Duty resume page and randomly selected about a dozen or so general officers of all grades and found only one without multiple combat tours from Just Cause, Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. The vast majority of the combat arms GO's were Division or BCT commanders or G/S3's in Iraq and Afghanistan and Company Commanders in Panama and the Gulf. · Jan 6 at 8:10pm
Pardon me, direct action. I'm on GOMO right now working through the names, and out of 32 I've looked at, I've found 5 that have seen combat. Operationally, the rest were all staff, and I have yet to see a battalion commander from OEF/OIF. I've found 2 who were commanders in either Panama or the Gulf.
Since you for some reason do not consider Division or BCT commanders or operations officer duty as operational experience, I limited my search to BG's and COL(P)'s and 9/10 maneuver branch officers had BN or Co command combat experience, many had both.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
I did correct myself above to say direct action, which is a lot narrower and closer to my intent. So why would you limit your search to O-6 and O-7? There's three grades past O-7, and that's where the bulk of our strategic planning comes from and where our doctrine is written. I realize that my initial statement was overly broad, but the point remains that the men making decisions on the future of our force, even if they have a modicum of relevant experience as much younger Soldiers, also have very short memories.
What did we learn in the three months leading up to the 14 days we fought in Panama? Quite a lot about the need for MOUT training... promptly forgotten by 1992. We started to relearn it in 2003 using FMs from the 1980s and a whole lot of help from civilian law enforcement. We learned the need for mental preparation for combat and dealing with casualties, something we didn't start to do seriously again until 2004. Body armor, combat loads, combatant to peacekeeper transition... sound familiar? We're still making the same mistakes in all three areas.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
I have hope for the next crop of general officers coming out of the last ten years of war, but they just aren't there yet in any numbers. Careerism and risk-aversion are still the norm.
We had serious logistical concerns in the 100-hour war in 1991, yet our only fix for that has been to let KBR take care of it and hope they don't charge us too much. How about HUMINT? We're not even recovered from the decimation we faced there in the 90s, and I tell you from experience that many to most commanders are much more likely to rely on the easy intelligence gathering via RAVEN, SHADOW, etc., instead of HUMINT gatherers because -- risk-aversion -- the tech is easy, available, low-risk. The problem is that we kill a whole lot of civilians by over-reliance on intelligence gathering other than HUMINT (particularly drones), and commanders in country for 10 months don't see the cumulative, negative effect this has on the populace. This is, again, a lesson we should have learned from Vietnam, is in the literature coming from Panama and the Balkans, and even Iraq. What about the future?
Jan '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
I did correct myself above to say direct action, which is a lot narrower and closer to my intent. So why would you limit your search to O-6 and O-7?
I limited myself to O6-O7 because those are the grades one would expect an officer who had seen direct action (as you define it) to have achieved today. A CO commander in in Panama or the Gulf would have been in line for a BN command at the start of Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Those at the higher GO grades would have been past those points in their career at those times.
I also disagree with your assessment of what we may have forgotten regarding the lessons from Panama. The light units I was in continued to focus on MOUT training, in fact we did quite a bit of it prior to Panama as well.
The bigger problems we face will generally be those that necessarily require the larger number of assumptions going into planning. Experience can mitigate those problems but that's about it. The problems we planned for in the transition out of combat operations were simply not those we faced.
Jan '11
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Casey Taylor
I have hope for the next crop of general officers coming out of the last ten years of war, but they just aren't there yet in any numbers. Careerism and risk-aversion are still the norm.
How about HUMINT? ...
From my experience the problem maneuver commanders have with HUMINT is they do not believe it is timely. They want the best information they can get when they need it, not necessarily the best information that may be available at some future date. Is that a fair assessment? Probably not but that is the perception that exists. They know that if they deploy a Shadow they will get information that they can use, if they deploy a HUMINT team they may or may not. Granted, the infor from the HUMINT team will generally be of much higher quality but when push comes to shove the 80% now is better than the 100% latter. I say this as an old SIGINT guy who watched tactical SIGINT fall to the side as UAS IMINT systems became dominant.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
That's just it, though; those COL (P)s and young BGs aren't the ones who've been signing off on training and doctrinal changes (or resisting those changes) for the last forever, they're the ones who will hopefully be implementing the hard lessons we've learned the last 10 years. Again, though, they're just not there yet. I've seen the results of lowered physical fitness standards and improper prioritization of OSUT training every quarter for the last several years when I received new Soldiers into my company. You would be amazed at how out of shape and ignorant of basic 11B skills many young men are coming from Benning. I've spoken with several DSs from my state, both multiple-tour vets, and they're major complaint is that TRADOC is unresponsive, inflexible, and out of touch with what is required on any battlefield, much less the ones we currently face.
Jun '10
Re: Defense Cutbacks and the Death of COIN
Regarding MOUT amnesia, I saw the effect of that firsthand. I can't speak to the rest of the combat arms -- I was mechanized infantry going into OIF 1 -- but we didn't receive any MOUT training in OSUT, none at Ft. Irwin, and none in Kuwait during invasion prep. It wasn't even on the radar at Ft. Riley (my duty station at the time) until the train-up for the next deployment for OIF 2.5.
I understand that it's impossible, and probably not even wise, to try to plan for every contingency. But there are certain basic hings that we should expect going into every conflict, and it seems like we, organizationally, forget those things every ten years or so.
Edited on January 9, 2012 at 2:07am