Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Walter Russel Mead, usually one of the web's best and sharpest reads, makes a few important missteps on China in the Wall Street Journal (and RealClearWorld). It's easy to see understand the appeal of hinging one's view of how to 'deal with China' on a few big analogies to European history. But the history has to be right. Mead's vision of America's China strategy -- a "realistic, humane, forward-looking, and enlightened" path to a true Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere -- is so alluring, and the alternatives so nettlesome, that he bends history to make it appear more like the outworking of reason than the revisionist fantasy it is.
The vision is simple, venerable, and liberal enough: encouraging "Asian powers to get rich by participating in the most open trading system in the history of the world. In exchange for commitments to abide by that system's rules, countries such as India, Vietnam, Indonesia and China would have the opportunity to industrialize and to help shape the future of the global economy."
Why power the prosperity of potential rivals? Easy, says Mead:
countries busy getting rich are unlikely to seek to overturn an international system that facilitates their prosperity. This was the case with both Germany and Japan after World War II, and the U.S. hopes the same will be true for India and China. [...]
[A]s countries deepen their participation in the global system, they become increasingly dependent on it. Hitler and Tojo learned the hard way what it meant to fight major wars without secure access to the resources and capital required.
No, you are not alone if you found yourself wondering how to analogize the utterly broken and conquered regimes of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan to China -- a vast land with a billion souls, a huge and growing army, and a degree of wealth unlike any in its history. There's already an international system in place that facilitates China's prosperity, and China is one of its indispensable pieces. The Middle Kingdom of 2012 is less like Germany's Federal Republic of 1949 than its Second Reich of 1912.
More on that in a moment. First, recall that it was the Western Allies who learned the hard way what it meant to fight major wars to prevent access to the resources Hitler and Tojo required for hegemony. A war over lebensraum and Indonesian oil might not have been worth it for twentieth-century Germany or Japan, but "War: It's Not Worth It" does not a strategy make when coming to grips with twenty-first-century China.
And Mead knows this, judging by his swift analytical pivot to America's military and political moves in the Pacific. The counterbalancing push "poses a strategic dilemma for Beijing. If it doesn't push back, the new U.S.-centered Asian system will continue to develop. But if it tries to block the system, it may frighten its neighbors into an even closer American embrace." Yet Mead declines to countenance the possibility of a third alternative -- or the degree to which China might be apt to choose it.
Why wouldn't the very strategy designed to make China play by American rules in an American lake provoke the Chinese to adopt a more belligerent strategy in return? Because, Mead reassures us, China's Asian situation contrasts so sharply with the Second Reich's in Europe:
the U.S. faces something different in Asia than the "inexorable rise of China" described by so many analysts. Consider a historical analogy. Germany in 1910 was a single rising power in a neighborhood of decline populated by France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. That was an inherently unstable balance of power. In Asia today, China is not a single rising power in a continent of decline.
Evidently the British Empire, a global colossus and economic giant upon which the sun never set, never got the memo that turn-of-the-century Europe was a neighborhood of decline. The French Empire, whipped like a dog in 1870 by a semi-modern Prussian army, withstood from 1914 to 1918 a fully industrialized Wehrmacht drawing from the full force of a unified Germany. Russia's apparent decline, product of a bloody civil war and the grisly consolidation of communist power, did little to detain the Soviets from unprecedented power by 1945. The weakest major powers in Europe were Germany's allies. The Austrians and the Ottomans extended the Kaiser's power from Berlin to Baghdad. Europe wasn't a continent in decline. We can be forgiven that it seems that way, given Germany's extraordinary power and strength, but in a few seconds we should be able to blink away that misleading impression.
In 1913, the economic interdependence of Europe and the world was at historic highs. That auspicious state of affairs did nothing to prevent the intercontinental conflagration triggered and exacerbated by the West's inescapable maze of interlocked and opposed alliance systems. Every piece and every place on the board, so to speak, was in play. Millions died and empires crumbled because of some difficulty in Serbia.
