Death?
From the New York Times:
The defendant, Steven J. Hayes, sat motionless at the defense table as a court clerk read, again and again, the jurors’ findings that Mr. Hayes should die for joining in the July 2007 home invasion that led to a night and morning of unimaginable terrors, of sexual abuse, baseball-bat beatings and flames, in the bucolic suburban town. Only one person has been executed in the state since 1960.
The crime was savage--beyond savage; evil--and Hayes's guilt was never in doubt.
Has the jury done right? I'd be particularly interested to learn what my friends Richard Epstein, John Yoo and Bill McGurn have to say. Legal scholars, Richard and John will have given a lot of thought to Supreme Court cases on the death penalty over the years, as also to the practical aspects of the penalty. (Hayes's appeals will take years, costing Connecticut taxpayers millions.) Bill McGurn? He's a learned Catholic, no doubt aware that Bishop William Lori, in whose diocese (if I'm not mistaken about the boundaries) the murder took place, represents one of the Church's--and the nation's--leading advocates for abolishing the death penalty outright.
Richard? John? Bill?
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Comments:
May '10
Re: Death?
For the record, I haven't quite said I oppose the death penalty. I have said EV gave me pause. It still does. The more I study JP II, the more I am impressed by his depth and stature as an original thinker. I think the Church (never mind the wider world) has hardly begun to grasp and absorb his legacy.
I'm an admirer of Justice Scalia. And I do not want to dispute his position as to the non-binding authority of an encyclical. My argument was not from authority. I'm not (here) concerned so much with the Catholic teaching as with the moral case.
Jul '10
Re: Death?
Excuse Me, but I just want to state that this has been the most remarkable discussion Here yet.
Truly fascinating.
May '10
Re: Death?
katievs,
I apologize if I came across as a prig. Late night commenting isn't the best idea apparently. However, I wasn't making an argument from authority (although, you are right. Argument from authority is the weakest, so says Boetheus). On the issue of the Kantian axiom, it's a question of how to interpret its use. JP II doesn't actually adopt it as Kant lays it out. Rather he adopts a modified version of it which does not contradict Aquinas. The idea that we should treat people as ends in themselves is only partially true. It requires a clarification as to what kind of end they are: an absolute end simpliciter or a end secundum quid. To treat others as ends simpliciter means that the common good is placed below the individual good. I do not want to make the individual higher than the common good, which includes that individual's good. Perhaps you disagree.
As far as dismissing Aquinas out of hand, I did not find your argument against Aquinas substantial (no offense intended). To deny the place of the individual within the state strikes me as leading to an extreme libertarianism.
May '10
Re: Death?
John, you are kind.
Now, to the substance:
I explicitly endorsed Kant's axiom as interpreted by Wojtyla/JP II, which does, however, by my lights, invalidate Aquinas' argument (as quoted by you) that the person is related to the community as an organ to the body.
Let's make it concrete. (I'll follow my former prof. John Crosby here.)
A solution is proposed to end religious violence: For the common good, all persons of a given region will take the religion of the prince. Suppose my prince is Protestant. Should I be forced to foreswear my Faith because the common good is above the individual good?
Or: An interracial crime has been committed. Let's say a white rapist of a black girl. Mobs are threatening to destroy the city. Should the chief of police frame a local bum they know to be innocent to appease the crowds and stop the violence? If the bum protests that he's innocent, could they not reply: "It's better for one innocent man to die than for the whole city to go up in flames?"
May '10
Re: Death?
"As far as dismissing Aquinas out of hand, I did not find your argument against Aquinas substantial (no offense intended). [None taken.] To deny the place of the individual within the state strikes me as leading to an extreme libertarianism."
Where did you find me denying the place of the individual within the state? I claimed only that he is not reducible to his part in the state. The person is metaphysically prior to the state and (unlike a limb or organ of a body) has dignity and value and rights that the state must respect.
Edited on November 11, 2010 at 3:57amSep '10
Re: Death?
katievs: John, you are kind.
Now, to the substance:
Let's make it concrete. (I'll follow my former prof. John Crosby here.)
A solution is proposed to end religious violence: For the common good, all persons of a given region will take the religion of the prince. Suppose my prince is Protestant. Should I be forced to foreswear my Faith because the common good is above the individual good?
· Nov 10 at 6:43pm
katievs,
I wonder aloud (my texts are packed away because of a home renovation) whether, in the example you've cited, your definition of the common good and individual good excludes the insightful work that Yves Simon did earlier in the 20th century on Thomistic political philosophy?
Sep '10
Re: Death?
Sorry I should have included this link to a 50 page summary of Yves Simon's contribution to political theory.
Re: Death?