No nation deserves to be annexed to a nasty neighbor, but Mead's sunny attitude toward America's China strategy can lead us alarmingly astray if we take his version of European history as a guide. It would be one thing if China were more isolated than Germany. (Then we'd have to worry about a dynamic like the one that set off the Pacific half of the Second World War, not the one that gave us two German-made catastrophes.)
But just as Germany had Austria-Hungary, so too does China have a weaker, over-militarized, dynastically unstable ally with an axe to grind: North Korea. America's political and military chess game in the Pacific, carefully calibrated and flawlessly executed though it may be, is a doomed exercise if directed against China alone. China and North Korea are interlocking parts to this puzzle, and we account for one to the exclusion of the other at tremendous peril.
That's why I devoted one of my 2012 predictions to a counter-intuitive scenario involving the precipitous surprise realignment of North Korea's military away from China. It's not a likely development, but it's not outlandish, either; and if events can swing that far in that direction, imagine how far they can swing in the other: toward a North Korean crisis that animates China in yet another way more analogous to Guns-of-August Germany than Mead might dare to imagine.
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Comments:
Jul '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
I think China seems content with slowly spreading its influence for now. Its Navy is ramshackle, so will sit tight as America recedes from global hegemony. But maybe in another decade, we will see China's navy in the Middle East much larger and better armed. Also, as it deals with a demographic disaster of listless surplus men and no women, and with the threat of domestic uprising, China will look for a way to send its millions of men abroad. And that will not be a good day.
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Elegantly argued, James.
Nov '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
I don't trust historical analysis much, but such trends without historical precedent worry me a lot.
Another worrisome trend without precedent is the shrinking population of Russia which still has the power to destroy the world several times over. Educated Russians are emigrating, leaving a population of unhappy peasant-stock who would just as soon kill their neighbor's cow as aspire to their own cow.
Edited on January 1, 2012 at 3:10amJul '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Evidently the British Empire, a global colossus and economic giant upon which the sun never set, never got the memo that turn-of-the-century Europe was a neighborhood of decline. The French Empire, whipped like a dog in 1870 by a semi-modern Prussian army, withstood from 1914 to 1918 a fully industrialized Wehrmacht drawing from the full force of a unified Germany. Russia's apparent decline, product of a bloody civil war and the grisly consolidation of communist power, did little to detain the Soviets from unprecedented power by 1945.
Good points all, James. But is the issue the state of European powers in the early 20th century, or Kaiser & Co.'s perception of it at the time?
It seems to me that a U.S. engaged with India and Japan can make it clear to China that its easier route to prosperity is trade, not conquest.
That's really the point isn't it? It's one thing to naively claim that interdependence necessarily leads to harmony, it's quite another to note that war mongers are less likely to prosper if there are other, less risky, routes to wealth.
Feb '11
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Ah , my post repeated what had been said in the original post. So, erase.
Edited on January 1, 2012 at 4:04amMay '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Byron, why were there no disasters when Korea faced the same demographic issue? And, the Chinese boy-girl numbers aren't quite that threatening- the "one child" policy isn't enforced the same way outside the coastal cities.
And I have a different view of this than James does. 1) Germany has been an essentially land-locked country, since Bismarck, with the inability to feed itself, and a long history of externally-directed militarism. 2) Japan is an island-locked country that has a long history of striking out beyond its borders to make war against Korea, China, Russia, you name them.
Someone show me a similar external military tendency- large army or not- on the part of the Han Chinese. That army is the most coveted job in the country- by mothers for their sons- because they know that the boys aren't deployed overseas and it's a secure paycheck. Overseas military adventurism just isn't in the historic culture.
Jul '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Duane Oyen
Someone show me a similar external military tendency- large army or not- on the part of the Han Chinese. That army is the most coveted job in the country- by mothers for their sons- because they know that the boys aren't deployed overseas and it's a secure paycheck. Overseas military adventurism just isn't in the historic culture.