As I understand the matter, Pseudodi, encyclicals are not in themselves binding. They might--indeed, they always do--repeat or reflect upon binding pronouncements. Perhaps 80 percent of Evangelium Vitae, for example, represents an extended meditation on the wrong of abortion, and abortion has, of course, been condemned since the Didache. But the section on the death penalty--section 56, if I recall correctly--represents something entirely new, a departure, a fresh or original consideration. It does not, in other words, repeat a binding teaching--and therefore has a claim only to our consideration, and not (at least not necessarily) to our assent.
Sep '10
Re: Death?
Peter - agreed, I just wanted to be clear that you weren't using the argument that many Catholics who reject Humanae Vitae use to dismiss the entire encyclical without even reading it. Clearly, you're not doing that, but I'm continually surprised by the number of Catholics who can froth over Humane Vitae or the "spirit" of Vatican II, but can't parse the document, nor understand that parts of these documents require varying levels of assent.
May '10
Re: Death?
Well, dear Pseud, being completely unacquainted with his name, never mind his work, I couldn't say.
Let me stress again that my argument is against the reduction of persons to a mere part within the greater whole of the state.
I am not a libertarian; I oppose radical individualism.
I hold with Wojtyla (and the Church) that the person has a communitarian dimension. We are not radically self-standing. We owe our existence to others; we are indebted and responsible to others in various ways....
May '10
Re: Death?
Posted without having read in between comments. Sorry.
Sep '10
Re: Death?
Hey - no problem. As a former Communio wannabe (the journal that is) who gradually drifted toward a more traditional Thomism, I think that the one area that North American thomistic philosophers have an edge over their European counterparts is in the in area of political philosophy. So, I understand your concerns but think that transplanted thinkers such as Yves Simon sought to wrestle with the Enlightenment tensions buried in the US founding documents to address some of those issues that JPII/Wotylja raised.
As well, there is a difference among Thomists of various stripes on obediential potency and the ranking (or perhaps more precisely ordering) of goods that bears directly on the discussion.
I should note that I'm right now merely throwing out lines for further exploration rather than trying to hammer out a definitive analysis much less a synthesis that would be acceptable to everyone.
Aug '10
Re: Death?
Katie, there is nothing I've said in my argument that does not hold in a natural rights/law context or a social contract framework. A murderer, by his actions, breaches the social contract not to murder, thereby calling onto himself the penalty for breaching the contract. But ultimately, your reasoning is somewhat circular because the "Laws of Nature" are "of Nature's God."
May '10
Re: Death?
I don't have a problem with the death penalty provided that it is unequivocally clear that we have the right verdict. However, I also would not have a problem with life in solitary confinement with photos of the victims posted high on the walls of the cell so that the perp can be continuously reminded of why s/he is there. I sort of like Tommy's trade regarding abortion.
The problem, of course, is that the ultra-civil libertarians keep pushing for life imprisonment to be something less than that, or define such punishment as described above as being "cruel".
Edited on November 12, 2010 at 6:25pmOct '10
Re: Death?
I must admit to not having followed all the comments, so forgive me if this territory has already been covered.
On the question of the meaning of the section of EV on the death penalty, I too have struggled with the degree to which it is binding, but moreso to understand the basis for it. After all, if it is rooted in the facts and circumstances of today, then by its nature it is a heavily prudential-oriented judgement (or at least, if a binding one, one that is focused on a very specific set of circumstances, such circumstances not clearly spelled out).
Oct '10
Re: Death?
The best I can come up with, though, is the question of whether the general deterrent theory of punishment ("I punish you to deter others from doing the same thing") is being objected to by the pope. JP II often is quoted as saying that persons are not objects but subjects, and as such persons are never to be treated as a means to an end. I think it could be argued that the imposition of the death penalty, if done for a reason other than the safety of others from the actions of the one to be executed, would constitute treating the individual as a means to an end. I rarely hear as a reason for the death penalty that there is no other basis to keep people safe from the criminal. In fact, I typically hear (at best) a general deterrent theory. I say at best, because some certainly make a retribution argument, but the line between that and seeking vengeance is very blurry and I would be leery of assuming society can safely walk that line.
Oct '10
Re: Death?
Worth expanding on this. In thinking about the death penalty, a subject rife with moral questions, it's worth asking whether the law should reflect some concern about protecting society from temptations to the immoral. In other words, as much as I understand the focus on whether the death penalty could be applied morally and trying to preserve the option for it in the law on the premise that it might be needed, I think it's also worth considering whether society is practically capable of applying the death penalty morally. As much as I'm willing to defend the theoretical possibility of moral application of the death penalty, there would be nothing more sad to me than to see the death penalty maintained in law because of a defense of it in the abstract yet watch a society apply it immorally.