When you occupy a huge chunk of easternmost Asia (a teeny bit bigger than the US) as the most populous nation in the world, "overseas" isn't the first concern. Historically, millennia of bloody wars to resolve the question of which of the several historical ethnicities, if any, would achieve control of the "natural" Chinese boundaries every generation or three does not equal a lack of military ambition.
The hegemony that China enjoyed over nearby states was maintained by threats and occasional harsh actions. The exchanged gifts that served as official trade activity favored the Chinese and were in many ways similar to Roman tribute requirements. Lacking Rome's drive to administrate the world did not keep China from arranging the neighborhood to suit itself.
In more applicable history, since the advent of Maoist control, there have been adventures in Tibet (invaded 1950-51), Korea (anybody remember Inchon?), India in 1962 and 1967, Vietnam in 1979, 1986, and 1988, and barely covert infiltration of the Panama Canal (a 50 year lease to operate the end ports by Panama to a Chinese company) and Pier J in Long Beach, California, (a 146 acre complex once known as the Long Beach Naval Air Station operated on US soil by COSCO, joined at the hip with the Chinese People's Liberation Army, in close proximity to critical US naval assets and major civilian targets). And don't mention the aircraft carrier they've built from a once Soviet hull dating back to the days when the Soviets aspired to super-power status.
And, of course, the China that longs only for the comfort of her rich river valleys is undertaking space missions comparable to America's Gemini program - in a bid to sip fruity adult beverages on the beaches of the Sea of Tranquility and operate vacation dreamlands, no doubt.
Edited on January 1, 2012 at 10:57amFeb '11
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Talk about bad historical analogies. North Korea as Austria-Hungary? Are you kidding? A pipsqueak versus an albeit aged eagle? No, the thing to worry about is a Chinese-Russian-Pakistani-Iranian alliance, something that would be easily obtainable.
Dec '11
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Over the last several years, computer hackers linked to the Chinese government have breached several high-stakes networks in the US, including Google, satellite control networks and the US Chamber of Commerce.
Claire Berlinski wrote about the Chinese naval buildup just a few weeks ago.
We really cannot hope that the Chinese are going to passively wait for things to develop while their economy slides into recession over the next 18 months. That's delusional.
May '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Sisyphus, 1) Mao isn't there; 2) he is openly disparaged- e.g., the cab driver who said "Mao, of course, was a psychopath....", not to mention the mocking "Cultural Revolution Restaurant", and 3) there is a difference between border disputes and overseas adventurism.
I repeat what I said about the PLA. I am not the concerned about an army that drills with wooden guns.
What have you seen in your visits to China? Or Korea? Or Vietnam?
Nov '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Duane Oyen:
I repeat what I said about the PLA. I am not the concerned about an army that drills with wooden guns.
The United States Army drilled with wooden guns in 1917 and, again, in 1940-1942.
I doubt that we now have the industrial capacity to duplicate the efforts of the years immediately following those; the Chinese do.
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Thanks, Paul, and thanks all for pursuing these important threads. I don't expect China to start things off with big or sensational projections of power overseas. The South China Sea, on the other hand? It's the US that's projected its power about as close to China as possible. It would be a puzzle if China didn't respond to that.
Trade is an easier path to economic prosperity than conquest (writing against Napoleon, Benjamin Constant argued it had become the only possible path). But we presume too much if we think of economic prosperity as alone adequate to fulfill human longings and political schemes -- in America, China, or anywhere else.
May '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
M1919A4
Duane Oyen:
I repeat what I said about the PLA. I am not the concerned about an army that drills with wooden guns.
The United States Army drilled with wooden guns in 1917 and, again, in 1940-1942.
I doubt that we now have the industrial capacity to duplicate the efforts of the years immediately following those; the Chinese do. · Jan 1 at 7:12pm
M1910A4, surely you realize that industrial capacity is not the reason that the PLA deploys with wooden rifles. Or spends their duty hours playing soccer in the park.
Nov '10
Re: Bad History, Worse Analogies: Fumbling Toward a China Strategy
Why DO they drill with wooden guns. I am unaware that they do or why they would.